Communication Through Removable Media
|Communication Through Removable Media|
|Tactic||Command and Control|
|Platform||Linux, macOS, Windows|
|Data Sources||File monitoring, Data loss prevention|
Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.
- APT28 uses a tool that captures information from air-gapped computers via an infected USB and transfers it to network-connected computer when the USB is inserted.1
- Part of APT28's operation involved using CHOPSTICK modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines, using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.231
- USBStealer drops commands for a second victim onto a removable media drive inserted into the first victim, and commands are executed when the drive is inserted into the second victim.4
Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.
- Anthe, C. et al. (2015, October 19). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 19. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
- FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.
- ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.
- Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017.
- Microsoft. (n.d.). How to disable the Autorun functionality in Windows. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
- Microsoft. (2007, August 31). https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771759(v=ws.10).aspx. Retrieved April 20, 2016.