Module 3:
Storing and Analyzing ATT&CK® Mapped Data

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MITRE | SOLVING PROBLEMS FOR A SAFER WORLD®

Module 3 Agenda

Lesson 3.1: Storing and Displaying ATT&CK mapped Data

Lesson 3.2: Expressing ATT&CK mapped Data

Lesson 3.3: Analyzing ATT&CK mapped Data

Lesson 3.4: Compare Layers in ATT&CK Navigator

Lesson 3.1 Storing and Displaying ATT&CK® Mapped Data

Lesson 3.1 Objectives

1. Consider who (or what) will be consuming the mapped CTI
2. Identify the most effective storage platform for your environment and requirements

Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data: Considerations

Who's consuming it?	What are the intelligence requirements? How will you provide context?	How detailed will it be?	How will you capture that detail?	How will you import and export data?
Human or machine?	Include full text?	Just a Technique/ sub-technique, or a Procedure?	▪ (Free text?) How will you link it to other CTI? ▪ Incident, group, campaign, indicator?	What format will you use?

Storing and Displaying ATT&CK Mapped Data



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Data Drilldown
Using the API

Tactics
Initial Access
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Defense Evasion
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Lateral Movement
Collection
Exfiltration
Command and Control

Techniques
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Windows
Linux

Scheduled Task

Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system.[1]

An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.

Contents [hide]
1 Examples
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Examples

- APT18 actors used the native at Windows task scheduler tool to use scheduled

Scheduled Task
Technique

ID	T1053
Tactic	Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Platform	Windows
Permissions Required	User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Effective Permissions	User, Administrator, SYSTEM
Data Sources	File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
Supports Remote	Yes
CAPEC ID	CAPEC-557
Contributors	Travis Smith, Tripwire, Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek, Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security

Storing and Displaying ATT&CK Mapped Data

Tags	tlp:white x Unstructured x osint:source-type="technical-report" x dnc:malware-type="CoinMiner" x +
Date	2018-11-13
Threat Level	Undefined
Analysis	Completed
Distribution	All communities
Info	OSINT: WebCobra Malware Uses Victims' Computers to Mine Cryptocurrency
Published	Yes (2019-01-26 14:09:07)
#Attributes	44
First recorded change	2018-11-13 16:10:27
Last change	2018-11-13 16:10:27
Modification map	
Sightings	0 (0)



Storing and Displaying ATT&CK Mapped Data



Courtesy of Alexandre Dulaunoy

Ability to link to indicators and files

MISP Threat Sharing

Lesson 3.1 Summary

1. Considered how the ATT&CK mapped data would be consumed, linked, contextualized, and imported/exported
2. Reviewed internal and external storage platform options for your environment and requirements

Lesson 3.2 Expressing and Storing ATT&CK® Mapped Data

Lesson 3.2 Objectives

1. Review methods for expressing and storing mapped-data
2. Identify the most effective approach for your environment and requirements

Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

Who Is Calling? CDRThief Targets Linux VoIP Softswitches

(published: September 10, 2020)

A new malware named “CDRThief” has been identified by ESET researchers. Targeting VoIP softswitches Linknat VOS2009 and VOS3000, the malware exfiltrates call data such as caller, call duration, call fee, callee IP address among other information. The call information is stolen from an internal MySQL database which is accessed using credentials taken from the softswitch config files. While the passwords are encrypted, CDRThief is able to decrypt them for use.

MITRE ATT&CK: [MITRE ATT&CK] Obfuscated Files or Information - T1027 | [MITRE ATT&CK] System Information Discovery - T1082 | [MITRE ATT&CK] Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel - T1041

Techniques at the end of a report

ANOMALI

Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

Techniques at the end of a report

Analyzing Operation GhostSecret: Attack Seeks to Steal Data Worldwide

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

McAfee
Together is power.

- Exfiltration over control server channel: data is exfiltrated over the control server channel using a custom protocol
- Commonly used port: the attackers used common ports such as port 443 for control server communications
- Service execution: registers the implant as a service on the victim's machine
- Automated collection: the implant automatically collects data about the victim and sends it to the control server
- Data from local system: local system is discovered and data is gathered
- Process discovery: implants can list processes running on the system
- System time discovery: part of the data reconnaissance method, the system time is also sent to the control server
- File deletion: malware can wipe files indicated by the attacker

Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

Growing Tensions Between U.S., DPRK Coincide with Higher Rate of CHOLLIMA Activity

Techniques Observed

- Persistence: New Service
- Defense Evasion: Masquerading
- Discovery: System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, File and Directory Discovery
- Command and Control

CROWDSTRIKE

Consistent with reporting trends across the community, OverWatch saw an increase in threat activity attributed to North Korea in 2017. For example, in mid-May, STARDUST CHOLLIMA actors exploited a web-facing SMB server belonging to a high-profile research institution located in the U.S. They leveraged access to install the following malicious DLL:

Techniques at the beginning of a report

https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2018-crowdstrike-global-threat-report-blurring-the-lines-between-statecraft-and-tradecraft/

Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

Ransomware Impacting Pipeline Operations

Original release date: February 18, 2020 | Last revised: July 16, 2020

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Summary

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) encourages asset owner operators across all critical infrastructure sectors to review the below threat actor techniques and ensure the corresponding mitigations are applied.

CISA responded to a cyberattack affecting control and communication assets on the operational technology (OT) network of a natural gas compression facility. A cyber threat actor used a *Spearphishing Link* [T1192] to obtain initial access to the organization's information technology (IT) network before pivoting to its OT network. The threat actor then deployed commodity ransomware to *Encrypt Data for Impact* [T1486] on both networks. Specific assets experiencing a *Loss of Availability* [T826] on the OT network included human machine interfaces (HMIs), data historians, and polling servers. Impacted assets were no longer able to read and aggregate real-time operational data reported from low-level OT devices, resulting in a partial *Loss of View* [T829] for human operators. The attack did not impact any programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and at no point did the victim lose control of operations. Although the victim's emergency response plan

In-text Techniques in a report

https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-049a

Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

digital shadows_

Mitre ATT&CK™ and the Mueller GRU Indictment: Lessons for Organizations

Adding additional info to an ATT&CK technique

MITRE ATT&CK Stage	GRU Tactics, Techniques and Procedures	Mitigation Advice
 1. Initial Access	Trusted Relationship	• 3rd parties, such as suppliers and partner organizations, typically have privileged access via a trusted relationship into certain environments. • These relationships can be abused by attackers to subvert security controls and gain unauthorized access into target environments. • Managing trusted relationships, like supply chains, is an incredibly complex topic. The NCSC (National Cyber Security Center) has an excellent overview of this challenging topic.

https://www.digitalshadows.com/blog-and-research/mitre-attck-and-the-mueller-gru-indictment-lessons-for-organizations/

Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data



With timestamps

https://www.recordedfuture.com/mitre-attack-framework/

Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

unit42 PLAYBOOK VIEWER

Technique: T1064: Scripting REFERENCE

Description	Indicator Pattern
Sysget writes a batch script in the %TEMP% folder to clean up the original files and spawning a newly written winlogon.exe executable.	[process:command_line = '@echo off :t timeout 1 for /f %%i in (\'tasklist /FI "IMAGENAME eq [original_executable_name]" ^| find /v /c ""\') do set YO=%%i if %%YO%%==4 goto :t del /F "[original_executable_path]" del /F "[tmp_file]" start /B cmd /c "[startup_winlogon.exe]" del /F "[self]" exit']

Technique: T1071: Standard Application Layer Protocol REFERENCE

Description	Indicator Pattern
C2 server communicates over HTTP and embeds data within the Cookie HTTP header.	[domain-name:value = '2014.zzux.com']

https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/

Expressing and Storing ATT&CK Mapped Data

Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking	APT28 has used COM hijacking for persistence by replacing the legitimate `MMDeviceEnumerator` object with a payload.[23][11]

https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/

Full-Text Report

APT15 was also observed using Mimikatz to dump credentials and generate Kerberos golden tickets. This allowed the group to persist in the victim's network in the event of

ATT&CK Technique

OS Credential Dumping (T1003)

https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2018/march/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/

Lesson 3.2 Summary

1. Reviewed various methods and levels of detail for expressing and storing mapped-data
2. Examined how to identify the most effective approach for your environment and requirements

Lesson 3.3
Analyzing ATT&CK® Mapped Data

Lesson 3.3 Objectives

1. Review the ATT&CK Navigator process for storing, analyzing, visualizing and exporting data in ATT&CK Navigator
2. Learn how to prioritize techniques and sub-techniques to inform actionable intelligence

APT28 Techniques



Sub-techniques in collapsed view

APT29 Techniques & Sub-techniques



Sub-techniques in expanded view

Comparing APT28 and APT29



Overlay known gaps

APT28

APT29

Both Groups

Choose Your Layer in Navigator



Now with domains and versions

1. Create an APT28 Layer in Navigator



2. Assign a Score and Rename the Layer



3. Create a New Layer





4. Repeat the Process but Assign New Score



5. Combine Layers & Adjust Score Colors





"Create Layer from other layers", combine the scores you have in your two layers (a,b,), and enter the expression "a + b" into the score expression field.

Set low value for 1 and high value (combined techniques) for 3

6. Expand Sub-Techniques & Export/Visualize



7. Combined Layers Visualized in SVG



Lesson 3.3 Summary

1. Learned how to map multiple threat groups in ATT&CK Navigator to enable analysis and identification of overlapping techniques/sub-techniques.

2. Examined how to prioritize techniques and sub-techniques for actionable intelligence

Lesson 3.4
Exercise 3:
Comparing Layers in ATT&CK® Navigator

Lesson 3.4 Objectives

1. Practice defining and comparing layers in Navigator
2. Review the overlapping techniques and sub-techniques

Exercise 3: Comparing Layers in Navigator

- Refer to the Resources section for Exercise 3
  - The techniques and sub-techniques are listed in the “APT39 and Cobalt Kitty Techniques” PDF

1. Open ATT&CK Navigator: http://bit.ly/attacknav
2. Enter the techniques and sub-techniques from APT39 and Cobalt Kitty/OceanLotus into separate Navigator layers with a unique score for each layer.
3. Combine the layers in Navigator to create a third layer
4. Color score your third layer
5. Make a list of the techniques and sub-techniques that overlap between the two groups

- Please pause. We suggest giving yourself 15 minutes for this exercise.

Exercise 3: Comparing Layers in Navigator



APT39 Techniques/Subs

APT32 (OceanLotus) Techniques/Subs

Overlapping Techniques/Subs that both groups employ

Exercise 3: Comparing Layers in Navigator

- What are some of the overlapping techniques and sub-techniques you identified?



Exercise 3: Comparing Layers in ATT&CK Navigator

Here are the overlapping techniques between APT39 and APT32:

- Phishing:Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001)
- Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002)
- Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059)
- Scheduled Task/Job:Scheduled Task (T1053.005)
- User Execution: Malicious Link(T1204.001)
- Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001)
- Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027)
- Network Service Scanning (T1046)

Lesson 3.4 Summary

1. Worked through defining and comparing layers in Navigator process and identified the overlapping techniques and sub-techniques
2. Reviewed the APT32 and APT39 intersecting outcomes

Next Up:

Module 4:
Making Defensive Recommendations from ATT&CK® Mapped Data

End of Module 3