Local Network Configuration Discovery

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Local Network Configuration Discovery
Technique
ID T1016
Tactic Discovery
Platform Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1
Permissions Required User
Data Sources Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
CAPEC ID CAPEC-309

Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.

Examples

  • Ke3chang performs local network configuration discovery using ipconfig /all.1
  • Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover network configuration details using the arp -a, nbtstat -n, and net config commands.2
  • admin@338 actors used the following command after exploiting a machine with LOWBALL malware to acquire information about local networks: ipconfig /all >> %temp%\download3
  • Naikon uses commands such as netsh interface show to discover network interface settings.4
  • A keylogging tool used by APT3 gathers network information from the victim, including the MAC address, IP address, WINS, DHCP server, and gateway.5
  • Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server information about the first network interface card’s configuration, including IP address, gateways, subnet mask, DHCP information, and whether WINS is available.6
  • Stealth Falcon malware gathers the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) table from the victim.7
  • Sykipot may use ipconfig /all to gather system network configuration details.8
  • The reconnaissance modules used with Duqu can collect information on network configuration.9
  • GeminiDuke collects information on network settings and Internet proxy settings from the victim.10
  • Sys10 collects the local IP address of the victim and sends it to the C2.4
  • Elise executes ipconfig /all after initial communication is made to the remote server.11
  • Emissary has the capability to execute the command ipconfig /all.12
  • Mis-Type may create a file containing the results of the command cmd.exe /c ipconfig /all.13
  • BlackEnergy has gathered information about network IP configurations using ipconfig.exe and about routing tables using route.exe.1415
  • Agent.btz collects the network adapter’s IP and MAC address as well as IP addresses of the network adapter’s default gateway, primary/secondary WINS, DHCP, and DNS servers, and saves them into a log file.16
  • T9000 gathers and beacons the MAC and IP addresses during installation.17
  • Arp can be used to display ARP configuration information on the host.
  • ipconfig can be used to display adapter configuration on Windows systems, including information for TCP/IP, DNS, and DHCP.
  • ifconfig can be used to display adapter configuration on Unix systems, including information for TCP/IP, DNS, and DHCP.
  • nbtstat can be used to discover local NetBIOS domain names.
  • route can be used to discover routing configuration information.
  • A module in Prikormka collects information from the victim about its IP addresses and MAC addresses.18
  • Crimson contains a command to collect the victim MAC address and LAN IP.19
  • Pisloader has a command to collect the victim's IP address.20
  • Remsec can obtain information about network configuration, including the routing table, ARP cache, and DNS cache.21
  • Unknown Logger can obtain information about the victim's IP address.22
  • PowerDuke has a command to get the victim's domain and NetBIOS name.23
  • Shamoon obtains the target's IP address and local network segment.24

Mitigation

Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about a system's network configuration, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting25 tools, like AppLocker,2627 or Software Restriction Policies28 where appropriate.29

Detection

System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.

References

  1. ^  Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  2. ^  Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014.
  3. ^  FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, December 1). China-based Cyber Threat Group Uses Dropbox for Malware Communications and Targets Hong Kong Media Outlets. Retrieved December 4, 2015.
  4. a b  Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved December 17, 2015.
  5. ^  Symantec Security Response. (2016, September 6). Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
  6. ^  Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Loaders, Installers and Uninstallers Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.
  7. ^  Marczak, B. and Scott-Railton, J.. (2016, May 29). Keep Calm and (Don’t) Enable Macros: A New Threat Actor Targets UAE Dissidents. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
  8. ^  Blasco, J. (2011, December 12). Another Sykipot sample likely targeting US federal agencies. Retrieved March 28, 2016.
  9. ^  Symantec Security Response. (2011, November). W32.Duqu: The precursor to the next Stuxnet. Retrieved September 17, 2015.
  10. ^  F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
  11. ^  Falcone, R., et al.. (2015, June 16). Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
  12. ^  Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2016, February 3). Emissary Trojan Changelog: Did Operation Lotus Blossom Cause It to Evolve?. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
  13. ^  Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved February 25, 2016.
  14. ^  F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
  15. ^  Baumgartner, K. and Garnaeva, M.. (2014, November 3). BE2 custom plugins, router abuse, and target profiles. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
  1. ^  Shevchenko, S.. (2008, November 30). Agent.btz - A Threat That Hit Pentagon. Retrieved April 8, 2016.
  2. ^  Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2016, February 4). T9000: Advanced Modular Backdoor Uses Complex Anti-Analysis Techniques. Retrieved April 15, 2016.
  3. ^  Cherepanov, A.. (2016, May 17). Operation Groundbait: Analysis of a surveillance toolkit. Retrieved May 18, 2016.
  4. ^  Huss, D.. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
  5. ^  Grunzweig, J., et al. (2016, May 24). New Wekby Attacks Use DNS Requests As Command and Control Mechanism. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
  6. ^  Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 9). The ProjectSauron APT. Technical Analysis. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
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  8. ^  Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
  9. ^  Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
  10. ^  Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  11. ^  Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
  12. ^  NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
  13. ^  Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  14. ^  Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.