Check out the results from our first round of ATT&CK Evaluations at attackevals.mitre.org!

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. [1] These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce

The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Visa and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. [2] For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll" [3]

The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders

Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.

ID: T1060

Tactic: Persistence

Platform:  Windows

Permissions Required:  User, Administrator

Data Sources:  Windows Registry, File monitoring

CAPEC ID:  CAPEC-270

Contributors:  Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe

Version: 1.0

Examples

NameDescription
ADVSTORESHELL

ADVSTORESHELL achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[4][5][6]

APT19

An APT19 HTTP malware variant establishes persistence by setting the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Debug Tools-%LOCALAPPDATA%\.[7]

APT29

APT29 added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[8]

APT3

APT3 places scripts in the startup folder for persistence.[9]

APT37

APT37's has added persistence via the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\.[10][11]

Backdoor.Oldrea

Backdoor.Oldrea adds Registry Run keys to achieve persistence.[12]

BACKSPACE

BACKSPACE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory.[13]

BADNEWS

BADNEWS installs a registry Run key to establish persistence.[14]

BBSRAT

BBSRAT has been loaded through DLL side-loading of a legitimate Citrix executable that is set to persist through the registry run key location: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ssonsvr.exe

Bisonal

Bisonal adds itself to the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\ for persistence.[15]

BlackEnergy

The BlackEnergy 3 variant drops its main DLL component and then creates a .lnk shortcut to that file in the startup folder.[16]

Briba

Briba creates run key Registry entries pointing to malicious DLLs dropped to disk.[17]

BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER has used a batch script that adds a Registry Run key to establish malware persistence.[18]

Carbanak

Carbanak stores a configuration files in the startup directory to automatically execute commands in order to persist across reboots.[19]

ChChes

ChChes establishes persistence by adding a Registry Run key.[20]

Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group has used Registry Run keys for persistence. The group has also set a Startup path to launch the PowerShell shell command and download Cobalt Strike.[21]

Comnie

Comnie achieves persistence by adding a shortcut of itself to the startup path in the Registry.[22]

CORESHELL

CORESHELL has established persistence by creating autostart extensibility point (ASEP) Registry entries in the Run key and other Registry keys, as well as by creating shortcuts in the Internet Explorer Quick Start folder.[23]

CozyCar

One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to set itself to be executed at system startup by adding a Registry value under one of the following Registry keys:
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run[24]

CrossRAT

CrossRAT uses run keys for persistence on Windows

Dark Caracal

Dark Caracal's version of Bandook adds a registry key to HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[25]

Darkhotel

Darkhotel has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.[26]

DownPaper

DownPaper uses PowerShell to add a Registry Run key in order to establish persistence.[27]

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 added the registry value ntdll to the Registry Run key to establish persistence.[28]

DustySky

DustySky achieves persistence by creating a Registry entry in HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[29]

Elise

If establishing persistence by installation as a new service fails, one variant of Elise establishes persistence for the created .exe file by setting the following Registry key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost : %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Network\svchost.exe. Other variants have set the following Registry key for persistence: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\imejp : [self].[30]

Emissary

Variants of Emissary have added Run Registry keys to establish persistence.[31]

EvilGrab

EvilGrab adds a Registry Run key for ctfmon.exe to establish persistence.[20]

FIN10

FIN10 has established persistence by using the Registry option in PowerShell Empire to add a Run key.[32][33]

FIN6

FIN6 has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence for its downloader tools known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD.[34]

FIN7

FIN7 malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.[35][36]

FinFisher

FinFisher establishes persistence by creating the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Run.[37][38]

FLASHFLOOD

FLASHFLOOD achieves persistence by making an entry in the Registry's Run key.[13]

Gazer

Gazer can establish persistence by creating a .lnk file in the Start menu.[39][40]

Gold Dragon

Gold Dragon establishes persistence in the Startup folder.[41]

Gorgon Group

Gorgon Group malware can create a .lnk file and add a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[42]

Helminth

Helminth establishes persistence by creating a shortcut in the Start Menu folder.[43]

Hi-Zor

Hi-Zor creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[44]

Honeybee

Honeybee uses a batch file that configures the ComSysApp service to autostart in order to establish persistence.[45]

HTTPBrowser

HTTPBrowser has established persistence by setting the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key value for wdm to the path of the executable. It has also used the Registry entry HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run vpdn "%ALLUSERPROFILE%\%APPDATA%\vpdn\VPDN_LU.exe" to establish persistence.[46][47]

InnaputRAT

Some InnaputRAT variants establish persistence by modifying the Registry key HKU\\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run:%appdata%\NeutralApp\NeutralApp.exe.[48]

JHUHUGIT

JHUHUGIT has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process.[49]

Kasidet

Kasidet creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[50][51]

Kazuar

Kazuar adds a sub-key under several Registry run keys.[52]

Ke3chang

Several Ke3chang backdoors achieved persistence by adding a Run key.[53]

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group malware attempts to maintain persistence by saving itself in the Start menu folder or by adding a Registry Run key.[54][55][56]

Leviathan

Leviathan has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder that points to its main backdoor.[57][58]

Magic Hound

Magic Hound malware has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[59]

Matroyshka

Matroyshka can establish persistence by adding Registry Run keys.[60][61]

Mivast

Mivast creates the following Registry entry: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Micromedia.[62]

Mosquito

Mosquito establishes persistence under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Run auto_update.[63]

MuddyWater

MuddyWater has added Registry Run keys to establish persistence.[64]

NanHaiShu

NanHaiShu modifies the %regrun% Registry to point itself to an autostart mechanism.[65]

NavRAT

NavRAT creates a Registry key to ensure a file gets executed upon reboot in order to establish persistence.[66]

NETEAGLE

The "SCOUT" variant of NETEAGLE achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[13]

NETWIRE

NETWIRE creates a Registry start-up entry to establish persistence.[67]

Patchwork

Patchwork has added the path of its second-stage malware to the startup folder to achieve persistence. One of its file stealers has also persisted by adding a Registry Run key.[68][69]

Pisloader

Pisloader establishes persistence via a Registry Run key.[70]

PLAINTEE

PLAINTEE gains persistence by adding the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce.[71]

PlugX

PlugX can add a Run key entry in the Registry to establish persistence.[72][20]

PoisonIvy

PoisonIvy creates run key Registry entries pointing to a malicious executable dropped to disk.[73]

PowerDuke

PowerDuke achieves persistence by using various Registry Run keys.[74]

POWERSOURCE

POWERSOURCE achieves persistence by setting a Registry Run key, with the path depending on whether the victim account has user or administrator access.[75]

PowerSploit

PowerSploit's New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[76][77]

Prikormka

Prikormka adds itself to a Registry Run key with the name guidVGA or guidVSA.[78]

Pteranodon

Pteranodon copies itself to the Startup folder to establish persistence.[79]

PUNCHBUGGY

PUNCHBUGGY can establish using a Registry run key.[80]

Pupy

Pupy adds itself to the startup folder or adds itself to the Registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[81]

Putter Panda

A dropper used by Putter Panda installs itself into the ASEP Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with a value named McUpdate.[82]

Reaver

Reaver creates a shortcut file and saves it in a Startup folder to establish persistence.[83]

RedLeaves

RedLeaves attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence. If this fails, it attempts to add Registry Run keys.[20][84]

RogueRobin

RogueRobin created a shortcut in the Windows startup folder to launch a PowerShell script each time the user logs in to establish persistence.[85]

Rover

Rover persists by creating a Registry entry in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\.[86]

RTM

RTM tries to add a Registry Run key under the name "Windows Update" to establish persistence.[87]

RunningRAT

RunningRAT adds itself to the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence upon reboot.[41]

S-Type

S-Type may create a .lnk file to itself that is saved in the Start menu folder. It may also create the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ IMJPMIJ8.1{3 characters of Unique Identifier}.[88]

Sakula

Most Sakula samples maintain persistence by setting the Registry Run key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ in the HKLM or HKCU hive, with the Registry value and file name varying by sample.[89]

SeaDuke

SeaDuke is capable of persisting via the Registry Run key or a .lnk file stored in the Startup directory.[90]

SHIPSHAPE

SHIPSHAPE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the Startup folder.[13]

Smoke Loader

Smoke Loader adds a Registry Run key for persistence and adds a script in the Startup folder to deploy the payload.[91]

SNUGRIDE

SNUGRIDE establishes persistence through a Registry Run key.[92]

SPACESHIP

SPACESHIP achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the current user's Startup folder.[13]

SslMM

To establish persistence, SslMM identifies the Start Menu Startup directory and drops a link to its own executable disguised as an "Office Start," "Yahoo Talk," "MSN Gaming Z0ne," or "MSN Talk" shortcut.[93]

Sykipot

Sykipot has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.[94]

Threat Group-3390

A Threat Group-3390 tool can add the binary’s path to the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to add persistence.[95]

TINYTYPHON

TINYTYPHON installs itself under Registry Run key to establish persistence.[14]

TinyZBot

TinyZBot can create a shortcut in the Windows startup folder for persistence.[96]

Trojan.Karagany

Trojan.Karagany can create a link to itself in the Startup folder to automatically start itself upon system restart.[12]

Truvasys

Truvasys adds a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[97]

Turla

A Turla Javascript backdoor added a local_update_check value under the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence. Additionally, a Turla custom executable containing Metasploit shellcode is saved to the Startup folder to gain persistence.[63][98]

TURNEDUP

TURNEDUP is capable of writing to a Registry Run key to establish.[99]

USBStealer

USBStealer registers itself under a Registry Run key with the name "USB Disk Security."[100]

Vasport

Vasport copies itself to disk and creates an associated run key Registry entry to establish.[101]

Mitigation

Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through run key or startup folder persistence using whitelisting [102] tools like AppLocker [103] [104] or Software Restriction Policies [105] where appropriate. [106]

Detection

Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. [107] Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.

Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.

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