

Module 3: Storing and Analyzing ATT&CK® Mapped Data

Jackie Lasky



Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Public Release Case Number 23-4342

MITRE | SOLVING PROBLEMS
FOR A SAFER WORLD®

Module 3 Agenda



Lesson 3.1: Storing and
Displaying ATT&CK mapped
Data



Lesson 3.2: Expressing
ATT&CK mapped Data



Lesson 3.3: Analyzing
ATT&CK mapped Data



Lesson 3.4: Compare Layers
in ATT&CK Navigator



Lesson 3.1

Storing and

Displaying

ATT&CK® Mapped

Data





Lesson 3.1 Objectives

1

Consider who (or what) will be consuming the mapped CTI

2

Identify the most effective storage platform for your environment and requirements



Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data: Considerations

Who's consuming it?

Human or machine?

What are the intelligence requirements?

How will you provide context?

How detailed will it be?

Include full text?

Just a Technique/sub-technique, or a Procedure?

How will you capture that detail?

- (Free text?) How will you link it to other CTI?
- Incident, group, campaign, indicator?

How will you import and export data?

What format will you use?



Storing and Displaying ATT&CK Mapped Data



Scheduled Task

Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system.^[1]

An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.

Contents [hide]

- 1 Examples
- 2 Mitigation
- 3 Detection
- 4 References

Scheduled Task

Technique	
ID	T1053
Tactic	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Platform	Windows
Permissions	User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Required	
Effective	User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Permissions	
Data Sources	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Supports Remote	Yes
CAPEC ID	CAPEC-557 🔗
Contributors	Travis Smith, Tripwire, Leo Loobeck, @leoloobeck, Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security

Examples

- APT18 actors used the native at Windows task scheduler tool to use scheduled



Storing and Displaying ATT&CK Mapped Data

Tags tip:white x Unstructured x osint:source-type="technical-report" x dnc:malware-type="CoinMiner" x +

Date 2018-11-13

Threat Level Undefined

Analysis Completed

Distribution All communities ?

Info OSINT: WebCobra Malware Uses Victims' Computers to Mine Cryptocurrency

Published Yes (2019-01-26 14:09:07)

#Attributes 44

First recorded change 2018-11-13 16:10:27

Last change 2018-11-13 16:10:27

Modification map 

Sightings 0 (0) 



MISP Threat Sharing

Galaxies

Intrusion Set Q

- + ⊕ Tropic Trooper
- + ⊕ Valid Accounts
- + ⊕ Rundll32 - T101
- + ⊕ Web Shell - T11
- + ⊕ Registry Run K
- + ⊕ Accessibility F
- + ⊕ DLL Side-Load
- + ⊕ Deobfuscate/D
- + ⊕ Application Wi
- + ⊕ File and Direct
- + ⊕ Process Discov
- + ⊕ Query Registry
- + ⊕ System Inform
- + ⊕ System Service
- + ⊕ Standard Crypt
- + ⊕ Remote File Co
- + ⊕ Exfiltration Ov

Galaxies

Threat Actor Q

- Sofacy Q ≡ ☰

Description

The Sofacy Group (also known as APT28, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear and Sednit) is a cyber espionage group believed to have ties to the Russian government. Likely operating since 2007, the group is known to target government, military, and security organizations. It has been characterized as an advanced persistent threat.

Synonyms

- APT 28
- APT28
- Pawn Storm
- Fancy Bear
- Sednit
- TsarTeam
- TG-4127
- Group-4127
- STRONTIUM
- Grey-Cloud

Source

- MISP Project

Authors

- Alexandre Dulaunoy
- Florian Roth
- Thomas Schreck
- Timo Steffens
- Various

Country


- RU

Refs

- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sofacy_Group

Add new cluster

Storing and Displaying ATT&CK Mapped Data



The screenshot shows the MISP interface with several indicators listed on the left and their associated ATT&CK mappings on the right. The indicators include:

- 2018-10-16, Name: ip-port, References: 0, Referenced by: 1. Associated with Attack Pattern: Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041 and Data Encrypted - T1022.
- 2018-10-16, Network activity, hostname: sincirewdo.ru. Associated with Attack Pattern: Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041 and Data Encrypted - T1022.
- 2018-10-16, Network activity, ip: 46.36.220.116. Associated with Attack Pattern: Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041 and Data Encrypted - T1022.
- 2018-10-16, Network activity, dst-port: 443. Associated with Attack Pattern: Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041 and Data Encrypted - T1022.
- 2018-10-16, External analysis, attachment, showing a screenshot of a spearphishing attachment.

Courtesy of Alexandre Dulaunoy

Ability to link to indicators and files



Lesson 3.1 Summary

- 1 Considered how the ATT&CK mapped data would be consumed, linked, contextualized, and imported/exported
- 2 Reviewed internal and external storage platform options for your environment and requirements

Lesson 3.2

Expressing and Storing ATT&CK® Mapped Data



Lesson 3.2 Objectives

1 Review methods for expressing and storing mapped-data

2 Identify the most effective approach for your environment and requirements



Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

Who Is Calling? CDRThief Targets Linux VoIP Softswitches

(published: September 10, 2020)

A new malware named “CDRThief” has been identified by ESET researchers. Targeting VoIP softswitches Linknat VOS2009 and VOS3000, the malware exfiltrates call data such as caller, call duration, call fee, callee IP address among other information. The call information is stolen from an internal MySQL database which is accessed using credentials taken from the softswitch config files. While the passwords are encrypted, CDRThief is able to decrypt them for use.

MITRE ATT&CK: [\[MITRE ATT&CK\] Obfuscated Files or Information - T1027](#) | [\[MITRE ATT&CK\] System Information Discovery - T1082](#) | [\[MITRE ATT&CK\] Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041](#)

**Techniques at the
end of a report**

ANOMALI



Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

Techniques at the end of a report

Analyzing Operation GhostSecret: Attack Seeks to Steal Data Worldwide

MITRE ATT&CK techniques



- Exfiltration over control server channel: data is exfiltrated over the control server channel using a custom protocol
- Commonly used port: the attackers used common ports such as port 443 for control server communications
- Service execution: registers the implant as a service on the victim's machine
- Automated collection: the implant automatically collects data about the victim and sends it to the control server
- Data from local system: local system is discovered and data is gathered
- Process discovery: implants can list processes running on the system
- System time discovery: part of the data reconnaissance method, the system time is also sent to the control server
- File deletion: malware can wipe files indicated by the attacker



Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

Growing Tensions Between U.S., DPRK Coincide with Higher Rate of CHOLLIMA Activity

Techniques Observed

- Persistence: New Service
- Defense Evasion: Masquerading
- Discovery: System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, File and Directory Discovery
- Command and Control

Techniques at the beginning of a report



CROWDSTRIKE

Consistent with reporting trends across the community, OverWatch saw an increase in threat activity attributed to North Korea in 2017. For example, in mid-May, STARDUST CHOLLIMA actors exploited a web-facing SMB server belonging to a high-profile research institution located in the U.S. They leveraged access to install the following malicious DLL:

<https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2018-crowdstrike-global-threat-report-blurring-the-lines-between-statecraft-and-tradecraft/>

Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data



**In-text
Techniques
in a report**



Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations

Original release date: February 18, 2020 | Last revised: July 16, 2020

Print

Tweet

Send

Share

Summary

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) encourages asset owner operators across all critical infrastructure sectors to review the below threat actor techniques and ensure the corresponding mitigations are applied.

CISA responded to a cyberattack affecting control and communication assets on the operational technology (OT) network of a natural gas compression facility. A cyber threat actor used a *Spearphishing Link* [T1192] to obtain initial access to the organization's information technology (IT) network before pivoting to its OT network. The threat actor then deployed commodity ransomware to *Encrypt Data for Impact* [T1486] on both networks. Specific assets experiencing a *Loss of Availability* [T826] on the OT network included human machine interfaces (HMIs), data historians, and polling servers. Impacted assets were no longer able to read and aggregate real-time operational data reported from low-level OT devices, resulting in a partial *Loss of View* [T829] for human operators. The attack did not impact any programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and at no point did the victim lose control of operations. Although the victim's emergency response plan

<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-049a>

Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

digital shadows

Mitre ATT&CK™ and the Mueller GRU Indictment:
Lessons for Organizations

Adding additional
info to an ATT&CK
technique

MITRE ATT&CK Stage



1. Initial Access

GRU Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

Trusted Relationship


Mitigation Advice

- 3rd parties, such as suppliers and partner organizations, typically have privileged access via a trusted relationship into certain environments.
- These relationships can be abused by attackers to subvert security controls and gain unauthorized access into target environments.
- Managing trusted relationships, like supply chains, is an incredibly complex topic. The NCSC (National Cyber Security Center) has an excellent overview of this challenging topic.

<https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/mitre-attck-and-the-mueller-gru-indictment-lessons-for-organizations/>



Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data



Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

PLAYBOOK VIEWER	
Description	Indicator Pattern
Technique: T1064: Scripting <small>REFERENCE</small> Sysget writes a batch script in the %TEMP% folder to clean up the original files and spawning a newly written winlogon.exe executable.	[process:command_line = '@echo off :t timeout 1 for /f %%i in (\`tasklist /FI "IMAGENAME eq [original_executable_name]\`" ^ find /v /c "\`") do set Y0=%%i if %%Y0%%==4 goto :t del /F "[original_executable_path]" del /F "[tmp_file]" start /B cmd /c "[startup_winlogon.exe]" del /F "[self]" exit']

Technique: T1071: Standard Application Layer Protocol <small>REFERENCE</small>	
Description	Indicator Pattern
C2 server communicates over HTTP and embeds data within the Cookie HTTP header.	[domain-name:value = '2014.zzux.com']

https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/



Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

Event Triggered
Execution:
Component Object
Model Hijacking

APT28 has used COM hijacking for persistence by replacing the legitimate `MMDeviceEnumerator` object with a payload. [23][11]

<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/>

Full-Text Report

APT15 was also observed using Mimikatz to **dump credentials** and generate **Kerberos golden tickets**. This allowed the group to persist in the victim's network in the event of

ATT&CK Technique
OS Credential Dumping (T1003)

<https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/>



Lesson 3.2 Summary

- 1 Reviewed various methods and levels of detail for expressing and storing mapped-data
- 2 Examined how to identify the most effective approach for your environment and requirements



Lesson 3.3

Analyzing ATT&CK®

Mapped Data



Lesson 3.3 Objectives




- 1 Review the ATT&CK Navigator process for storing, analyzing, visualizing and exporting data in ATT&CK Navigator
- 2 Learn how to prioritize techniques and sub-techniques to inform actionable intelligence

APT28 Techniques


Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Active Scanning	Acquire Infrastructure	Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter	Account Manipulation	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism	Brute Force	Account Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Archive Collected Data	Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Account Access Removal	
Gather Victim Host Information	Compromise Accounts	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Exploitation for Client Execution	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Credentials from Password Stores	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Audio Capture	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Transfer	Data Destruction	
Gather Victim Identity Information	Compromise Infrastructure	External Remote Services	Inter-Process Communication	BITs Jobs	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution	Exploitation for Credential Access	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Automated Collection	Data Throughput Limitation	Data Size Limits	Data Encrypted for Impact	
Gather Victim Network Information	Develop Capabilities	Hardware Additions	Native API	Boot or Logon Initialization Script	Boot or Logon Initialization Script	Forced Authentication	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Remote Service Session Hijacking	Clipboard Data	Data Encoding	Data Exfiltration Over Alternative Host	Data Manipulation	
Gather Victim Org Information	Establish Accounts	Phishing	Scheduled Task/Job	Browser Extensions	Create or Modify System Process	Input Capture	Cloud Service Dashboard	Remote Services	Data from Cloud Storage Object	Data from Configuration Repository	Data Over C2 Channel	Defacement	
Phishing for Information	Obtain Capabilities	Replication Through Removable Media	Shared Modules	Compromise Client Software Binary	Event Triggered Execution	Execution Guardrails	Cloud Service Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Data from Configuration Repository	Dynamic Resolution	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Disk Wipe	
Search Closed Sources	Supply Chain Compromise	Supply Chain Compromise	Create or Modify System Process	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Main-in-the-Middle	Domain Trust Discovery	Domain Shared Content	Encrypted Channel	Endpoint Denial of Service	Exfiltration Over Web Service	Resource Hijacking	
Search Open Technical Databases	Trusted Relationship	Trusted Relationship	Event Triggered Execution	File and Directory Permissions Modification	File and Directory Permissions Modification	Modify Authentication	File and Directory Discovery	Data from Local System	Fallback Channels	Firmware Corruption	Inhibit System Recovery	Service Stop	
Search Open Websites/Domains	Valid Accounts	Valid Accounts	External Remote Services	Hijack Execution Flow	Group Policy Modification	Network Sniffing	File and Directory Discovery	Ingress Tool Transfer	Multi-Stage Channels	Non-Application Layer Protocol	Network Denial of Service	System Shutdown/Reboot	
Search Victim-Owned Websites			Hijack Execution Flow	Hijack Execution Flow	Hijack Execution Flow	OS Credential Dumping	Network Service Scanning	Data from Network Shared Drive	Non-Standard Port	Protocol Tunneling	Resource Hijacking		
			Implant Container Image	Implant Defenses	Hide Artifacts	Steal Application Access Token	Network Share Discovery	Data from Removable Media	Protocol Tunneling	Proxy	Service Stop		
			Office Application Startup	Indicator Removal on Host	Group Policy Modification	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets	Network Sniffing	Data Staged	Remote System Discovery	Remote Access Software	System Shutdown/Reboot		
			Pre-OS Boot	Indirect Command Execution	Hijack Execution Flow	Steal Web Session Cookie	Password Policy Discovery	Email Collection	Screen Signaling	Traffic Signaling			
			Scheduled Task/Job	Masquerading	Indicator Removal on Host	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	Peripheral Device Discovery	Input Capture	Video Capture	Web Service			
			Server Software Component	Modify Authentication Process	Indirect Command Execution	Unsecured Credentials	Permission Groups Discovery	Man in the Browser					
			Traffic Signaling	Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure	Process Discovery	Process Discovery	System Information Discovery	Man-in-the-Middle					
			Valid Accounts	Modify Registry	Query Registry	Query Registry	System Network Configuration Discovery						
				Modify System Image	Remote System Discovery	Remote System Discovery	System Network Connections Discovery						
				Network Boundary Bridging	Software Discovery	Software Discovery	System Owner/User Discovery						
				Obfuscated Files or Information	System Service Discovery	System Service Discovery	System Service Discovery						
					Rootkit	System Time Discovery	System Time Discovery						
					Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion						
					Signed Script Proxy Execution								
					Subvert Trust Controls								
					Template Injection								
					Traffic Signaling								
					Third-Party Developer Utilities								
					Proxy Execution								
					Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions								
					Unauthenticated Material								
					Valid Accounts								
					Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion								
					Weaken Encryption								
					XSL Script								



APT29 Techniques & Sub-techniques



Comparing APT28 and APT29




Overlay known gaps

APT28

APT29

Both Groups

Choose Your Layer in Navigator



new tab x + MITRE ATT&CK® Navigator

Create New Layer Create a new empty layer

Enterprise Mobile ICS

More Options

version * Choose the version for the new layer. **Versions prior to ATT&CK v4 are not supported by Navigator v4.0.*

domain Choose a domain for the new layer.

Create

Open Existing Layer Load a layer from your computer or a URL


Create Layer from other layers Choose layers to inherit properties from

Create Customized Navigator Create a hyperlink to a customized ATT&CK Navigator


Now with domains and versions




1. Create an APT28 Layer in Navigator



2. Assign a Score and Rename the Layer



3. Create a New Layer



The image shows a screenshot of the ATT&CK Navigator interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with tabs for 'APT28' (selected), 'Resource Development' (6 techniques), 'Initial Access' (9 techniques), and 'Execution' (10 techniques). Below the navigation bar, a 'new tab' is open, displaying a 'Create New Layer' dialog box. The dialog box has a title 'Create New Layer' and a sub-instruction 'Create a new empty layer'. It includes three tabs: 'Enterprise' (selected), 'Mobile', and 'ICS'. Below these tabs is a 'More Options' button. The main content area of the 'new tab' shows three collapsed options: 'Open Existing Layer' (Load a layer from your computer or a URL), 'Create Layer from other layers' (Choose layers to inherit properties from), and 'Create Customized Navigator' (Create a hyperlink to a customized ATT&CK Navigator).

APT28 x +

renaissance techniques **Resource Development** 6 techniques **Initial Access** 9 techniques **Execution** 10 techniques

new tab x +

Create New Layer
Create a new empty layer

Enterprise Mobile ICS

More Options

Open Existing Layer Load a layer from your computer or a URL

Create Layer from other layers Choose layers to inherit properties from

Create Customized Navigator Create a hyperlink to a customized ATT&CK Navigator

4. Repeat the Process but Assign New Score

MITRE ATT&CK® Navigator


APT28 x APT29 x +

selection controls layer controls technique controls

Connaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Comm. Comp.	Impact
0 techniques	6 techniques	9 techniques	10 techniques	18 techniques	12 techniques	37 techniques	14 techniques	25 techniques	9 techniques	17 techniques	16 techniques	13 techniques
Scanning (0/2)	Acquire Infrastructure (1/6)	Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter (2/8)	Account Manipulation (0/4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (1/4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (1/4)	Brute Force (0/4)	Account Discovery (0/4)	Exploitation of Remote Services	Archive Collected Data (0/3)	Application Layer Protocol (0/4)	Automated Exfiltration (0/1)
Victim Host Identification (0/4)	Compromise Accounts (0/2)	Exploit Public-Facing Application	Exploit for Client Execution	BITS Jobs	Access Token Manipulation (0/5)	Access Token Manipulation (0/5)	Credentials from Password Stores (0/3)	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Audio Capture	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Transfer Size Limits
Victim Identity Identification (0/3)	Compromise Infrastructure (0/6)	External Remote Services	Inter-Process Communication (0/2)	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (2/12)	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (2/12)	BITS Jobs	Exploitation for Credential Access	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Automated Collection	Clipboard Data	Data Encoding (0/2)	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (0/3)
Victim Network Identification (0/6)	Develop Capabilities (1/4)	Hardware Additions	Native API	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (0/5)	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (0/5)	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Forced Authentication	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Cloud Service Dashboard	Cloud Service Discovery	Data Obfuscation (1/3)	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Victim Org Identification (0/4)	Establish Accounts (0/2)	Phishing (2/3)	Scheduled Task/Job (1/6)	Browser Extensions	Direct Volume Access	Execution Guardrails (0/1)	Input Capture (0/4)	Cloud Service Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	Dynamic Resolution (0/3)	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium (0/1)
Eng for Operation (0/3)	Obtain Capabilities (0/6)	Replication Through Removable Media	Shared Modules	Compromise Client Software Binary	Create or Modify System Process (0/4)	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Man-in-the-Middle (0/2)	Domain Trust Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	Encrypted Channel (0/2)	Firmware Corruption
Closed S (0/2)	Supply Chain Compromise (0/3)	System Services (0/2)	Create Account (0/3)	Event Triggered Execution (2/15)	File and Directory Permissions Modification (0/2)	File and Directory Permissions Modification (0/2)	Modify Authentication Process (0/4)	File and Directory Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	Fallback Channels	Inhibit System Recovery
Open calcuses (0/5)	Trusted Relationship	User Execution (1/2)	Create or Modify System Process (0/4)	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Group Policy Modification	Group Policy Modification	Network Sniffing	Network Service Scanning	Cloud Service Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	Ingress Tool Transfer	Network Defense Service (0/2)
Open Ses/Domains (0/2)	Valid Accounts (1/4)	Windows Management Instrumentation	Event Triggered Modification	Group Policy Modification	Hide Artifacts (0/7)	Hide Artifacts (0/7)	OS Credential Dumping (0/8)	Network Share Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	Cloud Service Discovery	Multi-Stage Channels	Resource Hijacking
Victim-Owned Ses			External Remote Services	Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	Steal Application Access Token	Network Sniffing	Cloud Service Discovery	Use Alternate Authentication Material (1/4)	Non-Application Layer Protocol	Scheduled Transfer
			Hijack Execution Flow (0/11)	Process Injection (0/11)	Impair Defenses (0/7)	Indicator Removal on	Steal or Forge	Password Policy Discovery	Data from Network Shared Drive	Data from Removable Media	Data Staged (0/2)	Transfer Data to Cloud Account
												System Shutdown/



5. Combine Layers & Adjust Score Colors




The screenshot shows the MITRE ATT&CK Navigator interface. On the left, the 'Create New Layer' section is open, showing options to 'Create New Layer', 'Open Existing Layer', and 'Create Layer from other layers'. The 'Create Layer from other layers' section is expanded, showing a 'domain' dropdown set to 'Enterprise ATT&CK v8', a 'score expression' input field containing 'a+b' (which is highlighted with a blue box), and other dropdowns for 'gradient', 'coloring', 'comments', 'states', 'filters', and 'filters'. On the right, the 'layer controls' section is open, showing a list of techniques under 'Discovery' and 'Lateral Movement'. The 'Lateral Movement' section is expanded, showing techniques like 'Exploitation of Remote Services' (highlighted with a red box) and 'Internal Spearphishing'. The 'Scoring Gradient' section is open, showing a color gradient from red to purple with 'Low value' set to '#ff6666' and 'High value' set to '#9f0e94' (both highlighted with blue boxes). A large green arrow points from the 'Create Layer from other layers' section towards the 'Scoring Gradient' section.

“Create Layer from other layers”, combine the scores you have in your two layers (a,b,), and enter the expression “a + b” into the score expression field.

Set low value for 1 and high value (combined techniques) for 3

6. Expand Sub-Techniques & Export/Visualize



7. Combined Layers Visualized in SVG



Lesson 3.3 Summary



- 1 Learned how to map multiple threat groups in ATT&CK Navigator to enable analysis and identification of overlapping techniques/sub-techniques.
- 2 Examined how to prioritize techniques and sub-techniques for actionable intelligence

Lesson 3.4

Exercise 3:

Comparing Layers in ATT&CK® Navigator



Lesson 3.4 Objectives



1

Practice defining and comparing layers in
Navigator

2

Review the overlapping techniques and sub-
techniques

Exercise 3: Comparing Layers in Navigator

- Refer to the Resources section for Exercise 3
 - The techniques and sub-techniques are listed in the “APT39 and Cobalt Kitty Techniques” PDF
- 1. Open ATT&CK Navigator: <http://bit.ly/attacknav>
- 2. Enter the techniques and sub-techniques from APT39 and Cobalt Kitty/OceanLotus into separate Navigator layers with a unique score for each layer.
- 3. Combine the layers in Navigator to create a third layer
- 4. Color score your third layer
- 5. Make a list of the techniques and sub-techniques that overlap between the two groups
- Please pause. We suggest giving yourself 15 minutes for this exercise.



Exercise 3: Comparing Layers in Navigator



APT39
Techniques/Subs

APT32 (OceanLotus)
Techniques/Subs

Overlapping
Techniques/Subs that
both groups employ

Exercise 3: Comparing Layers in Navigator

- What are some of the overlapping techniques and sub-techniques you identified?



Exercise 3: Comparing Layers in ATT&CK Navigator

Here are the overlapping techniques between APT39 and APT32:

Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001)

Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002)

Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059)

Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (T1053.005)

User Execution: Malicious Link (T1204.001)

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001)

Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027)

Network Service Scanning (T1046)



Lesson 3.4 Summary



- 1 Worked through defining and comparing layers in Navigator process and identified the overlapping techniques and sub-techniques
- 2 Reviewed the APT32 and APT39 intersecting outcomes

Next Up:

Module 4:
Making Defensive
Recommendations from
ATT&CK® Mapped Data



End of Module 3

