Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking, side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).

Side-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.[1]

ID: T1574.002
Sub-technique of:  T1574
Platforms: Windows
Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Application Control
Version: 2.0
Created: 13 March 2020
Last Modified: 30 March 2023

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0073 APT19

APT19 launched an HTTP malware variant and a Port 22 malware variant using a legitimate executable that loaded the malicious DLL.[2]

G0022 APT3

APT3 has been known to side load DLLs with a valid version of Chrome with one of their tools.[3][4]

G0050 APT32

APT32 ran legitimately-signed executables from Symantec and McAfee which load a malicious DLL. The group also side-loads its backdoor by dropping a library and a legitimate, signed executable (AcroTranscoder).[5][6][7]

G0096 APT41

APT41 used legitimate executables to perform DLL side-loading of their malware.[8]

C0040 APT41 DUST

APT41 DUST used DLL side-loading to execute DUSTTRAP via an AhnLab uninstaller.[9]

S0128 BADNEWS

BADNEWS typically loads its DLL file into a legitimate signed Java or VMware executable.[10][11]

S0127 BBSRAT

DLL side-loading has been used to execute BBSRAT through a legitimate Citrix executable, ssonsvr.exe. The Citrix executable was dropped along with BBSRAT by the dropper.[12]

G0098 BlackTech

BlackTech has used DLL side loading by giving DLLs hardcoded names and placing them in searched directories.[13]

G0060 BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER has used legitimate applications to side-load malicious DLLs.[14]

S1063 Brute Ratel C4

Brute Ratel C4 has loaded a malicious DLL by spoofing the name of the legitimate Version.DLL and placing it in the same folder as the digitally-signed Microsoft binary OneDriveUpdater.exe.[15]

G0114 Chimera

Chimera has used side loading to place malicious DLLs in memory.[16]

S1041 Chinoxy

Chinoxy can use a digitally signed binary ("Logitech Bluetooth Wizard Host Process") to load its dll into memory.[17]

G1021 Cinnamon Tempest

Cinnamon Tempest has abused legitimate executables to side-load weaponized DLLs.[18]

S0660 Clambling

Clambling can store a file named mpsvc.dll, which opens a malicious mpsvc.mui file, in the same folder as the legitimate Microsoft executable MsMpEng.exe to gain execution.[19][20]

G1034 Daggerfly

Daggerfly has used legitimate software to side-load PlugX loaders onto victim systems.[21] Daggerfly is also linked to multiple other instances of side-loading for initial loading activity.[22]

S1111 DarkGate

DarkGate includes one infection vector that leverages a malicious "KeyScramblerE.DLL" library that will load during the execution of the legitimate KeyScrambler application.[23]

S0354 Denis

Denis exploits a security vulnerability to load a fake DLL and execute its code.[5]

S0384 Dridex

Dridex can abuse legitimate Windows executables to side-load malicious DLL files.[24]

G1006 Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca has placed a malicious payload in %WINDIR%\SYSTEM32\oci.dll so it would be sideloaded by the MSDTC service.[25]

S0624 Ecipekac

Ecipekac can abuse the legitimate application policytool.exe to load a malicious DLL.[26]

S0554 Egregor

Egregor has used DLL side-loading to execute its payload.[27]

G1016 FIN13

FIN13 has used IISCrack.dll as a side-loading technique to load a malicious version of httpodbc.dll on old IIS Servers (CVE-2001-0507).[28]

S0182 FinFisher

FinFisher uses DLL side-loading to load malicious programs.[29][30]

G0093 GALLIUM

GALLIUM used DLL side-loading to covertly load PoisonIvy into memory on the victim machine.[31]

S0032 gh0st RAT

A gh0st RAT variant has used DLL side-loading.[32]

S0477 Goopy

Goopy has the ability to side-load malicious DLLs with legitimate applications from Kaspersky, Microsoft, and Google.[6]

G0126 Higaisa

Higaisa’s JavaScript file used a legitimate Microsoft Office 2007 package to side-load the OINFO12.OCX dynamic link library.[33]

S0070 HTTPBrowser

HTTPBrowser has used DLL side-loading.[34]

S0398 HyperBro

HyperBro has used a legitimate application to sideload a DLL to decrypt, decompress, and run a payload.[35][36]

S0528 Javali

Javali can use DLL side-loading to load malicious DLLs into legitimate executables.[37]

S0585 Kerrdown

Kerrdown can use DLL side-loading to load malicious DLLs.[38]

G0032 Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has replaced win_fw.dll, an internal component that is executed during IDA Pro installation, with a malicious DLL to download and execute a payload.[39]

S1101 LoFiSe

LoFiSe has been executed as a file named DsNcDiag.dll through side-loading.[40]

S0582 LookBack

LookBack side loads its communications module as a DLL into the libcurl.dll loader.[41]

G1014 LuminousMoth

LuminousMoth has used legitimate executables such as winword.exe and igfxem.exe to side-load their malware.[42][43]

G0045 menuPass

menuPass has used DLL side-loading to launch versions of Mimikatz and PwDump6 as well as UPPERCUT.[44][45][46]

S1059 metaMain

metaMain can support an HKCMD sideloading start method.[47]

S0455 Metamorfo

Metamorfo has side-loaded its malicious DLL file.[48][49][50]

G0069 MuddyWater

MuddyWater maintains persistence on victim networks through side-loading dlls to trick legitimate programs into running malware.[51]

G0129 Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has used a legitimately signed executable to execute a malicious payload within a DLL file.[52][53][54]

G0019 Naikon

Naikon has used DLL side-loading to load malicious DLL's into legitimate executables.[55]

S0630 Nebulae

Nebulae can use DLL side-loading to gain execution.[56]

S1100 Ninja

Ninja loaders can be side-loaded with legitimate and signed executables including the VLC.exe media player.[40]

C0012 Operation CuckooBees

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the legitimate Windows services IKEEXT and PrintNotify to side-load malicious DLLs.[57]

S0664 Pandora

Pandora can use DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads.[36]

G0040 Patchwork

A Patchwork .dll that contains BADNEWS is loaded and executed using DLL side-loading.[58]

S1102 Pcexter

Pcexter has been distributed and executed as a DLL file named Vspmsg.dll via DLL side-loading.[40]

S0013 PlugX

PlugX has used DLL side-loading to evade anti-virus.[4][34][59][44][60][19][61]

S1046 PowGoop

PowGoop can side-load Goopdate.dll into GoogleUpdate.exe.[51][62]

S0650 QakBot

QakBot has the ability to use DLL side-loading for execution.[63]

S0629 RainyDay

RainyDay can use side-loading to run malicious executables.[56]

S1130 Raspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin can use legitimate, signed EXE files paired with malicious DLL files to load and run malicious payloads while bypassing defenses.[64]

S0662 RCSession

RCSession can be installed via DLL side-loading.[65][19][61]

S0074 Sakula

Sakula uses DLL side-loading, typically using a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations or McAfee's Outlook Scan About Box to load malicious DLL files.[66]

G1008 SideCopy

SideCopy has used a malicious loader DLL file to execute the credwiz.exe process and side-load the malicious payload Duser.dll.[67]

G0121 Sidewinder

Sidewinder has used DLL side-loading to drop and execute malicious payloads including the hijacking of the legitimate Windows application file rekeywiz.exe.[68]

S0663 SysUpdate

SysUpdate can load DLLs through vulnerable legitimate executables.[36]

S0098 T9000

During the T9000 installation process, it drops a copy of the legitimate Microsoft binary igfxtray.exe. The executable contains a side-loading weakness which is used to load a portion of the malware.[69]

G0027 Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has used DLL side-loading, including by using legitimate Kaspersky antivirus variants as well as rc.exe, a legitimate Microsoft Resource Compiler.[34][70][71][35][72]

G0081 Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper has been known to side-load DLLs using a valid version of a Windows Address Book and Windows Defender executable with one of their tools.[73][74]

S0579 Waterbear

Waterbear has used DLL side loading to import and load a malicious DLL loader.[13]

S0176 Wingbird

Wingbird side loads a malicious file, sspisrv.dll, in part of a spoofed lssas.exe service.[75][76]

S0230 ZeroT

ZeroT has used DLL side-loading to load malicious payloads.[77][78]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1013 Application Developer Guidance

When possible, include hash values in manifest files to help prevent side-loading of malicious libraries.[1]

M1051 Update Software

Update software regularly to include patches that fix DLL side-loading vulnerabilities.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0022 File File Creation

Monitor for newly constructed files in common folders on the computer system.

File Modification

Monitor for changes made to files for unexpected modifications to access permissions and attributes

DS0011 Module Module Load

Monitor DLL/PE file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.

DS0009 Process Process Creation

Monitor newly constructed processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new files/programs.

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