You can help contribute to ATT&CK.
ATT&CK is in a constant state of development. We are always on the lookout for new information to help refine and extend what is covered. If you have additional techniques, know about variations on one already covered, have examples of techniques in use, or have other relevant information, then we would like to hear from you.
We are looking for contributions in the following areas in particular, but if you have other information you think may be useful, please reach us at firstname.lastname@example.org.
All contributions and feedback to ATT&CK are appreciated. Due to the high volume of contributions, it may take us about a week to get back to you. We may ask you follow-up questions to help us understand your contribution and gather additional information. We recommend you read our philosophy paper to understand our approach to maintaining ATT&CK so that we get the right details up front. If we find the contribution fills a gap, then we will make edits and send you a draft version of the technique or Group/Software page for your review prior to it being published, listing you as a contributor if desired. Content updates happen roughly every 3-6 months.
Contributing to ATT&CK
We appreciate your help to let us know about what new techniques and technique variations adversaries and red teamers are using. You can start by emailing us the technique name, a brief description, and references or knowledge about how it is being used by adversaries or red teams. We suggest you take a close look at what we already have on our site, paying attention to the level of abstraction of techniques. Since we are working on adding new technique details constantly, we will deconflict what you send with what we’re working on. We’ll provide feedback and work with you to get the content added.
macOS and Linux
While we are looking for new techniques for Windows, macOS, and Linux, we are interested in macOS and Linux techniques in particular since there is a lack of publicly available threat intel for techniques used against those systems. This leads to gaps in the knowledge base that you can help fill.
We map Group and Software examples on our site, and there is too much open source threat intelligence reporting for us to keep up on everything. We appreciate your help with referenced information about how Groups and Software samples use ATT&CK techniques. Threat intelligence contributions are most helpful to us when they are in the specific format we have on our website, including citing techniques and group names or associated groups to publicly-available references. We ask that you provide the technique name, a brief description of how the technique is implemented, and the publicly-available reference.
We often don’t have direct access to endpoint or network log data for technique use in incidents. We’re always looking for partners who would be interested in sharing relevant data from logs that show how adversaries are using ATT&CK techniques beyond what appears in threat reporting.
Your Use Cases
It’s always helpful for us to hear about how you’re using ATT&CK in your organization. We appreciate any information you can share with us about your specific use case or application of ATT&CK, and particularly any success stories you’ve had as a result.
New Technique Example
COM, ROM, & BE GONE
Data Sources: Windows API, Process monitoring, or other sources that can be used to detect this activity
Description: Component Object Model (COM) servers associated with Graphics Interchange Format (GIF) image viewers can be abused to corrupt arbitrary memory banks. Adversaries may leverage this opportunity to modify, mux, and maliciously annoy (MMA) read-only memory (ROM) regularly accessed during normal system operations.
Detection: Monitor the JIF viewers for muxing and malicious annoyance. Use event ID 423420 and 234222 to detect changes.
Mitigation: Configure the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet\001\Control\WindowsJIFControl\ to 0 to disable MMA access if not needed within the environment.
Adversary Use: Here is a publicly-available reference about FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK using this technique: (www[.]awesomeThreatReports[.]org/FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK_NOMS _ON_ROM_VIA_COM). Additionally, our red team uses this in our operations.
Additional References: Here is a reference from the researcher who discovered this technique: (www[.]crazySmartResearcher[.]net/POC_DETECTIONS_&_MITIGATIONS_4_WHEN_COM_RAMS_ROM)
Group & Software Example
Group Name: FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK (www[.]sourceX[.]com)
Associated Groups: APT1337 (www[.]sourceY[.]com)
Description: FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK is a Great Lakes-based threat group that has been active since at least May 2018. The group focuses on targeting the aviation sector. (www[.]sourceY[.]com)
- Spearphishing Attachment (T1193) – FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK has used spearphishing email attachments containing images of stale bread to deliver malware. (www[.]sourceX[.]com)
- File and Directory Discovery (T1083) – FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK has searched files and directories for the string *quack*. (www[.]sourceY[.]com)
Software Name: FLYINGV (www[.]sourceX[.]com) (wwwVsourceZ[.]com)
Group Association: FLYINGV has been used by FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK. (www[.]sourceZ[.]com)
Description: FLYINGV is custom malware used by FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK as a second-stage RAT. (www[.]sourceZ[.]com)
- Registry Run Keys / Start Folder (T1060) – FLYINGV has added the Registry Run key “HueyDeweyLouie” to establish persistence. (www[.]sourceX[.]com)
- File and Directory Discovery (T1083) – FLYINGV has used rundll32.exe to load its malicious dll file, estevez.dll. (www[.]sourceX[.]com)
Content Errors on the Website
If you find errors or typos on the site related to content, please let us know by sending an email to email@example.com with the subject Website Content Error.
Please let us know the following:
- The url where you found the error.
- A short description of the error.
Examples of errors:
- Typos and syntax errors
- Improperly formatted web pages
- 404 errors when links are clicked
The following individuals or organizations have contributed information regarding the existence of a technique, details on how to detect and/or mitigate use of a technique, or threat intelligence on adversary use:
- Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
- Alan Neville, @abnev
- Anastasios Pingios
- Andrew Smith, @jakx_
- Barry Shteiman, Exabeam
- Bart Parys
- Bartosz Jerzman
- Bryan Lee
- Carlos Borges, CIP
- Casey Smith
- Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek
- Cody Thomas, SpecterOps
- Craig Aitchison
- Cybereason Nocturnus, @nocturnus
- Daniel Oakley
- Darren Spruell
- Dave Westgard
- David Ferguson, CyberSponse
- David Lu, Tripwire
- David Routin
- Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
- Edward Millington
- Elger Vinicius S. Rodrigues, @elgervinicius, CYBINT Centre
- Elia Florio, Microsoft
- Elly Searle, CrowdStrike — contributed to tactic definitions
- Emily Ratliff, IBM
- Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas
- Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks
- Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus
- Hans Christoffer Gaardløs
- Itamar Mizrahi
- Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
- Jacob Wilkin, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
- Jan Miller, CrowdStrike
- Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson
- Jean-Ian Boutin, ESET
- Jeremy Galloway
- John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center
- John Strand
- Josh Abraham
- Justin Warner, ICEBRG
- Lab52 by S2 Grupo
- Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek
- Loic Jaquemet
- Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé, ESET
- Mark Wee
- Martin Smolar, ESET
- Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps
- Matt Kelly, @breakersall
- Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
- Matthew Molyett, @s1air
- Michael Cox
- Mike Kemmerer
- Milos Stojadinovic
- Nick Carr, FireEye
- Nik Seetharaman, Palantir
- Nishan Maharjan, @loki248
- Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe
- Oleg Skulkin, Group-IB
- Omkar Gudhate
- Patrick Campbell, @pjcampbe11
- Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center
- Pedro Harrison
- Rahmat Nurfauzi, @infosecn1nja, PT Xynexis International
- Red Canary
- RedHuntLabs (@redhuntlabs)
- Ricardo Dias
- Richard Gold, Digital Shadows
- Richie Cyrus, SpecterOps
- Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3
- Robert Falcone
- Romain Dumont, ESET
- Ryan Becwar
- Ryan Benson, Exabeam
- Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black
- Stefan Kanthak
- Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C
- Sunny Neo
- Sylvain Gil, Exabeam
- Teodor Cimpoesu
- Tim MalcomVetter
- Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure
- Tony Lambert, Red Canary
- Travis Smith, Tripwire
- Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence
- Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.
- Veeral Patel
- Vincent Le Toux
- Walker Johnson
- Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank
- Yonatan Gotlib, Deep Instinct
Thanks to those who have contributed to ATT&CK!