Groups are sets of related intrusion activity that are tracked by a common name in the security community. Groups are also sometimes referred to as campaigns or intrusion sets. Some groups have multiple names associated with the same set of activities due to various organizations tracking the same set of activities by different names. Organizations’ group definitions may be only partially overlapping and may be in disagreement on specific activity.
Groups are mapped to publicly reported technique use and referenced in the ATT&CK threat model. Groups are also mapped to reported software used during intrusions.
This is the list of publicly reported groups tracked in ATT&CK:
|APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398.1|
|APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China.2|
|APT16||APT16||APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations.3|
|APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.4|
|APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical.5|
|APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government.6789 This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee in April 2016.10|
|APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008.119 This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.10|
|APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.1213 This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.1214 As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.15 APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan|
|APT30||APT30||APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government.16 While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.17|
|APT32 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists, and has extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is believed to be Vietnam-based.1819|
|APT34||APT34||APT34 is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. APT34 loosely aligns with public reporting related to OilRig, but may not wholly align due to companies tracking threat groups in different ways.20|
|Axiom is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. It is responsible for the Operation SMN campaign.21 Though both this group and Winnti Group use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.222324|
|BRONZE BUTLER||BRONZE BUTLER|
|BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.2526|
|Carbanak is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name (Carbanak). It is sometimes referred to as FIN7, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately.2728|
|Charming Kitten||Charming Kitten||is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since approximately 2014. They appear to focus on targeting individuals of interest to Iran who work in academic research, human rights, and media, with most victims having been located in Iran, the US, Israel, and the UK. usually tries to access private email and Facebook accounts, and sometimes establishes a foothold on victim computers as a secondary objective. The group's TTPs overlap extensively with another group, Rocket Kitten, resulting in reporting that may not distinguish between the two groups' activities.29|
Threat Group 2889
|Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver.30 Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889).31|
|CopyKittens||CopyKittens||CopyKittens is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip.323334|
|Darkhotel||Darkhotel||Darkhotel is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing.35|
|Deep Panda||Deep Panda|
|Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications.36 The intrusion into healthcare company Anthem has been attributed to Deep Panda.37 This group is also known as Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens, and PinkPanther.38 Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion.39|
|DragonOK||DragonOK||DragonOK is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee.40 It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT.41|
|Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus on the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. The group appeared to decrease activity following public exposure in 2014, and re-emerged in late 2015 through 2017.4243|
|Dust Storm||Dust Storm||Dust Storm is a threat group that has targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries.44|
|Equation||Equation||Equation is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives.45|
|FIN10||FIN10||FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations.46|
|FIN5||FIN5||FIN5 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted personally identifiable information and payment card information. The group has been active since at least 2008 and has targeted the restaurant, gaming, and hotel industries. The group is made up of actors who likely speak Russian.474849|
|FIN6||FIN6||FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.50|
|FIN7||FIN7||FIN7 is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the retail and hospitality sectors, often using point-of-sale malware. It is sometimes referred to as Carbanak Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same Carbanak malware and are therefore tracked separately.5128|
|GCMAN||GCMAN||GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services.52|
|Gamaredon Group||Gamaredon Group||Gamaredon Group is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government.53|
|Group5||Group5||Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack.54|
|Ke3chang||Ke3chang||Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China.55|
|Lazarus Group||Lazarus Group|
Guardians of Peace
|Lazarus Group is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.56 The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.57|
|Lotus Blossom||Lotus Blossom|
|Lotus Blossom is a threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia.58|
|MONSOON is the name of an espionage campaign that apparently started in December 2015 and was ongoing as of July 2016. It is believed that the actors behind MONSOON are the same actors behind Operation Hangover. While attribution is unclear, the campaign has targeted victims with military and political interests in the Indian Subcontinent.59 Operation Hangover has been reported as being Indian in origin, and can be traced back to 2010.60|
|Magic Hound||Magic Hound|
Operation Saffron Rose
Ajax Security Team
|Magic Hound is an espionage campaign operating primarily in the Middle East that dates back to at least mid-2016. The group behind the campaign has primarily targeted organizations in the energy, government, and technology sectors that are either based or have business interests in Saudi Arabia.61|
|Moafee||Moafee||Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK.62|
|Molerats is a politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.6364|
|NEODYMIUM||NEODYMIUM||is an activity group that conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. The group has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics.6566|
|Naikon||Naikon||Naikon is a threat group that has focused on targets around the South China Sea.67 The group has been attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020).68 While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.17|
|Night Dragon||Night Dragon||Night Dragon is a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China.69|
|OilRig||OilRig||OilRig is a threat group with suspected Iranian origins that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2015. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets.7071727374 Reporting on OilRig may loosely overlap with APT34, but may not wholly align due to companies tracking groups in different ways.20|
|PROMETHIUM||PROMETHIUM||is an activity group that has been active since at least 2012. The group conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called NEODYMIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics.6566|
|Patchwork is a threat group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums.7576|
|PittyTiger||PittyTiger||PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.7778|
|Poseidon Group||Poseidon Group||Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm.79|
|Putter Panda||Putter Panda|
|Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD).80|
|RTM||RTM||RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM).81|
|Sandworm Team||Sandworm Team|
|Sandworm Team is a cyber espionage group that has operated since approximately 2009 and has been attributed to Russia.82|
|Scarlet Mimic||Scarlet Mimic||Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.83|
|Sowbug||Sowbug||Sowbug is a threat group that has conducted targeted attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia, particularly government entities, since at least 2015.84|
|Stealth Falcon||Stealth Falcon||Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed.85|
|Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda.8687|
|Suckfly||Suckfly||Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014.88|
|Taidoor||Taidoor||Taidoor is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has primarily targeted the Taiwanese government.89|
|Threat Group-1314||Threat Group-1314|
|Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim's remote access infrastructure.90|
|Threat Group-3390||Threat Group-3390|
|Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.91 The group has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors.92|
|Turla is a threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. They are known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns.9394|
|Winnti Group||Winnti Group|
|Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. Though both this group and Axiom use the malware Winnti, the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting.222324|
|admin@338||admin@338||admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors.95|
|menuPass is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.96979899100|
- Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
- Meyers, A. (2013, March 29). Whois Numbered Panda. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
- Winters, R.. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
- FireEye Labs/FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, May 14). Hiding in Plain Sight: FireEye and Microsoft Expose Obfuscation Tactic. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
- Carvey, H.. (2014, September 2). Where you AT?: Indicators of lateral movement using at.exe on Windows 7 systems. Retrieved January 25, 2016.
- FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.
- SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
- Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
- Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
- Eng, E., Caselden, D.. (2015, June 23). Operation Clandestine Wolf – Adobe Flash Zero-Day in APT3 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
- Insikt Group (Recorded Future). (2017, May 17). Recorded Future Research Concludes Chinese Ministry of State Security Behind APT3. Retrieved June 18, 2017.
- Moran, N., et al. (2014, November 21). Operation Double Tap. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
- Symantec Security Response. (2016, September 6). Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
- FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved May 1, 2015.
- Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May 14). The Naikon APT. Retrieved January 14, 2015.
- Carr, N.. (2017, May 14). Cyber Espionage is Alive and Well: APT32 and the Threat to Global Corporations. Retrieved June 18, 2017.
- Lassalle, D., et al. (2017, November 6). OceanLotus Blossoms: Mass Digital Surveillance and Attacks Targeting ASEAN, Asian Nations, the Media, Human Rights Groups, and Civil Society. Retrieved November 6, 2017.
- Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
- Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2013, April 11). Winnti. More than just a game. Retrieved February 8, 2017.
- Tarakanov, D. (2015, June 22). Games are over: Winnti is now targeting pharmaceutical companies. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
- Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017.
- Chen, J. and Hsieh, M. (2017, November 7). REDBALDKNIGHT/BRONZE BUTLER’s Daserf Backdoor Now Using Steganography. Retrieved December 27, 2017.
- Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, October 12). BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises. Retrieved January 4, 2018.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). CARBANAK APT THE GREAT BANK ROBBERY. Retrieved March 3, 2015.
- Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
- ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017.
- Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.
- Dell SecureWorks. (2015, October 7). Suspected Iran-Based Hacker Group Creates Network of Fake LinkedIn Profiles. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
- ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, March 30). Jerusalem Post and other Israeli websites compromised by Iranian threat agent CopyKitten. Retrieved August 21, 2017.
- ClearSky Cyber Security and Trend Micro. (2017, July). Operation Wilted Tulip: Exposing a cyber espionage apparatus. Retrieved August 21, 2017.
- Minerva Labs LTD and ClearSky Cyber Security. (2015, November 23). CopyKittens Attack Group. Retrieved September 11, 2017.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- ThreatConnect Research Team. (2015, February 27). The Anthem Hack: All Roads Lead to China. Retrieved January 26, 2016.
- RSA Incident Response. (2014, January). RSA Incident Response Emerging Threat Profile: Shell Crew. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
- DiMaggio, J.. (2015, August 6). The Black Vine cyberespionage group. Retrieved January 26, 2016.
- Haq, T., Moran, N., Vashisht, S., Scott, M. (2014, September). OPERATION QUANTUM ENTANGLEMENT. Retrieved November 4, 2015.
- Miller-Osborn, J., Grunzweig, J.. (2015, April). Unit 42 Identifies New DragonOK Backdoor Malware Deployed Against Japanese Targets. Retrieved November 4, 2015.
- Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.
- Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017.
- Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, February). Equation Group: Questions and Answers. Retrieved December 21, 2015.
- FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, June 16). FIN10: Anatomy of a Cyber Extortion Operation. Retrieved June 25, 2017.
- Scavella, T. and Rifki, A. (2017, July 20). Are you Ready to Respond? (Webinar). Retrieved October 4, 2017.
- Bromiley, M. and Lewis, P. (2016, October 7). Attacking the Hospitality and Gaming Industries: Tracking an Attacker Around the World in 7 Years. Retrieved October 6, 2017.
- Higgins, K. (2015, October 13). Prolific Cybercrime Gang Favors Legit Login Credentials. Retrieved October 4, 2017.
- FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved June 1, 2016.
- Miller, S., et al. (2017, March 7). FIN7 Spear Phishing Campaign Targets Personnel Involved in SEC Filings. Retrieved March 8, 2017.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, February 8). APT-style bank robberies increase with Metel, GCMAN and Carbanak 2.0 attacks. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
- Kasza, A. and Reichel, D.. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
- Scott-Railton, J., et al. (2016, August 2). Group5: Syria and the Iranian Connection. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
- Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
- Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.
- Falcone, R., et al.. (2015, June 16). Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
- Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.
- Fagerland, S., et al. (2013, May). Operation Hangover: Unveiling an Indian Cyberattack Infrastructure. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
- Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017.
- Haq, T., Moran, N., Scott, M., & Vashisht, S. O. (2014, September 10). The Path to Mass-Producing Cyber Attacks [Blog]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.
- ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2016, June 9). Operation DustySky – Part 2. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- Microsoft. (2016, December 14). Twin zero-day attacks: PROMETHIUM and NEODYMIUM target individuals in Europe. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
- Anthe, C. et al. (2016, December 14). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 21. Retrieved November 27, 2017.
- Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved December 17, 2015.
- ThreatConnect Inc. and Defense Group Inc. (DGI). (2015, September 23). Project CameraShy: Closing the Aperture on China's Unit 78020. Retrieved December 17, 2015.
- McAfee® Foundstone® Professional Services and McAfee Labs™. (2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”. Retrieved March 4, 2015.
- Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
- ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
- Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
- Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
- Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer - Oil Rig. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
- Cymmetria. (2016). Unveiling Patchwork - The Copy-Paste APT. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- Hamada, J.. (2016, July 25). Patchwork cyberespionage group expands targets from governments to wide range of industries. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
- Bizeul, D., Fontarensky, I., Mouchoux, R., Perigaud, F., Pernet, C. (2014, July 11). Eye of the Tiger. Retrieved September 29, 2015.
- Villeneuve, N., Homan, J. (2014, July 31). Spy of the Tiger. Retrieved September 29, 2015.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2016, February 9). Poseidon Group: a Targeted Attack Boutique specializing in global cyber-espionage. Retrieved March 16, 2016.
- Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
- Faou, M. and Boutin, J.. (2017, February). Read The Manual: A Guide to the RTM Banking Trojan. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
- Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017.
- Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2016, January 24). Scarlet Mimic: Years-Long Espionage Campaign Targets Minority Activists. Retrieved February 10, 2016.
- Symantec Security Response. (2017, November 7). Sowbug: Cyber espionage group targets South American and Southeast Asian governments. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
- Marczak, B. and Scott-Railton, J.. (2016, May 29). Keep Calm and (Don’t) Enable Macros: A New Threat Actor Targets UAE Dissidents. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
- Symantec Security Response. (2016, August 7). Strider: Cyberespionage group turns eye of Sauron on targets. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 8). ProjectSauron: top level cyber-espionage platform covertly extracts encrypted government comms. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
- DiMaggio, J.. (2016, March 15). Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
- Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Special Operations Team. (2015, May 28). Living off the Land. Retrieved January 26, 2016.
- Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved January 25, 2016.
- Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014.
- ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.
- FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, December 1). China-based Cyber Threat Group Uses Dropbox for Malware Communications and Targets Hong Kong Media Outlets. Retrieved December 4, 2015.
- Miller-Osborn, J. and Grunzweig, J.. (2017, February 16). menuPass Returns with New Malware and New Attacks Against Japanese Academics and Organizations. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
- Crowdstrike. (2013, October 16). CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
- FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
- PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017.
- FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.