Query Registry

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Query Registry
ID T1012
Tactic Discovery
Platform Windows
Permissions Required User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Data Sources Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.

The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security.1 Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network.


  • Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia checks Registry keys within HKCU and HKLM to determine if certain applications are present, including SecureCRT, Terminal Services, RealVNC, TightVNC, UltraVNC, Radmin, mRemote, TeamViewer, FileZilla, pcAnyware, and Remote Desktop.2
  • OilRig has used reg query “HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default” on a victim to query the Registry.3
  • Stealth Falcon malware attempts to determine the installed version of .NET by querying the Registry.4
  • Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover information in the Windows Registry with the reg query command.5
  • ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys.67
  • BACKSPACE is capable of enumerating and making modifications to an infected system's Registry.8
  • CHOPSTICK provides access to the Windows Registry, which can be used to gather information.9
  • DownPaper searches and reads the value of the Windows Update Registry Run key.10
  • OSInfo queries the registry to look for information about Terminal Services 11.
  • POWERSOURCE queries Registry keys in preparation for setting Run keys to achieve persistence.12
  • POWRUNER may query the Registry by running reg query on a victim.13
  • PlugX can query for information contained within the Windows Registry.14
  • Reaver queries the Registry to determine the correct Startup path to use for persistence.15
  • Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface.16
  • Shamoon queries several Registry keys to identify hard disk partitions to overwrite.17
  • WINDSHIELD can gather Registry values.18


Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information within the Registry, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting19 tools, like AppLocker,2021 or Software Restriction Policies22 where appropriate.23


System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

Interaction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as Reg or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.


  1. ^  Wikipedia. (n.d.). Windows Registry. Retrieved February 2, 2015.
  2. ^  Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Loaders, Installers and Uninstallers Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.
  3. ^  Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
  4. ^  Marczak, B. and Scott-Railton, J.. (2016, May 29). Keep Calm and (Don’t) Enable Macros: A New Threat Actor Targets UAE Dissidents. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
  5. ^  Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014.
  6. ^  ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.
  7. ^  Bitdefender. (2015, December). APT28 Under the Scope. Retrieved February 23, 2017.
  8. ^  FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved May 1, 2015.
  9. ^  FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.
  10. ^  ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017.
  11. ^  Symantec Security Response. (2016, September 6). Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
  12. ^  Brumaghin, E. and Grady, C.. (2017, March 2). Covert Channels and Poor Decisions: The Tale of DNSMessenger. Retrieved March 8, 2017.