Spearphishing Attachment

Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution.

There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.

ID: T1193

Tactic: Initial Access

Platform:  Windows, macOS, Linux

Data Sources:  File monitoring, Packet capture, Network intrusion detection system, Detonation chamber, Email gateway, Mail server

CAPEC ID:  CAPEC-163

Version: 1.0

Mitigations

Mitigation Description
Antivirus/Antimalware Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.
Network Intrusion Prevention Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity.
Restrict Web Based Content Block unknown or unused attachments by default that should not be transmitted over email as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some email scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious attachments in Obfuscated Files or Information.
User Training Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails.

Examples

Name Description
APT12

APT12 has sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents and PDFs attached.[1][2]

APT19

APT19 sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments in RTF and XLSM formats to deliver initial exploits.[3]

APT28

APT28 sent spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office attachments.[4][5][6][7][8][9]

APT29

APT29 has used spearphishing emails with an attachment to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.[10][11]

APT32

APT32 has sent spearphishing emails with a malicious executable disguised as a document or spreadsheet.[12][13][14][15]

APT37

APT37 delivers malware using spearphishing emails with malicious HWP attachments.[16][17][18]

APT39

APT39 leveraged spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to initially compromise victims.[19]

BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER used spearphishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments to infect victims.[20]

Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has sent spearphishing emails with various attachment types to corporate and personal email accounts of victim organizations. Attachment types have included .rtf, .doc, .xls, archives containing LNK files, and password protected archives containing .exe and .scr executables.[21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28]

Darkhotel

Darkhotel has sent spearphishing emails with malicious RAR attachments.[29]

DarkHydrus

DarkHydrus has sent spearphishing emails with password-protected RAR archives containing malicious Excel Web Query files (.iqy). The group has also sent spearphishing emails that contained malicious Microsoft Office documents that use the "attachedTemplate" technique to load a template from a remote server.[30][31][32]

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 used spearphishing with Microsoft Office attachments to target victims.[33][34]

Elderwood

Elderwood has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims via targeted emails containing malicious attachments.[35][36]

Emotet

Emotet has been delivered by phishing emails containing attachments.[37][38][39][40][41][42][43][44]

FIN4

FIN4 has used spearphishing emails containing attachments (which are often stolen, legitimate documents sent from compromised accounts) with embedded malicious macros.[45][46]

FIN7

FIN7 sent spearphishing emails with either malicious Microsoft Documents or RTF files attached.[47][48][49]

FIN8

FIN8 has distributed targeted emails containing Word documents with embedded malicious macros.[50][51][52]

Gallmaker

Gallmaker sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.[53]

Gorgon Group

Gorgon Group sent emails to victims with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.[54]

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.[55]

Leviathan

Leviathan has sent spearphishing emails with malicious attachments, including .rtf, .doc, and .xls files.[56]

Magic Hound

Magic Hound sent malicious attachments to victims over email, including an Excel spreadsheet containing macros to download Pupy.[57]

menuPass

menuPass has sent malicious Office documents via email as part of spearphishing campaigns as well as executables disguised as documents.[58][59][60][61]

MuddyWater

MuddyWater has compromised third parties and used compromised accounts to send spearphishing emails with targeted attachments to recipients.[62][63][64]

OceanSalt

OceanSalt has been delivered via spearphishing emails with Microsoft Office attachments.[65]

OilRig

OilRig has sent spearphising emails with malicious attachments to potential victims using compromised and/or spoofed email accounts.[66][67][68]

Patchwork

Patchwork has used spearphishing with an attachment to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.[69][70][71][72]

PLATINUM

PLATINUM has sent spearphishing emails with attachments to victims as its primary initial access vector.[73]

Rancor

Rancor has attached a malicious document to an email to gain initial access.[74]

Silence

Silence has sent emails with malicious DOCX, CHM and ZIP attachments. [75][76]

TA459

TA459 has targeted victims using spearphishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments.[77]

TA505

TA505 has used spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to initially compromise victims.[78][79][80][81][82][83]

The White Company

The White Company has sent phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments to victims.[84]

TrickBot

TrickBot has used an email with an Excel sheet containing a malicious macro to deploy the malware[85]

Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper sent spearphishing emails that contained malicious Microsoft Office attachments.[86][87][88]

Turla

Turla has used spearphishing emails to deliver BrainTest as a malicious attachment.[89]

Detection

Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.

Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as Exploitation for Client Execution and Scripting.

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