Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. [1] These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce

The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. [2] For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll" [3]

The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders

Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.

ID: T1060

Tactic: Persistence

Platform:  Windows

System Requirements:  HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE keys require administrator access to create and modify

Permissions Required:  User, Administrator

Data Sources:  Windows Registry, File monitoring


Contributors:  Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe

Version: 1.0



ADVSTORESHELL achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[4][5][6]

Agent Tesla

Agent Tesla adds itself to the Registry as a startup program to establish persistence.[7]


APT18 establishes persistence via the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key.[8][9]


An APT19 HTTP malware variant establishes persistence by setting the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Debug Tools-%LOCALAPPDATA%\.[10]


APT29 added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[11]


APT3 places scripts in the startup folder for persistence.[12]


APT32 established persistence using Registry Run keys, both to execute PowerShell and VBS scripts as well as to execute their backdoor directly.[13][14][15]


APT33 has deployed a tool known as DarkComet to the Startup folder of a victim.[16]


APT37's has added persistence via the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\.[17][18]


APT39 has maintained persistence using the startup folder.[19]


Astaroth creates a startup item for persistence.[20]


Backdoor.Oldrea adds Registry Run keys to achieve persistence.[21]


BACKSPACE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory.[22]


BADNEWS installs a registry Run key to establish persistence.[23]


BadPatch establishes a foothold by adding a link to the malware executable in the startup folder.[24]


BBSRAT has been loaded through DLL side-loading of a legitimate Citrix executable that is set to persist through the Registry Run key location HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ssonsvr.exe.


Bisonal adds itself to the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\ for persistence.[25]


The BlackEnergy 3 variant drops its main DLL component and then creates a .lnk shortcut to that file in the startup folder.[26]


Briba creates run key Registry entries pointing to malicious DLLs dropped to disk.[27]


BRONZE BUTLER has used a batch script that adds a Registry Run key to establish malware persistence.[28]


Carbanak stores a configuration files in the startup directory to automatically execute commands in order to persist across reboots.[29]

Cardinal RAT

Cardinal RAT} establishes Persistence by setting the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load Registry key to point to its executable.[30]


ChChes establishes persistence by adding a Registry Run key.[31]

Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has used Registry Run keys for persistence. The group has also set a Startup path to launch the PowerShell shell command and download Cobalt Strike.[32]

Cobian RAT

Cobian RAT creates an autostart Registry key to ensure persistence.[33]


Comnie achieves persistence by adding a shortcut of itself to the startup path in the Registry.[34]


CORESHELL has established persistence by creating autostart extensibility point (ASEP) Registry entries in the Run key and other Registry keys, as well as by creating shortcuts in the Internet Explorer Quick Start folder.[35]


One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to set itself to be executed at system startup by adding a Registry value under one of the following Registry keys:


CrossRAT uses run keys for persistence on Windows

Dark Caracal

Dark Caracal's version of Bandook adds a registry key to HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[37]


DarkComet adds several Registry entries to enable automatic execution at every system startup.[38][39]


Darkhotel has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.[40]


DownPaper uses PowerShell to add a Registry Run key in order to establish persistence.[41]

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 added the registry value ntdll to the Registry Run key to establish persistence.[42]


DustySky achieves persistence by creating a Registry entry in HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[43]


If establishing persistence by installation as a new service fails, one variant of Elise establishes persistence for the created .exe file by setting the following Registry key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost : %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Network\svchost.exe. Other variants have set the following Registry keys for persistence: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\imejp : [self] and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAStorD.[44][45]


Variants of Emissary have added Run Registry keys to establish persistence.[46]


Emotet has been observed adding the downloaded payload to the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key to maintain persistence.[47][48][49]


Empire can modify the registry run keys HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[50]


EvilGrab adds a Registry Run key for ctfmon.exe to establish persistence.[31]


FELIXROOT adds a shortcut file to the startup folder for persistence.[51]


FIN10 has established persistence by using the Registry option in PowerShell Empire to add a Run key.[52][50]


FIN6 has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence for its downloader tools known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD.[53]


FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.[54][55]


Final1stspy creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[56]


FinFisher establishes persistence by creating the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Run.[57][58]


FLASHFLOOD achieves persistence by making an entry in the Registry's Run key.[22]


Gazer can establish persistence by creating a .lnk file in the Start menu.[59][60]

gh0st RAT

gh0st RAT adds a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[61]

Gold Dragon

Gold Dragon establishes persistence in the Startup folder.[62]

Gorgon Group

Gorgon Group malware can create a .lnk file and add a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[63]


Helminth establishes persistence by creating a shortcut in the Start Menu folder.[64]


Hi-Zor creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[65]


Honeybee uses a batch file that configures the ComSysApp service to autostart in order to establish persistence.[66]


HTTPBrowser has established persistence by setting the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key value for wdm to the path of the executable. It has also used the Registry entry HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run vpdn "%ALLUSERPROFILE%\%APPDATA%\vpdn\VPDN_LU.exe" to establish persistence.[67][68]


Some InnaputRAT variants establish persistence by modifying the Registry key HKU\\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run:%appdata%\NeutralApp\NeutralApp.exe.[69]


JHUHUGIT has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process.[70]


Kasidet creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[71][72]


Kazuar adds a sub-key under several Registry run keys.[73]


Several Ke3chang backdoors achieved persistence by adding a Run key.[74]


A version of KONNI drops a Windows shortcut into the Startup folder to establish persistence.[75]

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group malware attempts to maintain persistence by saving itself in the Start menu folder or by adding a Registry Run key.[76][77][78]


Leviathan has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder that points to its main backdoor.[79][80]

Magic Hound

Magic Hound malware has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[81]


Matroyshka can establish persistence by adding Registry Run keys.[82][83]


Mivast creates the following Registry entry: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Micromedia.[84]


Mosquito establishes persistence under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Run auto_update.[85]


MuddyWater has added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[86][87]


NanHaiShu modifies the %regrun% Registry to point itself to an autostart mechanism.[88]


NanoCore creates a RunOnce key in the Registry to execute its VBS scripts each time the user logs on to the machine.[89]


NavRAT creates a Registry key to ensure a file gets executed upon reboot in order to establish persistence.[90]


The "SCOUT" variant of NETEAGLE achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[22]


NETWIRE creates a Registry start-up entry to establish persistence.[91]


NOKKI has established persistence by writing the payload to the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[92]


Patchwork has added the path of its second-stage malware to the startup folder to achieve persistence. One of its file stealers has also persisted by adding a Registry Run key.[93][94]


Pisloader establishes persistence via a Registry Run key.[95]


PLAINTEE gains persistence by adding the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce.[96]


PlugX adds Run key entries in the Registry to establish persistence.[97][31][98]


PoisonIvy creates run key Registry entries pointing to a malicious executable dropped to disk.[99]


PowerDuke achieves persistence by using various Registry Run keys.[100]


POWERSOURCE achieves persistence by setting a Registry Run key, with the path depending on whether the victim account has user or administrator access.[101]


PowerSploit's New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[102][103]


POWERTON can install a Registry Run key for persistence.[104]


Prikormka adds itself to a Registry Run key with the name guidVGA or guidVSA.[105]


Pteranodon copies itself to the Startup folder to establish persistence.[106]


PUNCHBUGGY can establish using a Registry run key.[107]


Pupy adds itself to the startup folder or adds itself to the Registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[108]

Putter Panda

A dropper used by Putter Panda installs itself into the ASEP Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with a value named McUpdate.[109]


Reaver creates a shortcut file and saves it in a Startup folder to establish persistence.[110]


RedLeaves attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence. If this fails, it attempts to add Registry Run keys.[31][111]


Remcos can add itself to the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[112]


Remexi utilizes Run Registry keys in the HKLM hive as a persistence mechanism.[113]


RogueRobin created a shortcut in the Windows startup folder to launch a PowerShell script each time the user logs in to establish persistence.[114]


Rover persists by creating a Registry entry in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\.[115]


RTM tries to add a Registry Run key under the name "Windows Update" to establish persistence.[116]


RunningRAT adds itself to the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence upon reboot.[62]


S-Type may create a .lnk file to itself that is saved in the Start menu folder. It may also create the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ IMJPMIJ8.1{3 characters of Unique Identifier}.[117]


Most Sakula samples maintain persistence by setting the Registry Run key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ in the HKLM or HKCU hive, with the Registry value and file name varying by sample.[118]


SeaDuke is capable of persisting via the Registry Run key or a .lnk file stored in the Startup directory.[119]


Seasalt creates a Registry entry to ensure infection after reboot under HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\currentVersion\Run.[120]


SHIPSHAPE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the Startup folder.[22]

Smoke Loader

Smoke Loader adds a Registry Run key for persistence and adds a script in the Startup folder to deploy the payload.[121]


SNUGRIDE establishes persistence through a Registry Run key.[122]


SPACESHIP achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the current user's Startup folder.[22]


To establish persistence, SslMM identifies the Start Menu Startup directory and drops a link to its own executable disguised as an "Office Start," "Yahoo Talk," "MSN Gaming Z0ne," or "MSN Talk" shortcut.[123]


Sykipot has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.[124]

Threat Group-3390

A Threat Group-3390 tool can add the binary’s path to the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to add persistence.[125]


TINYTYPHON installs itself under Registry Run key to establish persistence.[23]


TinyZBot can create a shortcut in the Windows startup folder for persistence.[126]


TrickBot establishes persistence in the Startup folder.[127]


Trojan.Karagany can create a link to itself in the Startup folder to automatically start itself upon system restart.[21]


Truvasys adds a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[128]


A Turla Javascript backdoor added a local_update_check value under the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence. Additionally, a Turla custom executable containing Metasploit shellcode is saved to the Startup folder to gain persistence.[85][129]


TURNEDUP is capable of writing to a Registry Run key to establish.[130]


USBStealer registers itself under a Registry Run key with the name "USB Disk Security."[131]


Vasport copies itself to disk and creates an associated run key Registry entry to establish.[132]


Xbash can create a Startup item for persistence if it determines it is on a Windows system.[133]


Zebrocy creates an entry in the Registry’s run keys for the malware to execute on startup.[134]

Zeus Panda

Zeus Panda adds persistence by creating Registry Run keys.[135][136]


Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting [137] tools like AppLocker [138] [139] or Software Restriction Policies [140] where appropriate. [141]


Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. [142] Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.

Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.


  1. Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  2. Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018.
  3. Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018.
  4. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
  5. ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.
  6. Bitdefender. (2015, December). APT28 Under the Scope. Retrieved February 23, 2017.
  7. Zhang, X. (2018, April 05). Analysis of New Agent Tesla Spyware Variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
  8. Shelmire, A. (2015, July 06). Evasive Maneuvers by the Wekby group with custom ROP-packing and DNS covert channels. Retrieved November 15, 2018.
  9. Grunzweig, J., et al. (2016, May 24). New Wekby Attacks Use DNS Requests As Command and Control Mechanism. Retrieved November 15, 2018.
  10. Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2016, January 22). New Attacks Linked to C0d0so0 Group. Retrieved August 2, 2018.
  11. Dunwoody, M. and Carr, N.. (2016, September 27). No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016. Retrieved October 4, 2016.
  12. Moran, N., et al. (2014, November 21). Operation Double Tap. Retrieved January 14, 2016.
  14. Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.
  15. Dumont, R. (2019, March 20). Fake or Fake: Keeping up with OceanLotus decoys. Retrieved April 1, 2019.
  16. Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
  17. FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018.
  18. Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018.
  19. Hawley et al. (2019, January 29). APT39: An Iranian Cyber Espionage Group Focused on Personal Information. Retrieved February 19, 2019.
  20. Doaty, J., Garrett, P.. (2018, September 10). We’re Seeing a Resurgence of the Demonic Astaroth WMIC Trojan. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
  21. Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.
  22. FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved May 1, 2015.
  23. Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016.
  24. Bar, T., Conant, S. (2017, October 20). BadPatch. Retrieved November 13, 2018.
  25. Hayashi, K., Ray, V. (2018, July 31). Bisonal Malware Used in Attacks Against Russia and South Korea. Retrieved August 7, 2018.
  26. F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
  27. Ladley, F. (2012, May 15). Backdoor.Briba. Retrieved February 21, 2018.
  28. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, October 12). BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises. Retrieved January 4, 2018.
  29. Bennett, J., Vengerik, B. (2017, June 12). Behind the CARBANAK Backdoor. Retrieved June 11, 2018.
  30. Grunzweig, J.. (2017, April 20). Cardinal RAT Active for Over Two Years. Retrieved December 8, 2018.
  31. PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.
  32. Matveeva, V. (2017, August 15). Secrets of Cobalt. Retrieved October 10, 2018.
  33. Yadav, A., et al. (2017, August 31). Cobian RAT – A backdoored RAT. Retrieved November 13, 2018.
  34. Grunzweig, J. (2018, January 31). Comnie Continues to Target Organizations in East Asia. Retrieved June 7, 2018.
  35. Anthe, C. et al. (2015, October 19). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 19. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
  36. F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
  37. Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
  38. TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018.
  39. Kujawa, A. (2018, March 27). You dirty RAT! Part 1: DarkComet. Retrieved November 6, 2018.
  40. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT A Story of Unusual Hospitality. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  41. ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017.
  42. US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.
  43. ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.
  44. Falcone, R., et al.. (2015, June 16). Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
  46. Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2016, February 3). Emissary Trojan Changelog: Did Operation Lotus Blossom Cause It to Evolve?. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
  47. Symantec. (2018, July 18). The Evolution of Emotet: From Banking Trojan to Threat Distributor. Retrieved March 25, 2019.
  48. US-CERT. (2018, July 20). Alert (TA18-201A) Emotet Malware. Retrieved March 25, 2019.
  49. Özarslan, S. (2018, December 21). The Christmas Card you never wanted - A new wave of Emotet is back to wreak havoc. Retrieved March 25, 2019.
  50. Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
  51. Cherepanov, A. (2018, October). GREYENERGY A successor to BlackEnergy. Retrieved November 15, 2018.
  52. FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, June 16). FIN10: Anatomy of a Cyber Extortion Operation. Retrieved June 25, 2017.
  53. FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2016, April). Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6. Retrieved June 1, 2016.
  54. Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
  55. Carr, N., et al. (2018, August 01). On the Hunt for FIN7: Pursuing an Enigmatic and Evasive Global Criminal Operation. Retrieved August 23, 2018.
  56. Grunzweig, J. (2018, October 01). NOKKI Almost Ties the Knot with DOGCALL: Reaper Group Uses New Malware to Deploy RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
  57. FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved December 20, 2017.
  58. Allievi, A.,Flori, E. (2018, March 01). FinFisher exposed: A researcher’s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex virtual machines. Retrieved July 9, 2018.
  59. ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.
  60. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.
  61. Pantazopoulos, N. (2018, April 17). Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant. Retrieved November 2, 2018.
  62. Sherstobitoff, R., Saavedra-Morales, J. (2018, February 02). Gold Dragon Widens Olympics Malware Attacks, Gains Permanent Presence on Victims’ Systems. Retrieved June 6, 2018.
  63. Falcone, R., et al. (2018, August 02). The Gorgon Group: Slithering Between Nation State and Cybercrime. Retrieved August 7, 2018.
  64. Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017.
  65. Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2015, December 16). Fidelis Threat Advisory #1020: Dissecting the Malware Involved in the INOCNATION Campaign. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
  66. Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, March 02). McAfee Uncovers Operation Honeybee, a Malicious Document Campaign Targeting Humanitarian Aid Groups. Retrieved May 16, 2018.
  67. Desai, D.. (2015, August 14). Chinese cyber espionage APT group leveraging recently leaked Hacking Team exploits to target a Financial Services Firm. Retrieved January 26, 2016.
  68. Shelmire, A.. (2015, July 6). Evasive Maneuvers. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
  69. ASERT Team. (2018, April 04). Innaput Actors Utilize Remote Access Trojan Since 2016, Presumably Targeting Victim Files. Retrieved July 9, 2018.
  70. ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 1: Approaching the Target. Retrieved November 8, 2016.
  71. Yadav, A., et al. (2016, January 29). Malicious Office files dropping Kasidet and Dridex. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
  1. Manuel, J. and Plantado, R.. (2015, August 9). Win32/Kasidet. Retrieved March 24, 2016.
  2. Levene, B, et al. (2017, May 03). Kazuar: Multiplatform Espionage Backdoor with API Access. Retrieved July 17, 2018.
  3. Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
  4. Rascagneres, P. (2017, May 03). KONNI: A Malware Under The Radar For Years. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
  5. Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.
  6. Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Remote Administration Tools & Content Staging Malware Report. Retrieved March 16, 2016.
  7. Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, February 12). Lazarus Resurfaces, Targets Global Banks and Bitcoin Users. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
  8. Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  9. FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
  10. Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017.
  11. ClearSky Cyber Security and Trend Micro. (2017, July). Operation Wilted Tulip: Exposing a cyber espionage apparatus. Retrieved August 21, 2017.
  12. Minerva Labs LTD and ClearSky Cyber Security. (2015, November 23). CopyKittens Attack Group. Retrieved September 11, 2017.
  13. Stama, D.. (2015, February 6). Backdoor.Mivast. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
  14. ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
  15. Singh, S. et al.. (2018, March 13). Iranian Threat Group Updates Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Spear Phishing Campaign. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
  16. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 10). MuddyWater expands operations. Retrieved November 2, 2018.
  17. F-Secure Labs. (2016, July). NANHAISHU RATing the South China Sea. Retrieved July 6, 2018.
  18. Patel, K. (2018, March 02). The NanoCore RAT Has Resurfaced From the Sewers. Retrieved November 9, 2018.
  19. Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, May 31). NavRAT Uses US-North Korea Summit As Decoy For Attacks In South Korea. Retrieved June 11, 2018.
  20. McAfee. (2015, March 2). Netwire RAT Behind Recent Targeted Attacks. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  21. Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2018, September 27). New KONNI Malware attacking Eurasia and Southeast Asia. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
  22. Cymmetria. (2016). Unveiling Patchwork - The Copy-Paste APT. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
  23. Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018.
  24. Grunzweig, J., et al. (2016, May 24). New Wekby Attacks Use DNS Requests As Command and Control Mechanism. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
  25. Ash, B., et al. (2018, June 26). RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families. Retrieved July 2, 2018.
  26. Vasilenko, R. (2013, December 17). An Analysis of PlugX Malware. Retrieved November 24, 2015.
  27. Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg. (2013, March 29). Analysis of a PlugX variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
  28. Hayashi, K. (2005, August 18). Backdoor.Darkmoon. Retrieved February 23, 2018.
  29. Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
  30. Brumaghin, E. and Grady, C.. (2017, March 2). Covert Channels and Poor Decisions: The Tale of DNSMessenger. Retrieved March 8, 2017.
  31. PowerShellMafia. (2012, May 26). PowerSploit - A PowerShell Post-Exploitation Framework. Retrieved February 6, 2018.
  32. PowerSploit. (n.d.). PowerSploit. Retrieved February 6, 2018.
  33. Ackerman, G., et al. (2018, December 21). OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive Adversary. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
  34. Cherepanov, A.. (2016, May 17). Operation Groundbait: Analysis of a surveillance toolkit. Retrieved May 18, 2016.
  35. Kasza, A. and Reichel, D.. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
  36. Elovitz, S. & Ahl, I. (2016, August 18). Know Your Enemy: New Financially-Motivated & Spear-Phishing Group. Retrieved February 26, 2018.
  37. Nicolas Verdier. (n.d.). Retrieved January 29, 2018.
  38. Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
  39. Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
  40. Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018.
  41. Bacurio, F., Salvio, J. (2017, February 14). REMCOS: A New RAT In The Wild. Retrieved November 6, 2018.
  42. Legezo, D. (2019, January 30). Chafer used Remexi malware to spy on Iran-based foreign diplomatic entities. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
  43. Falcone, R., et al. (2018, July 27). New Threat Actor Group DarkHydrus Targets Middle East Government. Retrieved August 2, 2018.
  44. Ray, V., Hayashi, K. (2016, February 29). New Malware ‘Rover’ Targets Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. Retrieved February 29, 2016.
  45. Faou, M. and Boutin, J.. (2017, February). Read The Manual: A Guide to the RTM Banking Trojan. Retrieved March 9, 2017.
  46. Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017.
  47. Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016.
  48. Grunzweig, J.. (2015, July 14). Unit 42 Technical Analysis: Seaduke. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
  49. Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A. (2018, October 18). ‘Operation Oceansalt’ Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group. Retrieved November 30, 2018.
  50. Hasherezade. (2016, September 12). Smoke Loader – downloader with a smokescreen still alive. Retrieved March 20, 2018.
  51. FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.
  52. Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
  53. Blasco, J. (2013, March 21). New Sykipot developments [Blog]. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  54. Pantazopoulos, N., Henry T. (2018, May 18). Emissary Panda – A potential new malicious tool. Retrieved June 25, 2018.
  55. Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.
  56. Anthony, N., Pascual, C.. (2018, November 1). Trickbot Shows Off New Trick: Password Grabber Module. Retrieved November 16, 2018.
  57. Microsoft. (2017, September 15). Backdoor:Win32/Truvasys.A!dha. Retrieved November 30, 2017.
  58. ESET Research. (2018, May 22). Turla Mosquito: A shift towards more generic tools. Retrieved July 3, 2018.
  59. Gavriel, H. & Erbesfeld, B. (2018, April 11). New ‘Early Bird’ Code Injection Technique Discovered. Retrieved May 24, 2018.
  60. Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017.
  61. Zhou, R. (2012, May 15). Backdoor.Vasport. Retrieved February 22, 2018.
  62. Xiao, C. (2018, September 17). Xbash Combines Botnet, Ransomware, Coinmining in Worm that Targets Linux and Windows. Retrieved November 14, 2018.
  63. ESET. (2018, November 20). Sednit: What’s going on with Zebrocy?. Retrieved February 12, 2019.
  64. Brumaghin, E., et al. (2017, November 02). Poisoning the Well: Banking Trojan Targets Google Search Results. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
  65. Ebach, L. (2017, June 22). Analysis Results of Zeus.Variant.Panda. Retrieved November 5, 2018.
  66. Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  67. Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016.
  68. NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016.
  69. Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.
  70. Microsoft. (2012, June 27). Using Software Restriction Policies and AppLocker Policies. Retrieved April 7, 2016.
  71. Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.