Input Capture

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Input Capture
Technique
ID T1056
Tactic Collection, Credential Access
Platform Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X
Permissions Required Administrator, SYSTEM
Data Sources Windows Registry, Kernel drivers, Process monitoring, API monitoring
CAPEC ID CAPEC-569
Contributors John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center

Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for Valid Accounts and information Collection that include keylogging and user input field interception.

Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes,1 but other methods exist to target information for specific purposes, such as performing a UAC prompt or wrapping the Windows default credential provider.2

Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.

Adversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Valid Accounts or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.3

Examples

  • APT28 can deploy a tool to perform keylogging.4
  • APT3 has used a keylogging tool that records keystrokes in encrypted files.5
  • Darkhotel uses a sophisticated keylogger.6
  • Malware used by Group5 is capable of capturing keystrokes.7
  • Lazarus Group malware KiloAlfa contains keylogging functionality.8
  • Threat Group-3390 actors installed a credential logger on Microsoft Exchange servers.9
  • ADVSTORESHELL can perform keylogging.1011
  • When it first starts, BADNEWS spawns a new thread to log keystrokes.12
  • BlackEnergy has run a keylogger plug-in on a victim.13
  • CHOPSTICK is capable of performing keylogging.1410
  • Carbanak contains keylogger functionality.15
  • Cobalt Strike can track key presses with a keylogger module.16
  • CosmicDuke uses a keylogger and steals clipboard contents from victims.17
  • Duqu can track key presses with a keylogger module.18
  • DustySky contains a keylogger.19
  • EvilGrab has the capability to capture keystrokes.20
  • FakeM contains a keylogger module.21
  • HTTPBrowser is capable of capturing keystrokes on victims.9
  • Kasidet has the ability to initiate keylogging.22
  • MoonWind has a keylogger.23
  • NetTraveler contains a keylogger.24
  • OwaAuth captures and DES-encrypts credentials before writing the username and password to a log file, C:\log.txt.9
  • PoisonIvy contains a keylogger.25
  • Prikormka contains a keylogger module that collects keystrokes and the titles of foreground windows.26
  • RTM can record keystrokes from both the keyboard and virtual keyboard.27
  • Regin contains a keylogger.28
  • Remsec contains a keylogger component.2930
  • Rover has keylogging functionality.31
  • SslMM creates a new thread implementing a keylogging facility using Windows Keyboard Accelerators.32
  • Sykipot contains keylogging functionality to steal passwords.33
  • TinyZBot contains keylogger functionality.34
  • Unknown Logger is capable of recording keystrokes.12
  • XAgentOSX contains keylogging functionality that will monitor for active application windows and write them to the log, it can handle special characters, and it will buffer by default 50 characters before sending them out over the C2 infrastructure35.
  • The gh0st RAT has a keylogger.36

Mitigation

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting37 tools, like AppLocker,3839 or Software Restriction Policies40 where appropriate.41

In cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of Valid Accounts.

Detection

Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include SetWindowsHook, GetKeyState, and GetAsynceyState.1 Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes and detect driver installs, as well as looking for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.

Monitor the Registry for the addition of a Custom Credential Provider.2 Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used.

References

  1. a b  Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.
  2. a b  Wrightson, T. (2012, January 2). CAPTURING WINDOWS 7 CREDENTIALS AT LOGON USING CUSTOM CREDENTIAL PROVIDER. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  3. ^  Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.
  4. ^  Anthe, C. et al. (2015, October 19). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 19. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
  5. ^  Symantec Security Response. (2016, September 6). Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
  6. ^  Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  7. ^  Scott-Railton, J., et al. (2016, August 2). Group5: Syria and the Iranian Connection. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
  8. ^  Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Tools Report. Retrieved March 10, 2016.
  9. a b c  Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved January 25, 2016.
  10. a b  ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.
  11. ^  Bitdefender. (2015, December). APT28 Under the Scope. Retrieved February 23, 2017.
  12. a b  Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.
  13. ^  Baumgartner, K. and Garnaeva, M.. (2014, November 3). BE2 custom plugins, router abuse, and target profiles. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
  14. ^  Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
  15. ^  Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved March 3, 2015.
  16. ^  Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
  17. ^  F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
  18. ^  Symantec Security Response. (2011, November). W32.Duqu: The precursor to the next Stuxnet. Retrieved September 17, 2015.
  19. ^  ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.
  20. ^  PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.
  21. ^  Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2016, January 24). Scarlet Mimic: Years-Long Espionage Campaign Targets Minority Activists. Retrieved February 10, 2016.
  1. ^  Yadav, A., et al. (2016, January 29). Malicious Office files dropping Kasidet and Dridex. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
  2. ^  Miller-Osborn, J. and Grunzweig, J.. (2017, March 30). Trochilus and New MoonWind RATs Used In Attack Against Thai Organizations. Retrieved March 30, 2017.
  3. ^  Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (n.d.). The NetTraveler (aka ‘Travnet’). Retrieved November 12, 2014.
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