Uncommonly Used Port

Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.

ID: T1065

Tactic: Command And Control

Platform:  Linux, macOS, Windows

Data Sources:  Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring

Requires Network:  Yes

Version: 1.0



An APT3 downloader establishes SOCKS5 connections to two separate IP addresses over TCP port 1913 and TCP port 81.[1]


Bankshot binds and listens on port 1058.[2]

Gorgon Group

Gorgon Group has used a variant of NanoCore RAT that communicates with its C2 server over port 6666.[3]


GravityRAT uses port 46769 for C2.[4]


Group5 C2 servers communicated with malware over TCP 8081, 8282, and 8083.[5]


InnaputRAT uses port 52100 and 5876 for C2 communications.[6]

Lazarus Group

Some Lazarus Group malware uses a list of ordered port numbers to choose a port for C2 traffic, which includes uncommonly used ports such as 995, 1816, 465, 1521, 3306, and many others.[7][8]

Magic Hound

Magic Hound malware has communicated with its C2 server over ports 4443 and 3543.[9]


MobileOrder communicates with its C2 server over TCP port 3728.[10]


PoisonIvy opens a backdoor on TCP ports 6868 and 7777.[11]


POWERSTATS has used ports 8060 and 8888 for C2.[12]


RedLeaves can use port 995 for C2.[13]


A Remsec module has a default C2 port of 13000.[14]


TrickBot uses ports 447 and 8082 for C2 communications.[15][16][17]


A TYPEFRAME variant can use port 127 for communications.[18]


Some Volgmer variants use port 8088 for C2.[19][20][21]


Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports.

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [22]


Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. [22]