New Service

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New Service
Technique
ID T1050
Tactic Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Platform Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10
Permissions Required Administrator, SYSTEM
Effective Permissions SYSTEM
Data Sources Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
CAPEC ID CAPEC-550

When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.1 A service's configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Adversaries may install a new service that can be configured to execute at startup by using utilities to interact with services or by directly modifying the Registry. The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software with Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.

Examples

  • Carbanak malware installs itself as a service to provide persistence and SYSTEM privileges.2
  • Several Lazarus Group malware families install themselves as new services on victims.3
  • One variant of BlackEnergy creates a new service using either a hard-coded or randomly generated name.4
  • CosmicDuke uses Windows services typically named "javamtsup" for persistence.5
  • One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to register itself as a Windows service.6
  • Duqu creates a new service that loads a malicious driver when the system starts. When Duqu is active, the operating system believes that the driver is legitimate, as it has been signed with a valid private key.7
  • Elise configures itself as a service.8
  • Emissary is capable of configuring itself as a service.9
  • JHUHUGIT has registered itself as a service to establish persistence.10
  • MoonWind installs itself as a new service with automatic startup to establish persistence. The service checks every 60 seconds to determine if the malware is running; if not, it will spawn a new instance.11
  • Nidiran can create a new service named msamger (Microsoft Security Accounts Manager).12
  • PlugX can be added as a service to establish persistence.131415
  • Some Sakula samples install themselves as services for persistence by calling WinExec with the net start argument.16
  • Shamoon creates a new service named “ntssrv” to execute the payload.17
  • StreamEx establishes persistence by installing a new service pointing to its DLL and setting the service to auto-start.18
  • TinyZBot can install as a Windows service for persistence.19
  • Winnti sets its DLL file as a new service in the Registry to establish persistence.20
  • ZLib creates Registry keys to allow itself to run as various services.21
  • hcdLoader installs itself as a service for persistence.2223

Mitigation

Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create new services.

Identify and block unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to create services by using whitelisting24 tools, like AppLocker,2526 or Software Restriction Policies27 where appropriate.28

Detection

Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.

Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence.29 Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.

Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.

References

  1. ^  Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.
  2. ^  Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved March 3, 2015.
  3. ^  Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Destructive Malware Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.
  4. ^  F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
  5. ^  F-Secure Labs. (2014, July). COSMICDUKE Cosmu with a twist of MiniDuke. Retrieved July 3, 2014.
  6. ^  F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
  7. ^  Symantec Security Response. (2011, November). W32.Duqu: The precursor to the next Stuxnet. Retrieved September 17, 2015.
  8. ^  Falcone, R., et al.. (2015, June 16). Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
  9. ^  Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2016, February 3). Emissary Trojan Changelog: Did Operation Lotus Blossom Cause It to Evolve?. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
  10. ^  ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 1: Approaching the Target. Retrieved November 8, 2016.
  11. ^  Miller-Osborn, J. and Grunzweig, J.. (2017, March 30). Trochilus and New MoonWind RATs Used In Attack Against Thai Organizations. Retrieved March 30, 2017.
  12. ^  Sponchioni, R.. (2016, March 11). Backdoor.Nidiran. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
  13. ^  Vasilenko, R. (2013, December 17). An Analysis of PlugX Malware. Retrieved November 24, 2015.
  14. ^  PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.
  15. ^  FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.
  1. ^  Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.
  2. ^  Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
  3. ^  Cylance SPEAR Team. (2017, February 9). Shell Crew Variants Continue to Fly Under Big AV’s Radar. Retrieved February 15, 2017.
  4. ^  Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.
  5. ^  Cap, P., et al. (2017, January 25). Detecting threat actors in recent German industrial attacks with Windows Defender ATP. Retrieved February 8, 2017.
  6. ^  Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017.
  7. ^  Carvey, H.. (2014, September 2). Where you AT?: Indicators of lateral movement using at.exe on Windows 7 systems. Retrieved January 25, 2016.
  8. ^  Shelmire, A.. (2015, July 6). Evasive Maneuvers. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
  9. ^  Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  10. ^  Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
  11. ^  NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
  12. ^  Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  13. ^  Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
  14. ^  Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.