Data from Local System
|Data from Local System|
|Platform||Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X|
|System Requirements||Privileges to access certain files and directories|
|Data Sources||File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters|
Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Exfiltration.
Adversaries will often search the file system on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. They may do this using a Command-Line Interface, such as cmd, which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.
- APT1 has collected files from a local victim.1
- Dust Storm has used Android backdoors capable of exfiltrating specific files directly from the infected devices.2
- Ke3chang gathered information and files from local directories for exfiltration.3
- Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is uploaded to one of its 10 C2 servers.4 Lazarus Group malware RomeoDelta copies specified directories from the victim's machine, then archives and encrypts the directories before uploading to its C2 server.5
- Patchwork collected and exfiltrated files from the infected system.6
- Stealth Falcon malware gathers data from the local victim system.7
- Threat Group-3390 actors saved RAR files for exfiltration in the Recycler directory on a victim system.8
- Threat Group-3390 ran a command to compile an archive of file types of interest from the victim user's directories.9
- When it first starts, BADNEWS crawls the victim's local drives and collects documents with the following extensions: .doc, .docx, .pdf, .ppt, .pptx, and .txt.10
- CosmicDuke steals user files from local hard drives with file extensions that match a predefined list.11
- FLASHFLOOD searches for interesting files (either a default or customized set of file extensions) on the local system. FLASHFLOOD will scan the My Recent Documents, Desktop, Temporary Internet Files, and TEMP directories. FLASHFLOOD also collects information stored in the Windows Address Book.12
- MobileOrder exfiltrates data collected from the victim mobile device.13
- PinchDuke collects user files from the compromised host based on predefined file extensions.14
- Rover searches for files on local drives based on a predefined list of file extensions.15
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from the local system, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting16 tools, like AppLocker,1718 or Software Restriction Policies19 where appropriate.20
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
- Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
- Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017.
- Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Loaders, Installers and Uninstallers Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016.
- Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Remote Administration Tools & Content Staging Malware Report. Retrieved March 16, 2016.
- Cymmetria. (2016). Unveiling Patchwork - The Copy-Paste APT. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- Marczak, B. and Scott-Railton, J.. (2016, May 29). Keep Calm and (Don’t) Enable Macros: A New Threat Actor Targets UAE Dissidents. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
- Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved January 25, 2016.
- Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
- Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.
- F-Secure Labs. (2014, July). COSMICDUKE Cosmu with a twist of MiniDuke. Retrieved July 3, 2014.
- FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved May 1, 2015.
- Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2016, January 24). Scarlet Mimic: Years-Long Espionage Campaign Targets Minority Activists. Retrieved February 10, 2016.
- F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
- Ray, V., Hayashi, K. (2016, February 29). New Malware ‘Rover’ Targets Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. Retrieved February 29, 2016.
- Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
- Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
- NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
- Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
- Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.